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PREFACE 
This book started as a postscript to my Debating European Security, which 
was co-published by the Centre for European Policy Studies in 1998, 50 
years after the Brussels Treaty of 1948 had marked the beginning of the 
process of European integration. The manuscript grew as developments 
accelerated after the Franco-British summit meeting at St Malo and took a 
new turn with the evolution of a European security and defence policy. I 
had the privilege of being able to follow these developments after my term 
as Secretary-General of the Western European Union (WEU). Soon after my 
return to the Netherlands in 1995, I was elected a senator in the Dutch 
parliament. In that capacity, I became a member of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly and in 2002 an alternate member of the European 
Convention, which for 16 months drafted a Constitution for the European 
Union. In my home country, I have served as Chairman of the European 
Movement for the past 10 years. 
Obviously, during these years I was an observer rather than a policy-
maker. My motivation to continue telling the story of the debate on 
European security no longer was to provide an insight into the workings of 
an international organisation, but rather to tie together the different strands 
of the argument, which remained remarkably similar even under changed 
circumstances. The plethora of core documents, many of them ably 
assembled by the EU Institute of Security Studies in a growing number of 
volumes, as well as adjacent developments in NATO and the United 
Nations made me aware of the need for an overview of the political battle 
to square institutional and procedural arrangements with real progress on 
the ground. 
Debating European Security dealt with the period 1948-98 and 
provided some inside knowledge of the functioning of the WEU and its ii | PREFACE 
place between the EU and NATO. 1 My period as Secretary-General saw the 
first instances of Europe assuming responsibilities outside its own 
continent. Few could imagine that only six months after the 50th 
anniversary of the WEU, European defence cooperation would take a new 
turn at St Malo. What followed is the subject of this book. Its sequence is to 
trace the political debate on Europe’s destiny in chapter 1 and progress in 
practice in chapter 2. That progress consisted of institutional measures 
during the successive EU presidencies, but gradually it also consisted of 
concrete military capabilities. The adjustment to new threats, which had 
been going on since 1989, shifted priorities away from collective defence. 
That process, which was strongly influenced by the attacks of catastrophic 
terrorism, is discussed in chapters 3 and 4, including the difficult debate on 
the interrelationship between the EU and NATO. The ‘European identity’ 
did not take shape within the Alliance, but turned into a European security 
and defence policy. In tracing these developments the approach is largely 
chronological, but not entirely. As concrete issues emerge, they are 
discussed separately, such as the capability commitments, civilian crisis 
management and police capabilities, as well as the action in Kosovo. 
Chapter 5 tells of my experience in the European Convention, 
drafting a Constitution for the EU, and how the Iraqi crisis impacted on its 
proceedings. Nevertheless, it was possible to develop solidarity clauses and 
at the same time devise ways of enhanced cooperation among a smaller 
group of member states. 
Chapter 6 discusses the European Security Strategy developed by EU 
High Representative Javier Solana, which has provided the conceptual 
underpinning of EU policies, even if it has not yet offered concrete 
guidance for defence planning. This chapter also summarises 
developments in 2004 and 2005. The creation of a European Defence 
Agency, which perhaps is better described as a capabilities agency 
combining requirements, R&D, procurement and evaluation, is the subject 
of chapter 7. 
My earlier book dealt with the problem of justified coercion and 
humanitarian intervention, largely in the wake of the plight of Kurdish 
refugees on barren mountain tops in 1991 and later the dramatic events in 
Srebrenica. This time I describe the debate on justified intervention in 
                                                 
1 See Willem van Eekelen, Debating European Security,  CEPS, Brussels and The 
Hague: SDU Publishers, 1998. FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | iii 
chapter 8, including the issue of prevention and pre-emption, and the 
important new move to recognise the ‘responsibility to protect’. 
Trying to be a practical Dutchman, I have always attached great 
importance to the notion of ‘security through participation’ – doing things 
together instead of relying on paper agreements – but also to the question 
of ‘what for?’ in the context of rebuilding our military capabilities. For that 
reason I have included a chapter (9) on scenarios, both from a European 
and an American angle, which will be essential if we are going to make the 
best use of scarce resources. That chapter ends with the growing 
interrelation of internal and external security. 
As a parliamentarian I have been impressed by the consensus-
building role of the international parliamentary assemblies in NATO, the 
WEU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. I am grateful to the Geneva 
Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces for asking me to write 
Occasional Papers on the national and international dimension of 
democratic control and on the role of parliaments in defence procurement. 
These are not repeated in the present book, but the chapter on a European 
Defence Agency has benefited from my work in this field. 
It was a real pleasure to be associated once again with CEPS, which 
through the years has maintained a very high standard of innovative policy 
analysis. I am indebted to its experienced editor, Anne Harrington, for her 
advice and to Kathleen King for her careful scrutiny of my first draft. 
This book is primarily intended for a readership of students and 
professionals starting work on the common foreign and security policy of 
the EU, of which the European security and defence policy has become an 
integral part. Although concentrating on the period after 1998, the book 
should stand alone for a wider public as well by providing the interested 
reader with a summary of earlier events in the introductory chapter. 
 
Willem van Eekelen 
January 2006 
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INTRODUCTION 
The course of European history might have been different if the European 
Defence Community (EDC), a project launched by French Prime Minister 
René Pleven, had not floundered in the French National Assembly in 1954. 
It was not even put to a vote, so unlikely was the chance of success, which 
was a great setback for the political vision of a united Europe after 
centuries of violent conflict. The failure of the European Constitution in a 
French referendum a little over 50 years later left similar feelings of 
disappointment and frustration. These were felt even more strongly this 
time, because the achievements of European integration had been solid for 
all of the EU member states and it would be difficult to envisage alternative 
compromises to the European Constitution. 
At the time, the EDC probably was a bridge too far, not only because 
defence was the last area where integration and the ensuing sharing of 
sovereignty would be acceptable, but also because the project entailed the 
discrimination of Germany, which over time would have been untenable. 
The project envisaged that Germany would become part of the EDC and 
the EDC part of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), while all the 
other countries would also be individual members of NATO. After the 
rejection, the alternative Acheson plan was adopted, making the German 
Federal Republic (at that time West Germany) a full and equal member of 
the Atlantic Alliance. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 between France, the UK 
and the Benelux countries was modified in 1954 to include Germany and 
Italy, and became the Western European Union (WEU). Although it 
contained restrictions on German rearmament, these were made more 
palatable by a control regime applicable to all member countries. An 
important element was the participation of the UK, which had remained 
aloof from the EDC, but was now prepared to enter a formal commitment 
to permanently station three divisions and a tactical air force on German 2 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
territory. For many years the WEU functioned as a reserve organisation 
with a collective defence clause of automatic military assistance, which was 
not fully matched by NATO. The Atlantic Alliance kept a discretionary 
element in its own Art. V, largely because the US Senate did not want to be 
drawn into foreign wars without a moment of decision of its own.2 
When Robert Schuman (then French Foreign Minister) launched the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950, it was an economic 
project with an eminently political character. By making it impossible to 
build separate national war establishments, never again could war ensue 
between France and Germany. The ECSC was supposed to be followed by 
a defence community and to be capped by a political union. After the 
setback of the EDC, European integration was re-launched as an economic 
community. Under the security umbrella of NATO, Europe was able to 
reconstruct and to reach an unprecedented level of stability and prosperity. 
Only after the accession of the UK to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) was ensured did it become possible to embark on political 
cooperation, which meant cooperation in the field of foreign policy, but not 
in defence. European political cooperation (EPC) was useful in establishing 
direct communications among the ministries of foreign affairs, but on 
substance did not proceed beyond the level of a ‘no-surprise policy’, the 
principle that one should not launch initiatives before the partners had 
been informed and given an opportunity to comment. And even that 
simple principle was not fully observed.  
Jumping to the situation in 2005 one might feel some nostalgia for the 
vision of 50 years earlier. With the EDC the perpetual groping for a 
European identity within the Alliance would have been avoided and 
                                                 
2 Art. V of the Brussels (WEU’) Treaty of 1948 (modified in 1954) states: “If any of 
the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the 
other...will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and 
assistance in their power“. Art. V of the North Atlantic (‘Washington’) Treaty of 
1949 reads:  
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and 
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in 
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.  FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 3 
transatlantic relations might have adjusted better to the growing 
importance of the European Union. On the military side things might also 
have been easier: the EDC in its final draft had adjusted the concept of 
multinational forces and made the brigade the largest unit with a national 
composition. In today’s world that has become the preferred size for a 
manoeuvre unit and, by the way, has come close to the two ‘battle groups’ 
that are now the focus of European capabilities.  
The European Communities took a long time in dealing with defence 
issues and military matters. During the cold war, the Soviet threat was 
predominant and collective defence could only be organised through 
NATO, with the American nuclear arsenal as the primary deterrent to 
aggression. Under those circumstances the EEC was conflicted over the 
wisdom of adding a political component, which at the time was thought 
might be divisive in the transatlantic context and create the impression of 
stronger capabilities than the members would be able to match in practice. 
With the pending first enlargement of the EEC with the UK, Denmark and 
Ireland, resistance to launching European political cooperation 
(particularly from the Netherlands) abated and a start was made in 1971. 
The initial agenda included the political aspects of East–West relations, the 
Middle East and voting in the United Nations, but the closest they came to 
security was the emerging Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe emanating from the Final Act of Helsinki (1975) and later becoming 
a formal organisation with OSCE as its acronym. Military aspects were 
negotiated in the Vienna-based Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions, where the Western position was coordinated in NATO 
(without the participation of France), and the Eastern position in the 
Warsaw Pact. The OSCE was no block-to-block negotiation and therefore 
allowed the nine members of the European political cooperation and some 
neutral countries to play a significant role. 
In 1982 the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy took the 
Genscher–Colombo initiative to extend the EPC to the field of security. 
Three participating countries, Denmark, Greece and Ireland, albeit for 
different reasons, were not prepared to come along and consequently the 
EPC in its Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart in 1983 was not able to go 
beyond the statement that the 10 would discuss the political and economic 
aspects of security, thus omitting the military ones. The seven member 
states of the WEU would have been prepared to go further, but there was 
little enthusiasm. Several felt that defence discussions outside NATO could 
become conflict-ridden, certainly as long as France did not participate in 
NATO’s integrated military structure and rejected the strategy of flexible 4 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
response. Nevertheless, all seven agreed to discuss a new role for the WEU 
at a meeting in Rome to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Paris Treaties 
of 1954. 
At a German suggestion, the ministers of defence were invited to join 
their foreign affairs colleagues. Their joint presence would soon become 
one of the most important characteristics of WEU ministerial sessions. Even 
in NATO the two did not sit at the same table, primarily because the French 
minister of defence did not attend the Defence Planning Committee, which 
became the principal venue for defence ministers. As a result, in ministerial 
sessions the North Atlantic Council was attended only by ministers of 
foreign affairs, except for the occasional summits at the level of heads of 
state or government. 
At the 1984 Rome meeting, ministers agreed to meet more frequently 
and to reorganise the two existing agencies, the Armaments Control 
Agency (ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC). At their 
next meeting in Bonn, three new agencies were created: one to study arms 
control and disarmament, one for armaments cooperation and one to study 
security and defence questions in general. Like the ACA and the SAC 
previously, they were housed in the WEU building in Paris, which also 
contained the staff of the WEU Assembly. In 1985 ministers tasked the 
Permanent Council to study how to strengthen cooperation among the 
existing national institutes in the field of security and defence.  
The WEU’s revitalisation did not proceed smoothly. Nobody was 
impressed by the work of the new agencies, which had taken over too 
many of the staff members of their predecessors. The UK provoked a crisis 
by withholding agreement to renew the contracts of the principal officers 
and showed its determination by allowing the contract of the British 
director of one of the agencies to lapse. The WEU was not in good shape. It 
was saved in 1987 when the Netherlands presidency managed to produce 
the WEU–Hague Platform on European Security Interests, which built a 
bridge between France and the other NATO members on strategic 
questions. The Platform recognised the need for a mix of nuclear and 
conventional weapons in the defence of Europe, the continued presence of 
American forces on the continent and the defence of member countries at 
their borders. The latter formula was alternative, but acceptable wording 
for the concept of ‘forward defence’ employed in NATO. Politically, the 
Platform gave an important signal by stating that “European integration FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 5 
would not be complete as long as it did not contain a defence element”.3 
This phrase was accepted by the UK and would often be quoted against it 
when London later put on the brakes. 
The second positive development was the WEU decision of 1987 to 
coordinate the mine-clearance operation in the Gulf during the war 
between Iran and Iraq, which was the first example of Europe being 
prepared to assume responsibilities outside its own continent. Of course, 
the freedom of navigation in the Gulf and security of oil supplies was as 
m u c h  a  E u r o p e a n  i n t e r e s t  a s  a n  A m e r i c a n  o n e ,  o r  e v e n  m o r e  s o .  
Nevertheless, in the past Europe had been so pre-occupied with its own 
survival, that it had allowed itself to be reduced to a regional power at best, 
with no ambition of force projection elsewhere to protect its interests with 
military means. 
The Iran–Iraq war was a most peculiar contingency, for the 
belligerents posed no threat to the West, only the mines did. Two years 
later the situation was quite different. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 
August 1990, provoking a UN Security Council Resolution authorising the 
use of “all necessary means” to restore the integrity of the country and 
imposing a complete trade embargo on Iraq.4 The WEU became the major 
enforcer of the embargo, examining about three-quarters of all ships sailing 
in the area. At the height of the operation 39 naval vessels, including ships 
from the new members, Spain and Portugal, took part in the operation. 
Compared with the 1987-88 operation, coordination was much better. 
Deployments were complementary and logistical-support capabilities were 
pooled along with air and sea transport from home countries. 
Neither the WEU nor NATO as an organisation took part in the 
coalition on the ground or in the air, but individual members did. France 
was tasked with a bold dash on the flank in the desert and contributed 
aircraft. The UK took part in the ground war and suffered losses in low-
flying bomber attacks. Italy lost an aircraft owing to faulty 
communications. All three got painful lessons about the inadequacy of 
their equipment. France sent an aircraft carrier without aircraft, because its 
planes were obsolete, being ridiculed as a porte camions instead of a porte 
                                                 
3 See Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, The 
Hague, 27 October, 1987. 
4 See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 661 adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2933rd meeting, S/RES/661 (1990), following up Res. 660 of 2 August, 
New York, 6 August 1990. 6 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
avions. At that time, Germany was still unable to despatch forces outside 
the NATO area, but made an important financial contribution, like Japan, 
and supplied a good number of Fuchs armoured chemical-warfare 
detection vehicles, which would have been most useful if Iraq had resorted 
to the use of chemical weapons. 
Following the fall of the Berlin wall and the increasing likelihood of a 
united Germany, the need was felt for a new attempt at defining the finalité 
politique  of the process of European integration. The Single Act of 
Luxembourg of 1985 had brought economic matters and foreign affairs 
together and the Netherlands presidency of 1991 tried to continue this line 
of thinking by applying the communitarian method to both of them. 
Instead the Maastricht Treaty with its pillar structure for the EU separated 
them again under the virtual coordination of the European Council, and 
added the third pillar bringing cooperation in the field of justice and home 
affairs within the scope of the EU. It called into existence the common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) as the successor of the European 
political cooperation. In the monetary sphere the momentous decision was 
taken on a timetable for the introduction of the euro. In spite of these 
milestones, one could doubt whether the resulting framework deserved the 
title of ‘Union’. The CFSP and judicial cooperation remained purely 
intergovernmental, without the communitarian characteristics of initiative 
by the European Commission, budgeting and control by the European 
Parliament and jurisdiction under the European Court of Justice. The most 
glaring shortcoming of the CFSP was its inability to include hard security 
within its scope. Again it proved impossible to square the circle between 
Atlanticists and European advocates. The result was a series of convoluted 
formulations, leaving military matters to the WEU. At Maastricht the WEU 
members issued the following declaration: 
WEU members agree on the need to develop a genuine European 
security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on 
defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual 
process involving successive phases. 
WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of 
the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity 
within the Atlantic Alliance. 
WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the 
longer term perspective of a common defence, compatible with that of 
the Atlantic Alliance. FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 7 
WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European 
Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance.5 
Art. J.4 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) contained the following 
wording in its first two subparagraphs:  
1.  The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions 
related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. 
2.  The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an 
integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the 
WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.6 
At the time it looked rather complicated, particularly as the promised 
practical arrangements were not forthcoming. It was unclear what the 
European identity and the European pillar would mean for the Atlantic 
Alliance. In spite of President John F. Kennedy’s metaphor of the dumbbell 
with America and Europe as its two weights, NATO was not constructed 
on a pillar basis and there was the question of how a European identity 
could function without some arrangements to express itself. A positive 
point was that the WEU Secretariat could be moved from London to 
Brussels, thus facilitating contacts with both the EU and NATO. Less 
encouraging was that it proved to be much easier to cooperate with NATO 
than with the EU. Yet, during the 1990s matters clarified themselves. Today 
little is heard of a European identity or pillar, and the European security 
and defence policy (ESDP) – only a vision at Maastricht – is now openly 
discussed and developed. In Amsterdam the conditional wording of 
Maastricht was removed in Art. J.7 and replaced by the simpler wording 
that the CFSP “shall include all questions relating to the security of the 
Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy…which might lead to a common defence should the European 
Council so decide”.7 
                                                 
5 For the text of the declaration, see NATO, NATO Review, No. 6, December, 
Brussels, 1991, p. 19. 
6 Treaty on European Union (‘Maastricht Treaty’), 7 February 1992, consolidated 
version, OJ (C 325) 5, 24 December 2002.  
7 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 OJ (C 340) 
1, 37 ILM 56, 2 October 1997. 8 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
At Maastricht several proposals, which had been launched during the 
preparations, did not muster sufficient support for early action and were 
referred for further examination. This applied to “enhanced cooperation in 
the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments 
agency”.8 It was interesting that the notion of enhanced cooperation made 
its way into treaty language (before it would become a recognised mode of 
a vanguard pushing ahead if not all the others wanted to join) but it would 
take another 13 years before such an agency could be created. The other 
proposal aimed at developing the WEU Institute of Security Studies, which 
had replaced the three agencies in Paris, into a European Security and 
Defence Academy. So far this has not materialised. 
The WEU gained some credibility by its actions in the Gulf, followed 
by its naval embargo of the rump of Yugoslavia in the Adriatic and a 
similar action manned by police and customs officers on the Danube. When 
the EU assumed the administration of the district of Mostar the WEU was 
asked to supply the police element. Later on the WEU provided the 
Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania after the 
country had experienced chaos following the crash of the pyramid scheme. 
Paradoxically, most of the activities were carried out by police officers, 
except for the naval embargoes, and bore little resemblance to the ‘defence 
implications’ tasked at Maastricht. 
In the military field the WEU made some progress by creating a 
Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, and after the move to Brussels a 
Planning Cell located in the same building as the Secretariat. The Satellite 
Centre trained officers in the analysis of satellite pictures, most of which 
were bought from the French commercial firm SPOT. An attempt to create 
a separate satellite capability failed because of lack of funding. The 
Planning Cell provided advice to the secretary-general and the Council and 
worked on procedures and contingencies for the use of what came to be 
called the Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU). 
In 1992, at their meeting on the Petersberg near Bonn, ministers 
defined the kinds of missions that the WEU might undertake: 
humanitarian, rescue (e.g. of citizens from a beleaguered city) and 
peacekeeping along with the role of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peace-making. Peacekeeping referred to the traditional UN 
                                                 
8 This was part of the joint proposal by President François Mitterand and 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 4 October 1991. See my Debating European Security (van 
Eekelen, 1998), op. cit., p. 283. FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 9 
concept with the agreement of the parties with a cease-fire in place. Peace-
making in today’s jargon would be peace enforcement. In the Amsterdam 
Treaty of 1997 these missions were transferred to the EU at the request of 
Finland and Sweden, who were prepared to take part, but did not want to 
subscribe to the automatic military assistance clause of the WEU. 
In the field of security, the fall of the Berlin wall and the demise of the 
Soviet Union represented a paradigm shift, away from collective defence 
and towards what could best be described as peace-support operations 
outside our immediate borders. For a while the WEU acted as a bridge 
between the EU and NATO and was particularly successful in drawing in 
the non-EU members of NATO by allowing them ‘full participation in the 
activities’, and later also the candidates for accession to the EU. ‘Security 
through participation’ was one of my slogans in those days.  
10 | 
 
 
1.  The Political Context and the  
Search for Europe’s Destiny 
Changing security perceptions 
Since 1989, European security has undergone fundamental changes. The 
end of the cold war and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union have 
lessened the priority given to the defence of Europe’s independence and 
territorial integrity and, for the members of NATO, to collective defence. 
With varying degrees of speed and consistency the focus of security policy 
shifted to what is now euphemistically called ‘peace-support operations’, 
but which in reality means either robust peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement. During the cold war peacekeeping by the United Nations was 
limited to the presence of lightly armed forces in situations where the 
parties to the conflict agreed to it and a ceasefire was in place and holding. 
In 1992 the WEU took a conceptual step further and included the role of 
combat forces in crisis management in the spectrum of possible European 
missions. At the initiative of Finland and Sweden this and the other 
‘Petersberg missions’ were included in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and 
accepted by all EU countries except Denmark. In practice, however, the 
actions carried out by the EU have not yet moved beyond low-intensity 
operations. 
Much effort was put into diplomatic paperwork developing 
procedures for planning and decision-making. In 1993 the WEU Planning 
Cell became operational when the WEU headquarters moved to Brussels. 
Military delegates sat next to their ambassadors at meetings of the 
Permanent Council, in most cases combining their function with that of 
military representative to NATO’s Military Committee. In 1994, the 
candidates for the European Union, which had signed a so-called ‘Europe 
Agreement’, were invited to become associate partners of the WEU, 
enabling them to attend regular sessions of the Permanent Council and to 
participate in operations on a case-by-case basis. Europe seemed to be FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 11 
going somewhere. The partner status was a major step in the process of 
‘security through participation’. Being present at Council meetings – and 
not at some specially conceived mechanism as in NATO or the EU – gave 
the new democracies a sense of belonging and an opportunity to make their 
security concerns known in a consultative and decision-making framework. 
This process was interrupted by the decision in Amsterdam in 1997 to 
transfer the functions of the WEU to the EU. In itself this was a logical 
decision, for within the Union there should not be separate foreign, security 
and defence policies. The manner in which it was done, however, left much 
to be desired. The WEU was not transferred in toto, but remained as a 
skeleton, maintaining the Treaty with its automatic military assistance 
clause in Art. V, but also the Western European Armaments Group with its 
contracts for research and technology and the WEU Assembly where 
parliamentarians from all four groups – full members, associated members 
(Norway, Turkey and Iceland), observers and associate partners – worked 
on joint reports and resolutions. More serious, however, was the policy to 
dismantle the operational institutions recently established by the WEU and 
build them up again from scratch in the new EU Military Staff and the EU 
Military Committee. The political functions of the WEU Council were taken 
over by the newly created Political and Security Committee with its full-
time representatives at the level of ambassadors. The process was 
reminiscent of the noble duke of York who marched his troops up the hill, 
then marched them down again, except that this time the movement was 
reversed. Possibly the political climate at the time did not allow for a more 
orderly transfer. The main players, particularly France and the UK, did not 
see eye to eye on the future of European security cooperation 
During the 1990s, the work of the EU was capability-driven. To some 
the assumed lack of capabilities was an excuse for not focusing on 
European contingencies. What use would autonomous action be, if the 
capabilities were clearly inadequate? This argument was carried too far, 
because with armed forces totalling some 2 million men and women for the 
enlarged EU, a number of operations should be feasible. Not a 1990 Kuwait 
operation or the 1995 one in the Bosnian crisis or that of 1999 in Kosovo, 
but then these were American scenarios implemented largely with US 
forces. Alternative actions were not considered. 
The question, ‘what for?’ became increasingly relevant for military 
and political reasons. Without a reasoned answer, no country would be 
able to quantify its defence needs. Prior to 1989 defence planning had 
yardsticks of opposing forces and commitments to defend precise 12 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
geographical sectors. After the fall of the Berlin wall, no one could provide 
uncontested arguments for the optimum size of their army, navy or air 
force. Only the acceptance of obligations to participate in multinational 
forces could introduce a new element of sustainable commitment. In order 
to be convincing, however, multinational force packages need some basis in 
probable scenarios, preferably fairly specific, but at least generic if too 
much precision raises questions of political sensitivity in parliamentary 
debates at home or diplomatic relations abroad. In any case, it will be 
necessary to know in advance, at least for planning purposes, which 
country might be prepared to participate in what type of operation. 
Otherwise the time would be lacking for adequate preparation of the 
command function and the arrangements for transportation, 
communications and logistics. 
On the political side, governments and parliaments had to shift their 
attention to the circumstances and conditions under which they might be 
prepared to send their forces abroad. That decision will be a sovereign 
national decision, which is most unlikely to ever become the subject of a 
majority vote, even in the most integrated form of a European Union. This 
means that there will always have to be a measure of redundancy in 
planning multinational operations, for national commitments cannot 
always be relied upon. But the more national interests converge and 
military cooperation becomes closer, the more the likelihood of consensus 
about necessary action, and the stronger the moral pressure grows to show 
solidarity. 
The tide in favour of the EU assuming a stronger role in security and 
defence policies turned in late 1998 and 1999 owing to the convergence of a 
number of short-term and long-term dynamics.9 In the UK a new Labour 
government wanted to utilise its foreign policy and defence capacity as an 
indispensable element of any sizeable European action, for the dual 
purpose of compensating for its absence in the Schengen arrangements for 
free movement across borders and in the eurozone, and of playing a 
leading role in the shaping of a new transatlantic security bargain. The 
wars in Bosnia and Kosovo had left their marks on both the EU and NATO 
and convinced many that a different approach to military operations was 
needed. On the European side, awareness dawned that to have weight in 
                                                 
9 See Giovanna Bono, “The European Union as an international security actor: 
Challenges to democratic accountability”, Chapter 10 in Hans Born and Heiner 
Hänggi (eds), The ‘double democratic deficit’, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003. FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 13 
international crises some military capabilities are necessary in conjunction 
with the diplomatic and economic instruments relied upon in the past. 
Consequently, it became possible for the EU to expand its common foreign 
and security policy and to add a European security and defence policy 
under its aegis, allowing for the first time EU political control over military 
and police forces for external operations. In the longer term it would 
become clear that in a Union of 25 members or more the pillar structure of 
the Maastricht Treaty would become unworkable and that the issues of 
transparency, democracy and effectiveness would have to be addressed 
again. 
Political destiny 
The debate on the finalité politique resumed in the run-up to the European 
Council of Nice, which would be held in December 2000. The pillar 
structure agreed in the Maastricht Treaty was showing its defects through a 
lack of coherence, while the prospect of enlargement raised questions about 
the possibility of making progress under a system with unanimous 
decision-making on many issues. Meanwhile, years of conservative 
government in the UK had raised doubts about its willingness to 
participate in any sensible deepening of the integration process. 
Suggestions about core groups or an avant-garde re-emerged, but their 
composition varied. At the same time it was unclear to what extent the 
summit in Nice would really offer sufficient opportunity to discuss 
fundamental issues. Four points would be on the agenda, irreverently 
called the ‘leftovers’ of Amsterdam: the size of the Commission, the 
extension of qualified majority voting (QMV), the weighing of votes per 
country and improvement of the method of enhanced cooperation that had 
been agreed in Amsterdam. In fact, the European Council would take more 
time than ever – four days – and after acrimonious debate did not do much 
more than assigning new numbers of votes to the present and future 
members. 
One of the peculiarities of European integration continued to be the 
overlapping processes. By the time one Treaty on European Union had 
finally entered into force, discussions on amending it were already in full 
swing. The Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in May 1999, 18 months 
before it was amended by the Nice Treaty, which in turn only entered into 
force in February 2003, when the Convention drafting the new Constitution 
had already been going for a year. 14 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
The conceptual debate received a new impulse from two German 
Christian Democratic politicians, Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers. In 
September 1994 they had argued in favour of the creation of a ‘hard core’ of 
those countries prepared to go further on the road to integration than the 
negative attitude of the UK would allow. That proposal will be 
remembered by the exclusion of founder-member Italy from the list of 
eligible countries, which made it still-born and exacerbated lingering anti-
German sentiment in Italy. On 3 May 1999, only a few months after the 
entry into force of the third phase of the monetary union, they presented a 
second document sketching the future of the EU as a liberal federation with 
an integrated internal market and foreign policy, but with social policies 
left to the autonomy of member states.10 Their paper was launched under 
the title “Europe needs a constitutional treaty”, three years before others 
came to discuss this possibility. They refuted the argument that in the 
absence of a European people (demos) it made little sense to 
constitutionalise European integration, by the historical analysis that the 
development of a common political conscience often went hand-in-hand 
with a constitutional process. 
  They sought a synthesis between two apparently contradictory 
characteristics of the EU: competition on the one hand, but partnership and 
solidarity on the other. As Germans they were familiar with their federal 
model of solidarity through payments to the poorer Länder, but found it 
lacking in competitiveness. In this way, they were ahead of their time, not 
only in terms of a constitution, but also of the Lisbon agenda for innovation 
and learning. Whether this dilemma can ever be solved at the European 
level remains to be seen. The EU is likely to remain a mixture of 
communitarian integration and intergovernmental cooperation with the 
balance shifting according to the perception that a problem is no longer apt 
to national solutions. The Union is becoming a level playing field for 
competition, allowing the individual citizen or company to compete 
throughout Europe on the same basis as at home. Yet, the domestic 
environment remains determined by the national government, which itself 
is increasingly being compared with partner countries according to the 
method of ‘open coordination’. For areas that are not (yet) ripe for 
regulation, comparisons are made of ‘best practices’, which are coming 
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debatte: Leitbilder für das Europa der Zukunft, Bonn: Europa-Union Verlag, 2001, and 
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close to a process of peer pressure and ‘naming and shaming’. The method 
fills a gap between the national and the EU level, and as such takes the 
roughness out of the subsidiarity principle, but its downside is the limited 
involvement of the European Commission and Parliament. Its effectiveness 
will be judged by progress in the implementation of the Lisbon agenda. 
At the outset, Messrs Schäuble and Lamers based their vision on the 
internal logic of integration, but recognised that enlargement would soon 
make it necessary to find mechanisms to overcome contradictions between 
deepening and widening, and between cohesion and flexibility. As time 
progressed, Mr Schäuble referred more often to external pressures from 
globalisation and the impending enlargements of the Union. The two 
authors restated their idea about ‘cores’, but attenuated them by talking of 
a ‘solid’ core instead of a ‘hard’ one, and emphasised that France and 
Germany should be the ‘core of the core’. In fact, the emphasis on a core 
group soon disappeared as a priority item when an unexpectedly large 
number of member countries qualified for membership of the monetary 
union, and the Labour government in the UK showed a more flexible 
attitude. This was further accentuated by the attitude of the 10 new 
member states, which were not keen on institutional arrangements that 
might be designed to keep them out. The possibility of enhanced 
cooperation, opened at Amsterdam and stretched at Nice, was not made 
more flexible in the Constitution, but remained as a possibility to show 
unwilling partners that there would be limits to unconstructive behaviour. 
The European Council of Cologne in June 1999 called for an 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to deal with the leftovers of 
Amsterdam. It also decided to use the method of a convention to draft a 
charter of fundamental rights. At this meeting, Javier Solana was appointed 
the dual function of Secretary-General of the Council and High 
Representative for the CFSP. The WEU as an organisation was considered 
to have ‘completed its mandate’ and its assets were transferred to the EU. 
On 1 September, shortly after his designation as President of the 
Commission, Romano Prodi asked three ‘wise men’ to advise him on the 
institutional implications of enlargement. Former Belgian Prime Minister 
Jean-Luc Dehaene, former CEO of British Petroleum Lord David Simon of 
Highbury and former President of Germany Richard von Weiszäcker 
worked quickly and presented their report to the Commission on 18 
October 1999. In a manner not uncommon for wise men, they exceeded 
their mandate beyond the three questions put to them and advised the ICG 
to proceed towards profound reform of the EU. In their analysis they not 16 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
only noted the need for a greater capacity to act, but also for greater 
transparency and thereby greater legitimacy and, finally, the worryingly 
slow speed of decision-making. They made an important point on 
enhanced cooperation, or ‘flexibility’ as they called it, by putting their 
finger on the risk of creating a Europe à la carte instead of stabilising a 
vanguard. Their warning resulted in the extension of the ICG to include 
this dilemma. The wise men proposed to apply QMV to the CFSP and to 
the third pillar and to grant the European Parliament the right of co-
decision on every matter on which the Council decided with QMV. They 
did not talk of a constitution, but of a basic treaty limited to the objectives, 
principles and general orientations of the Union, the rights of citizens and 
the institutional framework. They advised that the other provisions of the 
existing treaties be put into separate texts, making them easier to change by 
a decision of the Council without the need for ratification. 
In Germany the idea of a constitution was warmly defended by 
President Johannes Rau. To him federalism was a means of distributing 
power, not of centralising it. In a welcome address to President Jacques 
Chirac, he tried to link the horizontal trias politica of Charles Montesquieu 
with the vertical distribution of power in Germany.11 Yet the French 
president had another idea of Europe. The next day before the Bundestag he 
made no reference to Jean Monnet or Robert Schuman, nor to the 
communitarian method or to the European Commission. It was not easy to 
identify his European vision, for it contained different elements, but 
foremost was his conviction that the nation-state remained the source of 
our identity and roots, as well as that for future generations. To envisage 
their extinction would be as absurd as denying that they had already opted 
for commonly exercising part of their sovereignty and that they had an 
interest in continuing to do so. He mentioned the European Central Bank, 
the Court of Justice and QMV as examples of a common sovereignty. By 
accepting these ‘common sovereignties’ (in plural, which seemed odd for a 
Frenchman who normally regards sovereignty as indivisible) we would 
acquire new power and added radiance. More specifically, he wanted to: 
make the Union more democratic – through the European Parliament and 
the national parliaments; clarify the competences, without freezing them; 
apply subsidiarity; and allow those who were prepared to go further to do 
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so without being slowed down by those who did not want to proceed so 
quickly. His concept of ‘Europe-puissance’ was one that possessed strong 
institutions and an effective and legitimate decision-making mechanism, 
giving its full place to majority voting and reflecting the relative weight of 
the member states. The first task for the French presidency was to conclude 
the Intergovernmental Conference. Then the ‘great transition’ would start 
towards stabilising the EU within its borders and its institutions. Together 
with Germany and France a ‘pioneer group’ could be formed, based on the 
new procedure for enhanced cooperation, and if necessary outside the 
treaty framework. As subjects he mentioned better coordination of 
economic policy, strengthening defence policy and the fight against crime. 
After Nice, the other institutional questions had to be tackled, for which 
several methods could be envisaged, ranging from a committee of wise 
men to a convention on the model of the current one drafting the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
For his part, former Commission President Jacques Delors was less 
keen on fundamental change and described himself as a mechanic 
convinced that without the institutional triangle of Commission, Council 
and Parliament nothing would work. His vision was a ‘federation of nation 
states’, which has since become accepted wisdom in France, but is not well 
understood elsewhere. Mr Delors did not like the idea of a constitution and 
opposed the method of enhanced cooperation, which put him in opposition 
to Pierre Moscovici, then Minister for European Affairs and currently 
member of the European Parliament. For Mr Delors, like for the founding 
fathers, the fundamental values remained the essence and his purpose was 
to link them again with the system he firmly believed in.12 
A note of great concern about the speed of enlargement without the 
necessary institutional reform was struck by former French President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and former German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt.13 They did not talk about a constitution, but argued that the risk 
of a crisis was so serious that a new IGC made no sense without a clear 
political orientation from the outset.  
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The two founders of the European monetary system proposed 
organising Europe at three levels: first, a European space that includes the 
candidate countries and covers economic and free trade issues, with a 
degree of political integration not exceeding the current one among the 15 
member states and with strict application of the subsidiarity principle. 
Second, they endorsed the creation of a European defence organisation 
(with the UK), resting on those countries that possessed important military 
means and which have declared publicly to accept a rapid and effective 
decision-making mechanism. In this w a y ,  E u r o p e  w o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  
maintain influence in a world that was bound to see a reduction of the 
preponderance of the American superpower and the emergence of other 
global powers. The third level could comprise a tier to maintain what was 
left of the initial ambition of integration. It was not realistic to expect full 
integration of 30 countries, different as they were in political tradition, 
culture and economic development. A group of ‘Europeans of the euro’, 
willing to integrate part of their political competences on the basis of a 
federal approach, could become a distinct political entity on the European 
continent. To do so, supplementary institutions would be necessary: a 
Council, a parliamentary structure with operational links to national 
parliaments, “and certainly no Commission”.14 Both Mr Giscard and Mr 
Schmidt were thinking of institutions within the existing institutions and 
not entering into competition with the latter. That remained a weak point 
in their construction that was criticised particularly by the smaller 
countries, which saw the Commission as the only body capable of defining 
European interests, overarching the multitude of national interests. They 
tried to anticipate such reactions, by writing that these reforms would be an 
excellent domain for the European Parliament to take the initiative. In 
subsequent writings in Die Zeit, Mr Schmidt grew closer to the Eurosceptics 
and favoured limitation of the powers of the EU and a concentration on the 
economic and monetary union.15 
As the number of countries meeting the criteria for euro membership 
increased, the core grew and offered a prospect of an all-inclusive 
monetary union. Denmark, Sweden and the UK qualified technically, but 
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abstained for political reasons. A eurozone of 11 members was no longer a 
core but a sizeable majority, which met the criteria of enhanced 
cooperation. It posed a problem for the agenda of the Ecofin Council to 
organise questions relating to all 15 or only the 11, but that was 
manageable. If the 11 wanted to be nice to the UK, they would put more on 
the large agenda; if not, the discussion would be among themselves. 
Moreover, among the 11 there was little cohesion on other issues. Austria 
and Finland qualified for the euro, but had little inclination to go further on 
a common defence policy. For different reasons, traditionally Atlanticist 
countries like the Netherlands and Portugal took a similar position. 
Therefore, the suggestion advocated by Messrs Schmidt and Giscard to 
place the euro-11 at the centre found little response. The idea of Jacques 
Delors to fall back on the six founding states of the European Community 
to conclude a ‘treaty within the treaty’, which would make far-reaching 
reforms and lead to a federation of nation states, was too exclusive. It was 
an attempt to reconcile the opposing camps of advocates of a federal 
structure and defenders of national identity. Clearly, the European Union 
had federal characteristics, but unfortunately the word ‘federation’ had 
acquired such an emotional charge in the UK that its use became 
counterproductive. For some reason Britons regarded it as a concept of 
centralised government, while on the continent, and particularly in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, it was seen as a model for decentralisation 
with the constituent parts retaining all the powers that they had not 
transferred to the federal government. Anyone treading in this minefield 
had to be extremely cautious. 
Institutional change 
The debate really took off with the speech of Joschka Fischer, the German 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Humboldt University in Berlin.16 He 
firmly added the subject of the ‘finality’ of European integration to the 
agenda for Nice. Despite his repeated assurances that it was only a 
personal vision, his ‘mulling over in public’ of a few more fundamental and 
conceptual thoughts on the future shape of Europe got the ball rolling and 
accelerated debate throughout the EU. Mr Fischer started from the premise 
that a divided system of states in Europe, without an overarching order, 
would in the long term make Europe a continent of uncertainty; in the 
medium term the traditional line of conflict would shift from Eastern 
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Europe back into the EU again. To integrate the new members without 
substantially denting the EU’s capacity for action “we must put into place 
the last brick in the building of European integration. Namely political 
integration.”17 The ‘Monnet method’ of gradual integration with no 
blueprint for the final state had proved to be of only limited use for the 
political integration and democratisation of Europe. Mr Fischer had a 
simple answer: the transition from a union of states to full 
parliamentarisation as a European federation, which meant nothing less 
than a European Parliament and a European government that really did 
exercise legislative and executive power within the federation, based on a 
constituent treaty. This could only be done on the basis of a division of 
sovereignty between the EU and the nation states according to the concept 
of ‘subsidiarity’ (which Mr Fischer, with his tongue-in-cheek sense of 
humour, called a subject currently discussed by everyone and understood 
by virtually none). 
A European Parliament in Mr Fischer’s view had to represent both an 
EU of nation states and a Europe of the citizens and therefore needed to 
have two chambers. One would be for elected members who would also be 
members of their own national parliaments (thus avoiding a clash between 
national parliaments and the European Parliament, and between the 
nation-state and the EU). The composition of the second chamber would 
involve a choice between directly elected senators from the member states – 
with either equal or proportional representation – or a system of 
representation like that in the German Bundesrat. 
In an enlarged and thus necessarily more heterogeneous European 
Union, Mr Fischer thought further differentiation would be inevitable. 
Within the next 10 years, the Union would be confronted with the 
alternative of either a majority of member states taking the leap into full 
integration and agreeing on a European constitution or a smaller group of 
states taking this route as the avant-garde or a centre of gravity. When 
would be the right time, who would be involved and would this centre of 
gravity emerge within or outside the framework of the treaties? These 
questions were impossible to answer at that time, but one thing at least was 
certain: no European project would succeed without close Franco-German 
cooperation. Several stages could be imagined. First, the expansion of 
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reinforced cooperation and then later the formation of a centre of gravity 
with a new framework treaty for a federation, which would 
develop its own institutions, establish a government which within the 
EU should speak with one voice on behalf of the members of the 
g r o u p  o n  a s  m a n y  i s s u e s  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  a  s t r o n g  p a r l i a m e n t  a n d  a  
directly elected president. Such a centre of gravity…should from the 
start comprise all the elements of the future federation.18 
Mechanisms would have to be developed to cooperate smoothly with 
others in the larger EU, following former German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher’s tenet that no member state could be forced to go 
farther than it was able and willing to go, but that those who did not want 
to go any farther could not prevent others from doing so. If that precept 
were to be followed, the centre of gravity would emerge within the treaty 
framework, otherwise outside it. 
Mr Fischer stuck his neck out, but ultimately had to draw it in again, 
not because of the flak he got from the West, but because he realised that 
his plea for a centre of gravity was incompatible with his advocacy of 
enlargement. If the candidates feared anything, it was the Union forming a 
select group from which they were likely to be excluded for some 
considerable time to come. Mr Fischer thought of reinforced cooperation in 
many areas: the further development of the euro-11 into a politico-
economic union, environmental protection, the fight against crime, 
common immigration and asylum policies “and of course the foreign and 
security policy”. That would reduce the newcomers to a group of 
apprentices. 
Mr Fischer said to be aware of the institutional problems his 
proposals would raise with regard to the current EU, and thought it 
critically important not to jeopardise the EU acquis or to divide the Union. 
Therefore, mechanisms would have to be developed that permitted the 
members of the centre to cooperate smoothly with others in the larger EU. 
For the older members that was the Achilles heel of his vision, for the list of 
subjects mentioned for enhanced cooperation could hardly be implemented 
without affecting past achievements.  
The speech was interesting in many respects. In few countries would 
a foreign minister speak so freely. Outside his country these proposals were 
seen as overly predicated on the German model. The combination of 
membership of national and European parliaments was considered too 
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burdensome, especially for the smaller countries, but most controversial 
was the proposal for a senate as a second parliamentary body. Most critics 
saw the Council of Ministers as the institution in which national views 
should be expressed, but that did not fit well in Mr Fischer’s parliamentary 
approach. As a result he remained imprecise on the options for the 
European executive or government and – worse – said nothing on the 
position of the European Commission as a collegiate body with the 
exclusive right of initiative for European legislation. He envisaged two 
alternative poles: either developing the European Council into a European 
government, i.e. forming it from national governments, or taking the 
existing Commission structure as a starting point, but leading to the direct 
election of a president with far-reaching executive powers.  
Joschka Fischer’s speech firmly established his credentials as a 
convinced European. It accelerated the debate and other leaders joined in, 
but in the end few of his proposals found their way into the draft 
Constitution. This applied in particular to the notion of a second 
parliamentary chamber. Reactions were manifold and not slow in coming. 
Some were procedural, questioning how a foreign minister could speak in a 
personal capacity, but Chancellor Gerhard Schröder kept his powder dry 
and remained silent for quite a while. The most important rebuttal came a 
month later in an open letter from the French Foreign Minister, Hubert 
Védrine.19 He praised his friend Joschka for opening the debate, but apart 
from asking a host of questions and precisions, he claimed a special 
position as part of the incoming French presidency of the EU. As such, he 
could not at the same time lead the IGC to adopt reforms and introduce a 
project that was already proving divisive. Moreover, the proposals for a 
federal structure differed on essential features, which led him to avoid 
theoretical discussions on its meaning and to focus on specific points. How 
should the members of a possible hard core be selected? Should it comprise 
the original six? But others wanted to join. How about the euro–11? Yet 
would their number not grow and exceed the size of a core? And 
participation in the euro did not necessarily lead to more political 
integration. More important still were the competences of the federal level 
and its institutions. It should be necessary to define exactly what would 
remain at, or be restored to, the national level. Any governmental structure 
should emanate from national governments, as it currently does from the 
Council and not follow the model of the Commission. How should the two 
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European structures, one large and one small, interact? If Mr Fischer meant 
a classic model of federation, he would be heading for a road block in 
France, but a model of a federation of nation states, as proposed by Jacques 
Delors, could be explored. 
Among the conceptual contributions made before Nice, a personal 
note of EU Commissioner Michel Barnier figured prominently. He was 
clearly in favour of a basic text, a constitutional treaty, under whatever 
name. The European University Institute in Florence had demonstrated 
that this was possible in a single text with a small number of articles and he 
could not see why anyone would oppose an effort of clarification. In terms 
of reform, Mr Barnier saw three approaches: the federal vision of ‘all for 
one’, the intergovernmental hypothesis of ‘everyone for himself’ and a 
communitarian re-launch of ‘everyone for all’.20 On the federal side he 
favoured a bicameral system with one chamber being designated by 
national parliaments and governments. The intergovernmental method 
was insufficient to define common interests and would only produce soft 
norms without much obligation or commitment. Mr Barnier defended the 
community system as a model of shared powers: the Parliament shared 
legislative power with the Council and the Council exercised executive 
power together with the Commission. The latter pointed in the direction of 
a collegiate presidency, rather than embodying it in a single person. One 
day the president of the Commission should be elected in order to give the 
role direct legitimacy. Then the possibility should be opened for dissolution 
of the Parliament, either on a proposal of the president of the Commission, 
accepted by the Council, or vice versa. Finally, the high representative for 
the CFSP should become a vice-president of the Commission. Thus, Mr 
Barnier maintained his conviction that the communitarian model could be 
preserved, also after enlargement, and that contrary to Joschka Fischer and 
Jacques Delors, the Union could grow in numbers and still remain strong. 
A centre of gravity would be too discouraging for the new entrants. 
Some ideas started to coalesce, while others became more divergent. 
The British and Spanish Prime Ministers Tony Blair and José María Aznar 
agreed with adding a second chamber to the Parliament, as well as with 
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strengthening the European Council, and envisaged team presidencies for 
the other Council formations. On substance they focused on growth, jobs 
and modernisation, and rejected heavy regulations and fiscal 
harmonisation, which would scare off investors. They preferred the 
method of enhanced cooperation, but respecting agreed rules and 
procedures. Especially aimed at critics in the UK, they made the point that 
the Union might become a super-power, but never a super-state.21 
The most radical proposal came from former Prime Minister Alain 
Juppé and former Minister of Justice Jacques Toubon, which replaced the 
Council and the Commission with a president (for 30 months, with the 
primary function of representing the EU abroad), a head of government 
(for three years) who composes his/her government without restraints 
imposed by geography or nationality, and two chambers of parliament. 
They believed that enhanced cooperation for different subjects, but among 
the same countries, would give a heart (coeur) to the EU and lead to a 
‘reinforced Union’. Much in their proposal remained ambiguous, but its 
main value was the fact that the notion of a constitution was no longer an 
anathema to Gaullist circles.  
German Chancellor Schröder chose another way to make his views 
known, but waited until after the Nice European Council. No speech or 
article, but a resolution was offered for the party congress of the Social 
Democrats (SPD), elaborated under the responsibility of the Federal 
Chancellor.22 Its 10 points focused more on policies than on institutions. He 
did not use the word ‘federalism’, but took up an idea of his Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Wolfgang Clement, for a new assignment of 
competences to the EU and the member states. This provoked a strong 
reaction from his French colleague, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, 
who objected to the member states being reduced to the level of the 
German  Länder. That was not what the resolution said, but French 
sensitivities had been aroused by the emphasis on subsidiarity and the 
need to transfer back to the member states those competences “which did 
not constitute a risk to the internal market” and these included agricultural 
and structural policies. For the rest, the SPD position was predictable: it 
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strongly favoured enlargement. It also referred to the need for a capacity to 
act and a strengthening of the CFSP, including the possibility of 
autonomous action, but with NATO as the basis for security in Europe. 
Mr Jospin stated his position before the National Assembly on 28 
May 2001, a month after the publication of the SPD paper. He wanted 
Europe to be a societal project, a vision of world order and a political 
architecture. He rallied to the notion of a federation of nation states, with a 
better association of national parliaments added to the process. The 
institutional triangle of the Commission, Council and Parliament should be 
preserved, but some evolution would be necessary. Mr Jospin wanted to 
strengthen the Commission as guarantor of the general European interest 
by designating its president from the political group that had won the 
European elections. On the other hand, in case of a grave crisis or a blocked 
situation, the Council should be able, on a proposal from the Commission 
or member states, to dissolve the European Parliament. The European 
Council should be institutionalised, with responsibility to adopt a multi-
annual legislative programme on the basis of a proposal from the 
Commission and the European Parliament. Below this level a permanent 
council of deputy-prime ministers should meet regularly in Brussels to 
implement the programme on the basis of qualified majority voting. On 
procedure the French Prime Minister coined his three C’s: convene a 
Convention to elaborate a Constitution that should incorporate the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. On substance, Mr Jospin rejected a two-speed 
Europe but favoured enhanced cooperation and pushed it quite far by 
paradoxically proposing the appointment of a president for the eurozone. 
He wanted a strong Europe with a message of peace, solidarity and 
pluralism, maintaining its cultural diversity. Mr Jospin made a few digs at 
the US by noting that Europe was at the head of the fight for sustainable 
development, while the Americans seemed to evade their responsibilities. 
Faced with unilateralist temptations in the world – which led to the law of 
the strongest or to simplistic visions – Europe should be a factor of 
equilibrium in international relations. The position of the high 
representative for the CFSP should be strengthened and the common 
strategies deepened. In this connection a coherent position with regard to 
the US anti-ballistic missile defence system was mentioned. 
In the light of all these different visions and the failure of the Nice 
summit to reach a consensus, it was not surprising that the idea to convene 
a second Convention gathered speed. Some saw it as a means to gain time 
and, like the Netherlands and the UK, did not expect more than a number 
of options. It was the great merit of the Belgian presidency to list so many 26 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
questions at the European Council of Laeken in 2001 that the only way to 
answer them coherently was in the form of a draft basic text codifying and 
enlarging all previous treaties. Convention President Giscard was keen on 
calling it a ‘constitution’, for its symbolic value and to give it a sense of 
durability. He even talked of a document that should last for 50 years. With 
the privilege of hindsight, that was a mistake, at least for the northern 
countries. The name constitution suggested more than it really was, but 
that explanation did not go down well with a suspicious public. How all 
this happened is described later, but first we shall trace the course of events 
in the development of the security and defence policy.  
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2.  Progress in Practice 
On 28 June 2001, the Netherlands presidency gave a luncheon to mark the 
last session of the permanent WEU Council. Three days later the crisis-
management functions of the WEU were taken over by the European 
Union and its Political and Security Committee (PSC), as envisaged at 
Amsterdam and confirmed in Nice. On the insistence of the Netherlands, 
the new institutions of the Union, the PSC, the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) had been formalised in Art. 25 
of the Nice Treaty. The transfer was not complete, however, and a rump of 
the WEU secretariat was maintained to deal with the Art. V automatic 
military assistance commitment, relations with the WEU Assembly and 
armaments cooperation. It had not been possible to agree on a full merger 
with an open-ended protocol containing the collective defence guarantee 
for those who wished to sign it. The formerly ‘neutral’ members of the EU, 
particularly Sweden, had objected to integrating the WEU ‘lock, stock and 
barrel’. Denmark maintained its opt-out of any EU defence policies. These 
objections seemed exaggerated as the Amsterdam Treaty, at British 
insistence, had reduced the substance of an EU defence policy to crisis 
management; nevertheless, the domestic political traffic in those countries 
was not able to bear more. 
Shortly after the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997, where 
he had been present, but had not fundamentally changed the previous UK 
position, Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to use the security policy field 
for enhancing the UK’s participation in European affairs. On foreign policy 
and defence the UK had an obvious contribution to make. Any European 
operation was unlikely to succeed without the assistance of British 
diplomacy and well-trained soldiers. The first inkling that something was 
cooking came in bilateral contacts, but remained tantalisingly vague. At the 
informal European summit at Pörtschach in Austria on 24-25 October 1998, 
Mr Blair told the press of “a strong willingness, which the UK obviously 28 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role”.23 His 
colleagues had applauded this about-turn on the issue in London, which 
previously had been the main drag on EU progress, but was now ready for 
an open debate. That same press conference showed that Mr Blair had not 
yet come to any concrete conclusions and juggled with different notions: he 
was not wedded to fourth pillar ideas at all (i.e. the full transfer of the 
WEU, but without attempting to integrate it immediately in the second 
pillar of the CFSP), the European security and defence identity being very 
much within NATO. Yet, he was convinced that the only thing that was 
ever going to work in a crisis like that in Kosovo was diplomacy backed up 
by the credible threat of force. 
In early December 1998, two important bilateral summits took place. 
The Franco-German summit at Potsdam on 1 December 1998 mentioned for 
the first time a common European defence policy next to the common 
foreign and security policy and the need for concrete action for the 
prevention and management of regional crises, in particular in former 
Yugoslavia and the Middle East. Ways would be sought to allow the EU to 
dispose of operational capabilities, which so far were lacking, either by 
giving it proper European means (through WEU and multinational 
formations) or by using NATO resources made available by the Alliance at 
its meeting in Berlin. Two days later, President Jacques Chirac and Prime 
Minister Blair met at St Malo and agreed on the responsibility of the 
European Council – on an intergovernmental basis – to decide on the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of the 
CFSP. They continued: 
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To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them 
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.24 
Their joint declaration also stated that the EU will need to have 
recourse to suitable military means and specified them as European 
capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar, or national or 
multinational European means outside the NATO framework. It was a sea-
change in the British attitude towards European defence and the start of a 
continuing process, leading up to the Headline Goals of Helsinki and new 
institutional arrangements. Things started moving, in High Representative 
for CFSP Javier Solana’s words “with the speed of light”. Even a trained 
physicist like Mr Solana might be forgiven the exaggeration, because 
progress was real.  
The European Council of Vienna on 11-12 December 1998 welcomed 
the new impetus given to the debate and considered that for the EU to be in 
a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be 
backed by credible operational capabilities. The WEU would conduct an 
audit of the assets available for European operations. 
In 1999, Germany took over the presidency of both the EU and the 
WEU and on 24 February produced an informal reflection, which contained 
five options for military crisis-management operations with potentially 
different participants and different degrees of European involvement: 
1.  NATO operations in which all NATO members participate; 
2.  NATO-plus operations, conducted by NATO and including 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) members and possibly others (for 
example, the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (SFOR)); 
3.  NATO operations in which not all NATO members participate with 
troops (e.g. the extraction force for the Kosovo Verification Mission); 
4.  European (EU/WEU)-led operations using NATO assets and 
capabilities. These would be conducted by Europeans having 
recourse to NATO assets in the application of the Berlin decisions; a 
further implementation decision at the NATO summit in Washington 
would be required for this option to be fully operational; and 
5.  autonomous European (EU/WEU)-led operations conducted by the 
Europeans without recourse to NATO assets. 
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The German presidency asked a large number of penetrating 
questions, such as: What are the minimum requirements for an effective 
decision-making capability? Should the WEU be merged with the EU along 
the lines of the phase concepts introduced during the last IGC on treaty 
changes or in one go? Do we need regular or ad hoc meetings of the 
General Affairs Council together with defence ministers? Do we need an 
EU military committee? How do we involve non-EU European NATO 
members and the Associate Partners? And how do we address US concerns 
as expressed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 7 December 1998 
and compressed into three D’s: no decoupling, no duplication and no 
discrimination? 
Less than three weeks later, Germany firmed up this reflection by a 
proposal to the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers at Eltville on 13-
14 March 1999. The guiding principle was to strengthen the CFSP and to 
complement it by the development of a common EU policy on security and 
defence. “This requires a capacity for action backed by credible military 
capabilities and appropriate decision-making bodies. Decisions to act 
would be taken within the institutional framework of the European 
Union.”25 The EU Council would thus be able to make decisions on the 
whole range of activities in the external relations of the Union (trade, the 
CFSP and defence). 
Some of the questions posed earlier were answered in the proposal. 
There would be a need for political control and strategic direction, a 
capacity for analysis, sources of intelligence and relevant strategic 
planning. The paper opted for a permanent body consisting of 
representatives with political/military expertise, an EU military committee 
and an EU military staff including the EU Situation Centre. An interesting 
new point on the arrangements with NATO and its non-EU European 
members was the reverse side of this coin: all EU member states should be 
able to participate fully in European operations drawing on NATO assets 
and capabilities.  
The European Council of Cologne of 3-4 June 1999 confirmed this 
line of thought by adopting a presidency report on strengthening the CFSP 
by a common EU policy on security and defence. It expressed the 
conviction “that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the 
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full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the 
Treaty on European Union”,26 i.e. the Petersberg tasks. Decisions to act 
would be taken within the framework of the CFSP according to appropriate 
procedures in order to reflect the specific nature of decisions in this field. 
The exact formulation of the declaration at St Malo was repeated: the Union 
must have the capacity for autonomous a c t i o n  b a c k e d  u p  b y  c r e d i b l e  
military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in 
order to respond to international crises. The only difference was that in 
Cologne the words “without prejudice to actions by NATO” were added. 
Moreover, the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the 
industrial and technological defence base was recognised, “which we want 
to be competitive and dynamic”. On the transfer of the WEU to the EU the 
Council took a step back under the guise of their determination to launch a 
new step in the construction of the European Union. It only managed a 
cumbersome formula: the General Affairs Council was tasked “to prepare 
the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve these objectives 
including the definition of the modalities for inclusion of those functions of 
the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities 
in the area of the Petersberg tasks”;27 therefore, no full merger, only a 
transfer of functions. 
The sensitive issue of the participation of non-EU member states 
was taken forward with the statement “that all participants in an EU-led 
operation will have equal rights in respect of the conduct of that operation, 
without prejudice to the principle of the EU’s decision-making autonomy, 
notably the right of the Council to discuss and decide matters of principle 
and policy”.28 In the report of the German presidency, non-EU European 
NATO members were promised satisfactory arrangements to ensure their 
fullest possible involvement in EU-led operations, building upon existing 
consultation arrangements within the WEU. The latter phrase, taken from 
the Washington summit, would later be used by Turkey in demanding 
more than the WEU arrangements. Linguistically they had a point, as 
‘building upon’ suggested something additional, but in practice their 
demand was difficult to meet: in the WEU the associate members and 
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partners participated in the regular WEU Council, but that would be 
unlikely in the General Affairs Council of the EU. Neither the EU nor 
NATO allow non-members in their regular council meetings and devised 
special bodies for meetings with other countries. 
NATO summit in Washington 
On 24 April 1999, NATO marked its 50th anniversary and admitted three 
new members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The decision was 
clearly a political one, for during the cold war a country that did not border 
on any other NATO member would have had a slim chance of joining the 
Alliance. Times had changed and NATO had elaborated a new strategic 
concept ready for approval. But again events in the Balkans had changed 
the security environment. Just as the 1994 summit that had been highjacked 
by the Bosnian crisis, so was the 1999 session dominated by Kosovo. Three 
weeks later the bombing of Serbia began, leaving the public in the new 
member countries somewhat puzzled. Having thought that they were 
joining a defensive alliance, they were immediately involved in offensive 
action, for Hungary even one that was on its doorstep. 
The summit saw the fundamental security tasks of NATO as 
providing a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment in which no country 
would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of 
force, consulting on any issue that affects their interests, along with 
deterrence and defence against any threat of aggression. Key words for the 
enhancement of security and stability were ‘crisis management’ and 
‘partnership’. Like its predecessor of 1991, the new strategic concept 
provided little guidance for defence planning beyond generalities, such as 
deployability and mobility, survivability and sustainability, incorporating 
logistics and force rotation, and the need to have a limited but militarily 
significant proportion of ground, air and sea forces capable of reacting 
rapidly. A new but not further-defined essential operational capability was 
called ‘effective engagement capability’. The overall size of the allies’ forces 
would be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of 
collective defence and other Alliance missions and their peacetime 
geographical distribution should ensure a sufficient military presence 
throughout the territory of the Alliance. 
While these are all laudable objectives, for the most part they are 
difficult to quantify, which is not surprising in a situation where large-scale 
conventional aggression was deemed highly unlikely, although “the FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 33 
possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists”.29 Instead, 
the security of the Alliance remained subject to a wide variety of military 
and non-military risks that were multi-directional and often difficult to 
predict. These included uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-
Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the 
Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. An effort to be more specific became 
stranded in a list of generalities: ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial 
disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights 
and the dissolution of states. It remained unclear under what circumstances 
these risks and challenges would provoke a military response. 
One area in which, under the influence of the Kosovo crisis, the speed 
of events overtook the NATO bureaucracy was the acceptance of the ESDP 
as an element of the common foreign and security policy. The summit’s 
final communiqué was more forthcoming than the strategic concept 
prepared earlier. The latter did not go beyond the notions of the Berlin 
communiqué of 1996 and only mentioned them briefly. Para. 53 stated that 
NATO’s command structure would be able to undertake command and 
control of the full range of the Alliance’s military missions, at times 
through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular 
combined joint task force (CJTF)30 headquarters, to command and control 
multinational and multi-service forces. It added that: 
It will also be able to support operations under the political control 
and strategic direction of either the WEU or as otherwise agreed, 
thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the 
Alliance, and conduct NATO-led non Article 5 crisis response 
operations in which Partners and other countries may participate.31 
In para. 58, dealing with the need to work closely together given 
reduced force levels and constrained resources, a reference to the European 
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was added, almost as an afterthought 
to pacify suspicious critics: 
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The detailed practical arrangements that have been developed as part 
of the ESDI within the Alliance contribute to close allied co-operation 
without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities.32 
It sounded as a statement of fact. One could only hope it was true. Earlier, 
in para. 30, the standard reference to ESDI (which “will continue to be 
developed within NATO”) appeared, a process requiring close cooperation 
between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the EU. The 
reference was followed by a positive assessment: 
It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and 
effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as 
an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the 
transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act 
by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a 
case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and 
capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not 
engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction 
either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full 
participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.33 
This sounded positive, but was not sufficiently innovative to keep up 
with the new momentum of the ESDP. The final communiqué of the 
Washington summit was much more forthcoming. It acknowledged “the 
resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action 
so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance 
as a whole is not engaged”. And it took an important step in defining 
“ready access by the EU to the collective assets and capabilities of the 
Alliance for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged 
militarily” as follows: 
a)  assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute 
to military planning for EU-led operations;  
b)  the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO 
capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;  
c)  identification of a range of European command options for EU-led 
operations, further developing the role of the deputy SACEUR34 in 
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order for the incumbent to assume fully and effectively his/her 
European responsibilities for such operations; and finally, 
d)  the further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to 
incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-
led operations.  
The Council in Permanent Session was tasked to approve these 
arrangements, but owing to Turkish opposition, which sought to link 
agreement to more extensive participation in ESDP decision-making, it 
would take until 16 December 2002 before the NATO ministerial session 
could approve the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, which allowed the “fullest 
possible involvement” of non-EU members of NATO with the ESDP. 
NATO action in Kosovo 
The escalation of the crisis in former Yugoslavia had all the trappings of a 
Greek tragedy. Events were predictable and seemed inevitable, only the 
magnitude and barbarity of the conflict exceeded what people thought 
possible in a civilised Europe. They harboured the potential for a much 
larger conflagration involving all countries in the region, either directly or 
by proxy. The first act saw fighting between Serbs and Croats – particularly 
in the Vukovar area – to be followed by the second act, the eruption in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The third act was likely to be the explosion of Kosovo, 
which would lead to the horrific scenario of the disintegration of 
Macedonia and the neighbouring countries fighting over the pieces. The 
first three acts unrolled as feared; the last one could be contained, but 
barely. 
In 1995 the Bosnian crisis came to a head with Serbians holding UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) soldiers hostage, the massacre at Srebrenica 
and finally NATO air strikes against Serbian military installations. The 
Dayton Peace Accords of that year had ended the war but did not achieve 
the structure of a comprehensive peace going beyond the confines of 
Bosnia. The agreement brokered by Richard Holbrooke owed much to the 
last-minute concessions made by Yugoslavian President Slobodan 
Milosevic and his willingness to sign on behalf of the demurring Bosnian 
Serbs. In return, Mr Milosevic expected that the Dayton Accords had 
brought him a guarantee of territorial integrity for what remained of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including Kosovo. For a while the 
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situation in the province seemed to improve after Mr Milosevic and 
Kosovar President Ibrahim Rugova agreed in a surprise meeting in 1996 to 
end the six-year Albanian boycott of schools. High hopes were shortlived, 
however, and further rapprochement was not forthcoming. In 1998 the 
d e c a d e  o f  p e a c e f u l  a c t i o n  c a m e  t o  an end with the violent entry of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its demand for independence. 
On 13 October 1998, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
summoned the NATO foreign ministers to approve the Activation Orders 
(ACTORDS) that would allow air strikes against Serbian targets in Kosovo 
and elsewhere in the country if Serbia failed to comply with UN Security 
Council Resolution 1199 on withdrawing its forces from the field of battle. 
The US obtained the ACTORDS, but the same evening the North Atlantic 
Council despatched Mr Holbrooke to Belgrade in a last attempt to avert 
war. Once again he seemed to succeed. Mr Milosevic promised to 
withdraw his army and a substantial part of his security forces and NATO 
did not have to act. In Brussels the permanent representatives heaved a 
sigh of relief as, in spite of the sabre rattling with the orders, NATO was 
still poorly prepared for an air campaign. Mr Milosevic was aware of 
NATO’s lack of readiness, which probably hardened his stance when in 
2001 NATO again issued a threat. If so, he misjudged NATO’s 
determination to uphold its credibility and take military action, if necessary 
even without an explicit mandate from the Security Council.  
The October agreement provided for the entry into Kosovo of 2000 
unarmed OSCE ‘verifiers’ to monitor a ceasefire, backed up by an 
‘extraction force’ stationed outside the province. The OSCE also would 
have a role in negotiating the details of restoring autonomy for Kosovo. 
The agreement had something in it for the Kosovars in allowing the 
refugees to come down from the hills and, more importantly, in taking a 
step – albeit feeble – towards internationalisation of the conflict through 
OSCE. Serbia was allowed to keep 10,000 police and 11,000 army personnel 
in Kosovo, which proved to be a recipe for disaster. The KLA predictably 
made progress in extending its area of control and had several skirmishes 
with the Serbs. A Serbian massacre of 40 Albanian-speaking Kosovars 
outside the village of Racak brought matters to a head. 
In January 1999 a draft arrangement for Kosovo was presented at a 
conference in Rambouillet, which to the chagrin of Mr Milosevic was 
accepted by the Kosovars. They would not have obligatory links with 
Serbia, but only some with the Yugoslav Federation. On the final status a FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 37 
mechanism was proposed that would take into account the will of the 
people after three years. A side-letter from Madeleine Albright to KLA 
leader Hashim Thaci indicated that this mechanism would include a 
referendum, which made him give up his demand for immediate 
independence. The Serbs obtained some safeguards for their minority, 
including a disproportionately large representation in the Kosovo 
parliament. For Mr Milosevic the stumbling block was the presence of a 
NATO military force to guarantee the constitutional and political 
provisions. His refusal led to a 78-day air war in June 1999, but not before 
two NATO Generals, Wesley Clark and Klaus Naumann, had travelled to 
Belgrade to issue an ultimate warning. 
President Bill Clinton offered three aims for the bombing campaign: 
to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose, to prevent further 
violence against the Kosovar population and to preserve regional stability. 
These aims were not immediately realised. Against all expectations, 
President Milosevic managed to cleanse north-western Kosovo from 
Albanians and at the same time consolidate his authority at home. Those 
who had argued that he would give in after a few days of bombing, or was 
looking for an excuse to do so, were proven terribly wrong. In fact, Kosovo 
almost became a case of ‘the operation was successful, but the patient died’ 
as the region was being emptied of Albanians. Some 750,000 refugees 
crossed the borders with Albania and Macedonia. The bombing campaign 
ran out of targets (and the remaining ones became a political issue) and the 
lack of troops on the ground to turn the tide became painfully obvious. The 
situation was exacerbated by public denials in Washington of any intention 
to despatch ground forces, thus lessening the impact on President 
Milosevic and facilitating his military planning. Once again, democracies 
proved to be poor war strategists in publicly foreclosing options that might 
constrain the enemy. Only the Blair government in London was prepared 
to keep the option of ground forces alive. 
The North Atlantic Council did not give a free hand to their military 
authorities. Different levels of delegation were determined for the selection 
of targets to be bombed. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe 
(SHAPE) prepared the target lists and handed them to the countries 
contributing aircraft to the campaign. Although President Chirac publicly 
prided himself at having vetoed certain targets, the difficulty that arose in 
the Council was about the move to the next level of delegation, not about 
individual targets. This situation was greatly resented by the US military, 
which later, during the war in Afghanistan, cited the Kosovo experience as 
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delivered most of the ordnance and few allies made a substantial 
contribution. Among them, only the Netherlands’ aircraft were able to 
shoot down a Serbian plane, because they possessed an adequate stand-off 
weapon.  
The Kosovo intervention was a fundamental departure from past 
practice. For the first time since Europe settled down to the Westphalian 
system, action was taken to change the status quo in an operation to restore 
human rights to part of a sovereign country. No wonder that champions of 
sovereignty, such as Russia and China, opposed it. A Russian draft 
resolution in the UN Security Council (UNSC) obtained only 3 votes out of 
the 15. Public support for the bombing action was widespread throughout 
NATO. The extent of human suffering and violation of human rights was 
so massive that it restrained political reactions to the long duration of the 
bombing before it yielded results. The absence of casualties among the 
pilots participating in the air campaign and the avoidance of concrete 
involvement in ground operations were contributing factors. Negative 
reactions came from Russia, which suspended cooperation with NATO and 
its Parliamentary Assembly.  
More widespread was the debate on the question of legitimacy in the 
absence of a clear UNSC mandate and whether grave violations of human 
rights could provide their own legitimacy for coercive action. On the whole 
this legitimacy was recognised in a situation where the Security Council 
did not live up to its primary responsibility for peace and security by 
taking concrete action. That was also the case in Canada, usually most 
insistent on UN mandates. Its Director-General for the International 
Security Bureau, Paul Meyer, told a group from the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly (NPA) that there was no division in the Security Council on 
objectives, and that the problem arose over the use of force. In his view 
humanitarian imperatives did override the sovereignty issue and the lack 
of a formal mandate. All parties supported the bombing, but for the 
Canadian government it was a difficult decision.35 In Greece the situation 
was different, but the outcome the same. The population was 
overwhelmingly against the bombing, but the government nevertheless 
managed to join the NATO consensus. On the whole, NATO again had 
scored a point as a credible organisation capable of effective action. Its 
indirect effect was the realisation among Europeans that the possession of 
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at least some military capabilities would be necessary to give clout to the 
CFSP. After the intervention the Security Council regularised the situation 
by installing the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the interim 
administration in Kosovo, but most of the military were supplied by 
NATO.  
In the words of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS),36 
Kosovo constituted a highly significant precedent, which established more 
firmly in international law the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds, 
even without an express mandate from the UN Security Council. The 
position of the NATO states suggested, however, that such intervention 
would be lawful only when 
•  a grave emergency threatens widespread loss of life; 
•  that emergency’s existence is authoritatively confirmed; and 
•  action by the Security Council is blocked by (the threat of) the veto. 
These criteria of the IISS, valuable as they were for circumscribing 
acceptability, did not provide guidance on how deeply the international 
community might be allowed to intervene in the internal affairs of a 
country. That issue would arise in the Iraq war, where regime change 
became identical with the search weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). 
On 3 June, Mr Milosevic finally gave in and met all five conditions 
NATO imposed on him: all Serbian troops would leave; NATO could move 
into Kosovo; the refugees could return; an international administration 
would be created; and the foundation was laid for a political solution. Why 
did he yield? Ivo Daalder saw three reasons: the bombing campaign, 
although precision-guided and without much collateral damage, started to 
hurt his economic infrastructure and began to affect the tactical situation on 
the ground; from mid-May he had to reckon with a positive US decision on 
a ground war; and finally, Russia could not substantially help him.37 A 
fourth reason might have been that by not continuing the fight he had 
better chances of staying in power. 
What lessons can we draw from the Kosovo experience? For Europe, 
Kosovo constituted the second case in which intervention was possible 
only with the active participation and leadership of the US. The British shift 
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towards a European defence policy is assumed to be caused by 
exasperation over the Kosovo crisis. NATO won, but barely, and failed to 
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Fortunately, the refugees returned, but 
that was owing to the determination of the Kosovars. NATO had no proper 
plan and could not match its words with prompt military action. The 
internal debate on ground forces was counter-productive and the air 
campaign did not destroy the military targets: the Serbian troops were not 
isolated and were able to maintain their lines of communications. The 
doctrine established under President Josip Broz Tito against a possible 
Soviet invasion proved its value. At the time of the Rambouillet conference, 
NATO should have demonstrated resolve by pre-deploying its forces. Yet, 
after the summer of 1998 it would have been difficult to prevent a military 
conflict. A few months earlier, that might have been possible, because 
President Milosevic was not yet ready and the Kosovars not yet militant. 
Richard Holbrooke’s October agreement was flawed, because it only 
constrained Mr Milosevic and did not demand anything from the KLA, 
which was bound to re-emerge as soon as Serbia withdrew. Then, in early 
November Mr Milosevic changed course, fired his chief of staff and the 
chief of the security forces and started ‘operation horse-shoe’ to squeeze the 
Kosovars out. 
The EU from its side did not do well either. The conclusions of the 
European Council in Berlin were long on Mr Milosevic, but short on the 
bombing or other measures. In the end everyone was lucky that internal 
developments within Serbia led to the removal of President Milosevic and 
later to his despatch to The Hague tribunal. There was no consensus on the 
future of Kosovo and the political question was postponed. That was the 
difference with the Bosnian settlement, which ended with an agreement on 
how to run the place. In the case of Kosovo that was difficult, particularly 
because the UN Security Council still regarded the province as part of the 
FRY, even though the FRY had lost much of its meaning when Montenegro 
started its move to secede. 
In a briefing to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Pieter Feith, then 
working in the NATO International Secretariat, drew nine lessons from the 
Kosovo operation:38 
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1)  A clear political consensus was needed to get rid of the security forces 
of Slobodan Milosevic, later to be extended to halting ethnic 
cleansing. 
2)  Clear and unambiguous messages were required. 
3)  NATO should be more politically involved than was possible in the 
G-7 and the Contact Group. 
4)  Constraints were needed to avoid collateral damage and casualties 
among own forces. 
5)  Room for diplomatic initiatives was required. 
6)  All options were to be kept open. 
7)  A permanent solution requires the agreement of the EU, the US and 
Russia. 
8)  The NATO strategic concept was validated with its emphasis on 
crisis management, flexibility and its PfP approach. 
9)  Crisis management required the sustainability of a long-term 
presence. 
Five years later, the western Balkans remains an important test-case 
for the EU, not for an ‘hour of Europe’ but for a concerted effort in 
conjunction with others. Gradually the EU has taken over most of the 
operations from NATO, except Kosovo. The diminishing risk of a massive 
explosion leaves more scope for non-military measures, but their success 
does not rest assured. The component parts remain dependent upon 
external aid, have weak government and extensive mafia practices, and 
struggle with problems of national identity and state-building. On the EU 
side, the inclusion of five different free trade areas in the draft stability and 
EU Association Agreements should become more coherent. 
For a while after the surrender of Slobodan Milosevic the EU could 
hide behind the formula of ‘standards before status’ following the report by 
the Independent Commission for Kosovo under the chairmanship of 
Richard Goldstone.39 It made conditional independence subject to 
substantial improvements in the human rights situation of the minorities 
and the return of refugees. Tolerance was seen as the political and moral 
condition for self-determination. The other point was the exclusion of 
changes in the borders of Kosovo and the guarantee that it would not 
constitute a threat to its neighbours. The report was important in making 
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clear to the Kosovars that they had to do better, but the emphasis on 
standards was running out of steam when it became clear that the ultimate 
status was bound to impact on the standards applying to minorities. The 
status quo was becoming untenable. In 2005 the Contact Group took a step 
forward by indicating what Kosovo would not be, but did not specify what 
it could be. There would be no return to the situation prior to 1999, nor 
would Kosovo accede to another area or be partitioned. In June the UN 
Security Council supported the secretary-general’s proposal to review the 
implementation of standards and to report his views on a political solution 
in September, to be followed by negotiations between the parties. After the 
summer former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was put in charge of the 
negotiations. 
There seems to be growing acceptance of Kosovar independence, 
possibly subject to certain conditions. For the short term, however, a major 
obstacle has been created by the Serbian minority in Kosovo, which refused 
to participate in elections and have thus made inter-ethnic dialogue 
virtually impossible. Conditional independence seems a likely outcome, yet 
will meet considerable opposition from Serbia, which talks of “more than 
autonomy but less than independence”, as well as from Russia and China.40 
Others fear a domino effect on Montenegro and Republica Srpska, but the 
former might declare its independence anyway, while the latter does not 
have the geographical conditions for statehood. Ten years after the Dayton 
agreement a draft constitution is on the table to unify Bosnia as one country 
with a single president and a strong central government. Belgrade has 
reacted ominously, however, and stated that any dictated solution risks 
destabilising the region.41 
The respected Kosovar-Albanian politician Vetton Surroj has 
suggested a provisional solution with an ambiguous de facto independence: 
statehood without internationally recognised sovereignty. This formula has 
been erroneously compared with the Taiwan model, because the People’s 
Republic of China denies statehood to Taiwan and threatens the use of 
force if Taipei declares independence. It maintains the fiction of ‘one 
country, two systems’. In Kosovo we face the dilemma of how long the 
population will go along with an ambiguous status and remain a de facto 
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protectorate. Serbia is proposing a partition of Kosovo, which has always 
been rejected by Pristina. Although the moment of truth has been 
postponed by the death of President Rugova, who was much respected for 
his peaceful means, it is nevertheless approaching fast. 
Towards European military capabilities 
In the run-up to the European Council in Helsinki, much work was done, 
on both the institutional arrangements and – with substantial British input 
– the capabilities needed. Prior to St Malo and Cologne some European 
capabilities existed, headquarters as well as forces. The Eurocorps in 
Strasbourg combined units from France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. It was followed by the European Rapid Operation Force 
(EUROFOR) in Florence with Italian, French and Spanish participation. In 
the naval field the southern European countries established the European 
Maritime Forces of the southern members of the WEU (EUROMAFOR). 
They were grouped together as the Forces Answerable to the WEU or 
‘FAWEU’ along with other existing capabilities and were given a dual 
purpose – European in addition to their availability to NATO. This applied 
to the German–Netherlands Corps and the UK–Netherlands Amphibious 
Force. The WEU Planning Cell established in Brussels in 1992-93 attempted 
to tie them into generic scenarios, but did not establish a force-planning 
process comparable to that of NATO, nor command arrangements 
overarching the headquarters of the respective multinational forces. It was 
assumed that any deployment would take place under the command of a 
lead nation. Multinationality was in fashion. NATO had created the Allied 
Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) under British command, to be followed by 
the German-Polish-Danish Corps in Schwerin and the Baltic battalion. 
Multinationality stressed common responsibility and solidarity, but also 
avoided the risk of one country being singled out for retaliation. In the UN 
context multinationality implied fairly small contributions, often not more 
than a reinforced battalion. Now the Bosnia and Kosovo experiences 
pointed in the direction of a corps-sized European capability. 
At a British–Italian summit in London on 19-20 July 1999, a joint 
proposal was made to set criteria for improved and strengthened European 
defence capabilities and effective performance, including a time table for 
European-wide goals but also for national capability objectives to achieve 
this European aim. More specifically, it was proposed to organise a peer 
review by at least one joint foreign affairs/defence ministers’ meeting of 
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progress against the agreed criteria. These efforts were also to be 
underpinned by the detailed work on NATO’s Defence Capabilities 
Initiative (DCI). Finally, a road map was to be drawn up for more effective 
European defence procurement. 
French President Jacques Chirac wrote to the new Finnish EU 
presidency on 22 July 1999 to submit an action plan to follow up the 
decisions taken in Cologne. He proposed to give to the Political and 
Security Committee the tasks previously fulfilled by the Political 
Committee of Political Directors from capitals (COPO) and to have it 
chaired by the incoming High Representative/Secretary-General of the 
Council, Javier Solana. It would be composed of ambassadors different 
from the permanent representation to NATO, thus ending the ‘double-
hatting’ several countries had adopted for the WEU. The new committee 
would deal with both CFSP and defence matters. Next to it a military 
committee would function consisting of the military representations to the 
NATO Military Committee (for those countries that belonged to the 
Alliance). Here double-hatting would apply, which, if implemented, 
constituted an improvement over the WEU practice where several 
countries including France had a separate military delegate to the WEU. 
Unfortunately, it was not put into practice and Belgium and France kept 
separate military representatives to the EUMC. 
On 15 November 1999, Lord George Robertson, Secretary-General of 
NATO, weighed in with a speech to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 
Amsterdam. He regarded a more mature transatlantic security relationship 
as a high priority. The division of labour in the Kosovo campaign had been 
militarily necessary, but was politically unsustainable in the longer term. 
“The European Security and Defence Identity is no longer just an attractive 
idea; it has become an urgent necessity. Simply put, the burden of dealing 
with European security crises should not fall disproportionately on the 
shoulders of the US”.42 Lord Robertson turned the three D’s of Madeleine 
Albright with their negative connotation (no decoupling, no duplication 
and no discrimination) into positive principles, the three I’s of 
improvement in European defence capabilities; inclusiveness and 
transparency for all allies; and the indivisibility of transatlantic security, 
based on our shared values. ESDI should not mean ‘less US’ but ‘more 
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Europe’, and hence a stronger NATO. In response to questions he said, and 
would repeat on many other occasions, that he was less interested in 
‘wiring diagrams’ than in concrete capabilities. 
On the same date, the General Affairs Council met for the first time 
with EU defence ministers and discussed the preparation of progress 
reports for the European Council in Helsinki of 10-11 December. As 
Finland was not a full member of the WEU, Luxembourg assured its 
presidency during this semester. The Council also authorised Javier Solana 
to accept the office of Secretary-General of the WEU in addition to his 
duties as Secretary-General and High Representative for CFSP. Mr Solana 
assumed this office on 25 November after expiration of the mandate of José 
Cutileiro.  
The WEU Ministerial Council met on 22-23 November and took note 
of the audit of assets and capabilities for European crisis-management 
operations and approved its recommendations. In principle, Europeans 
had the available force levels and resources needed to prepare and 
implement military operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks. 
Yet, a number of gaps and deficiencies were identified. Priorities with 
regard to collective capabilities were strategic intelligence and strategic 
planning. For operational capabilities the recommendations were similar to 
NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative availability, deployability, strategic 
mobility, sustainability, survivability, and interoperability and operational 
effectiveness. In addition, the Europeans needed to focus on multinational 
joint operation and force HQs. The WEU military were tasked to assess the 
time constraints in the build-up of ad hoc operation and force HQs for 
immediate and rapid reaction based on relevant force packages. 
 The emphasis on force packages was most useful, for increasingly 
the link between HQs and forces was slackening, as also seen in NATO. 
During the cold war a NATO commander knew precisely which forces 
would be available for the defence of a sector and could train them 
together. Today, assignments are looser and reflect more an inventory of 
forces to draw upon. This arrangement might enhance flexibility, but has 
the drawback of taking more time in assembling and moulding the 
different units into a coherent force. Moreover, the question should be 
answered as to whether the flood of multinational HQs has not reached 
excessive proportions. That could not be said of operation HQs providing 
overall direction. Here NATO had the advantage with SHAPE, while the 
Europeans only possessed national capabilities in the UK (Northwood) and 
France (Creil); Germany, and later Greece and Italy, announced the creation 46 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
of a similar capability. In the meantime, the WEU was preparing a 
command post exercise with NATO, to practice and validate crisis-
management procedures and consultation arrangements in the event of a 
WEU-led operation using NATO assets. In addition, work was done on 
concepts for civil-military cooperation and for medical support. Actual 
field missions were limited to the MAPE in Albania and, at the request of 
the EU, the WEU Demining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM) in Croatia. 
Almost a year after St Malo, another Anglo-French summit took place 
on 25 November 1999 in London, and again set the scene for the European 
Council. The Helsinki summit was called upon to:  
•  set itself the goal of being able to deploy rapidly and then sustain 
combat forces, which are militarily self-sufficient up to corps level 
with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, 
logistics, combat support and other combat service support (up to 50-
60,000 personnel) and appropriate naval and air combat elements. All 
these forces should have the full range capabilities necessary to 
undertake the most demanding crisis-management tasks; and  
•  urge the member states to provide the capabilities to deploy in full at 
this level within 60 days and within this package to provide some 
smaller rapid response elements at very high readiness. As such a 
deployment needs to be sustainable for at least a year, it will require 
further deployable forces (and supporting elements) at lower 
readiness to provide replacements for the initial force.  
Northwood and Creil were made available as options to command 
EU-led operations and would include multinationalised cells to include 
officers from other EU partners. Moreover, the UK would be ready to 
provide British forces for the Eurocorps HQ (now turned into a rapid 
reaction force) for specific operations, just as the Eurocorps nations had 
already done for the British-led Rapid Reaction Corps of Allied Command 
Europe. 
The word ‘autonomous’, which had caused so many ripples on 
transatlantic waters, re-appeared, but with a different angle. While St Malo 
had bluntly called for the capacity for autonomous action, the London 
declaration softened it by wanting to give the European Union “the 
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is not engaged, to launch and to conduct EU-led military operations”.43 The 
same phrase would appear five days later in the Franco-German summit in 
Paris on 30 November 1999. That meeting was less conceptual and 
concentrated on some important aspects of equipment cooperation. It 
proposed to create a European transport command and envisaged the 
development of a common transport aircraft. A less specific paragraph 
dealt with their determination to combine intelligence resources, including 
those in space in order to constitute common European capabilities. 
The Helsinki Headline Goals 
The European Council meeting in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999 agreed 
the Headline Goals in line with the Anglo-French proposals: 
Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and 
sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50.000-60.000 
persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.44 
At the same time it was decided to establish a non-military crisis 
management mechanism to coordinate the various civilian means and 
resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union 
and the member states. 
The decision was based on two presidency reports, one on 
Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence and the 
other on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union.45 The latter 
stated that in establishing a rapid reaction capability urgent consideration 
would be given to developing civil police capabilities. The former 
contained the new permanent structure of political and military bodies in 
Brussels: a Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee 
(EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS). Pending their activation, interim 
bodies were to be set up as of March 2000 and military experts would be 
seconded to the Council Secretariat. In the interim period Mr Solana was 
asked to make full use of the WEU assets for the purpose of advising the 
Council. In its meeting of 14-15 February 2000, the General Affairs Council 
formalised the interim arrangements. The PSC represented a new 
departure by including both political and military matters. It replaced the 
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COPO that had coordinated the European political cooperation, but had 
not dealt with security issues except the OSCE agenda. Thereby the 
cooperation lost some of the personal touch, which the first German 
participant, Berndt von Staden, described as the Direktintegration der 
Aussenämter,46 but the increasing workload required a permanent presence 
in Brussels. This meant the appointment of another ambassador in Brussels 
– for many countries the fourth after their permanent representatives to 
NATO and the EU and the bilateral ambassador to Belgium. The newcomer 
was the most junior and had to accept that his/her colleagues in the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives to the EU (COREPER) assumed 
the right to have a look at his/her collective effort before it was passed on 
to the foreign affairs council, currently called the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC). The members of the EUMC were 
present at the meetings of the PSC, but did not have the equal status they 
enjoyed in the WEU Council. The Treaty of Nice formalised these 
institutional arrangements.  
Well before Helsinki and at British initiative, a detailed description of 
the composition and tasks of the new bodies was drawn up. The final 
version of this ‘toolbox paper’ was presented to the EU defence ministers’ 
meeting at Sintra on 28 February 2000, and provided the basis for the 
Capabilities Commitment Conference to be held in November. It also 
contained an annex on terminology. The paper is too detailed to be 
analysed here. Only an example will suffice. The build-up of a crisis was 
analysed as follows. In the early stages the focus of EU activities was likely 
to be on diplomatic, humanitarian and economic crisis-prevention 
measures. As the crisis emerged, the Military Staff would provide an initial 
military situation assessment to the Political and Security Committee 
through the chairman of the Military Committee, drawing on all available 
information sources, including NATO. On this basis the PSC, together with 
the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and other relevant elements of 
the European Council Secretariat would develop a political/military 
framework for addressing the crisis. Once this framework had been agreed 
by nations, the PSC, through the chairman of the Military Committee, 
would task the military staff to develop and prioritise military strategic 
options. These could include options for operations with or without the use 
of NATO assets and capabilities. The military committee and military staff 
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would be the permanent components of the EU decision-making structure 
for all types of EU-led operations. Other planning capabilities and 
command structures would be drawn from NATO or from national or 
multinational sources. The chain of command would encompass three 
levels. The Operation Commander, appointed by the PSC/Council, would 
need a military-strategic operation HQ to plan the mounting and conduct 
of a joint operation. A wide-ranging operation would also require a theatre 
HQ to plan at theatre level and conduct the operation in the field. Finally, 
supporting and component HQs would be required, depending on the 
circumstances. Obviously, for less complex operations these arrangements 
could be simplified, as had been the case for past WEU operations. 
For EU-led operations using NATO assets, the deputies of SACEUR 
and SHAPE were identified as the primary, although not the only, 
candidates for operation commander and military-strategic operation HQ. 
If no NATO assets were used, planning and command requirements would 
draw on existing national and multinational HQs available to the EU, 
multinationalised by adding officers from participating nations. 
Elaboration under the Portuguese presidency 
The year 2000 started with high expectations. Not in the false belief that it 
was the first year of the third millennium, for in fact it was the last year of 
the second. In my note to the annual Dolder meeting in Zürich, I expressed 
the hope that the EU would be able not only to clear up the ‘leftovers’ of 
Amsterdam, but given the economic upturn in France and Germany to also 
take the decisions needed to get ready for the biggest enlargement in its 
history. It seemed necessary to enhance the efficiency of decision-making in 
the Council by more delegation to permanent bodies in Brussels, including 
a permanent committee for foreign policy, security and defence issues and 
authority for the high representative to formulate policy options 
independently from the EU presidency. It would also be important to give 
more effect to the anodyne strategies that had been adopted for relations 
with Russia, Ukraine and others and to allow a measure of majority voting 
for their implementation as envisaged at the Amsterdam European Council 
in 1997. 
Fortunately, the so-called ‘neutral countries’ had not blocked the 
designation of Javier Solana as Secretary-General of the WEU alongside his 
other tasks for the EU, providing an immediate personal link between the 
two organisations. Nevertheless, it seemed that integrating them fully 
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Therefore, it appeared preferable to transfer the Western European Union 
‘lock, stock and barrel’ to the CFSP and reduce treaty changes to a 
minimum. It was held that the collective defence guarantee of Art. V 
should remain, albeit only for those countries willing to adhere to it. 
Abolishing the article would be a step back in terms of European solidarity, 
even though its implementation had never been envisaged outside the 
NATO framework. In my view, the WEU clause was an additional 
guarantee among its signatories, strengthening the more discretionary 
article in the Washington Treaty establishing NATO. In any case, by 2000 
collective defence had lost much of the priority attached to it during the 
cold war.  
What mattered most now was to enhance the credibility of the CFSP 
by giving it some military capabilities for European-led operations in cases 
where NATO (which meant the US in particular) did not want to be 
involved as an organisation. Some argued that without US participation the 
Europeans would not be able to do anything, but that would depend on the 
nature and place of the conflict. On their own continent the Europeans 
already provided the bulk of the available forces. The problem seemed to 
be more political than military: Who would provide political guidance for 
the conduct of the operation? Presumably, the PSC (or COPS as the French 
acronym) would take over from the permanent WEU Council and the CFSP 
ministerial council would be reinforced with defence ministers when 
dealing with military operations. The full participation of the associate 
members of the WEU (originally Norway, Iceland and Turkey, but after 
NATO’s enlargement also the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) in the 
activities should be maintained, because without their consent the 
development of a constructive relationship with NATO, avoiding 
unnecessary duplication through allowing the use of NATO assets for EU-
led operations, would not be possible. 
The Helsinki Headline Goal was a political commitment, but 
contained insufficient detail for the purposes of military planning. 
Questions remained as to where the EU-led task forces might be expected 
to operate, with whom and how often. The Portuguese presidency took 
matters several steps further. On 14 March 2000 the interim PSC and six 
days later the General Affairs Council, reinforced with ministers of defence, 
agreed that a ‘food for thought’ paper entitled the Elaboration of the headline 
goal should be the basis for future work. It outlined a systematic step-by-
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Step 1.   an outline of the overall strategic context for the European 
Union’s Helsinki Headline Goals; 
Step  2.   articulation of key planning assumptions; these contained 
the premise that the most demanding operations would 
occur in and around Europe; 
Step  3.  selection of planning scenarios that describe illustrative 
situations for the employment of EU-led forces; 
Step 4.   identification of the force capabilities required to support the 
scenarios; 
Step  5.  development of illustrative force packages that have the 
required capabilities and conformation of their effectiveness 
against the planning scenarios; and 
Step 6.   using these different force packages to define the full range 
of requirements implicit in the headline goal.47 
Finally, national contributions were to be compared against the Headline 
Goal and capability gaps defined. 
During the Portuguese semester ministers of defence were closely 
involved. After their meeting at Sintra they attended two meetings of the 
General Affairs Council, on 20 March and 13 June, and participated as 
usual in the WEU ministerial meeting in Porto on 15-16 May. At the 
European Council at Santa Maria da Feira on 19-20 June the different 
strands were brought together in a presidency report with four appendices. 
The earlier European Council in Lisbon on 23-24 March had reviewed 
progress but not taken any decisions. It mentioned that as a first priority for 
civilian crisis management a preliminary database on civil police 
capabilities had been established and that the European Commission was 
preparing a proposal to set up a Rapid Reaction Fund. 
The Helsinki European Council had invited the incoming Portuguese 
presidency to make proposals for the modalities of consultation and 
participation (or both) that would allow the non-member states concerned 
to contribute to EU military crisis management, and for principles for 
consultation with NATO. Finally, an indication was requested as to 
whether or not treaty amendment was judged necessary.  
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At Feira, it was understandable that much attention was given to the 
Capabilities Commitment Conference scheduled for November. It was 
thought that the interim military body – the future EUMC – should 
propose the elements encompassing the Headline Goal by identifying the 
capabilities necessary for the EU to respond to the full range of the 
Petersberg tasks. As the last one of a series of guidelines, it was stated that 
non-member countries would be encouraged to contribute through 
supplementary commitments. In fact, Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary had already offered them, although the arrangements for 
their participation and for consultation with NATO had not yet been 
clarified. Discussions in Brussels had been acrimonious and did not 
produce much. The Presidency Conclusions could not say more than that 
the modalities for EU–NATO relations had been identified in four areas, 
covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to 
NATO assets and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements. 
Ad hoc working groups would pursue them, and the deputy SACEUR 
would participate in the second and third areas.  
The EU further proposed to hold a series of meetings in a single, 
inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned (the non-EU 
European NATO members and the EU accession candidates) could “enjoy 
the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU”.48 Their 
joy must have been tempered, however, by the first guideline, stating that 
the development of the Headline Goals should be conducted by the 15 
member states of the European Union “in accordance with the decision-
making autonomy of the EU as well as the requirements regarding military 
efficiency”. The point on decision-making was appropriate – the WEU 
arrangements had similarly provided decision-making powers only for its 
full members – but the reference to military efficiency was gratuitous. 
The proposed structure distinguished between routine and 
operational phases, both for the interim period and the permanent 
arrangements. The operational phase was further divided into discussions 
considering options for action and the subsequent period when the Council 
decided to launch an operation and an ad hoc Committee of Contributors 
was set up. A formula had already been developed for the latter in 
Helsinki, the operational phase stricto sensu: 
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Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non–EU 
E u r o p e a n  N A T O  m e m b e r s  w i l l  p a r t i c i p a t e ,  i f  t h e y  s o  w i s h ,  i n  t h e  
event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and 
capabilities. 
They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in 
operations where the EU does not use NATO assets. 
Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also 
be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the 
Council has decided to launch such an operation.49 
Later, at the Feira European Council meeting on 19-20 June 2000 the 
following statement was added: 
Those countries (of both categories) which have confirmed their 
participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military 
forces, will have the same rights and obligations as the EU 
participating Member States in the day to day conduct of that 
operation.50 
Despite the establishment of the Committee of Contributions, the 
Council/PSC would be responsible for the political control and strategic 
direction of the operation. The paper did not specify how these two bodies 
would interact. For instance, would all contributing countries participate in 
the PSC when it discussed the strategic direction? 
The routine arrangements envisaged a minimum of two meetings in a 
format of the EU plus 15 non-member countries (EU+15) during each 
presidency, supplementing the meetings held as part of the reinforced 
political dialogue on CFSP matters. Equally, a minimum of two meetings 
would be organised in the EU+6 format for the non-EU European NATO 
members. For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, who figured in 
both formats, this would mean at least four meetings. Finally, a meeting at 
ministerial level would be organised with the 15 and with the 6. The 
Council or PSC could organise additional sessions and in the event of a 
crisis, dialogue and consultation would be intensified, presumably mainly 
through the PSC. 
In terms of information this plethora of meetings would seem to be 
sufficient. That, at least, was the impression of President Clinton before the 
December 2000 ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council. He wrote 
to the Turkish government to advise them to accept the EU–NATO 
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relationship. It was to no avail, because Turkey felt, with some justification, 
that the proposed arrangements were less than what it had obtained in the 
WEU. There, it had been able to attend at least half of the regular Council 
meetings, with the possibility to propose items for the agenda and to 
participate in decision-shaping. As the WEU worked by consensus (albeit 
of the full members) no votes were taken. Associates and observers could 
not block the consensus, but their participation gave them status and the 
ability to make their views known before a consensus was reached, and 
thus to join in a process of ‘security through participation’. 
Feira was also supposed to give an indication of whether or not the 
Treaty on European Union should be amended to take account of the new 
institutions for the new security and defence policy. The legal service of the 
Council Secretariat was of the opinion that the Presidency Conclusions of 
Cologne and Helsinki could be implemented without it being legally 
necessary to amend the treaties, with a caveat: 
However, such amendments would be necessary if the intention is to 
transfer the Council’s decision-making powers to a body made up of 
officials, or to amend the Treaty’s provisions regarding the WEU. 
Furthermore, it is for member states to determine whether 
amendments to the Treaty would be politically desirable or 
operationally appropriate.51  
As a result, the presidency suggested that the issue of treaty revision – 
which was particularly supported by the Netherlands – should continue to 
be examined between the Feira and Nice European Councils. 
Capabilities commitment during the French presidency 
In preparation for the Commitment Conference, ministers of defence met at 
Ecouen on 22 September 2000. In his summary as Chairman, the French 
Minister of Defence Alain Richard, gave a somewhat new description of the 
Petersberg tasks. With four basic hypotheses or scenarios all of them could 
be covered: separation by force of belligerent parties; prevention of 
conflicts; humanitarian aid; and finally, the evacuation of nationals. He also 
reported that in order to be able to deploy 60,000 persons in all possible 
configurations of use, the objective should be greater, probably nearer 
80,000. For air forces the aim was between 300 and 350 fighter planes and 
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for naval forces 80 ships. As three examples of prognoses in coping with 
deficiencies the minister mentioned the command capacity acquired by the 
Eurocorps for the terrestrial component, demonstrated in the Kosovo Force 
() by General Juan Ortuno and his staff. The satellite imaging interpretation 
of the WEU at Torrejon would be transferred to the EU. And six members 
had officially declared their commitment to a military transport aircraft 
developed by Airbus. Alongside came the Franco–Netherlands initiative on 
maritime strategic transport. At the end, his statement gave an encouraging 
indication of a more flexible attitude towards the European Parliament. 
While France had never previously accepted any competence of the 
European Parliament in defence matters, Alain Richard would inform its 
committee on foreign affairs and human rights of the progress made at 
Ecouen. 
The WEU held its last substantive ministerial session in Marseilles on 
13 November 2000. With the transfer of most of its functions to the EU, the 
WEU would keep some residual functions and structures as from 1 July 
2001, particularly those arising from Arts. V (the automatic military 
assistance clause) and IX (the annual report on its activities to the WEU 
Assembly). What these functions would entail in practice remained to be 
seen. If there were no activities, because these had been transferred to the 
EU, the report was likely to be empty. The collective defence obligation was 
closely tied to NATO and did not involve a separate military organisation. 
This question mark also cast doubt on the continued value of the WEU 
Assembly, although it remained the only parliamentary forum for politico-
military aspects based on a treaty. The future dimension of parliamentary 
involvement with European security is discussed in a separate section of 
this study. 
In Marseilles it was decided to suspend the consultation mechanisms 
with the EU and NATO. The Satellite Centre and the Paris-based Institute 
for Security Studies would be continued in the form of agencies within the 
EU, the Institute also being tasked to undertake the activities of the 
Transatlantic Forum. The EU would take over the MAPE mission on police 
cooperation with Albania. The Demining Assistance Mission in Croatia 
would be continued under the responsibility of Sweden until the expiration 
of its mandate on 9 May 2001. The Western European Armaments Group 
would continue to carry out its function of reflection and cooperation in the 
armaments field, which was extended to Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, Hungary, Poland and Sweden. The Western European Armaments 
Organisation was increasing its target for funding research and technology 
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At Feira the preparatory work for the Capabilities Commitment 
Conference had been entrusted to the Headline Goal Task Force. When 
EU–NATO relations and cooperation were addressed, the group was 
reinforced by NATO experts. By July 2000 a first catalogue was produced, 
which after several updates was discussed under the chairmanship of the 
Alain Richard at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels on 
20-21 November 2000. In his opening statement he made an additional 
point on the area of deployment of European forces. Thought had to be 
given to distant operations, often in a degraded environment, when the 
defence of European interests or the support of UN decisions so demanded. 
The catalogue itself remained confidential, but a declaration was issued 
explaining its purpose. The process of developing more effective military 
capabilities without unnecessary duplication “does not involve the 
establishment of a European army”.52 In addition to the 60,000 persons – up 
to army corps level – the member states would rapidly develop “collective 
capability goals, particularly in the field of command and control, 
intelligence and strategic transport”. By 2003 the Union would be able to 
carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks, but certain capabilities needed 
to be improved both in quantitative and qualitative terms in order to 
maximise the capabilities available to the Union. The Force Catalogue 
constituted a pool of more than 100,000 persons and some 400 combat 
aircraft and 100 vessels, substantially more than had been envisaged at 
Ecouen a month earlier. Meeting the collective capability goals would be a 
process continuing beyond 2003. Some countries had already announced 
decisions in this field, to 
•  develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military 
means; 
•  open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from 
other  member states; 
•  reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European 
multinational forces; 
•  prepare the establishment of a European air-transport command; 
•  increase the number of readily deployable troops; and 
•  enhance strategic sea-lift capability. 
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The declaration avoided overly ambitious statements. By 2003 the 
Union would “gradually be able to undertake Petersberg tasks in line with 
its increasing military capabilities”. Further improvement of the 
availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces 
would be needed, if the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg 
tasks were to be fully satisfied. Efforts also needed to be made in specific 
areas, which were only indicated in very general terms, such as “military 
equipment, including weapons and munitions, support services, including 
medical services, prevention of operational risks and protection of forces”. 
Concerning strategic capabilities, emphasis was put on multinational 
solutions and the pooling of resources. Among the projects in this field 
figured the well-known areas of strategic mobility and intelligence. Under 
the heading “strengthening essential operational capabilities” resources 
were listed for search and rescue in operational conditions, means of 
defence against ground-to-ground missiles, precision weapons, logistical 
support and simulation tools. 
The declaration stressed the importance of an evaluation mechanism, 
both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The Nice European Council of 
December 2000 was expected to approve its broad outline, based on a 
consultation method among the member states. Those participating in 
NATO’s integrated military structure would rely on its defence planning 
and review processes and the involvement of NATO experts in the 
Headline Goal Task Forces would be continued (the so-called ‘HTF Plus’). 
EU commitments would, however, be less binding than in NATO: their 
political and voluntary nature was recognised, which implied that member 
states were responsible for any adjustment of the commitments in the light 
of the evaluation made.  
The paragraph on relations with NATO seemed satisfactory. It held 
that EU commitments should be compatible with the force goals accepted 
in NATO, and the EU capability goals and NATO’s Defence Capabilities 
Initiative should be mutually reinforcing. Unnecessary duplication of 
procedures and information requests should be avoided. The contribution 
of the 15 non-member countries would be taken into account. 
Nice was not nice 
The Nice European Council of 7-9 December 2000 was the longest in 
history but devoted little attention to security and defence. Most of its time 
was taken up by the ‘leftovers’ of Amsterdam relating to voting power in 
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composition of the Commission, all of them in the perspective of the future 
enlargement of the EU with at least 10 new member states. Whether the 
solutions found for these issues would really make the Union ready for 
enlargement remained a moot question. The best that could be said of the 
outcome was that without their resolution it would have been difficult to 
continue the process. On the ESDP the Council approved the presidency 
report plus annexes and decided that the Union should be made 
operational in this field no later than the meeting in Laeken in December 
2001. At the insistence of the Netherlands the EU Treaty was amended to 
include a new Art. 25 providing a basis for the new Political and Security 
Committee. It reads: 
Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, a Political and Security Committee shall 
monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the 
common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition 
of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the 
Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the 
implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the 
responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission. 
Within the scope of this Title, this Committee shall exercise, under the 
responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction 
of crisis management operations. 
The Council may authorise the Committee, for the purpose and for 
the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the 
Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control 
and strategic direction of the operation, without prejudice to Article 
47.53 
The new Art. 25 with all its safeguards of Council competence and its 
reference to other articles54 did not deserve a prize for clarity. Nor did it 
explain that with the establishment of the PSC the Union entered the field 
of defence policy and that behind the facade of this new body a military 
committee and a military staff would function. Nevertheless, it would have 
been odd if this committee at ambassadorial level had not been given a 
basis in the Treaty. The most important part of the new text was the 
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provision of decision-making power, albeit delegated, for the PSC. This 
was new in the Union, where thus far ministerial presence in a Council 
session (if necessary in another format) had been required to take valid 
decisions. In the NATO and the WEU permanent councils the ambassadors 
had always been authorised to take decisions on behalf of their ministers. 
 To many, the inclusion of the new Art. 25 came as a surprise. It had 
been a persistent demand of the Netherlands, which had gathered little 
support. Most countries did not see the need and some feared 
complications in their domestic ratification processes. Its inclusion has been 
blamed for the negative result in the Irish referendum on the Treaty of 
Nice, but it seemed exaggerated to hold this vague and unreadable article 
alone responsible for a failed campaign in favour of the Treaty.  
Acceptance at Nice was seen as a French gesture towards the Dutch 
to gain their approval of the changed distribution of votes in the Council 
for reaching a qualified majority. The Dutch did not comply and spoiled 
their relationship with Belgium by insisting on obtaining one vote more. 
Germany was the big winner by agreeing to the same number of votes as 
France and the UK (29), but seeing its preponderance in terms of 
population rewarded by 99 seats in the European Parliament. A qualified 
majority would be reached if three criteria had been fulfilled: 71% of the 
votes and a majority of the member states, who represented at least 62% of 
the population. Germany would also do well under this population 
criterion.  
The Nice Treaty also eased the conditions of enhanced cooperation by 
removing the possibility of a veto and extending it to the CFSP. It opened 
the door for a group of countries to request permission from the Council to 
enter this strengthened form of cooperation in the implementation of a joint 
action or a common position in the context of the CFSP. Art. 27b stated 
explicitly, however, that “It shall not relate to matters having military or 
defence implications”. This meant that such questions would have to be 
dealt with by all 15 members of the EU together. The only flexibility 
remaining would be ‘constructive abstention’ by the country finding itself 
in an isolated position. Another positive point was the transfer of parts of 
the intergovernmental third pillar relating to asylum and immigration 
policies to the communitarian first pillar.  
On the substance of the common ESDP the Presidency Conclusions at 
Nice simply stated that the European Council approved the presidency 
report plus annexes. In fact, it was a whole bunch of annexes with annexes 
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been agreed earlier and added very little. On the Capabilities Commitment 
Conference it was said that the member states had signalled their 
determination to make the necessary efforts to improve their operational 
capabilities further in order to carry out in full the most demanding of the 
Petersberg tasks. On police capabilities the papers stated that by 2003 
member states should be able to provide 5,000 officers, 1,000 of whom to be 
deployed within less than 30 days. The new permanent bodies were 
formally established: the Political and Security Committee, the Military 
Committee and the Military Staff – and their terms of reference were 
spelled out. The PSC would have a central role in the definition and follow-
u p  t o  t h e  E U  r e s p o n s e  t o  a  c r i s i s .  T h e  t e x t  c o n t i n u e d :  “ T h e  S e c r e t a r y  
General/High Representative, who may chair the PSC, plays an important 
role in providing impetus. He also contributes to the effectiveness and 
visibility of the Union’s action and policy”.55 
Under the heading “Inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions 
of the WEU” the report confirmed the EU’s intention of assuming the crisis-
management function of the WEU. The arrangements with NATO and 
other countries appeared somewhat haphazardly throughout the 
presidency report. Early on, it reiterated the importance of assured access 
to NATO’s planning capabilities and of the presumption of availability of 
NATO’s assets as envisaged at the Washington summit. The report 
continued that that the EU “will call on NATO for operational planning of 
any operation using NATO assets and capabilities”. That was very 
definitive. It was less so for the situation in which the EU examined options 
for conducting an operation: “the establishing of its strategic military 
options can involve a contribution by NATO’s planning capabilities”. A 
positive note was struck on the joint meetings of the interim PSC and the 
North Atlantic Council in mid-September and early November, which were 
said to have marked a decisive stage in the development of a relationship 
of confidence between the EU and NATO. The two secretaries-general also 
concluded an Interim Security Agreement. 
Section VI of the report detailed the arrangements for the 
consultation and participation of other potential partners. Contrary to what 
this heading might have suggested, it did not deal with non-EU NATO 
members – which were discussed in a separate annex – but with countries 
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such as Russia, Ukraine and Canada, with which the EU maintained a 
political dialogue. Information would be exchanged once every six months 
by the PSC troika. In a crisis, when a military crisis-management operation 
was considered, this framework would be used for consultations on 
“possible participation by potential partners”, either by the troika or by the 
secretary-general/high representative. 
Annex V to Annex VI dealt with the arrangements concerning non-
EU European NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU. 
These repeated the decisions of Helsinki and Feira and the proposed 
meeting schedule. Accordingly, each country might appoint a 
representative from its mission to the EU to follow the ESDP and act as 
interlocutor with regard to the PSC. They might also accredit an officer to 
the EU Military Staff who would serve as a contact for possible 
involvement in military activities; further, a minimum of two information 
meetings would be held during each presidency. During NATO/EU 
exercises specific liaison arrangements would be organised. 
For crisis situations, a distinction was made between the pre-
operational phase, in which consultations would be intensified at all levels, 
and the operational phase where other countries were taking part in the 
actual operation. During the former, the discussions at the politico-military 
expert level would ensure that potential contributors would be informed of 
the European Union’s intentions and the military options being envisaged. 
At the start of the operational phase, when the Council had selected the 
strategic military options the operational planning work would be 
presented to those who had expressed their intention in principle to take 
part in the operation. This would enable them to determine the nature and 
volume of their contribution once the Council had approved the concept of 
operation. Having taken into consideration the outcome of the 
consultations with non-member countries, they would formally be invited 
to take part according to the arrangements agreed at Helsinki. For non-EU 
European NATO members, this meant, as explained earlier, the right to 
participate in an operation using NATO assets and the possibility, on a 
decision by the Council, to be invited to join operations when the EU does 
not use these assets. Other candidate countries to the European Union 
might also be invited once the Council had decided to launch the operation. 
For autonomous operations the non-EU allies may send liaison officers to 
the Military Staff to exchange information on operational planning and the 
contributions envisaged at the time (which would later to be specified 
during meetings with the operation commander). Then the participants 
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Force Generation Conference, following which the operation would be 
formally launched and the Committee of Contributors established. 
Malaise in 2001 
The year 2001 started with a feeling of malaise. The summit at Nice had 
done the bare minimum, but failed in a convincing move to modernise the 
Union in time for the coming enlargement. The intergovernmental reflexes 
seemed to grow by strengthening the European Council, a tendency to 
reduce the Commission to the role of supervising the internal market and 
increasing bilateralism. With the coming of the euro, it was held that more 
progress should be made on moving from market integration to the 
integration of policies. One conference participant sighed with an adage of 
Goethe: “the creation of definitive order is not given to mankind, and God 
does not seem to want it”! 
The picture was not more positive on the NATO side. The usual 
meeting of NATO parliamentarians in February was confronted with 
stalemate on most issues. My own summing up went as follows: the 
transfer of NATO assets to the ESDP was blocked by Turkey, which 
wanted to have assured participation in the planning of operations before 
agreeing to assured EU access to NATO assets. The country followed a 
literal interpretation of the Washington summit, which had indicated 
arrangements building on those existing in the WEU, while in fact they 
would obtain less than the full participation in the activities agreed during 
the Maastricht conference. The absence of progress raised the question of 
whether we could still talk of a European identity within NATO or switch 
to the ESDP and its relationship with NATO consultations. Moreover, no 
one talked anymore of the CJTF concept that had looked so promising at 
the 1994 summit, both for NATO itself and for the relations with the EU.  
On Kosovo there was no clarity about its future status. Enlargement 
was not yet formally discussed out of fear of diverging promises. In 
Washington no one was in favour of a next round in 2002 and the Pentagon 
stressed that the summit of 1999 did not say that there would be further 
enlargement.56  
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On the US National Missile Defence programme a discussion of the 
implications for the allies was postponed until the US had made up its 
mind on the preferred system. The leader of the US delegation, Douglas 
Bereuter, voiced his frustration about EU policies, which on trade increased 
non-tariff barriers and on security seemed to wish to put NATO under UN 
auspices. The balance of argument was restored somewhat by Christoph 
Heusgen, then Director of the Policy Unit under Javier Solana, who pointed 
at the maximum effort to ensure transparency. He did not see much 
duplication with NATO except the Military Committee (largely made up of 
the MilReps to NATO – only Belgium and France and the non-NATO 
countries had separate delegates) and the EU Military Staff of some 130 
people engaged in strategic planning as distinct from tactical and 
operational planning. If NATO assets were required, NATO planning was 
needed; if an HQ of the lead nation would not do it, then Northwood in the 
UK or Creil in France would. In this connection, G.G. Messervy-Whiting of 
the EUMS pointed out that the EU was planning to do some things that 
NATO would not undertake, such as the evacuation of citizens, 
humanitarian relief and blue helmet operations. A remarkably positive note 
was struck by Norway, which had issued the following declaration in Oslo: 
Norway strongly supports the development of a common European 
security and defence policy. We are convinced that it will serve our 
security interests in the broadest sense. That is why we have made 
clear that our planned Armed Forces Task Force for International 
Operations, totalling some 3500 personnel will be available to EU led 
operations. We will make active use of the structures established for 
third-party cooperation at the Nice summit in December, as well as 
actively pursuing our bilateral contacts.57 
The American Permanent Representative to NATO, Alexander 
Vershbow, stated at the same meeting that the new administration was in 
favour of the ESDP if it was done right and aimed at two goals: increasing 
European capacity to contribute to NATO operations and providing a more 
effective option for the European nations to take the lead if NATO was not 
engaged. The key to success would be the acquisition of capabilities that 
should have been procured long ago, such as secure communications, the 
suppression of enemy air defences and all-weather capabilities for aircraft. 
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He admitted that the Europeans were contributing 85% of the military 
presence in Bosnia and Kosovo, but also noted that this was stretching their 
capabilities to the limit. He added that sometimes he had the impression 
that autonomy had become a goal in itself and felt that all operations, 
whether or not using NATO assets, needed a degree of inclusiveness.  
Two weeks later, the WEU Institute of Security Studies in Paris 
organised a seminar on the same issues.58 Alfred van Staden made the 
point that an effective security and defence policy needed more than just 
capabilities; it needed swift and timely decision-making as well. Bill 
Hopkinson regarded the ESDP as both an obstacle and a driving force. It 
was an obstacle in raising transatlantic tensions that had repercussions in 
Europe, certainly if the ambition was to form a counterweight to the US. 
The EU would need political institutions capable of giving clear 
instructions to the military, but also the will to share burdens and to inflict 
casualties if necessary. The driving force was the need for serious effort to 
reach the declared aims and to function in practice. Working together 
would create understanding and team spirit and ultimately 
interdependence. Joint formations had the advantage of risk- and burden-
sharing. If the defence task was taken seriously, it would promote 
integration, but the outcome might be messy, with some doing more than 
others. And those who did most would also be entitled to have the most 
say. In that sense a directorate might develop. Finally, Mr Hopkinson 
startled the audience with his assertion that Kosovo had been NATO’s first, 
but also last war. 
On 11 September 2001, the perception of security really became 
multi-dimensional. The old threats were still there, but internal and 
external dimensions were blurring. Weapons of mass destruction were 
becoming accessible to non-state actors, who were not susceptible to 
traditional deterrence. Security in the streets and at airports became a 
primary concern of the individual citizen. This was more the case in the US 
than in Europe, which had lived with various forms of terrorism for 
decades. For the US its new vulnerability was a shock, exacerbated by the 
feeling that Americans were singled out by the terrorists in their 
uncompromising fight against the Western way of life. In that respect the 
attacks on the World Trade Center as the symbol of globalisation and on 
the Pentagon as the base of American military power had great symbolic 
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value. The attacks changed the world, but also the debate on the legitimacy 
of intervention, the capabilities needed to deal with a phenomenon that 
was only partly military, the problem of failed states and the challenges of 
post-conflict reconstruction. NATO had to review its Defence Capabilities 
Initiative and the EU its shortfalls. Much of the force planning of the past 
bore little relevance to the new demands for special forces, unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and police-type units to engage in peace-building. 
NATO was not asked to fight against the Taliban, but if it had been, it 
would have had preciously few forces for that type of operation.  
EU defence ministers met in Brussels on 19-20 November 2001 for a 
Capabilities Improvement Conference (CIC) and approved the Helsinki 
Force Catalogue 2001, which gave a survey of the commitments, and the 
Helsinki Progress Catalogue 2001, which analysed in detail the 
shortcomings in realising the Headline Goals. Obviously, the lessons of 11 
September and the subsequent operation in Afghanistan could not be 
included, so some of the objectives would have to be amended later. More 
importantly, they agreed upon a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) 
to overcome those shortfalls. The initiative for this plan was taken in 
September by the Netherlands Minister of Defence Frank de Grave. In a 
note to the Netherlands parliament he gave the following reasons for the 
plan:59 
a)  to increase the effectiveness of the European defence efforts; 
b)  to apply a bottom-up approach on the basis of existing forms of 
cooperation among member states; 
c)  to demonstrate the importance of coordination among member states 
and with NATO; and 
d)  to enhance political and public support for the capability 
improvements. 
On the basis of these premises member states could commit 
themselves, individually or in groups, to reinforce certain capacities, thus 
applying the lead nation concept. These considerations found their way 
into the Action Plan that was included in the CIC declaration which itself 
figured as Annex 1 to the presidency report on the ESDP submitted to the 
European Council at Laeken in December 2001. Both the declaration and 
the report suffered from an ambiguity caused by the statement at Nice a 
year earlier that the ESDP should become operational not later than the 
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Laeken summit. The Headline Goals themselves, however, would only be 
fulfilled in 2003. As a result the notion of becoming ‘operational’ referred 
primarily to the organisational set-up of the PSC, the MC and the EUMS. 
Moreover, it was not made clear what the EU would be capable of doing 
immediately. Both documents confirmed that by 2003 the EU would be able 
to perform the entire spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. Nevertheless, efforts 
should be made to allow the EU to conduct in an optimum manner the 
most complex operations and to reduce the limitations and possible 
restrictions on their size, deployment and risk levels. 
By now, force levels were sufficient with a reservoir of more than 
100,000 persons, approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships. 
Additional commitments had been made in terms of rocket launchers, 
communications, electronic warfare, armoured personal carriers, bridge-
laying and engineering, and naval air capabilities had been committed as 
well as search and rescue and precision-guided armaments. Under efforts 
still to be made figured fairly general requirements such as the protection 
of deployed forces, the capacity to engage enemy forces and logistics. 
Similarly, the readiness of ground forces had to be improved as well as 
their operational mobility and flexibility. No wonder that several ministers 
left the CIC meeting a bit perplexed as to the real situation. This feeling was 
enhanced by the continuing imprecision of the types of mission envisaged 
under the 1992 Petersberg spectrum. The role of combat forces in crisis 
management as set out in the Petersberg tasks could entail virtually 
everything, but a corps-size capability was by definition limited and should 
not be compared with the overall capabilities of NATO. Close scrutiny of 
the Capabilities Improvement Chart in addition to the Action Plan, even in 
its simplified format, confirmed that progress in filling the gaps did not 
fully justify the jubilant tone of the report. In November 2001, out of a total 
of 144 required military capabilities, 94 had been made available. A year 
later 10 capabilities had been added, leaving 30 deficiencies, especially in 
the area of the ‘heavy’ Petersberg tasks involving enforcement action. 
Several countries had plans for meeting them, but their implementation 
would take them well beyond 2003. 
In spite of these perplexities, one had to recognise real progress. 
Numbers were raised and gaps closed, either entirely or partially. At the 
command level a sufficient number of headquarters had been offered and 
at the levels of the overall operation, the field headquarters and component 
commands had been added. Air and sea transport were able to deploy an FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 67 
initial entry force and strategic mobility had also improved. There was still 
a shortage of large transport aircraft and roll-on ships, but this could be 
remedied by joint use and organised recourse to commercial means. The 
most persistent shortcomings were seen in assisting strategic decision-
making, since the means of intelligence, target acquisition, surveillance and 
reconnaissance remained limited. Whether a shortfall also existed in the 
field of command, control, communication and intelligence (C4SI) would 
depend on a qualitative analysis that was still to be completed. 
Finally, the contributions of the non-EU members of NATO and the 
candidates for EU membership were also updated and included in a 
supplement to the Forces Catalogue. In line with the agreement made 
earlier at the Göteborg European Council, a detailed mechanism would be 
developed to follow and evaluate the military capabilities, taking into 
account the NATO defence-planning process and the planning in the 
context of the Partnership for Peace initiative. 
The Turkish issue 
As explained earlier, Ankara took the words in the Washington Summit 
Declaration literally, that the arrangements with the EU should “build on” 
those developed in the WEU, but it was already difficult enough to 
produce something similar to the WEU practice where all associates and 
observers attended regular meetings of the Permanent Council. Neither in 
the EU nor in NATO was such participation ever made possible. A solution 
of the Turkish problem remained on the agenda during nearly the whole of 
2001. Thanks to persistent efforts of the US and UK with some assistance 
from the Netherlands, a compromise was finally found in December 2001. 
An important demand from Turkey was a statement that the ESDP should 
not be used against a NATO ally. The impossibility of invoking NATO or 
the EU against a member of the other organisation had been agreed in the 
WEU meetings of 1991-92 inviting Greece to join. As such it was nothing 
new, even though Greece never felt happy with it. In any case, the situation 
was different in the EU, which did not have the automatic military 
assistance clause of the WEU Treaty. 
More difficult was the Turkish demand for participation in decision-
making to launch an operation and for the option to join in. Here, the WEU 
provisions could not be taken as a precedent, as the full participation in the 
activities of the associate members that was promised in Maastricht did not 
cover the unqualified right to participate in the implementation of 
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be possible “unless a majority of the member states, or half the member 
states including the presidency, decide otherwise”.60 The December 2001 
compromise stated that in case of an operation in the vicinity of a non-EU 
ally or touching on the security interests of that country, it would be 
consulted before the Council took a decision on issuing an invitation to 
participate. Turkey could live with this formula, but now Greece did not 
agree and needed time for reflection. As long as the participation issue had 
not been resolved, the Netherlands maintained its reservation on § 29 of the 
report for Laeken declaring the ESDP operational. Its government stated 
that before agreement, the EU–NATO relationship had to be clarified, 
including in particular the mechanism of making available NATO assets for 
EU operations. As the EU would have difficulty in mounting enforcement 
action on its own, NATO capabilities would remain indispensable for some 
considerable time. Inasmuch as EU capabilities improved, it would be able 
to conduct more complex operations. Therefore, in each case in the future 
an assessment should be made of the ability of the EU to execute the 
operation. 
The Turkish problem lingered on. First it delayed implementation of 
the Berlin Plus agreement. Later, after the accession of Cyprus and Malta, it 
made it impossible for EU-NATO consultation to go beyond the agreed 
operations in the Balkans and Darfur. We shall return to this problem later. 
Focus on civilian crisis management during the Swedish presidency 
Sweden took over the EU presidency from France shortly after the Nice 
summit in 2000 and focused on the civilian aspects of crisis management. In 
May 2001, a conference was held at the level of directors-general of police 
to work out the Feira mandate to establish a capability of 5,000 persons, 
1,000 of whom should be available within 30 days. Subsequently, the 
European Council of Göteborg on 15-16 June 2001 adopted an action plan 
and on 19 November a ministerial Commitment Conference took place in 
Brussels. The latter raised the objective for the short-notice capability from 
1,000 to 1,400. Several countries offered integrated units capable of rapid 
reaction and interoperability, while others promised individual officers. 
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Events in former Yugoslavia had shown how important police units 
were in the grey area between combat forces and civilian administration. 
The WEU had gained some experience in Mostar and later in the police 
element in Albania (MAPE). In describing the mission, the declaration 
issued by ministers in November stated that the EU could support police 
operations conducted by the UN or OSCE and also conduct autonomous 
actions. Coordination with the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe was 
envisaged to avoid duplication. Qualitatively, the mission could be to 
reinforce local police or to substitute them, which meant that all forms of 
specialisation should be included. Similarly, the commitments could 
include both civilian police and those with a military status like that of the 
Gendarmerie in France, the Carabinieri in Italy, the Guardia Civil in Spain 
and the Marechaussee in the Netherlands. 
The Action Plan was taken forward by a new police unit within the 
EU Council Secretariat, which would be able to plan and conduct police 
operations. Its terms of reference included integrated planning and 
coordination, assessment of a situation, preparation of exercises and the 
establishment of cadres and legal rules. Göteborg also established the 
principles and modalities for the participation of the non-EU NATO 
members and the EU candidate countries. 
The EU did not stop at the creation of a police capability and 
formulated concrete objectives relating to the rule of law and civil 
protection in the context of civilian aspects of crisis management. At Feira 
four priority areas had already been defined: policing, reinforcing the rule 
of law, and strengthening civil administration and civil protection. The 
Göteborg European Council added to their rationale: strengthening the rule 
of law was a precondition for the consolidation of peace and security; 
“international efforts to strengthen, and where necessary re-establish, 
credible local police forces cannot be fully successful if the police are not 
complemented by a functioning judicial and penal system”.61 Equally the 
EU should play a catalysing role within international organisations to 
promote the definition of a clear mandate for international missions 
involving officials and experts in the field of rule of law, as well as the 
elaboration within the UN framework of a “basic, directly applicable, 
interim legal framework, to be used when the international community 
faces an institutional and normative vacuum”. The summit agreed that the 
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EU should develop a comprehensive range of agreed standards for 
selection, training and equipment of officials and experts in the field of the 
rule of law, and modules for their training. 
These points were taken up by the Belgian presidency, which 
identified the following elements to be taken into account: 
•  The first element involves recognition and observance of the local 
law. In the case of temporary absence or inapplicability of local law, 
recourse might be made to an interim legal framework to be 
elaborated within the framework of the UN. The report noted in 
particular experience gained in Kosovo and East Timor. It would be 
desirable that the police officers and judiciary had a good knowledge 
of the law and procedures of the region in crisis but should also 
possess the means to guarantee in the field the enforcement of the 
fundamental rights that are the pillars of the rule of law. For this 
purpose “an identification of the relevant international standards to 
be taken into account could be helpful”.62 
•  The EU was willing to assist the UN in elaborating a basic interim 
legal framework. “Such a framework should reconcile the particular 
nature of crisis management operations in the field of security and 
respect for human rights and allow in the long run a restoration of 
the rule of law.” 
At the end of 2001 it was still too early to judge the significance of the 
cooperation in this field. It certainly constituted an important area of 
activity. In Kosovo most experts agreed that police, judges and prisons 
were more urgently needed than the military after Mr Milosevic had been 
replaced. Yet, the problems were considerable in winning the trust of the 
local population in the administration of justice by foreigners. Moreover, it 
remained to be seen to what extent an interim legal framework could be 
developed in the abstract and be imposed rapidly in a concrete crisis 
situation. Nevertheless, it was worth trying. The same applied to the 
mechanism for reinforced cooperation in the field of emergency 
intervention for the protection of civilians, which was agreed by the 
Council on 23 October 2001. 
Belgium assumed the presidency during the second half of 2001, 
which saw three important events: the terrorist strike of 11 September, 
which is discussed in the next chapter and led to an extraordinary 
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European Council meeting expressing solidarity with the US and adopting 
an action plan for the fight against terrorism; the Capability Improvement 
Conference of 19 November identifying 55 capability shortfalls and 
proposing a new capability review system; and the Laeken European 
Council of 14-15 December, which opened the way towards the Convention 
on the Future of Europe by drawing up a list of questions and appointing 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as its Chairman. The Convention is discussed in 
chapter 4.  
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3.  Terrorism Strikes – Adjustment to 
New Threats 
The world is full of paradoxes and so is Europe. Who, before 11 September 
2001, would have believed that NATO would invoke Art. V and its 
collective defence implications for the first time in response to a terrorist 
attack on the US? Previously the dangers of terrorism had been recognised 
in NATO’s strategic concept but were generally regarded as one of the new 
‘risks and responsibilities’ coming under Art. IV instead of the collective 
defence clause of Art. V. Who, before 11 September, would have expected 
France and Germany to solicit US requests for participation in the Afghan 
operations far outside the NATO area? In an entirely different area, who 
would have expected Germany to attempt tinkering with the stability pact 
on which the value of the euro depends? Indeed, the world was changing. 
In the security field the invocation of Art. V was a brilliant initiative 
to show European solidarity with the unprecedented catastrophe in the US. 
For a brief moment it did more for transatlantic relations than any gesture 
or declaration in the past. The US speaker of the House of Representatives 
travelled specifically to Ottawa to thank the members of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly for their demonstration of solidarity. Yet, it raised 
several questions. First, the Netherlands permanent representative raised 
some eyebrows by delaying the Council in order to ask for instructions 
from his government. Second, the invocation was made dependent upon 
determination that the attack was directed from abroad. That confirmation 
came on 2 October. Third, some reticence was shown about the possible 
consequences: Would other terrorist attacks also fall under Art. V, and 
would the allies have to do everything the US asked? Presumably not, for 
the US National Security Strategy of 2002 defined terrorism broadly as 
“premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
innocents”. This could not imply that every instance would lead to 
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After the confirmation of the external origin of 9/11 a host of 
measures were taken: naval forces were deployed to the eastern 
Mediterranean as a ‘backfill’ operation to free US assets. AWACS aircraft 
were moved from Europe to Tinker Air Force Base in the US. The military 
authorities were instructed to draw up a concept for fighting terrorism. 
NATO was not involved in generating the forces for the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but would have been able to do so. Later 
NATO was requested to take command of the force. 
The attacks of 11 September marked the first time that a non-state 
actor became a strategic threat and in an entirely new manner. The threat 
was directed against the Western way of living and did so in a 
frighteningly uncompromising manner: no demands, no negotiation, only 
destruction. Some were reminded of the anarchist attacks in Europe of a 
century earlier. How would this affect the security of the North Atlantic 
Treaty area? Previously, collective defence was thought to imply American 
leadership and command arrangements within NATO. That was also the 
understanding behind the European security and defence policy. At British 
insistence the ESDP would deal with crisis management only, while NATO 
would manage collective defence and could undertake crisis management 
if all its members including the US wanted to be engaged. That paradigm 
changed with the decision to leave the leadership of the Afghan war to the 
US, which would ask for contributions from the allies. François Heisbourg 
called this the ‘don’t call us, we’ll call you’ arrangement, which made many 
people impatient. 
The concept of a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ had existed for 
peace-support operations since the fall of the Berlin wall. Usually there 
were more able than willing allies; this time the partners were willing, but 
the US did not attach much value to their ability to make a useful 
contribution. Most pledges were more symbolic than operationally useful. 
As a result the press questioned NATO’s relevance during the December 
ministerial session in Brussels. And indeed, NATO did not seem the best 
framework to develop an anti-terrorist strategy, as it possessed no 
economic, police or judicial means necessary to develop a coherent 
approach. It also was questionable whether a NATO label would be helpful 
in an action in Central Asia.  
There were good reasons for the paucity of requests: the US could do 
it all alone and was not keen to repeat the Kosovo recriminations over 
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trained together intensively and were confident that they could rely on 
each other. In NATO the special forces had never worked together before 
and for many countries had not even been identified as a force 
requirement. Another argument was that the operation was run by the US 
Central Command (CentCom), which had no links with NATO. 
Nevertheless, the fact remained that NATO was hardly involved and was 
limited to the exchange of information and some backfill replacement of US 
assets deployed to the Afghan theatre. 
The training requirement plays an important role in all multinational 
units. From 22-28 May 2002, the EU conducted its first crisis-management 
exercise, CME 02, in the context of the ESDP. Its objective was to test and 
evaluate a range of procedures and structures and, more particularly, the 
framework within which the full range of EU civilian and military 
instruments should be coordinated as well as the interaction among EU 
institutions and member states in a crisis situation. At the end Mr Solana 
seemed satisfied with the results and concluded that the Union had 
acquired a body of procedures and concepts that enabled it to integrate 
military and civilian aspects of crisis management. In view of later 
squabbles over planning capabilities it was interesting to note his remark 
that the EU had demonstrated that it possessed adequate strategic planning 
capacities. 
Comparing the capabilities of the EU and NATO in combating 
terrorism, the EU was better placed to take measures against internal 
terrorism but did little against the external threat. At first, the EU took the 
application of Art. V to mean that it could leave most of the crisis-
management consultations to NATO and focused on non-military matters 
such as money-laundering, police cooperation, arrest warrants and 
harmonising maximum sentences for terrorist and other crimes. Its third 
pillar of justice and home affairs got a powerful impulse, which even 
seemed to overtake the second pillar of foreign and security policy in 
importance. As usual, the latter primarily dealt with post-crisis 
reconstruction. Many of its leaders resorted to an unsightly scramble to 
Washington and did little to forge a united response in the military field. 
The European Council at Laeken in 2001 even explicitly rejected a 
combined European input into the peacekeeping force for Afghanistan. 
The US managed to build a coalition in a remarkably short time. Its 
purpose never was precisely defined, but focused on Osama Bin Laden and 
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coalition against the terrorism of this form of Muslim fundamentalism, not 
against authoritarianism. It included regimes with few democratic 
credentials. Providing a new rationale after the capture of Bin Laden would 
not be an easy task. The Iraq crisis has postponed the answer, but the 
question remains as to how one can ever win a war against terrorism. One 
does not have to agree with everything Eric Hobsbawm wrote in his 
autobiography, defining himself as standing at a slight angle to the 
universe, to be struck by his comment, that America having won the cold 
war against the former USSR, implausibly decided on 11 September 2001 
that the cause of freedom was again engaged on another life-and-death 
struggle against another evil but spectacularly ill-defined enemy.63  
Unfortunately, after a successful beginning in Afghanistan, the 
quick military victory in Iraq failed to build the peace rapidly enough to 
turn the country around. The Europeans followed suit in putting terrorism 
first among the new threats to be countered, but did not see a direct link 
with Saddam Hussein, evil as his regime undoubtedly was. Admittedly, 
many of them were cynically sceptical about the objective of bringing 
democracy to the Middle East, but may eventually be persuaded if the 
government finally emerging from the elections in Iraq results in a 
reasonably effective government, able to stand on its own feet. 
Unfortunately, the threat of civil war is blurring that prospect and will 
perpetuate the need for foreign forces to maintain order. If there is one 
lesson from peace-support operations in the past, it is the need for a long, 
often very long, military presence in order to allow the situation to stabilise 
and to give civil society a chance to re-establish itself. Except for the Kuwait 
war, which restored the old government after the expulsion of Iraqi forces 
from its territory (and was more like a traditional inter-state war) all 
operations in failed states or ethnic and religious conflicts have proven to 
be of long duration and presented the dilemma of withdrawing too early or 
risking the sympathy for the occupying forces.  
Policy implications 
The immediate effect of the emergence of catastrophic terrorism was a stop 
to the declining trend of defence budgets, but new money did not go to old 
priorities. Intelligence-gathering and international cooperation among the 
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services, the adaptation of intervention forces (with priority given to 
special forces and the police) were the new beneficiaries. The UN Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 
against the financing of terrorist activities. The EU was pushed to make 
progress in the third pillar of justice and home affairs, where files that had 
been pending for years finally moved forward. An indirect effect on 
international affairs was the rescue of Pakistan from a slippery slope 
descending into Taliban-like conditions. NATO had to respond to the 
question of whether all terrorist attacks would lead to the invocation of Art. 
V or a certain order of magnitude would be needed to trigger an Alliance 
response. For the EU, strict observance of the principle that collective 
defence would be for NATO to undertake would in turn paralyse European 
action. But the US did not want to tie its hands to NATO in its Asian 
operations, and some European countries would have been reluctant to go 
there. 
Both in NATO and the EU the longer-term policy implications had to 
be defined. What was the desired form of future coalitions for crises 
outside their immediate periphery? Was the ESDP already mature enough 
to operate that far out or should the focus be on making compact European 
contributions available to the organisation or lead nation most immediately 
involved? Would there be a new urgency in resolving the Israeli–
Palestinian question and was there any chance left for doing so? Would the 
Afghan crisis finally be the end of the cold war period and result in a new 
relationship with Russia, even giving it a role in certain decision-making 
processes, and what would this do to US leadership? 
The latter question had a direct bearing on the enlargement issue. 
Both NATO and the EU were adding new members, but the two processes 
were not linked. The EU had a ‘big bang’ of 10 countries in May 2004, 
excluding for the time being Bulgaria and Romania (who have a date for 
2007) and Turkey (with whom the negotiations started in October 2005) but 
including the Baltic countries. At first, the NATO picture was less clear 
except that there was agreement that at least some new members should be 
invited in order to show that the door of the Alliance was indeed open. 
Slovenia and Slovakia seemed to qualify, but other candidatures were more 
questionable. One could argue that their present status was not worse than 
that of the Czechs, Hungarians or Polish at the time of their accession. All 
had worked hard on their Membership Action Plans. In the end, as always, 
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American position. Furthermore, if Washington agreed, why should the 
Europeans object to an extension of the transatlantic security zone? 
In this context much weight was given to an assessment of the 
policies and sensitivities of President Vladimir Putin. He stuck his neck out 
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  R u s s i a n  p u b l i c  o p i n ion in rallying quickly to the US 
coalition in Afghanistan, reminding the West that Moscow had been aware 
of the terrorist threat long before. Was it appropriate under these 
circumstances to proceed with the US National Missile Defence programme 
and NATO enlargement? For a while Washington was prepared to go slow 
on missile testing. Moscow agreed to the principle of reducing the numbers 
of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Ultimately, however, the US 
went ahead with denouncing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 
1972. Inclusion of the Baltic countries in NATO was opposed by all 
Russians. The reasons were more psychological than real, but in politics 
that matters. For the West the real issue was whether we all would be 
better off with enlargement, especially as we admitted that there was no 
military rationale for the process. The candidate countries rightly wanted to 
belong to Western organisations, but economically had much at stake in 
relations with their eastern neighbours. For their stability and prosperity 
EU membership would be more important than NATO.  
Prime Minister Tony Blair saw the need for a new initiative to draw 
in Russia. In 1997 Moscow had accepted the NATO–Russia Founding Act 
in the context of its participation in Partnership for Peace, but never made 
good use of its many possibilities. Russia’s main aim was an arrangement 
in which it would be able to participate in decision-making on an equal 
basis with the NATO members. A formula of 19+1 for consultations in 
which the full members stuck to positions they had previously agreed 
among themselves, did not meet that objective. The Blair proposal went 
some way in meeting Russian wishes in envisaging joint decisions on 
certain issues. He had hoped to reach agreement during the December 2001 
ministerial meeting, but several countries wanted more time for reflection 
and preferred postponement until the spring 2002 session in Reykjavik. 
The crucial question was whether the new relationship would extend 
beyond the fight against terrorism. During a meeting of the Joint 
Monitoring Group of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the State 
Duma our Russian colleagues expressed the hope for a wider agenda. They 
had a point. Terrorism will be with us for a long time, perhaps forever, 
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movements are less inclined to sponsor violent methods. But terrorism 
alone would be insufficient as an organising principle for lasting 
international cooperation. The reconstruction of Afghanistan as a multi-
ethnic society might offer wider scope for action, but it would also be liable 
to jockeying for position among all its neighbours. There was no love lost 
for the Taliban, which only had diplomatic relations with Pakistan, but the 
history of the country does not augur well for a peaceful Afghanistan that 
would refrain from growing drugs and ensure safe operations for pipelines 
bringing oil and gas from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean.  
Ever since the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent decline in 
European defence budgets to cash in on the ‘peace dividend’, US attitudes 
towards the CFSP and later the ESDP were characterised by extreme 
scepticism. It was dismissed as ‘Euro-babble’ or in the Texan vernacular as 
‘big hats, no cattle’. American emphasis on the ‘revolution in military 
affairs’ and synchronising emerging information and weapon technologies 
was not energetically pursued in Europe and threatened to undermine 
allied interoperability. Which European forces would still be able to fight 
together with US units? The Helsinki Headline Goals would lack strategic 
lift and satellite-based real time intelligence, and in NATO the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative also failed to tackle the high end of the spectrum. 
Part of the criticism was certainly justified, but much of it was 
exaggerated. It was all very well to say that defence should shift from being 
threat-driven to capability-driven, but it became increasingly difficult to 
quantify military requirements in an environment where collective defence 
had lost its absolute priority and peace-support-types of intervention had 
moved up on the agenda. Equally, the Defence Capabilities Initiative had 
become a typical NATO programme including some 58 deficiencies 
without prioritisation. As a result all the parties could say that they were 
addressing many of them, without having to undertake much additional 
effort. In 2001, in its third year, 24 had been rectified and 14 showed little 
progress. Deficiencies were notable in the suppression of enemy air 
defences, anti-missile and air defence, combat identification and the 
provision of deployable forces – all items of considerable importance in 
military interventions. The criticism was most unfair in the context of the 
operations in former Yugoslavia, where SFOR and KFOR were 
predominantly manned by Europeans. In the Macedonian arms-collection 
operation no Americans participated. Of course it was true that the 
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the assets required, but then it should a l s o  be  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  t h i s  t y p e  o f  
action was the only one acceptable to the US…and that it almost failed in 
producing a timely success. 
The question Europeans would have to answer in providing defence 
improvements would continue to be ‘what for?’. In response to this 
question then as now it is too simple to say that they have to spend more. 
The conduct of the Afghan campaign would not have been different if the 
Europeans had spent more on defence. Looking forward, it will be more 
important to spend differently. As noted before, the Headline Goal aimed 
at a limited capability, a robust army corps with supporting air and naval 
assets. It did not seek to create an EU army, but a capability to support EU 
security policies and enhance their credibility. Such a limited capability 
should also be restrained in its ambitions and clarify what it would be 
capable of achieving, not what it cannot do. There are plenty of things it 
will not be able to do, but that is not the point. Within its limitations it 
should be able to mount a rapid reaction force, which is well-trained and 
exercised in a multinational context, focusing on the periphery of the EU, 
but also able to make a contribution to a UN or OSCE operation on behalf 
of those states that are willing to do so. In my view, now held for more than 
a decade, the utility of the Headline Goals will depend on the ability to 
compose ‘force packages’ that are pre-planned for various scenarios. 
Current practice in NATO, where headquarters no longer have organic 
links with dedicated forces, might be wonderful in terms of flexibility, but a 
disaster in rapidly organising combined operations of combat forces. 
Transformation 
Well before 11 September 2001, the US Department of Defense was 
working on its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report characterised by 
the word ‘transformation’. It appeared on 30 September and underscored 
the point that there are many threats against the nation and that they will 
take many forms. In his foreword, US Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld set out its objective: 
to establish a new strategy for America’s defence that would embrace 
uncertainty and contend with surprise, a strategy premised on the 
idea that to be effective abroad, America must be safe at home.64 
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As explained in a briefing to the NATO parliamentarians,65 the review 
undertaken by the United States essentially rested on seven themes: 
•  uncertainty and surprise about the next adversary and where the 
adversary might attack; 
•  asymmetric warfare, which would put a focus on coercive 
instruments; 
•  new concepts of deterrence, which had to be multi-layered and multi-
faceted and include denial and protection. Retaliation could no longer 
be its centre piece; 
•  homeland security, as the US must be safe at home in order to 
effectively project its force abroad; 
•  the view that the US cannot wait for the next surprise and have to 
transform defence in order to protect critical bases, to deny the enemy 
both access and sanctuaries, to conduct information and space 
operations, and to improve communications. More reliance would be 
put on joint task forces. The ‘interim brigade unit teams’ would be 
sent to Europe by 2007;  
•  a paradigm change from a threat-based to a capabilities-based 
approach; and 
•  a new approach to risk management. 
The QDR report was presented as a vision, with the blueprint to 
follow later. Yet, it was a compromise as the US president and secretary of 
defense had wanted to be more revolutionary, skipping a generation. Apart 
from the expected emphasis on homeland defence, the report was 
important in providing a new standard for sizing forces. If faced with two 
major regional conflicts, overlapping in time, the US should be able to 
decisively defeat the adversary in one and hold the line in the other. In the 
words of Hans Binnendijk, the shift was from ‘win-win’ to ‘win-hold’, thus 
freeing substantial forces for flexible use.66 In addition, the geographical 
focus was fixed upon northeast and southwest Asia – together with the 
need for new bases near areas of instability. This focus was a striking 
change from the earlier expectation of a reduced military presence abroad. 
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No adversaries were named. To the contrary, the report stated that it 
focused more on how an adversary might fight than on whom the 
adversary might be and where a war might occur 
Much emphasis was put on future challenges. As the review noted, 
the US would not wait for the next surprise. US Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave the future ‘a seat at the table’ of risk 
management. Conceptually the partial shift from deterrence to dissuasion 
was interesting because it was more than semantic. During the cold war the 
French always used the word ‘dissuasion’ when they meant deterrence, 
giving it an appeal by stressing reason rather than terror. Now the US used 
dissuasion as the opposite of the arms race: a limited missile defence would 
dissuade North Korea from spending money on ICBMs that would never 
get through and therefore lose their power as blackmail. The multifaceted 
approach to deterrence, including denial and protection, provided food for 
thought for the high priests of deterrence who had filled many library 
shelves with their ‘thinking about the unthinkable’. To them the most 
interesting question would be whether the old maxim of the cold war – 
‘uncertainty is the deterrent’ – could still be maintained, or more precise 
responses would have to be announced in order to forestall negative 
developments. 
The implications of the QDR for Europe were not spelled out; nor 
were those for US participation in peace support. The war in Iraq 
postponed any ‘blueprint’, which at best could now be expected only from 
the next QDR, due in February 2006. A reduction of US troops in the 
Balkans was widely expected. So far US forces in Europe have been geared 
for high-intensity conflict. In NATO the distinction between Main Defence 
Forces and reaction forces has been abandoned, but in practice most armies 
have a hard job in fulfilling their peace-support commitments and 
simultaneously maintaining the professional skills of their soldiers. The 
only indication given in the report was that the new US forward-stationed 
interim brigade unit team would be ready to be deployed in Europe by 
2007. Some mentioned Bulgaria or Romania as a future location. The 
secretary of the army would explore options for enhancing ground force 
capabilities in the Arabian Gulf. 
Could the war against terrorism, combined with the new US defence 
posture, lead to new arrangements for burden-sharing? As previously 
indicated, the EU possesses in its third pillar an unprecedented measure of 
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and home affairs. But to a large extent this cooperation has internal 
application alone. Nevertheless, common policies in the field of 
immigration and asylum, an enhanced mandate for Europol and closer 
contacts among intelligence sources are important instruments in 
controlling terrorist movements. These instruments are unique in the world 
and are being extended to the candidate countries for EU membership, so 
t h a t  m o s t  o f  E u r o p e  c o u l d  b e c o m e  a special zone of vigilance against 
terrorism and thus a valuable partner.  
A division of labour in the military field, as distinct from the political 
area, is not as difficult, but still delicate. At first glance, there would not be 
anything wrong with it. Task specialisation had been discussed for 
decades, especially by the smaller NATO members that would not be able 
to cover the entire spectrum of capabilities. Most attempts came to nothing, 
however, as the larger countries did not want to create new dependencies 
and the smaller ones doubted the availability in a crisis of assets entrusted 
to others. Nevertheless, the Headline Goals should include a degree of 
specialisation if the force packages are to be used effectively. Not every 
European country has to contribute everything as long as there is an 
equitable sharing of risk overall. A division of labour where some only 
provide medical units and others the combat forces will not be sustainable. 
That problem also figures prominently in transatlantic relations. The 
US too often gets the feeling that it has to do the dirty work and Europe 
does not play its part. In that respect the mine-cleaning operations of the 
WEU during the Iran–Iraq war in 1987-88 was the first instance of Europe 
assuming responsibilities outside the NATO area. Similarly, UK, French 
and Italian participation with land and air forces in the eviction of Saddam 
Hussein from Kuwait was important in showing that the US was not alone. 
Subsequent events in Somalia, where American troops lost their lives in a 
situation that was not regarded as a vital interest to the US, changed 
Washington’s approach to crisis management. When in the role of 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell developed the doctrine of going 
in with an overwhelming force to do the job quickly and with minimum 
losses and then to get out. As Secretary of State he changed that view and 
reassured Europeans of the continued US presence in Bosnia and Kosovo; 
“we went in together, we’ll go out together” suggested a prolonged stay 
after the immediate military action had been completed and peace-building 
activities were in progress. It was an important statement; however, it 
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these two Balkan regions may have to last for decades. In other words, the 
EU may never ‘get out’, while at a given moment a build-down and 
eventual departure of US forces might become justified and acceptable. 
The initial Afghanistan operation was largely a unilateral American 
campaign to hunt down Osama Bin Laden and destroy the Taliban by 
aiding the opposition through aerial bombardments. Few demands were 
made on the allies during the fighting, but after the defeat of the Taliban 
the reconstruction of a national government was left to the UN and the 
peacekeeping force assembled without American units participating. It was 
a case of ‘we’ll do the cooking, you do the dishwashing’. Politically such a 
low profile on the ground probably was an astute tactic, but it was not yet 
clear how this would fit in with the new emphasis on forward basing in the 
QDR of 2001. During 2005 the US changed course and tried to merge 
Operation Enduring Freedom with ISAF, but there was little enthusiasm 
from the allies, including the UK, which did not want an American general 
in charge of the entire affair.   
The hope that the events of 11 September would persuade the US to 
become more multinationalist in its policies did not come true. Its newly 
confirmed determination to abrogate the ABM Treaty, its refusal to ratify 
the international penal court and the Kyoto agreement and the obstacles 
put in the process of a convention on biological weapons were proof of the 
contrary. The unilateralist streak in US policy continued to be present. The 
first test in its attitude towards Europe would come in the context of force 
levels in Bosnia and Kosovo. Europe could and should do more, but the 
credibility of the operations would benefit if some US presence could be 
maintained. Without it, Europe’s bluff would be called. If subsequently the 
EU were to rise to the occasion and manage well (which should not be all 
that difficult) confidence in the CFSP/ESDP would receive a boost. 
A mandate for the Spanish presidency of 2002 
The Laeken summit of December 2001 had declared the ESDP operational, 
but at the same time demonstrated that this operationality was largely 
limited to the institutional arrangements on paper. A formidable mandate 
was left for the incoming Spanish presidency, which was invited to report 
to the European Council in Seville on 21-22 June 2002.67 Obviously, work 
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had to continue on the Headline Goals and the action plans for the military 
capabilities and the police. Then there was the unresolved question of the 
financial arrangements for crisis-management operations. Part of the 
mandate was to work out the practical modalities of civil-military 
cooperation, which was no easy task. The European Commission had 
access to the EU budget, but only limited competence. It was able to 
contribute to civilian crisis management and reconstruction, but only up to 
a point. The Stability Pact for the Balkans was coordinated by an outsider 
and the UN CivPol Unit in the Council Secretariat came under the EU’s 
intergovernmental second pillar. In an inter-institutional agreement the 
European Parliament had voted a lump sum of €200 million for the CFSP, 
but this would not be available for military crisis management. Most 
nations, especially the larger ones, favoured the principle ‘costs lie where 
they fall’, i.e. all parties pay their own expenses except for a relatively small 
multilateral budget for common costs. NATO works on the same principle, 
although its annual infrastructure budget represents a sizeable investment. 
As long as the ESDP remained an intergovernmental activity with no 
links to the European Parliament, recourse to the EU budget would be 
impossible. The alternative of establishing a large fund for crisis 
management, separate from the EU institutions, seemed most unlikely. Mr 
Solana’s reports showed how cumbersome the pillar structure of the Union 
operated. In 1986 the Single European Act of Luxembourg had brought the 
Economic Community and the European political cooperation together in a 
single Treaty. The trend towards convergence was not continued at 
Maastricht. At that time a link was established with the WEU, which was 
requested “to elaborate and implement decisions having defence 
implications”.68 Not much came of it and paradoxically the few requests to 
the WEU were limited to police and customs activities. Ten years later the 
crisis management functions of the WEU were transferred to the EU and a 
common security and defence policy would be developed as part of the 
common foreign security policy. That was logical. The EU could not have 
separate policies in these fields. Security and defence are integral parts of 
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foreign policy. Unfortunately, a new division was created between military 
and civilian crisis management, owing to the pillar structure. 
Coordination between the first and second pillar remained a 
seemingly impossible task and as a result the EU was not able to use all its 
instruments in a coherent manner. To the extent that some results were 
achieved, they were the outcome of the good personal relations between 
Commissioner Chris Patten and the high representative. The changing six-
monthly presidency made the threesome a further nuisance. Some 
suggested that the high representative should also have a seat in the 
European Commission. That would not be possible if simultaneously the 
post-holder retained the position of secretary-general of the Council, which 
made the individual the servant of the Council and to a certain extent 
subordinate to the presidency. On the other side, being a member of the 
Commission implied a limit on personal initiative as decisions are taken by 
a collegiate body. The problem seemed insoluble as long as the pillar 
structure was maintained and the right of initiative of the Commission was 
not extended to the second pillar in its entirety. Only then could the 
function of high representative be combined with a vice-president of the 
Commission. It was short of a miracle that the Intergovernmental 
Conference following the European Convention agreed on the combination 
of the functions of high representative and vice-president of the 
Commission in a single foreign minister. 
The mandate for the Spanish presidency also included the phrase “to 
enhance cooperation in the field of armaments as member states consider 
appropriate”.69 The second part of the sentence already indicated that this 
might be another ‘mission impossible’. Several members showed no 
enthusiasm for bringing armaments into the orbit of the EU. It was not only 
a question of the old Art. 223 (now 296), which took armaments out of the 
internal market. It would be conceivable to have competition among the EU 
member states and to maintain the article as a bargaining chip against non-
members, including the US, which applied restrictions on the imports of 
armaments. The problem was deeper in the nature of the European arms 
industry, where only a few countries are able to act as prime contractors 
and most of the others only produce components. In such a situation the 
larger members prefer arrangements among themselves – a kind of 
reinforced cooperation facilitating work-sharing over a range of projects as 
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envisaged in OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en matiere 
d’Armement). Moreover, the consolidation of the European defence industry 
was entering a new phase. First it focused on national champions and then 
it entered into transborder mergers, some of which are now strong enough 
to survive alone or to consider transatlantic cooperation. The major failure 
on the European side was still the dispersed manner in which research and 
development were funded, leaving the European Union far behind the US.  
In this connection the Spanish presidency was invited to study the 
Belgian suggestion to formalise the meetings of defence ministers and give 
them a place in the Council framework. There seemed to be widespread 
support for the idea, but Ireland and Sweden were opposed in addition to 
Denmark, which ever since the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam dissociated itself 
from defence cooperation in the EU. Part of the problem was the format of 
the General Affairs Council. Joint meetings of foreign affairs and defence 
ministers were foreseen in crisis situations. This has been standing practice 
in the WEU since its revitalisation of 1984 and was conducive to rapid 
decision-making. Foreign ministers provided their analysis of the situation 
and defence ministers could immediately indicate which forces they could 
make available. Separate meetings of defence ministers took place at the 
beginning of WEU ministerial meetings, but their agenda was limited to 
equipment cooperation, the former Eurogroup at 13 having been 
transferred to the WEU as the Western European Armaments Group 
(WEAG). These days, defence ministers have much more on their plate and 
there was merit in putting their work on the Headline Goals firmly within 
the EU structure. Spanish Defence Minister Federico Trillo took this up 
and, in a speech in Madrid on 10 January 2002 setting out the objectives of 
the Spanish presidency for ESDP, proposed the format of the General 
Affairs Council with defence ministers. His aim was “to reach an exact 
balance between full respect for the institutions and permission to the 
Ministers of Defence to carry out their work on developing the ESDP”. 70 
This intention was noted by the General Affairs Council of 18-19 February 
and defence ministers were enabled to discuss certain agenda items, 
limited to issues covering military capabilities, chaired by the minister of 
defence of the country holding the presidency.71  
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 In Minister Trillo’s speech, “effectiveness” and “more Europe” were 
key words, the latter meaning a greater effort on interoperability, 
specialisation and capabilities. His approach was modest but realistic. In 
May a progress report would be made on the European Capabilities Action 
Plan (ECAP) but Mr Trillo made clear that it would not attempt to set up 
standing rapid reaction forces. It aimed at “the development of concepts 
and procedures that will allow for the deployment of the rapid-reaction 
elements foreseen at Helsinki, while specifying use of the elements most 
readily available in the Helsinki Catalogue”. Among the aspects to be 
considered he mentioned decision-taking procedures, the designation of 
command and control elements and the speedy generation of command 
elements and forces. In view of the controversy that erupted in the spring 
of 2003 over the EU’s establishment of an operational command capability, 
the wording of Mr Trillo’s speech is quoted in full: 
The Spanish Presidency…will promote the work for making use of the 
command and control capabilities offered, existent and future – both 
national and multinational. In view of the abundance of European 
initiatives in this field, we must encourage their effective use. 
Among other work, the drawing up of the lead/framework nation 
concept should be mentioned, together with the GHQ’s[72] 
standardised operation procedures (SOPs), or the issue of the marking 
of the national GHQs (multinationalised or multinationisable) and the 
improvement of their operationality, projectability and C2 features. It 
will also be important to bear in mind the matter of the Alliance’s 
European Command Arrangements.73 
All these issues were seen as complex and requiring work under 
future presidencies as well. No wonder public opinion was unimpressed 
and questioned the assertion of the Laeken European Council that the 
ESDP was operational.74 I n  a n y  c a s e ,  m u c h  w o r k  r e m a i n e d  t o  b e  d o n e .  
Progress on the ECAP in order to remedy shortfalls is reviewed in the next 
chapter. 
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Minister Trillo also touched on several undecided issues. On the 
Belgian idea of compiling a defence white book he said that the Institute for 
Security Studies would start compiling a book on European defence “which 
will be descriptive in nature and whose readership is intended to be the 
parliamentary assemblies and the general public”. So, there would be no 
policy document in the sense of a White Paper; that idea remained 
controversial in the Council. On the parliamentary dimension the speech 
was very bland: the sense of importance of keeping the parliaments 
informed was shared, but the fact was accepted that for the time being only 
the national parliaments were competent to exercise parliamentary control 
over matters of defence policy. Not a word was said about the consensus-
building roles of parliamentary assemblies like the WEU Assembly and the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 
Conflict prevention 
The Spanish presidency was also expected to report on the implementation 
of the European programme for the prevention of violent conflict and to 
continue developing and giving further practical expression to EU 
cooperation with the UN, the OSCE and other relevant organisations. 
Conflict prevention had been the subject of a report by High Representative 
Solana to the Nice summit, which defined the central challenge as 
coherence in deploying the right combination and sequence of instruments 
in a timely and integrated manner. The report continued: 
This demands greater coherence and complementarily at several 
levels, between the pillars, between the Union and its international 
partners in conflict prevention.75 
Conflict-prevention policies could not be separated from the broader 
issue of how the EU set its priorities in the area of external relations (§ 8) 
and could only be effective if the Union adopted a proactive approach, 
identifying problems before they became acute and translating early 
warning into early action. Mr Solana advocated a much more focused 
approach than the earlier ‘strategies’ emanating from the Amsterdam 
summit. Strategies had been written for the Balkans, Russia, Ukraine and 
the Mediterranean, but their impact had been minimal because they did not 
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manage to rise beyond the level of generalities and benevolent platitudes. 
On this occasion, Mr Solana recommended that conflict prevention should 
be addressed by the General Affairs Council, possibly during its annual 
orientation debate on external relations, and integrated into its work and 
that of the Development Council: 
The Union should set the explicit aim of developing targeted, 
common approaches to countries and regions at risk of conflict, taking 
account of CFSP, development, trade, economic and justice and home 
affairs issues.76 
On the policy planning side a format for the EU’s Country Strategy 
Paper s had been agreed. On the implementation side it was recommended 
that more use be made of special representatives “with the objective of 
more focused, flexible and robust diplomatic engagement”. Further, the 
Political and Security Committee should develop its potential as a focal 
point within the framework of the CFSP and ESDP (then still called the 
common security and defence policy (CSDP)) for the development, 
implementation and monitoring of conflict prevention policies. 
After the Nice European Council of 2000, the European Commission 
prepared a very substantial Communication on conflict prevention, giving 
an overview of all its activities.77 The EU itself was an on-going exercise in 
making peace and prosperity with a wide range of instruments at its 
disposal. The projection of stability in supporting regional structures in 
Africa, but also autonomous trade concessions to the western Balkans were 
mentioned as examples with a long-term stabilisation prospect. External 
aid might be focused on the (re)emergence of a favourable political 
environment and there might be a need to become more involved in 
security sector reform and specific rehabilitation programmes. The 
Communication argued that the EU should improve its ability to react 
quickly where a country seemed to be entering a downward spiral. The 
Commission admitted that security sector reform had not traditionally been 
a focus of Community cooperation, but felt that in many countries 
achieving structural stability may require a fundamental overhaul of the 
state security sector. Where support from the Community could offer 
added value, the Commission should focus on this sector; where member 
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states were better placed to assist (as in the case of reforming armed forces) 
they would be encouraged to do so during the discussion of the EU’s 
Country Strategy Papers. The Community could support conversion of 
military resources to civilian use, and the decommissioning of WMDs and 
conventional weapons. Within the limits of its competences, the 
Commission intended to play an increasingly active role in the security 
sector area. 
The Communication also had an interesting section on sanctions. So 
far, their impact had been somewhat disappointing; because of poor design 
and poor enforcement it had generally been a question of too little, too late. 
To target so-called ‘smart’ preventive sanctions and minimise the suffering 
of ordinary people a rigorous preliminary analysis would be necessary: 
Preventive sanctions might be justified as legitimate countermeasures 
to serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law. However, 
as a general rule, they will have to be compatible with international 
obligations (e.g. WTO and Cotonou Agreement).78 
The presidency report on the EU programme for the prevention of 
violent conflicts was less extensive than the Communication from the 
Commission. Apparently, some of the proposals were regarded as out-of-
bounds in terms of the competence of the Commission. The report stressed 
the need for greater coherence among the activities carried out under the 
different treaties. The EU had taken a considerable number of actions with 
a clear aim of conflict prevention: efforts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, 
Central Asia and the African Great Lakes region, as well as in the fight 
against terrorism after the 11 September attacks were all mentioned as 
examples. The sobering conclusion was added that “not all efforts 
undertaken by the EU had been successful”.79 So, more efficient preventive 
strategies were necessary. A systematic approach to early warning and 
early action was called for as well instruments aimed at short-term 
prevention and dealing with the root causes of conflict.  
Based on conflict assessments of more than 120 countries, the 
European Commission had maintained a ‘watch list’ of those that were a 
priority and developed a set of conflict indicators. The Council Secretariat 
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had started an early warning process providing assessments for the 
Political and Security Committee. These are undertaken jointly by the 
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PU), the EU Military Staff 
Intelligence Division and the Joint Situation Centre. The General Affairs 
Council of 13 May 2002 had stressed several elements in enhancing 
coherence: the main role of the PSC in bringing issues to the attention of the 
Council, through COREPER; the association of the geographical working 
groups with conflict prevention; and the role of heads of mission as the 
main EU ‘sensors’ in the field. An attempt was made at prioritising their 
work with the following instruction: 
In examining the likelihood of conflict in a country or region, there 
should be an evaluation of the potential impact of an eventual conflict 
on EU Member States and international stability, the EU’s capacity of 
influence/interest in the region or country, the instruments at the 
EU’s disposal, the role of other actors on the ground (international 
organisations other States, NGO’s, etc.) and the possibility to 
cooperate with them, as well as the need to ensure the follow-up of 
decisions taken.80 
Instruments for short-term prevention were fact-finding missions, 
monitoring missions (such as the Togo facilitators), election observation 
missions, human rights monitors, special representatives or other types of 
representatives (presidency representatives, tasking senior officials of the 
Council Secretariat or the Commission and other envoys). 
Long-term conflict prevention required the combined use of various 
policies and instruments at the EU’s disposal. Mention was made of 
policies such as those in the areas of: trade (an ‘open door’ approach such 
as the ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative as well as the EU contribution to the 
Kimberly process for the trade of rough diamonds); environmental policy 
such as the Kyoto protocol; human rights issues (including respect for 
minority rights in potential conflict regions and post-conflict rehabilitation, 
and support for the International Criminal Court); international financial 
policies; and non-proliferation, disarmament and arms-control instruments, 
including those related to small arms and light weapons. In the annex a 
contribution by the CFSP working groups on conventional arms exports 
(COARM) global disarmament and arms control (CODUN), and non-
proliferation (CONOP) went into more detail. Its most salient conclusion 
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was that a sound and coherent EU policy on export controls could be a 
major contribution to conflict prevention, impeding the acquisition and 
development of weapons by states of concern or terrorist groups. 
In my later submission to the working group on defence of the 
European Convention (reproduced in Annex 3), I stressed that as a new 
and potentially autonomous actor in the field of security the EU had a 
chance to develop a broad concept of security. In my view the programme 
of action decided by the European Council of Göteborg (2001) had a weak 
point in lacking a reference to crisis management. If this should be 
explained by the reluctance of the formerly ‘neutral’ members of the EU, it 
could be overcome by the formulation of a strategic concept, responding to 
the question of ‘what for?’ in terms of the ESDP, the Headline Goals and 
the conditions governing the possible use of force. Such a concept should 
develop the notions of comprehensive security, including conflict 
prevention, democracy-building and economic development, but also 
cooperative security with neighbouring regions. To be credible it should 
also contain a military capability underpinning the policies of the EU.  
Police capabilities 
In spite of the high-sounding statements about operational readiness, the 
year 2002 witnessed no EU military deployment. That would come only a 
year later when the deadlock over the use of NATO assets had been broken 
and the Berlin Plus arrangements had entered into force, giving the EU 
access to NATO assets. Paradoxically, it was another police mission that 
came first. On 28 January 2002, the General Affairs Council announced the 
EU’s readiness to ensure by 1 January 2003 the follow-on to the UN 
International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia up to the end of 2005. Less 
than a month later, on 18-19 February, the Council adopted the mission 
statement of the EU Police Mission (EUPM), its chain of command, 
coordination and financing arrangements, as well as the modalities for the 
contributions of non-member states. In the first instance, the non-EU 
European members of NATO, EU accession candidates and those OSCE 
member states already contributing to the IPTF were invited to participate. 
The EU would address the whole range of rule-of-law aspects, including 
institution-building programmes, which should be mutually supportive 
with the police activities. The chain of command would be as follows: 
•  The police commissioner would lead the mission and assume its day-
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•  The police commissioner would report to the secretary-general/high 
representative through the special representative of the EU in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
•  The special representative would report to the Council through the 
secretary-general/high representative for the CFSP. 
•  The PSC would provide the political control and strategic direction. 
•  The secretary-general/high representative would give guidance to 
the police commissioner through the special representative.81 
The Council formally adopted a Joint Action for replacing the IPTF 
on 11 March 2000, establishing the EUPM and a preparatory planning 
team. It took almost a full year of preparations before the IPTF could be 
taken over, but it was a useful first step in a process of the EU assuming 
more responsibility in former Yugoslavia. The involvement of the UN in 
police activities in this ethnically sensitive area was one of the doubtful 
elements of the Dayton agreement. How could one expect police officers 
from other continents, with completely different traditions of police 
authority, to bring together Serbs, Croats and Muslims in a multicultural 
environment? Apparently, in 1995 the EU was unable to muster sufficient 
personnel for the task, but other considerations also played a role. The 
fathers of Dayton wanted some role for the UN and had little confidence in 
the effectiveness of the EU. With the inclusion in the Helsinki Headline 
Goals of 5,000 police officers, EU credibility was enhanced. 
A corollary to the police capability was that concerning the rule of 
law, i.e. judges, prosecutors, correctional officers and experts in this field. 
The Göteborg European Council had set a target of 200 officials by 2003, 
including a capability to supplement rapid-deployment police units or fact-
finding missions, who would be deployable within 30 days. To this end a 
Rule of Law Capabilities Conference was held in Brussels on 16 May 2002, 
which came up with voluntary national commitments of 282 officials for 
crisis-management operations by 2003, including 60 being available within 
30 days and 43 for fact-finding missions. They were divided into broad 
categories of judiciary system (72 judges, 48 prosecutors and 38 
representing administrative services) and penitentiary system with 72 and 
34 officers. This meant that the Göteborg targets had been met in a 
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balanced way. Nevertheless, some points required further attention, the 
first of these being, as was to be expected, the financial aspects, but also the 
variety in the background of the officials that came from institutions with 
different competences. Some of them enjoyed an independent status with 
respect to their national administration. Therefore great interest was 
expressed in developing common crisis-management training modules. 
Finally, the EU was working on guidelines for criminal procedures, which 
would be offered, as an intellectual contribution, to support the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in implementing 
recommendations of the Brahimi report of 2000, which had called for a 
doctrinal shift on the use of civilian police in peace operations. 
Except for these guidelines, the progress on capabilities said little 
about the way in which the police assets would be used. In 1995 the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations had encapsulated the experience 
gained with CivPol since the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 
mission in Namibia in 1989 in the SMART concept: Supporting human 
rights; Monitoring the performance of the local enforcement authority; 
Advising the local police on best practice; Reporting on situations and 
incidents; and Training local enforcement personnel in best practices for 
policing and human rights. 
The SMART concept proved inadequate in situations such as Kosovo 
or East Timor, where the United Nations had assumed sovereign authority 
and established a transitional administration, as discussed in a SIPRI 
Research Report.82 In those cases the UN police component had to 
substitute for local police forces and perform functions that previous 
CivPol operations did not entail. In the absence of a sovereign state 
authority, executive police officers had the power to arrest and detain 
individuals and to investigate crimes of all kinds; they were armed and had 
to carry out law enforcement duties at the same time as they were 
attempting to re-establish local police capacity. To have a lasting effect, the 
authority to put in place and supervise a comprehensive framework for law 
and order is a prerequisite and policing should thus be seen as part of a 
rule-of-law continuum that includes the judiciary and penal institutions. 
Given the short rotations of international police officers and the diversity of 
their legal systems, the creation of a cadre of police should be taken in hand 
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to provide for longer assignments and specialised knowledge. Local police 
training cannot be done as a simple ‘add-on’ to operational duties. 
The SIPRI report also included interesting models for transferring 
executive authority. One of its main conclusions was that in view of the 
enormity of the challenge, law enforcement should be approached with 
caution and that it should be based on a clear, and to the public, 
transparent legal framework. Second, international policing would, of 
necessity, be limited in the number of objectives it could successfully 
achieve. Yet, prioritisation would be extremely difficult. Third, Renata 
Dwan made the point that, while multifunctional team approaches would 
be required, Western domestic police cultures tended to be insular and 
suspicious of close contacts with the military, while the judiciary was often 
perceived as a separate element of the rule of law. 
Another Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference was held 
on 19 November 2002 at ministerial level. At the conference it was stressed 
that in addition to the existing EU police-planning capability an 
appropriate EU planning and mission-support capability should be 
established within the Secretariat General of the Council covering the other 
areas of civilian crisis management as a matter of priority. Not surprisingly, 
ministers noted that the budgetary implications still had to be addressed. In 
addition, coordination in the field had to be improved and a unified chain 
of command in EU missions established, as well as full synergy between 
the European Community and EU instruments. Civil-military coordination 
would be strengthened through an action plan. 
Financing common costs 
The cost of the EU Police Mission was estimated at €38 million annually, 
consisting of €11 million in operational costs, €4 million for local staff, €5 
million for international civilian staff and €18 million for per diem and 
travel costs of the seconded police officers, their salaries being covered by 
the sending states. Start-up costs of €14 million for 2002 would be covered 
by the CFSP budget, but in future years this budget could provide only €10 
million and would have to be increased. In preparing for consultations with 
the European Parliament member states agreed to finance the per diem and 
travel costs on the basis of costs lie where they fall, i.e. also shared by the 
sending states. Financing continued to be a tricky business in the 
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Art. 28 of the Treaty on European Union provided for charging 
administrative expenditure for the institutions (whether or not arising from 
operations having military or defence implications) to the EC budget. 
Nevertheless, operational expenditure for military/defence operations 
must be charged to the member states. This was deemed to include the use 
of non-military assistance strongly related to a military operation. The 
Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue made the sending nations responsible 
for obtaining transportation resources to deploy, sustain and redeploy their 
forces. Yet some common costs would have to be covered in the budget of 
an operation. In Annex II to the presidency report on ESDP, submitted to 
the European Council at Seville on 21-22 June 2002, these were spelled out 
and divided in two categories: a) incremental costs for (deployable or fixed) 
headquarters for EU-led operations in comparison with the situation in 
which they were not involved in an operation, such as transport, 
administration, locally-hired personnel, communications, barracks and 
infrastructure, public information and representation/hospitality; and b) 
incremental costs incurred for providing support to the forces as a whole, 
such as infrastructure, additional equipment, identification marking and 
medical expenditure. 
The General Affairs Council of 17 June 2002 adopted this general 
framework for identifying common costs as distinct from all other costs, 
which had to be financed on the basis of costs lie where they fall (all parties 
paying for their own expenditures). The following week the European 
Council approved the presidency report on ESDP with its six annexes, but 
the financial principles were a facade without any real money behind it. No 
solution was provided as to how the common costs should be financed. The 
report itself proposed a series of items on which further work would be 
necessary, the first being “the possible need for a separate budget for EU 
common costs as well as for adequate control and auditing”.83 The truth of 
the matter was that countries such as France and the UK did not want a 
role for the Commission and the European Parliament in the ESDP, without 
which it could not be financed from the Union budget, while others refused 
to consider a parallel budget. As a result, the bizarre paradox continued of 
a high representative with recognised competence but no money, and a 
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commissioner for external relations with access to the European Union’s 
budget, but only competent for matters of civilian crisis management. 
It would take until February 2004 to adopt intergovernmental rules 
for meeting the common costs for ESDP operations, which after long debate 
were defined as headquarters, transport, management, local forces, 
communications, caserns, public relations, infrastructure, additional 
equipment, medical services, and civil and military exercises. These would 
be financed under the ATHENA mechanism, based on the GDP key.84 It 
represented a step forward in comparison with NATO, which still followed 
the principle that operational costs had to be born by each participating 
state individually and therefore found it difficult to deploy forces to places 
such as Darfur in Sudan. From a democratic point of view, resorting to a 
separate budget apart from the EU budget was not ideal, but it was a 
practical solution to a real problem. 
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4.  Transatlantic Crossroads 
In 2002 a large chunk of the security debate centred on the question of 
NATO’s relevance in the era of US power.85 At the January Dolder meeting 
near Zürich, opinion among the Europeans was divided. One argued that 
the US would not run wars outside Europe in the NATO framework. 
NATO was a war machine of last resort, not of choice, which derived its 
value mainly from the practice of joint planning, standing operating 
procedures and rules of engagement. Another rebutted that, if you wanted 
to make war, NATO was still the best available. And a third raised the 
ironic question of whether the Alliance, after invoking Art. V, really had 
“restored the security of the North Atlantic area”. An American participant 
pointed at the paradox that the Pentagon had created an Office of Force 
Transformation because there was no agreement on a future force 
structure. Now a compromise would have to be struck between homeland 
defence, including missile defence, and asymmetric warfare. Later, post-
conflict stabilisation forces would be added. 
Much attention was paid to the likelihood of a US intervention in 
Iraq. A senior American thought the case for action to be strong, but no 
scenario was attractive. The only opposition to Saddam Hussein came from 
the Kurds, but they were unable to obtain support from their neighbours. 
Perhaps the system was more brittle than it appeared for the moment. His 
preferred option was to focus on the Iraqi potential to supply weapons of 
mass destruction for terrorist action and to obtain support for international 
inspections. The regime was unlikely to be able to accept them, which 
could be followed up by air strikes. No one doubted that Iraq had chemical 
weapons, but its conventional capabilities were also assessed as quite 
formidable: 2,700 main battle tanks, 2,200 of which would be operational. 
Doubt was expressed about the likelihood of the UN Special Commission 
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(UNSCOM) ever being able to go back to resume its inspections, a 
sentiment that apparently was shared among the inspectors. With the 
privilege of hindsight, we now know that all these analyses were wrong. 
Saddam Hussein had no chemical weapons left, but could not admit it 
openly if he wanted to retain his position in the Middle East as a symbol of 
defiance against the US. If he had cooperated better with the Hans Blix 
team upon their return, he could have avoided the negative tone of their 
report, which would have made US intervention very difficult. As to his 
conventional forces, they disappeared in the sandstorms and disbanded, as 
advised by the Americans on their mobile telephones, and in the ensuing 
chaos early consolidation appeared impossible. So far it is not known to 
what extent the subsequent attacks on the occupying forces had already 
been prepared in order to sabotage the reconstruction effort. 
Two weeks later, on 2 February 2002, the European security 
community gathering at the traditional Wehrkunde Conference in Munich 
was shaken up by a provocative but also moving speech by US Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. It was moving because it ended with 
the example of a German destroyer shortly after 11 September drawing 
close to the USS Winston Churchill, flying the American flag at half-mast 
and manning the rails while signalling “We Stand by You”. It was 
provocative because, although appreciative of the 3,500 troops contributed 
by coalition partners to Operation Enduring Freedom and the International 
Security Assistance Force in Kabul, it posed the question: What have we 
learned from the events of 11 September? Mr Wolfowitz warned of 
terrorists possessing weapons of mass destruction. The problem had gone 
beyond crime and punishment and required prevention and sometimes 
pre-emption. In his view, “we are at war” and in war the mission must 
determine the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission, 
otherwise it would be reduced to the lowest common denominator. So 
there would be different coalitions for different missions, which would not 
‘unravel’ if some country stopped participation. In the military 
transformation agenda to be launched at the Prague summit the 
development of NATO’s capacities in counter-terrorism should be a key 
component and part of NATO’s basic job description: collective defence. 
Art. V threats could come from anywhere and in many forms. Rather than 
guessing which enemy would confront us and where, he stressed that we 
should focus on what capabilities adversaries could use against us, shore  
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up our vulnerabilities and exploit new capabilities to extend our own 
military advantages. That was the essence of a capabilities-based approach 
to defence planning. 
Reading the speech again several years later, it seems less 
provocative. Admittedly, the speech contained a veiled barb against the 
French, who had intervened in targeting decisions during the Kosovo 
campaign. It also provided a prelude to Pentagon doubts about the 
capabilities of its allies, but Europeans had a point in saying that before 11 
September, the US – and NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson 
– had stressed different capabilities without prioritising them and, for 
example, without emphasis on the special forces, which would be much in 
demand in the Afghan campaign. Most worrying to NATO supporters was 
the concept of varying coalitions for missions, which hardly seemed 
compatible with the traditional stress on common values. If the coalition 
had no role in a consultation process, the allies had no other choice than to 
sign up to the mission as defined by the US or abstain altogether. Yet, it 
was realistic to assume that in ‘out of area’ operations not involving the 
defence of NATO territory not everyone would join, so the real question 
was whether collective defence should remain geographically limited or 
extended to other common interests. 
In Munich, Mr Wolfowitz did not say openly that NATO should go 
global. That came later, at the NATO summit in Prague on 21-22 
November, when the heads of state and government decided “to 
strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, 
populations and territory, from wherever they may come” (§3).86 The word 
‘pre-emption’ was not used, but the chosen wording came close to it in 
saying “we are determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against 
any attack on us”. In order to carry out the full range of its missions, 
“NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they 
are needed to sustain operations over distance and time” (§4). It was a 
typical NATO compromise text. The possibility of operations outside the 
Treaty area was confirmed but the phrase “wherever they are needed” 
remained vague and subject to (unanimous) ad hoc decisions of the North 
Atlantic Council. Nevertheless, it was an important outcome for the work 
of NATO planners. As early as 1992, at the annual IISS conference Manfred 
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Wörner had declared the out-of-area debate out of date, but that referred to 
operations in former Yugoslavia. Now, more distant action had to be 
envisaged and attention turned to the ways in which it could be 
implemented. Not for the first time was the focus on capabilities without 
formulating a clear idea of the concrete tasks they should be able to 
perform. That made sense up to a point, because without the capabilities no 
action would be possible, but with the building-up of new forces the ‘what 
for?’ question continued to pop up, both in NATO and in the EU. 
Pillar, bridge, identity and separable or autonomous capability? 
The NATO bureaucracy never was at ease with the European political 
cooperation and feared that it would be divisive within the Alliance. The 
same could be said of many people in Washington. The meetings of the 
political directors took place outside the consultations in the Brussels 
headquarters and showed little transparency to the rest of the world. Yet, 
no one really could object to the EEC, and later the European Union, 
attempting to forge a more coherent link between its economic policies and 
political objectives. As long as the EPC did not deal with security (except 
for the OSCE) there was no outright clash or duplication with NATO, but 
on other issues two separate circuits developed. Consequently, the primary 
function of NATO as a forum for consultation eroded. Paradoxically, after 
the end of the cold war NATO became more military in its orientation 
instead of more political. It focused on operations – first in the Balkans and 
later in Afghanistan, but political objectives were insufficiently discussed to 
be able to present a convincing picture to the outside world. The worst 
came during the US intervention in Iraq, when no discussion in the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) took place at all. The EU did not do any better and 
was equally split down the middle. 
The problem of EU-NATO relations was exacerbated by American 
resistance to the formation of a ‘European caucus’ within NATO. 
W a s h i n g t o n  w a n t e d  t o  r e m a i n  i n v o l v e d  i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  
beginning and not be confronted by European positions that had emerged 
in its absence. In negotiations such as the multilateral trade rounds the US 
had seen how the difficulty in agreeing upon European positions had held 
up progress in the plenary. That would be unacceptable in crisis 
management, where speed would be of the essence. It is true, however, that 
there is a difference between Alliance consultations, based on solidarity 
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the one hand, but eager for a stronger military European contribution on 
the other, Washington never came to grips with the problem, which 
inexorably moved to the emergence of two centres of decision-making in 
Brussels, making the problem of interaction only larger. 
President John F. Kennedy coined the image of a two-pillar structure 
for the Alliance, but during his time this was premature in view of the 
incomplete structure of European integration. American leadership 
remained crucial in the face of the Soviet threat and most Europeans were 
content with this reassurance of their security. If there was any talk of a 
transatlantic bargain, it referred to the American nuclear umbrella in 
exchange for better European conventional defences to strengthen 
deterrence and make it less dependent on nuclear retaliation. Transatlantic 
relations never were without irritations, but the predominant interest of 
collective defence dampened them considerably and by and large made 
American initiatives in the politico-military field palatable to their 
European allies. The Europeans on their side were hesitant; however, to 
globalise their relations with the US for fear that its predominance in 
defence would extract undesirable concessions in the economic sphere. As 
a result, relations between the US and the EEC and later the EU never 
reached the maturity that might have been hoped for. 
The pillar image lingered on. After 1991, when the WEU gained some 
brief respectability as a vehicle for actions that the EU had put at arms 
length but NATO was not able to undertake, the organisation was 
described as being simultaneously the European pillar of NATO and the 
military dimension of the European Union. But pillars standing alone 
without a connecting frieze made little sense. At Maastricht the European 
Union was constructed with three pillars and an overarching European 
Council. While not very efficient, this was at least a model for combining 
the communitarian and intergovernmental aspects of EU integration. 
Within NATO the European presence remained limited to contacts at the 
level of deputy and assistant secretary-general and occasional meetings of 
the NATO and WEU Councils. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner 
made a point of inviting his WEU colleague to the ministerial sessions, 
even the restricted ones, but substantial inputs were few and far between. 
The exception was the cooperation in the Adriatic in 1994 to enforce the 
embargo against Serbia. For the rest, the ambassador of the WEU 
presidency country was charged to inform the NATO Permanent Council 
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of joint councils has been continued with the Political and Security 
Committee of the EU after it took over from the WEU. This meant that non-
NATO members would also sit around the table, in addition to non-EU 
members on the NATO side. Such meetings were useful in providing 
transparency, but inevitably grew very large as most countries are 
represented by two ambassadors. 
  Several other metaphors acquired new currency in the semantic 
vocabulary of transatlantic discourse. Could the WEU be seen as a bridge? 
Not really, because it was part of the European shore. Then could it be 
viewed as a European identity?87 The term is not easily comprehensible and 
no one specified what it meant. As far as it dealt with defence it was 
presumed to be within NATO, but the Alliance never made the 
organisational arrangements to make a European identity visible. In fact, 
the US adamantly opposed the creation of a European caucus that would 
discuss agenda items before they were taken up in the North Atlantic 
Council. The only exception was the Eurogroup initiative of 1968 by Denis 
Healey, then the UK Secretary of State for Defence, to better present the 
European defence contribution to the US and to promote cooperation on 
defence procurement among the Europeans. 
Identity suggests a measure of personality and individuality, but also 
a degree of oneness and unity encompassing both specificity and closeness, 
which makes it possible to stand out in relation to other identities. In 1973 
the EPC had embarked on an abortive attempt to define the European 
identity in terms of common heritage, common interests, specific 
commitment and the status of the integration process. In substance, 
however, this definition did not rise above a series of platitudes stating that 
links were important with all parts of the world. The existing close ties with 
the US and the sharing of values and goals that emanated from a common 
heritage were said to be profitable for both sides and should be preserved. 
They did not, however, affect the determination of the (then 9) members to 
act with autonomous unity.88 At the same time they wanted to continue 
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their constructive dialogue with the US and base their cooperation on 
equality developed in a spirit of friendship. The resulting document was so 
anodyne that it was soon forgotten. Moreover, it was overtaken by Henry 
Kissinger’s initiative to launch a year of Europe, which also proved ill fated 
after the oil boycott had turned it into the year of the Arabs.  
The 1986 Single European Act of Luxembourg drew the EEC and EPC 
closer together and stated that “closer cooperation on questions of 
European security would contribute in an essential way to the 
development of a European identity in external policy matters”.89 That 
made sense if the EPC was to develop into meaningful policy coordination 
and did not necessarily extend into the realm of defence. The WEU 
Platform on Security Interests took it a step further by intending “to 
develop a more cohesive European defence identity”. The North Atlantic 
Council of 11 December 1987 responded positively and noted that WEU 
ministers “affirmed a positive identity in the field of European security 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, conducive to the 
strengthening of the transatlantic partnership and of the Alliance as a 
whole”. The NATO summit in Brussels of 29-30 May 1989 used different 
wording and talked of “a reinforced European component of our common 
security effort and its efficiency”. The joint US-EU declaration of 23 
November 1990 affirmed that the “European Community is acquiring its 
own identity in economic and monetary matters, in foreign policy and in 
the domain of security”.  
The word ‘defence’ appeared in December 1990 in the communiqué 
of the North Atlantic Council, but it was linked with NATO: “A European 
security and defence role, reflected in the construction of a European pillar 
within the Alliance will not only serve the interests of the European states, 
but also help to strengthen Atlantic solidarity”. The NAC communiqué of 
Copenhagen of 7 June 1991 produced another mix in “the emergence and 
development of a European security and defence role” and the necessity of 
“complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it 
emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance”. The words 
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“European security identity and defence role” were repeated at the Rome 
summit of NATO in November 1991 and also in the Strategic Concept 
adopted then. The WEU declaration issued at the time of the Maastricht 
European Council of 10 December 1991 agreed “on the need to develop a 
genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European 
responsibility in defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a 
gradual process involving successive phases.” The NAC of 19 December 
reproduced the decisions taken at Maastricht in detail under the heading of 
“European Security Identity and Defence Role”. Six months later, in Oslo 
on 4 June 1992, the NAC finally brought home the title of a European 
Security and Defence Identity or ESDI. That did not mean that other images 
would no longer be used. The NATO summit declaration of January 1994 
mentioned the European pillar not less than five times. The word ‘identity’ 
made some sense when it referred to the WEU, which was at arms length of 
the EU, but after its functions were transferred to the EU in 1998 the 
emphasis was to be on the European security and defence policy, which 
was an integral part of the EU.  
The semantic issue being more or less settled, attention shifted to 
capabilities and the possibility of European operations. Initially, the WEU 
had an advantage over NATO in not being prevented from engaging in 
out-of-area operations. Until Germany had cleared this issue with the 
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, it was not able to engage its military 
forces outside the NATO area. The WEU never required all partners to be 
militarily involved as soon as the political decision to be engaged had been 
taken by the Council. Its first operation where Europeans took 
responsibility for actions outside the European continent was the mine-
clearing operation in the Gulf during the Iran–Iraq war. Later, the German 
problem was solved by its participation with personnel of the 
Bundesgrenzschütz  in the embargo operation on the Danube. NATO 
Secretary-General Wörner did his utmost to lift the restriction on Alliance 
operations, but it took time. On the US side he was spurred on by US 
Senator Richard Lugar’s dictum that NATO had to go out of area or out of 
business.  
In November 1993 the WEU ministerial meeting decided to intensify 
their coordination on Alliance issues representing an important common 
interest, with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in the WEU into 
the process of consultation in the Alliance. Second, in future crises it was 
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including those through joint Council meetings on whether and how they 
might cooperate. And third, the hope was expressed that the forthcoming 
NATO summit of January 1994 would endorse the principle that the WEU 
could use the collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance, such as 
communication systems, command facilities and headquarters. This would 
be the only way to avoid unnecessary duplication. At the NATO foreign 
ministers’ meeting to prepare for the summit, I described the WEU as the 
“operational arm” of the EU. Reactions were favourable, also from US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who supported a strong ESDI as the 
logical consequence of the process of European integration. In his opinion, 
NATO should offer the common assets on the principle of ‘separable but 
not separate’, meaning that they could function under different command 
arrangements without affecting their ultimate availability to NATO. On 
their availability he was not fully clear: the NATO consultation process 
should continue to generate views on all topical security issues, but he did 
not regard them as implying a possible veto on the use of Alliance assets. A 
decision by the NAC would be necessary to safeguard Alliance cohesion, 
but the new concept of CJTF would be tailored for actions by both NATO 
and the WEU. The summit declaration ingeniously avoided the word 
‘decision’ by the NAC and mentioned ‘consultations’ when NATO assets 
were to be made available. 
The ‘separable but not separate’ metaphor was a suitable placebo for 
those who were concerned about the Europeans going their own way. It 
did not stand up, however, to close scrutiny. Once made available, it would 
be most unlikely that the forces could be withdrawn, and in any case no 
one worried what would happen to the assets when the crisis was over. 
CJTF on the other hand was a most innovative new concept of the 
American military to operate in an environment that would be increasingly 
multi-service, multi-agency and multinational.90 Ad hoc pooling of 
resources to deal with humanitarian crises or regional conflicts was bound 
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to remain inadequate. For a better chance of success ‘employment 
packages’ needed to be formed around the nucleus of a pre-selected and 
pre-trained command element and based on central planning but 
decentralised execution. The concept would enhance NATO’s own 
capability for crisis management, but could also provide for the needs of 
the WEU. Unfortunately, it was never formally put into practice. NATO 
planning for the WEU did not have a lucky start and aimed at operations 
that were either too large or too small. When asked about this in 1994, the 
SACEUR, General George Joulwan, complained of the lack of guidance he 
received from Brussels, which made him use a contingency plan developed 
for Bosnia. When NATO actually deployed in Bosnia in 1995 with the 
planned size of some 50,000 personnel, it did not do so under a CJTF 
banner.91  Nor did it do so in the small Kosovo Extraction Force for the 
possible evacuation of OSCE monitors, which consisted entirely of 
European units. The EU-led Operation Concordia in Macedonia in March 
2003 could be said to draw on the Berlin Plus arrangement, but it consisted 
only of 350 lightly armed personnel for a period of six months and 
therefore could have been accomplished without recourse to NATO. 
Several things went wrong. France stepped back from its announced 
resumption of a role in the appropriate NATO bodies after an unfortunate 
misunderstanding between Presidents Clinton and Chirac. They came 
within one sentence, only four words, of Europeanising the function of 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) at the 
headquarters in Naples and giving France the prospect of occupying the 
post some time in the future. If this had been successful the subsequent 
debate on ESDI and ESDP might have been muted.92 Washington with 
some justification hesitated to give up its post as major subordinate 
commander, which was double-hatted with the Sixth Fleet. The situation 
between Greece and Turkey and generally in the eastern Mediterranean 
was better handled by an American commander able to provide the glue to 
keep the Alliance together. 
 Greek-Turkish problems were also the reason why agreement on the 
availability of NATO assets proved so difficult. Ankara wanted to make 
sure that those assets would not be provided for European operations in 
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which Turkey was not allowed to participate and it would take years to 
square that circle. Finally, the Berlin meeting of the NAC in 1996, which 
focused on CJTF, put it firmly in the centre of NATO’s own approach 
towards contingency operations. A new concept was coined of a single 
system being capable of performing multiple functions, including non-Art. 
V operations. In other words, NATO could do it all on its own and the 
division of labour would not be drawn along the lines of collective defence 
for NATO and non-Art. V activities for the WEU. In future the criterion 
would be whether NATO as a whole would not be engaged, primarily 
because the US would not be prepared to join. At Berlin NATO did not 
make any dissenting noises and declared support for “the development of 
ESDI within NATO by conducting at the request of and in coordination 
with the WEU, military planning and exercises for illustrative missions 
identified by the WEU”.93 ESDI was described as a “permanent and visible” 
part of NATO, but the details seemed complicated and much of the earlier 
enthusiasm was lost. NATO wanted to maintain control of the assets 
handed to Europe, even if the Alliance was not engaged in an operation. If 
the ESDI remained a purely military device to leave everything as it was, 
but to give final command authority to the deputy SACEUR, it would 
never remotely resemble a European identity. The military had a point in 
saying that they remained responsible for the rotation of personnel and the 
quality of their work, but politically the message for the scope of 
autonomous action was not positive. The French countermove to Berlin 
was the development of the ‘lead nation’ concept and during their 
presidency of the EU an exercise was organised using a national 
headquarters as the basis for the command structure, bringing in officers 
from other participating countries. In any case, it would take years before 
the Berlin Plus agreement was redefined. By that time the WEU had 
transferred its functions to the European Union, but the problems remained 
the same. 
In 1999 the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier 
Ruperez, convened a steering group to argue the case for the ESDI, aiming 
at repeating the successful report of his predecessor Senator William Roth 
on the future of NATO. He wanted the ESDI within NATO, but then an 
Alliance that incorporated all members of the EU. In his view, neutrality 
should not be allowed to survive because opting out ran counter to the 
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spirit of solidarity. Europe needed a security dimension for building up a 
European consciousness. Part of the new reflection should cover the 
mechanism needed for the transfer of NATO resources to the EU. His 
compatriot and later successor Rafael Estrella rebutted that the CFSP aimed 
at autonomous actions, such as the strategy with regard to Russia and 
others, so the ESDI could not be entirely within NATO. This led Mr 
Ruperez to the question of which autonomous military actions could be 
regarded as probable, either by the EU or the US. The exercise petered out, 
because Mr Ruperez was appointed Spanish ambassador to Washington, 
but his questions remained. 
In my opinion it was and remains illogical for the US to stress the 
importance of the ESDI, but simultaneously resist any European caucus in 
NATO. This stance is even more illogical in a period when the US reserves 
the right for unilateral action and focuses on coalitions of the willing to join 
them. In fact, the Europeans are much less likely to engage in autonomous 
action than the Americans and envisage doing so only if the US does not 
want to become engaged. The more the EU builds capabilities, either for 
NATO-led or EU-led operations, the more it should be able to formulate 
views on objectives and strategy. 
The real problem lies in the way Europeans develop common 
positions and subsequently introduce them into NATO consultations. 
There is no reason why that could not be done in a spirit of complete 
openness and transparency and willingness to adapt initial views to sound 
arguments advanced by others, especially the US. Immutable positions 
stand up poorly in an alliance and, if they occur, would constitute a serious 
problem, regardless of any European pillar or identity. Washington should 
be less concerned about the Europeans ganging up against them. 
Europeans might be divided about joining the US, but are most unlikely to 
act against its clear wishes. The danger to NATO is not EU success, but its 
failure to deliver, for EU success will not be measured in terms of its 
consistency with NATO, but in its capacity to generate an independent and 
influential role in security affairs.94 In any case, without the ESDI, and the 
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subsequent ESDP (which soon replaced the identity metaphor), European 
spending on defence would have decreased. While the political quarrel 
continued, things on the ground sometimes could be arranged amicably. At 
the beginning of the year 2000 the Eurocorps provided the core of the 
KFOR headquarters and five years later France participated in a NATO 
Response Force (NRF). 
American representatives went too far with the presumed ‘right of 
first refusal’ for NATO to undertake a mission, in preference to the EU. It 
was pressed in reaction to the Franco-British agreement at St Malo 
concerning the possibility of autonomous European action. I found the 
vocabulary peculiar, because who was offering anything? In reality it 
would be difficult enough finding anyone willing to act. During a crisis all 
international organisations would be consulting their members, and 
hopefully each other as well. Informally, NATO would keep the pride of 
place, for everyone would be keen on using its well-oiled machinery with 
American participation, but why formalise it in an artificial and probably 
time-consuming manner? If the US did not want to join, either the CJTF or 
the autonomous mode would be possible, but it would make little sense to 
determine the best option through a binary process of elimination. The 
argument that conferring this right upon NATO would force the Alliance 
to make up its mind was risky. Would the US always want to say clearly 
that it did not wish to be involved, thereby bringing diverging opinions out 
in the open and putting the remaining partners at a disadvantage?  
Another suggestion to arrive at a formal division of labour – that of 
leaving the Balkans to the EU and the Middle East to the US – equally 
should be approached with caution for several reasons. First among these is 
that any division of labour, by definition, is divisive. Would it be politically 
desirable or feasible to parcel out parts of the world where both the EU and 
the US had important interests? In 2000 the sceptics would sneer that the 
EU would not be up to it and might be pushed to do things it was not 
ready for. More importantly it would risk eroding NATO by under-cutting 
the assumption that security remained indivisible. Philip Gordon warned a 
group from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly against institutional 
gimmicks: if Europe puts value to the table, NATO would move that way. 
His conditions for the right outcome were the building of better European 
capabilities, for NATO to remain the preferred option whenever possible, 
good NATO-EU links including the availability of NATO assets, the 
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He also made the important point that duplication referred to planning and 
command structures, not to the Europeans acquiring weapon systems.95 
So far, the EU has conducted only one autonomous operation. In the 
summer of 1994 in Bunia in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo a multinational force of some 1,500 personnel acted quickly to 
d e a l  w i t h  a n  e r u p t i o n  o f  v i o l e n c e  and managed to control the situation 
until a larger UN force could be despatched. One could ask the question of 
whether a Berlin Plus arrangement could have acted with similar swiftness 
in this time-sensitive contingency.96 This experience would later be the 
model for the ‘battle group’ concept of the EU. 
Every time NATO goes through a crisis of confidence, calls are heard 
for a second Harmel report to redefine the future tasks of the Alliance. In 
1967 the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel performed a valuable 
function in raising morale after NATO had to move from Paris to Brussels 
by focusing on the doubleheader of defence and détente (and in passing 
formulating German unification as an objective). Usually the establishment 
has not been in favour out of fear that everything would be turned upside 
down and so far it has not happened. In 1993 the German Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel toyed with the idea of a different set-up of the Alliance, 
inviting all EU members to join and thus making the European identity 
within NATO more visible.97 The last call for a group of wise men came 
from Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the Munich security conference of 
2005, when he pointed at the waning substance of NATO’s political 
consultations. We shall come back to that difficult period in transatlantic 
relations. At this point it suffices to note that governments generally are not 
enamoured of special panels or wise men, unless they see no way out and 
want to gain time. Usually they want to control developments more closely 
than is possible when a group of independent statesmen or experts (or 
both) have a go at the problem.  
The most worrying trend in transatlantic relations was the widening 
divergence on a variety of issues, ranging from ratification of the 
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to hormones in beef, genetically modified 
organisms, hush-kits for noisy aircraft engines and development issues 
such as the import of bananas from former colonies. In the past, the debate 
on protectionism related primarily to classic commercial issues – tariffs, 
quotas and preferences, for example – but now also extended to health and 
environmental policies and pure food legislation. It was compounded by 
the fact that on these issues the EU was more permissive of national 
exceptions than the World Trade Organisation (WTO). To cap it all, the 
WTO was suddenly confronted by an unholy alliance of NGOs and interest 
groups, whose only common ground was opposition to further trade 
liberalisation. Transatlantic compromise was more necessary than ever, but 
was not forthcoming in the presidential election year 2004. Many of the 
issues did not immediately relate to security matters, but were bound to 
have an impact on the overall perception of American policies. With a Bush 
administration bent on spreading democracy, paradoxically the Europeans 
became increasingly sceptical about the way these values and norms were 
being applied. The American campaign against the International Criminal 
Court was a case in point. Torture during the occupation of Iraq was even 
more painful. Anti-Americanism increased throughout Western Europe 
albeit in varying degrees, with the UK and the Netherlands being least 
affected.  
American attitudes towards European integration have become 
ambiguous. It is difficult to determine a precise moment when benign 
scepticism turned into more negative or even hostile attitudes. The failure 
of France to return to the military side of NATO in 1995 as the result of a 
misunderstanding between Presidents Chirac and Clinton had something 
t o  d o  w i t h  i t .  S u s p i c i o n s  o f  F r e n ch designs to construct the European 
identity as a counterweight to the US have always been a factor, which 
reached a climax during the French opposition (and even active 
campaigning) in the Security Council to the American intervention in Iraq. 
This happened in the middle of the work of the European Convention and 
influenced opinion on the resulting Constitution and its subsequent setback 
in referenda among a small but vocal group of experts. 
That opinion was shaping up as early as 1992 when a Pentagon White 
Paper bluntly stated that the US government must “discourage the 
advanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership or even 
aspiring to a larger regional or global role”. It thought it critical for the US 
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which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies and friends, or 
which could seriously unsettle international relations”.98 To most 
Europeans the idea of the EU challenging American leadership seemed far-
fetched, but some exaggerated declarations of European politicians might 
have nourished those concerns. An extreme example was the unwise 
statement at the European Council of Lisbon in 2000 that within 10 years 
the EU should become the most competitive group in the world. Half-way 
through the decade, little has happened to fulfil that promise. In any case it 
would have already been quite a challenge to become simply competitive, 
but to say ‘most competitive’ was absurd. 
Some European writers, indignant about American unilateralism and 
the intervention in Iraq, have kindled the bushfire. The German 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas and his French colleague Jacques Derrida 
published a joint plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in a core 
Europe.99 They took the massive demonstrations across Europe to protest 
against the impending invasion of Iraq as “a sign of the birth of a European 
public sphere” and argued that it was necessary for Europe “to throw its 
weight on the scales to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the 
US”. Europe should exert its influence in shaping the design for a coming 
global domestic policy, presumably an extension of the Western European 
way of doing things. The cacophonous response to this outright plea for 
building the European identity on the basis of overt opposition to the US 
led Anatol Lieven to the melancholy observation that European nations 
were largely formed by defining themselves as enemies of other European 
nations: a German was a German because he was neither a Pole nor a 
Frenchman, and so on.100 His conclusion was that much would depend on 
more extreme enemies. If no major terrorist attack occurs against the US, 
the country might gradually move towards a basically pragmatic and 
restrained approach to deal with the rest of the world. After the attacks in 
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Madrid and London, one might add that European attitudes to terrorism 
are hardening too, and leading to tougher measures in dealing with the 
threat. 
Lawrence Freedman approached the issue from a different angle. The 
EU had a comparative advantage in soft power, using non-military means 
of influence and persuasion, at least in its own neighbourhood, but this was 
derived from the fact of its very existence rather than from an active foreign 
policy. Its common foreign policy was still largely reactive “and the basic 
organising principle often appears to be to find the minimum necessary for 
a quiet life”.101 He felt that many Europeans, probably a majority, had little 
interest in a Europe that could define itself only in relation to the US and 
would rather want to work together with Washington. He seemed right. A 
European Union of 25 members or more might be able to agree on certain 
common policies to protect shared interests, but ganging up against the US 
is unlikely to be one of them. 
The US foreign policy elite, both Republican and Democrat, have 
consistently supported a stronger and more globally responsible EU, on the 
assumption that it would be more open, more free-market oriented and a 
more useful partner in addressing global security issues, hopefully 
releasing the US from some of its international responsibilities.102 
Consequently, those policy-makers could be expected to see the European 
crisis as having negative implications for transatlantic burden-sharing and 
the promotion of stability in areas of US interests. These concerns were 
voiced by Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution in warning his 
compatriots that they should not cheer a French ‘no’ vote to the 
Constitution. Its result would be the sort of disunity and political paralysis 
that made the current EU such an awkward partner.103 Rejection of the 
Constitution would undermine further enlargement, lead to divisive and 
unworkable proposals for ‘core groups’ and signify a victory for the anti-
American, anti-capitalist, anti-globalisation activists who formed a nucleus 
of the rejectionist camp. These views are contradicted by the influential and 
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conservative Heritage Foundation, which has long argued against support 
for European integration and in favour of a policy of dividing the 
Europeans. The American Enterprise Institute was subtler in supporting 
European integration as long as it was limited to economic aspects, but 
objected to what it regarded as advancing political centralism in the 
Constitution. Both organisations were particularly critical about the parts of 
the Constitution that strengthened the external role of the Union, which in 
their view would be detrimental to transatlantic relations. Most people, 
however, were indifferent or even oblivious of the impending stalemate in 
the Union and in the words of Marcin Zaborowski, would be prone to 
come to regard it as another example of “this European mess”.104 
Ronald Asmus tried to bridge the gap by giving four fundamental 
reasons why the US has a real and growing interest in the success of the 
European Union:105 
1)  For sustaining peace and security in Europe, the European Union is 
the best guarantee. 
2)  The US has a profound stake in the EU remaining a magnet with 
influence beyond its borders, helping to anchor the young and fragile 
democracies to the West. 
3)  There is a need for strategic cooperation between the US and Europe.  
4)  There is the potential to form a natural coalition of democracies that 
work together to confront new challenges. 
From the European side one could not agree more, but will it 
happen? It takes ‘two to tango’ and US leadership will only function if its 
steps do not hurt the toes of its partners. It will have to take the views of 
the allies sufficiently into consideration to have everyone recognise its 
interests in a joint partnership. Making NATO more political is long 
overdue but cannot be the whole story, because today’s challenges have 
outgrown the military-focused framework. It will only be possible to set a 
common global agenda if the dance produces new figures in the search for 
a common purpose and a sense of shared norms. 
NATO and the EU play leap-frog 
As the debate continued, NATO and the EU played a game of leap-frog. 
After the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 the Prague summit of 21-22 
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November 2002 created the NATO Response Force of some 20,000 persons 
with an initial operational capability by October 2004 that was to be fully 
operational two years later. It would consist of technologically advanced, 
flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces including land, 
sea and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided 
by the Council. With this decision NATO jumped ahead of the EU: the NRF 
would be an ‘insertion force’ with considerable fighting power and 
substantial air and naval components, able to deploy much quicker than 
the 60 days set for the EU Headline Goals. Its units would be designated in 
advance as a force package, while the EU was still working on the basis of a 
Force Catalogue from which units could be selected when a crisis erupted.  
On the European side, defence ministers also worked on their 
capabilities. On 11 February 2002 the European Capability Action Plan had 
been launched under the Spanish presidency to remedy 24 significant 
shortfalls with the help of 12 and later 19 panels. Informal meetings were 
held in Zaragoza on 22-23 March and Rethymnon on 4-5 October, and their 
first formal meeting in the format of the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC in the new jargon and ‘jerk’ in the vernacular) 
took place on 13 May. At Zaragoza High Representative Solana struck a 
stern note. Ultimately, the ECAP was to deliver real capabilities and to be 
able to do so the issue of resources for defence should be addressed 
seriously. European defence spending had steadily declined throughout 
the 1990s to an average of less than 2% of GDP. In his view, increased 
solidarity and a stronger sense of common interests among member states 
should reduce the scope for purely national military intervention and push 
towards integration among their armed forces. Therefore, it should not be 
hard to move more decisively towards greater task-sharing, the 
development of multinational capabilities and pooling of resources. 
Strategic mobility, communication and information systems were prime 
candidates for that approach.106 
The formal meeting of defence ministers of 13 May 2002 examined all 
relevant aspects of the development of EU military capabilities as set out at 
the 2001 European Council of Laeken. The conclusions were positive but 
hardly spectacular. The ECAP was scrutinising many of the shortfalls, but 
ministers recognised that “as expected at this early stage, significant 
shortfalls will remain until results have been produced, while others still 
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need to be addressed”.107 The Council also confirmed the need for further 
development of concepts and procedures in accordance with the 
Presidency Work Plan on Rapid Response. Reference was made to work “in 
the various areas related to the improvement of operationality of 
Headquarters”. 
The presidency report on ESDP to the European Council at Seville on 
21-22 June 2002 incorporated these elements. It also made a conceptual 
point by stating that “The bottom-up and voluntary character of the ECAP 
has been built into the mechanisms established for ECAP implementation”, 
a sentence that required further elucidation to become comprehensible.108 
Obviously no country could be forced to change its commitments or 
national planning against its wish, but in a multinational context it would 
be necessary to merge bottom-up and top-down processes. NATO did so 
successfully by agreeing guidance from above as the basis for commitments 
and for implementation from below, which was then evaluated together. In 
the EU such a defence-planning cycle still appeared to be an anathema to 
French sensitivities. Yet, without it the coherence of European capabilities 
would remain doubtful. 
On structure the report mentioned that the WEU Satellite Centre and 
Institute for Security Studies had become operational as EU agencies on 1 
January 2002. Within the Council Secretariat a Joint Situation Centre had 
been further developed, which would improve support to the Council in 
the whole field of CFSP. 
At Rethymnon in October 2002 (with the Greek minister as host in 
view of the Danish non-participation in the ESDP), Javier Solana repeated 
his call to defence ministers for spending more and doing better. More 
significant was his moving away from the bottom-up approach. He argued 
that it should be combined with a process that gives the necessary political 
impetus for the actual implementation of the technical options prepared by 
military experts. Ministers had an essential role in this process, on the basis 
of the advice of the EU Military Committee. In other words, waiting for 
uncoordinated national contributions would not be sufficient. Therefore, 
High Representative Solana appealed for a common definition of 
operational requirements and better coordination of acquisition and 
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research programmes. Another interesting remark dealt with the need to 
take fully into account the new NATO Defence Capability Initiative. ECAP 
and the DCI were not per se mutually reinforcing, but had to be financed 
out of the same set of budgets. 
On 19 November defence ministers again met in the GAERC format 
and considered the intermediate reports of the ECAP panels 
“encouraging”. Mr Solana was satisfied with the progress made within a 
short period of time, except in the area of improving European military 
capabilities. He still did not have an overall picture of the state of play in 
the various ECAP panels, which made it difficult to collectively assess 
progress and to give meaningful political guidance for the way ahead. To 
enhance European credibility, High Representative Solana proposed to 
ensure that at least a few high visibility projects were implemented – or at 
least firmly committed and funded – by the end of 2003, if possible 
concentrating on capabilities that were critical for EU strategic autonomy. 
Thus spurred into speedier action the GAERC called for the EU rapid 
response elements to be finalised, able to react within 5-30 days, with 
streamlined crisis-management procedures and advance planning based on 
illustrative scenarios. In the Headline Force Catalogue the rapid response 
elements were to be identified specifically and the modalities worked out 
for the use of the agreed framework-nation concept and other concepts as 
might be agreed. 
On that occasion the Secretariat-General of the EU Council provided 
an illustrative document on the ECAP109 drawn up by representatives of 
the states that chaired panels, then 19 in total. The list was illuminating for 
its scope and the incorporation of capabilities for offensive operations: 
1)  Helicopters. Out of the three attack helicopter battalions required by 
the Headline Goal, two had been contributed, which would be 
sufficient in all but the most demanding scenarios. On support 
helicopters the panel was still at an early stage. 
2)  Nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) protection. Initially the 
requirement of two battalions was raised to three, but later amended 
                                                 
109 See General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC), Council 
Conclusions at the GAERC meeting of 19 November 2002(b) in Brussels; see also 
Chaillot Paper No. 57 (Haine, 2003), op. cit., pp. 148-155 for the document and 
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to just one NBC company. Offers had been received to make up this 
shortfall as well as for contributing to deployable NBC laboratories.  
3)  Surveillance and target acquisition units/UAVs. Requirements in terms of 
quality and quantity had been established, which were now being 
compared with existing assets and ongoing projects in member states. 
A final report was to be ready by March 2003. 
4)  Medical role and medical collective protection. In the medium to long 
term, it was held that a multinational approach could possibly 
remedy the shortfall. 
5)  Special operations. Proposals were to be made to end the shortfall for 
concurrent EU scenarios by the end of 2003. 
6)  Carrier-based air power. The panel considered that at least 60 aircraft 
would be necessary, which required an increase of national 
contributions. 
7)  Suppression of enemy air defence. Threat analysis had shown that the 
destruction of an acquisition radar or ground-to-air site would not be 
sufficient for guaranteeing the safety of an offensive deep strike 
mission. Short-term solutions were explored such as jamming devices 
or other appropriate weapons, but further analysis was needed, e.g. 
on localising and identifying any defences before deciding on a 
procurement policy. 
8)  Air-to-air refuelling. A short-term solution involving additional 
national contributions would be possible by the end of 2003. Medium-
term, interim (until 2012) and long-term solutions were being 
developed. 
9)  Combat search and rescue. Quantitative requirements could be met if 
additional forces were provided; qualitatively, the panel was 
considering alternatives for improving European capabilities. 
10)  Cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions (PGM). Recent operations 
and the foreseeable geopolitical environments underlined the 
importance in crisis management of extremely precise weapons, fired 
from aircraft or ships. In 2003 European cruise missile capabilities 
were to be increased substantially and requirements would be fully 
met by 2006. Most EU member states already had acquired or ordered 
PGM. In view of the diversity of launchers efforts were now directed 
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11)  Tactical ballistic missile defence. Possibilities seemed to exist in the 
further combining of expertise, joint development of doctrines and 
procedures, multinational exercises and armaments cooperation. 
12)  Deployable communication and information modules (DCMs). The number 
of assets offered (four from France, two from the UK and one from 
Italy) was insufficient to meet the overall requirement for eight 
DCMs, also because of differences in size and composition. A step-by-
step approach was followed to define the specific assets needed for 
deployable headquarters. 
13)  Theatre surveillance air picture. Requirements had been compared with 
existing national capabilities. Options for enhancement were to be 
presented by March 2003. 
14)  Strategic imagery intelligence collection. For the short term, the panel 
concentrated on images provided by observation satellites, both 
commercial and military. They considered that medium-term (2005-
07) access to future military or dual-use systems would be negotiated 
and for the timeframe 2010-15 common programmes for the next 
generation of observation satellites should be developed. 
15)  UAVs at high and medium altitude with long endurance and tactical UAVs. 
This concerned the French–Dutch MALE project and the integration 
of drones in the airspace and their certification. 
16)  Strategic air mobility/outsize transport and general cargo aircraft (items 
16/17 in the document). These two panels only reported that they 
would be able to present options in time to meet the deadlines. 
17)  Roll-on-roll-off/general cargo shipping (items 18/19 in the document). 
Options were developed for the use of commercial assets and the 
appropriate management mechanisms and related legal issues. 
It remained difficult to assess the overall significance of these reports 
for the mounting of EU-led operations. Undoubtedly, progress was being 
made, but one could only sympathise with Javier Solana’s outburst that 
political guidance for the way ahead was hardly possible. Of course, the 
same question could be asked of NATO planning for crisis-management 
operations, but there US assets could fill the gaps left by the Europeans; the 
well-oiled machinery of the NATO command structure and its defence-
planning cycle were better able to put forces together and to define and 
remedy shortcomings. For the EU the interrelationships between the panels 
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strategic intelligence and target acquisition and a follow-up with ground 
forces? For the short term it would be meaningful to clarify what tasks the 
EU would be able to perform initially and to build from there in the context 
of the most plausible contingencies, rather than continually emphasise 
shortfalls in a panoply of requirements, some of which would only be 
needed in scenarios where autonomous European action was not to be 
expected soon. Moreover, the acquisition of deep-strike capabilities, such as 
cruise missiles and the suppression of enemy air defences, required 
political support for the contingencies of their possible use, which would 
not be easily provided by national parliaments. 
Surveying developments in 2002 led to the paradoxical conclusion 
that the year had not witnessed any deployment of EU forces for Petersberg 
tasks, in spite of the fact that the Laeken European Council had adopted a 
Declaration of Operational Capability of the common European security 
and defence policy. That would only come a year later when the deadlock 
over the use of NATO assets had been broken and the EU took over from 
NATO in Macedonia, to be followed by the first autonomous operation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and the agreement that by December 
2003 NATO would hand over SFOR in Bosnia, where the EU already had 
established a police mission as a follow-on to the UN International Police 
Task Force.  
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5.  The Convention on the Future of 
Europe 
It took until February 2003 before the Treaty of Nice entered into force. An 
Irish referendum had turned negative, requiring another declaration to 
make the text palatable to public opinion.110 Fortunately, this did not 
preclude the continuation of the conceptual debate. At the Nice European 
Council meeting in 2000 the European leaders had issued a Declaration on 
the Future of the Union, calling for a deeper and wider debate on the future 
development of the EU, and agreed a general, but not very precise, 
roadmap towards the next Intergovernmental Conference, expected for 
2004. It would be prepared by a broad-based Convention including the 
candidate countries and a sizeable number of members of the European 
Parliament. The debate was to address the question of subsidiarity, the 
status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a simplification of the treaties 
and the role of national parliaments. At the European Council at Laeken, 
held a year after Nice, it had already become clear that the agenda would 
have to be wider than those four points. Apart from further extending the 
areas of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, coupled with 
co-decision of the European Parliament, the mechanisms of the second 
pillar would have to be improved. The triumvirate of Javier Solana as High 
Representative for CFSP, Chris Patten as Commissioner for External 
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Relations and the six-monthly presidency worked reasonably well in 
Macedonia (with the participation of NATO Secretary-General Lord 
George Robertson as well) but was cumbersome. It was also clear that the 
high representative should be given larger powers of initiative and work in 
tandem with the Commission. Moreover, the EU was hampered by divided 
competences, with Mr Solana responsible for politico-military crisis 
management and Mr Patten (with the money of the EU budget behind him) 
for the civilian aspects. That was no efficient way of operating – even 
though present personalities made the best of it – and was contrary to the 
reality that the EU could only make a mark when all its resources were 
used in a coherent manner. 
The idea of a Convention was not new. It had been successfully tried 
in drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights under the chairmanship of 
the former German President Roman Herzog. In 1999, the European 
Council of Tampere accepted a German proposal to codify the existing 
fundamental rights in the Union into a single document and entrusted the 
task to a mixed convention of 15 government representatives, 16 members 
of the European Parliament, 30 national parliamentarians (2 from each 
member country) and 1 European commissioner. The outcome was a 
consensus text, which was adopted by the Nice European Council as a 
political document, but not legally binding. That distinction undoubtedly 
made agreement easier. 
The Belgian presidency deserved credit for widening the scope of the 
debate. The declaration emanating from the Laeken European Council of 
December 2001 listed some 58 questions to be answered by the Convention. 
Europe not only had to be made more democratic, more transparent and 
more efficient, but also had to resolve three basic challenges: to bring the 
citizen closer to the European design, to organise European politics in an 
enlarged Union, and to develop it into a stabilising factor and a model in 
the new, multipolar world. The Convention was tasked with drawing up a 
final document that might comprise either different options (indicating the 
degree of support they received) or recommendations if consensus was 
achieved. The subsequent Intergovernmental Conference would take the 
ultimate decisions. The Laeken declaration was short on defence policy: the 
only questions posed related to how a more coherent external policy and 
defence policy could be formulated, and whether the Petersberg missions 
should be updated. There was quite a difference, as noted by Philippe de 124 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
Schoutheete, with the precise questions posed about the institutions, the 
instruments, the competences, subsidiarity and other issues.111 
The Convention followed the earlier model, but with some 
differences. Its President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, would be aided by two 
Vice-Presidents, former Italian Prime Minister Giulio Amato and the 
former Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene. The Commission had 
two representatives, Commissioners Antonio Vitorino and Michel Barnier. 
All candidate states, including Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey were given 
equal treatment to the full members and would also have one government 
representative and two parliamentarian members. The European 
Parliament wanted to have 30 members, as many as the MPs from member 
countries, but was kept at 16 as in the previous Convention. All members 
had substitutes, who were allowed to participate in the working groups, 
and as the Convention progressed, they were also permitted to speak even 
when their full member was present. Altogether, there were 210 persons 
plus observers from the Economic and Social Committee, social partners 
and the Committee of the Regions. During the hearings with 
representatives from civil society and in the committees, many others were 
allowed to speak. 
The European Convention was opened on 26 February 2002 by an 
impressive speech from its president. The great hemicycle of the European 
Parliament in Brussels was packed and the hall opposite provided 
television viewing. Everyone had the feeling of being present at the 
creation of something new. Opinions differed on what exactly it would 
turn out to be. Mr Giscard himself sketched the alternatives: either a 
yawning abyss of failure, adding to the current confusion in the European 
project, or agreement on a concept of the European Union bringing unity to 
our continent and respect for its diversity. His speech combined 
philosophical vision with a clear sense of purpose, without becoming 
unduly rhetoric. For the first time since the Messina conference of 1955 the 
future of Europe would be examined in detail – a Europe that had made 
three fundamental contributions to humanity: reason, humanism and 
freedom. The main reason why Europe was marking time was the 
difficulty of combining a strong feeling of belonging to the EU with a 
continuing sense of national identity. Therefore, the first stage of the 
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PESD, Cahier de Chaillot No. 71, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 
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Convention should be attentive listening to the question: What do 
Europeans expect of Europe at the beginning of the 21st century? Special 
attention would be paid to a Convention for young persons and to 
interaction with civil society. Would Europeans imagine Europe 50 years 
hence as a more uniform Europe, driven forward by a process of 
harmonisation or as keeping its diversity while respecting cultural and 
historical identities? His question left the audience puzzled, because the 
obvious answer would be: both. That would be the outcome of the 
Convention after 16 months’ work: union in diversity. It was not entirely 
clear why Mr Giscard said that the two objectives would result in different 
approaches. Perhaps to show that he had no preconceived ideas about the 
ultimate result. 
In any case, the formulae he proposed to consider in a second stage 
gave room for different visions: 
•  the organisation of the European institutions resulting from the 
Treaty of Nice; 
•  the plan for an EU organised along federal lines, as put forward by 
high-level German decision-makers in particular; 
•  the document prepared by the European Commission modernising 
the Community method; and 
•  the solutions submitted under the banner of a ‘federation of nation 
states’, whether or not they involved the creation of a second 
chamber. 
The third stage should be the formulation of a proposal. The Laeken 
declaration left the Convention free to choose between submitting options 
and making a single recommendation. Obviously, a broad consensus on a 
single proposal would carry considerable weight and authority and open 
the way towards a constitution for Europe. He did not want to choose now, 
but nevertheless pointed the way when, with the argument of avoiding 
disagreement over semantics, he proposed to call it a ‘constitutional treaty 
for Europe’. To most of the audience the difference was small. On working 
methods, Mr Giscard made only a few remarks in his inaugural address, 
the most important dealing with the nature of a convention in general: it 
was neither an Intergovernmental Conference, nor a parliament, but a 
group of men and women meeting for the sole purpose of preparing a joint 
proposal. None of the inaugural speakers made a reference to security and 
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During the 16-month gestation period of the Convention several 
outside events had an impact. First, the Seville European Council in 2002 
took some decisions on the CFSP, which could be seen as pre-empting 
some of the work of the Convention by designating the meetings of the 
foreign ministers as the General Affairs and External Relations Council. 
Second, the European Parliament adopted an omnibus resolution that dealt 
with several issues under consideration by the Convention. Third, the crisis 
in Iraq led to a delay in the proceedings, particularly on the issues of 
external action. 
In the light of the coming enlargement, the Seville summit adopted a 
number of measures changing the rules of procedure of the Council and 
limiting the number of formats to nine. Several ministers could attend at 
the same time. The GAERC combined general affairs and external affairs, 
but would discuss them in separate sessions with their own agendas and 
possibly on different days. External affairs would entail the whole field of 
external action, including the CFSP, ESDP, foreign trade, development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid.112 For the first time in December 2003, a 
strategic multi-annual programme for the next three years would be 
adopted, drafted by the presidencies concerned in consultation with the 
Commission. Anticipating this, an operational programme for the next year 
would be presented by the two incoming presidencies in December 2002. 
Preparatory meetings for the budget during the first semester would be 
chaired by the presidency for the second semester. Some more technical 
groups would be chaired by a member of the Council Secretariat. The 
presidency would be able to limit speaking time and to ask delegations 
sharing a particular point of view to designate a single speaker.  
These measures made organisational sense, but seemed to preclude 
the high representative or future foreign minister from chairing the 
Council. Another implicit innovation, but also recognition of a fact of life, 
was the reference to caucusing by like-minded countries on a particular 
issue, which would encourage the formation of ad hoc coalitions. 
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The European Parliament reports 
On 26 September 2002 the European Parliament adopted the report on The 
Progress Achieved in the Implementation of the CFSP.113 It dealt tous azimuts 
with topical issues, but also with fundamental institutional questions. The 
general point was made that a substantial expansion of intergovernmental 
bodies in the EU’s CFSP management had taken place, particularly through 
the extension of new security and defence policy structures in the Council 
Secretariat. More specifically, the report 
•  reiterated its view that in order to avoid the inefficiency caused by 
the situation (in which the EU remained silent on major international 
issues) the tasks of high representative and the commissioner for 
external relations must be merged; further, this new office, to be set 
up in the Commission, must be given a pivotal role in daily crisis 
management and be answerable both to the Council and the 
European Parliament; 
•  restated that effective external action by the Union required steps to 
be taken towards shaping a common, though not single, EU 
diplomacy, boosting the political role of the network of Commission 
delegations; 
•  took the view that the creation of a council of foreign ministers that 
could also include ministers for defence, external trade and 
development cooperation, could shape the EU’s conflict-prevention 
policy and crisis management much more coherently and effectively; 
however, the report repeated its demand that a separate council of 
ministers of defence should be created for ESDP matters; and 
•  demanded that the high representative/commissioner for external 
relations be made answerable in writing to the European Parliament. 
The Council’s annual report on the financial implications of decisions 
taken within the framework of the CFSP did not go far enough. 
Concerning the ESDP, the document 
•  called for a clear negotiating mandate for direct talks between the 
high representative and the NATO secretary-general; 
                                                 
113 The Resolution adopting the report is reproduced in Chaillot Paper No. 57 
(Haine, 2003), pp. 118-128. 128 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
•  advocated a greater division of lab o u r  t o  f i l l  g a p s  i n  t h e  R a p i d  
Reaction Force and reiterated its demand for a European armaments 
agency; 
•  took the view that the EU and its member states should not limit 
themselves to peacekeeping missions alone, but also be in a position 
to carry out peace-enforcement operations in accordance with the UN 
Charter;  
•  welcomed the agreement of 17 May 2002 on the funding of military 
operations, distinguishing between joint and individual costs. 
Nevertheless, it recommended that the transport of troops to the 
deployment area and accommodation there should be treated not on 
a case-by-case basis, but as joint costs as a matter of principle. Joint 
costs should be funded from the Community budget (as already 
occurred in the civilian sphere in the case of police operations) and 
not from a subsidiary budget of the member states; 
•  called for the mutual assistance obligations laid down in the WEU 
Treaty to be incorporated into the future EU draft Constitution; and 
•  proposed that crisis prevention and the ESDP be integrated in the 
Barcelona process with a view to achieving mutual security. 
Working groups 
When the European Parliament adopted its resolutions on CFSP, the 
Convention had already moved into phase 2, the working groups. Initially, 
Mr Giscard had not envisaged them, but a near-revolt from the plenary 
against an overly large role for the Presidium had led to their creation. The 
first six were on subsidiarity, the Charter of Fundamental rights, legal 
personality, the role of national parliaments, complementary competences 
and economic governance. Later another four developed on external action, 
defence, simplification of legislative procedures, and freedom, security and 
justice. Finally, an 11th grou p formed on social policy. The grou ps were 
chaired by members of the Presidium. The group on external relations was 
headed by Jean-Luc Dehaene; defence was led by Michel Barnier (who 
originally had hoped to become chairman of both committees).114 The 
working groups were composed according to the wishes of the individual 
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members. Thus they were not representative for the Convention as a whole, 
but thanks to very thorough proceedings, with hearings of experts and 
large numbers of written contributions, their reports commanded much 
support. In the third phase, however, when the Presidium was drafting the 
Constitution, not all recommendations were taken on board. 
On 10 September the mandates of the working groups on external 
action and defence were published, both quite brief, but with substantial 
annotations. The external action group focused on the definition of the 
interests of the Union, on ensuring consistency and coordination of all 
available instruments, rapid action, the experience gained with the post of 
high representative, how the necessary forces should be made available, 
and what arrangements should be made for external representation. The 
group on defence had eight points, covering:  
•  what defence remit could be envisaged for the EU, apart from the 
Petersberg tasks;  
•  what could be done to ensure that member states have the military 
capabilities needed to guarantee the credibility of the Union’s defence 
policy, including the possibility of admission criteria and a pact to be 
complied with, such as that agreed for the monetary union;  
•  whether enhanced cooperation should be extended to defence 
matters;  
•  how to ensure quick decision-making during crisis management and, 
as a separate question, coherent planning of the EU’s operations; and  
•  whether a European arms agency should be envisaged.  
The annotated mandate postulated more specific questions: 
1)  The group was to consider the question of whether an undertaking of 
collective defence should be enshrined in the Treaty or in a protocol 
annexed thereto, possibly with an ‘opting-in’ clause for states that 
might not wish to subscribe to such an undertaking as of now, or 
which might not yet have the capabilities. 
2)  Mechanisms were therefore to be identified that ensure that the 
member states meet their commitments as regards military 
capabilities. It was thought that one possibility would be to take as a 
basis what has been done for monetary union: namely to establish 
strict criteria that member states must meet if they are to be allowed 
to participate in the EU’s defence policy and a legal act that they 
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were unable to participate in this mechanism or that did not wish to 
do so could join it subsequently when they fulfilled the requisite 
criteria. 
3)  In the case of mutual assistance and military capabilities, the 
mechanisms were to allow those states that have the will and the 
means to do so to intensify their commitments. 
4)  The working group was to consider ways of ensuring that decisions 
could be taken rapidly and effectively during the implementation of 
an operation and that the military leaders could identify a clear chain 
of command. 
5)  The group was to consider how to ensure that the planning of 
military and civil aspects (which may incidentally be covered by Title 
V or by the EEC Treaty and must therefore be planned respectively 
by the Council General Secretariat’s new politico-military structures 
and by the Commission) is coordinated.  
6)  The group was also asked to give consideration as to whether forms 
of cooperation on armaments could be incorporated into the Treaty, 
such as cooperation among all member states or voluntary 
cooperation with accession criteria. It was suggested that the group 
might investigate the possibility of setting up an arms agency whose 
tasks (research, development and acquisitions) and operating 
methods would have to be studied in detail. 
Near the end of the proceedings in the working groups, on 21 
November, the French and German Foreign Ministers, Dominique de 
Villepin and Joschka Fischer, presented joint proposals to the Convention, 
thus following up the announcement at the Franco–German defence and 
security summit at Schwerin of 30 July 2002. At that time their statement 
had been fairly general, deriving its interest primarily from the fact that the 
two were on speaking terms again. Their leaders talked of harmonising 
requirements-planning and mentioned the A400M transport aircraft, 
transforming the air-transport coordination cell into a European transport 
command; they spoke of a ‘federation’ of space observation systems 
including Helios II and SAR-LUPE and discussed the exchange of 
increasing numbers of officers in their headquarters. The two countries 
would present proposals on preventing and fighting terrorism, notably 
against deployed forces, and an analysis of the threat posed by the 
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In the Convention the two ministers were quite specific. They 
proposed to annex a political declaration to the Treaty dealing with 
solidarity and common security in order to identify the entire spectrum of 
risks, including terrorism in particular, and the means to face them. They 
envisaged a transformation of the ESDP into a European security and 
defence union, which would also strengthen the European pillar of the 
Alliance. Although in principle it would be desirable that all member states 
participated, there would be situations in which not everyone would be 
willing or able to do so. Therefore reinforced cooperation should also be 
available in the ESDP, notably in the fields of: 
•  multinational forces with integrated commands, without prejudice to 
their employment in NATO; 
•  armament and capabilities; and  
•  human resource management and the development of common 
doctrines. 
In their view, starting reinforced cooperation should become possible 
by qualified majority, with a lower threshold of participants (rather than 
half the members) and guarantee rapid decision-making. Nevertheless, 
unanimity would remain necessary for the launching of a military 
operation, albeit with the possibility of constructive abstention. Those 
countries willing to do so should transfer their WEU Art. V commitment to 
the EU by making use of reinforced cooperation. 
On developing military capabilities, France and Germany proposed a 
protocol containing the commitments of the participating countries and 
establishing new forms of cooperation, notably by harmonising their 
requirements planning, joining (la mise en commun) their capabilities and 
resources and task specialisation. They also advocated a European 
armaments policy but saw it in an intergovernmental framework to 
harmonise operational requirements and to procure equipment in 
multinational programmes. The possibility of an armaments agency was 
mentioned twice, but somewhat differently. For acquiring equipment 
developed in multinational programmes an agency could eventually be 
used by enlarging the OCCAR agreement. Yet, at the end of the paper there 
was a firm proposal to include in the Treaty a European armaments 
agency, if necessary on the basis of reinforced cooperation. The two 
countries further recommended that the Treaty include the progressive 
creation of a European market for arms, thus adapting Art. 296 (previously 
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Armaments required specific arrangements for transit and customs tariffs, 
along with information security, intellectual property and research. 
Other half-way contributions came from the European Commission, 
which did little good and created confusion. On 1 December both an 
official Communication115 of the Commission and the ‘Penelope’ working 
document on institutional architecture were published, the latter under the 
personal responsibility of Commission President Romano Prodi, but 
judging by underground rumbling, not adequately staffed within the 
Commission.116 Even the two Commissioners participating in the 
Convention, Messrs Barnier and Vitorino, appeared to have been left out of 
the loop. Penelope was a closely argued draft treaty, which utterly failed to 
make a mark on the proceedings.  
The Commission Communication described the area immediately to 
the south and east of the Union as de facto the ideal area for a common 
foreign policy. If it was to acquire a higher profile, the Union must have 
decision-making capacity on security and defence issues and encourage the 
development of a European arms industry. Through the EU Europeans 
would be able to defend their model of society and exercise their 
democratic rights more effectively and more completely. The Commission 
repeated its agreement with a merger of the functions of high 
representative and the commissioner responsible for external relations 
(already expressed in its Communication of 22 May 2002) and now 
proposed creating the post of secretary of the European Union as a vice-
president of the Commission with special status. During an as yet 
unspecified transitional period the post-holder would exercise the 
Commission’s right of initiative as regards the CFSP “within the 
framework of the guidelines and mandates given to him by the Council, or 
of a group of member states with a particular interest in a specific question 
and whose common interests might require action on the part of the 
Union”.117 At the end of the transitional period the Council, acting on a 
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proposal from the Commission and applying an enhanced  qualified 
majority, would rule on the arrangements by which the secretary of the 
Union would autonomously exercise the Commission’s right of initiative in 
terms of the CFSP. Consequently, the Council would also have to rule on 
the extent of the member states’ right of initiative at the end of the 
transition period. Other proposals on external relations such as 
international trade and development would continue to form part of the 
Commission’s autonomous initiative. The secretary of the Union would 
have access to a single administration resource drawn from the General 
Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and the member states, placed 
under his/her authority and benefiting from the administrative 
infrastructure of the Commission. This unity of administration was deemed 
essential if common action was to be effective. 
On defence an earlier version of Penelope document envisaged the 
creation of a delegate for defence issues, in line with its thinking of turning 
this area into a ‘fourth pillar’ of the EU. In its final form it proposed to refer 
defence to an optional additional act, which would also have had the effect 
of continuing the WEU arrangement, but transporting the organisation into 
the Union framework. This would have had the advantage of including the 
WEU ‘lock, stock and barrel’ and avoiding a squabble with the non-
aligned, but would not create the solidarity inherent in a union. Moreover, 
the notion of a fourth pillar had been explicitly discarded earlier by a group 
of ‘wise men’ under the chairmanship of Mr Dehaene.118 
The groups on external action and defence were interlinked but stood 
alone with regard to the other working groups, except the one on legal 
personality. Under the able chairmanship of Giulio Amato that group not 
only achieved a consensus minus one (the French Europarliamentarian 
William Abitbol) on a single legal personality for the European Union as a 
whole, but also concluded that as a result the pillar structure could 
disappear. This did not mean, however, that procedures for decision-
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making should become identical. A separate regime for the CFSP remained 
possible. Although the Treaty already enabled the Council to conclude 
agreements in the areas of CFSP and police and judicial matters on behalf 
of the Union, conferring legal personality on the Union would clarify the 
possibility for the Union as such to conclude agreements in the field of its 
competence. In this connection the working group on external action noted 
that the Court of Justice had recognised implicit external Community 
competences when the conclusion of international agreements was 
necessary for the implementation of internal policies. The group also made 
the point that in a possibly regrouped section of the new draft 
Constitutional Treaty, covering all aspects of external action, it would be 
useful to have provisions (and preferably one single provision) indicating 
who would act on behalf of the Union in negotiating and concluding 
international agreements.  
The working group on external action, chaired by Convention Vice-
President Jean Luc Dehaene, covered a wide range of subjects. Its main 
impact was a list of principles and objectives that found their way into Art. 
III-283 of the Constitution (see Annex 2) and a thorough discussion of four 
options for bringing the roles of the high representatives and the 
commissioner responsible for external relations closer together: 
1)  The first option was to enhance their synergy, while keeping their 
functions separate, through recognition of the right of proposal of the 
high representative; his/her participation in the relevant meetings of 
the Commission, possibly with the status of observer; the preparation 
of joint proposals; and more cooperation between their services, with 
a possible merger in certain areas and the creation of EU embassies. 
Then the functions of high representative should be split from that of 
the secretary-general of the Council. A considerable number of 
members of the group felt that maintaining two distinct functions 
would not ensure coherence and were looking for bolder institutional 
change. 
2)  A second option concerned bringing the functions of the high 
representative into the Commission, i.e. extending the 
communitarian method to the CFSP, but not the ESDP. A 
considerable number saw this as the most effective solution, but at 
the same time noted that it might not be attainable at this stage, as 
there was no consensus among member states to turn foreign policy 
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3)  Also considered was the option of exercising of both offices by one 
person with the title of ‘European external representative’ who would 
be appointed by the European Council with a qualified majority and 
with the approval of the president of the Commission and 
endorsement by the European Parliament. Procedures for CFSP and 
Community issues should remain distinct. In the capacity of high 
representative the post-holder would have the formal, but not 
exclusive right of initiative in the Council, and if this right was 
exercised the Commission was to abstain from taking a competing 
initiative. The initiatives and decisions to put to the Commission in 
effect would not be subject to prior approval by the college of 
Commissioners. On issues falling under Community competences 
s/he would fully participate in decisions of the college following the 
regular procedure of majority voting. The new official would ensure 
the external representation of the Union and replace the current 
troika. 
Opponents of this option questioned its compatibility with the 
principle of collegiality and felt that the scope of responsibility was 
too large for one person. According to insiders this was also the 
personal view of the current high representative Javier Solana, but he 
did not say so openly. 
4)  A fourth option was the creation of the post of ‘EU minister of foreign 
affairs’ under the direct authority of the European Council, 
combining the two functions of high representative and RELEX 
commissioner and chairing the newly formed External Action 
Council. In the wording of the report, “the aim would be to increase 
coherence between policy guidelines agreed by the Council and the 
operational responsibilities of the Commission in the field of external 
action, while respecting the competencies attributed to each 
institution”.119 
Not surprisingly, a large trend emerged in the working group in 
favour of the third option with a European external representative. The 
fourth was overly weighted in favour of the Council and the disputed 
function of a European president. As we see later, the Convention 
ultimately agreed upon a mixture of options 3 and 4 above, in which it 
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accepted the title of minister of foreign affairs, but more narrowly 
circumscribed the function of the president of the European Council. 
Much attention was paid to the vexed question of qualified majority 
voting. The group advanced the dubious argument that the CFSP was not a 
policy that advanced by legislation (which was true), and was thus less 
adapted to the use of QMV (which did not follow, because legislative 
decisions have much more lasting effects than the ad hoc decisions that 
characterise most CFSP matters). Nevertheless, the group agreed that QMV 
as “an instrument of last resort to unblock a stalemate” could have a 
positive effect on consensus-building. Even in Community policy areas the 
Council rarely proceeded to a vote. The current need for unanimity 
restricted the Union’s capacity to act and resulted in a policy dictated by 
the least ambitious position. To overcome the risk of increasing ‘CFSP 
inertia’, a considerable number of persons advocated extending the use of 
QMV as a general rule (without prejudice to decisions in the 
military/defence area) but others voiced objections: it would be difficult for 
a member state to find itself in a minority position when its vital interests 
were at stake and voting would heighten non-member state awareness of 
internal EU disagreement. To counter these arguments suggestions were 
made to provide an emergency brake by involving a vital national interest 
or some other safeguard clause such as Art. 23.2 of the TEU. 
Notwithstanding the different positions, the group in general was 
favourable to better use being made of the existing provisions for QMV and 
could agree to a passerelle clause in the draft Constitutional Treaty 
providing for the possibility of the European Council agreeing by 
unanimity to extend the use of QMV in CFSP. A special case, which almost 
made it into the draft Constitution, was the introduction of a joint initiative 
by the high representative and the Commission, which would then be 
decided by the Council with QMV. It was deleted by the Presidium after a 
visit of Mr Giscard to London. He later defended the refusal with the 
argument that the Commission should not be the judge in deciding the 
voting mode. 
The working group also showed wide support for QMV in all areas 
of commercial policy, including services and intellectual property; for 
including the European Development Fund into the overall EU budget; for 
a single spokesperson in international fora when there was an agreed 
position of the Union; and for a single representation of the eurozone in 
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considered as an element of the global strategy of the Union, and required 
more cooperation between the EU and member states. Together they 
provided more than half of all donor aid. 
The Barnier report 
The composition of the working group on defence, chaired by 
Commissioner Michel Barnier, was not representative for the Convention 
as a whole inasmuch as it contained many opponents of strengthening the 
ESDP. Several Scandinavians voiced objections to a ‘militarisation’ of the 
EU and advised those wanting a collective defence commitment – albeit in 
an optional protocol – to seek it in NATO. They were not susceptible to the 
argument that the existing formulation of Art. 17 of the TEU already stated 
“the progressive framing of a common defence policy…which might lead 
to a Common Defence, should the European Council so decide”. 
Fortunately, they did not object to a number of far-reaching 
recommendations, provided a footnote made clear that these were not 
shared by all members of the working group. 
The report also appeared on 16 December but followed a different 
format. The first part reviewed the legal context, developments since the 
Cologne European Council of June 1999, progress made and the gaps 
remaining, and the new challenges and threats of the evolving strategic 
environment. The actions of the high representative in ‘flashpoint 
diplomacy’, as in the case of Macedonia, had been significant and useful, 
but in declaring the ESDP operational the 2001 Laeken European Council 
had only noted that the Union was now capable of conducting some crisis-
management operations. With regard to the use of NATO assets, the Berlin 
Plus agreement had not yet been concluded. Under the existing provisions 
of the TEU qualified majority voting could not be applied to decisions 
having military or defence implications, nor could their operational 
expenditure be charged to the budget of the European Communities. The 
report described in detail the diversity in the situation of individual states, 
in terms of status in the WEU and NATO, their defence industries, budget 
differences, deployment capabilities, nuclear capabilities and professional 
or conscript armies. Some forms of closer cooperation already existed, both 
in the area of armaments and in multinational military units with 
headquarters. 
The report considered that after 11 September the threat was no 
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The current situation was more one of global insecurity characterised by 
less clear-cut risks (such as those posed by international terrorist 
organisations or the use of weapons of mass destruction) that eluded 
conflict management in the traditional sense. The group stressed that the 
security and defence policy made a powerful contribution to the Union’s 
credibility, but did not aim at transforming it into a military alliance. The 
objective was “to provide the Union with the instruments needed to defend 
its objectives and its values and to contribute to peace and stability in the 
world in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter and 
international law”.120 More specifically, the group recommended: 
I.  On crisis management 
a)  updating the Petersberg tasks to include conflict prevention, 
through early warning and confidence and security-building 
measures (CSBM); joint disarmament operations (WMDs and 
arms control programmes); military advice and assistance in 
‘defence outreach’ including developing democratically 
accountable armed forces; post-conflict stabilisation; and 
support for the authorities of a non-member country, at their 
request, in combating terrorism. One could take the view that 
these tasks were already implicit in the Petersberg tasks, but 
spelling them out would do no harm as long as it did not 
detract from the most important task of the role of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement; 
b)  ensuring coherence and efficiency by giving the high 
representative a right of initiative in crisis management, 
specifying the type of operation contemplated and the 
resources needed, and assigning to the post-holder the 
responsibility for coordinating the civilian and military aspects 
of the operation. It was proposed to set up a relatively modest 
fund, based on member states’ contributions, from which the 
preparatory stage could be financed. Provision was to be made 
for the early establishment of a mechanism for bearing common 
costs; and 
                                                 
120 See European Convention Secretariat, Final Report of Working Group VIII on 
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c)  facilitating flexibility in decision-making and action. Under this 
heading some far-reaching proposals were made. Most 
members wanted a move from unanimity to other decision-
taking procedures, relying more on consent and a culture of 
solidarity. The launching of an operation would be decided 
unanimously, but the rules on constructive abstention would 
apply, although these might be relaxed. Those member states 
not wishing to support an operation actively and in particular 
not to contribute militarily would be encouraged not to oppose 
the operation, but to abstain. Once the operation was under 
way, abstaining states would not participate in decisions 
concerning its implementation, but could join at a later stage. 
They would, however, take part in decisions having important 
political consequences or fundamentally changing the original 
concept of the operation. 
  In view of the diversity in capabilities and willingness to 
commit them, several members of the group proposed 
emulating the euro example and providing for a form of closer 
cooperation, open to all member states wishing to carry out the 
most demanding tasks and fulfilling the requirements it to be 
credible. Conditions for taking part in this ‘defence eurozone’ 
would be a presumption that pre-identified forces and 
command and control capabilities would be available, as well 
as participation in multinational forces with integrated 
command and control capabilities, and other factors such as 
force preparedness, interoperability and deployment 
capabilities. In addition, some members proposed amending 
the provisions for enhanced cooperation to open it for security 
and defence matters and relaxing the threshold of the required 
number of participants. 
II.  The response to the new threat: More solidarity 
a.  A solidarity clause was recommended enabling recourse to all 
of the Union’s instruments for the protection of the civilian 
population and democratic institutions. Such a clause, 
originally proposed by France and Germany, would not be a 
collective defence commitment, but apply to threats from non-
state entities. A pool of specialised civilian or military civil-
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coordination programmes to facilitate intervention in the event 
of natural or humanitarian disasters within the Union. 
b.  A solidarity and common security clause in an annex to the 
Treaty was proposed, to identify risks of any sort that threaten 
the Union (including terrorism) and the means of dealing with 
them. It was thought that such a clause would produce a 
European security and defence union that would also 
contribute to the European pillar of the Alliance. 
c.  A collective defence clause for member states wishing to share 
the obligation of the Brussels Treaty relating to mutual military 
assistance was suggested, thus bringing to an end the WEU. 
Some members considered this unacceptable because of their 
non-aligned status and others were opposed because collective 
defence was covered by NATO. The proponents argued that it 
would be sensible to allow this closer type of cooperation on 
defence within the framework of the Treaty rather than outside 
it. Decisions would be taken only by the participating states. 
III.  Capabilities and armaments: Towards a European agency 
Many members of the group supported the setting up, on an 
intergovernmental basis, of a European armaments and strategic 
research agency to meet operational requirements by promoting a 
policy of harmonised procurement and to support research into 
defence technology, including military space systems. A mechanism 
was needed to evaluate and improve the way in which member states 
fulfilled their commitments. If was felt that this should cover inter alia 
the proportion of the defence budget in relation to GNP and its share 
for equipment and research as well as force preparedness, including 
deployment capabilities and their interoperability. Entrusting these 
functions to the armaments agency would turn it into a true 
capabilities agency, authorised to monitor member states’ progress. 
Its head would report annually to a Council configuration bringing 
ministers of defence together.  
IV.  Strengthening the institutional framework  
This section was the least substantial. It recommended that there 
should be a political figure, acting under the Council’s authority, with 
responsibility for EU action in the area of ESDP, who should be the 
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scrutiny the report evaded the problem of what to do with the WEU 
Assembly and only recommended regular meetings of the relevant 
committees of the national parliaments; some wanted members of the 
European Parliament to be associated with these meetings. 
On 20 December both reports – on external action and on defence – 
were debated in the Convention plenary. Mr Dehaene defended the 
double-hatting of one person with the two functions of high representative 
and RELEX commissioner. If the official spoke on behalf of the 
Commission, the Council should decide by QMV, but if the proposal was 
only the initiative of the high representative, unanimity would apply. 
Further, the high representative would chair the foreign affairs council. 
The strongest opposition came from the UK’s Secretary of State for 
Wales, Peter Hain. He argued that greater coherence was not necessarily 
the same as a merger of the two functions. More generally, he consistently 
opposed QMV in defence policy with the argument that the despatch of 
military forces into harm’s way should remain a national prerogative. That 
point was widely shared, but did not lead other members to the view that 
therefore all matters of ESDP should require unanimity. Mr Hain’s 
compatriot, the leader of the Liberal Group Andrew Duff, also had 
reservations about double-hatting, but for different reasons. He feared a 
Council cuckoo in the nest of the Commission. Serving two masters was 
not impossible, but rather improbable, certainly if the post-holder could act 
without the agreement of the full college of commissioners. What, for 
example, would be the official’s relationship with the president of the 
Commission and the latter’s prerogative of requesting a commissioner to 
resign? French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin also expressed 
doubt about the double-hatting. Criticism from other members related to 
the need for a more geo-political and strategic context: What did we want 
to achieve with the CFSP? 
On defence some opposition came from the neutral or non-aligned, as 
could be expected. Some argued that with the ESDP being part of the CFSP 
there was no need for a separate chapter on defence. And why did the 
members of NATO not keep defence within the Alliance they belonged to? 
The solidarity clause in case of terrorist attack or calamity received broad 
support. It was an ingenious attempt to place solidarity in a wider context 
than collective defence and was hard to refuse. The same applied to the 
proposal for an armaments agency with a wider scope than just 
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In his summing up Mr Barnier concluded that the proposals had been 
received very positively, particularly the extension of the Petersberg tasks, 
the solidarity clause (which had to be drafted carefully to clarify its scope 
and the range of available instruments), the armaments agency and the 
point of giving the high representative responsibility for the ESDP. No 
consensus was reached on the flexibility clauses for crisis management and 
defence, but Mr Barnier noted the strong appeal for going beyond the 
present situation. He underlined that the Presidium should consider the 
relationship between possible forms of enhanced cooperation, the scope of 
a defence policy in which all members would be included and the 
necessary political solidarity.121 
A draft Constitution 
In January 2003 the Presidium started the introduction of draft articles for 
the Constitution, but the details of external relations and defence only came 
in April, which meant that the final phase of the Convention did not start 
before the plenary of 15-16 May. Not surprisingly, the Presidium found the 
task difficult and needed long additional sessions. In April a crisis 
threatened when Mr Giscard published a set of articles of his own, which 
would have given the draft Constitution a distinctly intergovernmental 
flavour, but the storm passed when he left the task of modifying them to 
the Presidium in his absence. The result contained some innovative and 
ingenious formulations, but in several respects fell short of expectations. 
Some ideas, which had been overwhelmingly rejected, such as a people’s 
congress, had been retained, while others that had received wide support, 
like QMV in foreign policy, had not been included.  
In the plenary the decision-making procedures proved to be the 
biggest problem in the area of CFSP. Many speakers feared that it would be 
paralysed if the requirement of unanimity was maintained and suggested a 
number of alternatives. Some wanted to retain unanimity only for cases in 
which a proposal had not been submitted by the foreign minister. Other 
suggestions were the introduction of a super qualified majority and 
enhanced cooperation in all fields of the CFSP. According to the summary 
report of the session all were agreed that a member state could prevent a 
decision being taken if its vital interests were at stake. In that case the 
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foreign minister should attempt to formulate a proposal that would be 
acceptable to the member concerned.122 Mr Giscard defended the deletion 
of QMV by arguing that the working groups had not been representative 
for the Convention as whole and that, more importantly, the proposals 
needed to have a chance of being accepted in the subsequent IGC. He did 
not say so, but during his visit to London the UK government had stated its 
opposition to most of the innovations for the CFSP and wanted no 
collective defence clause, no structured cooperation and no title of 
European foreign minister giving the impression of the Union becoming a 
state. Personally, Mr Giscard rejected the compromise formula of Mr 
Dehaene to apply QMV if the full Commission was supporting a proposal 
of the high representative, because he did not want to make the 
Commission the determining factor for deciding how CFSP matters should 
be handled. 
On defence the new text remained quite ambitious and closely 
followed the Barnier report. Although in the past most provisions were 
about what the Union could not do, now they included enabling clauses. 
Most members could accept the proposed range of modalities for 
‘flexibility’. Virtual unanimity existed on the possibility to execute a 
mission, which had been unanimously agreed by the Council, with a 
limited group of member states. But that would not be much. It resembled 
the Amsterdam decision on unanimous adoption of strategies, which could 
be implemented with majority voting. The next step – structured 
cooperation – was more delicate and raised concerns about its closed 
character. Why not keep it simple and apply ‘enhanced cooperation’ to the 
entire range of Union activities, including defence? One member made the 
clever point that a reference to action outside the Union framework did not 
belong in its Constitution. Wide support existed for a mutual defence 
clause as a necessary element of solidarity and for the need to improve the 
military capabilities at the disposal of the Union. 
To sum up the state of the debate at the end of the Convention, three 
modalities were envisaged for action in the field of defence and security: 
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•  The Council could entrust the execution of a task, within the Union 
framework, to a group of member states in order to protect the 
Union’s values and serve its interests.123 
•  Those member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria 
and which have made more binding commitments to one another in 
this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish 
permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.124 
•  A form of enhanced cooperation was supported for mutual defence 
as long as the European Council had not taken the decision to create 
the common defence envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and 
subsequent treaties. The participating states would assist each other, 
in case of an armed attack on the territory of another participating 
state, with all available military and other means, in accordance with 
Art. 51 of the UN Charter concerning the right of self-defence.125 
During the last three plenary sessions these issues did not play a 
prominent role. The group of national parliamentarians started to assert 
itself on other points. Previously, its meetings had been fairly disorganised 
with no clear positions emerging. Members had quite different views of 
their tasks with the British alternate member Lord John Tomlinson taking 
the most minimalist view in loudly clamouring for concentration on the 
future role of national parliamentarians in EU matters. Fortunately, his 
liberal colleague, Lord Robert MacLennan of Rogart provided closely 
argued legal opinions on a wide range of issues. The Eurosceptic David 
Heathcote-Amory did not want a constitution at all and followed a strict 
interpretation of the Laeken mandate to answer the questions posed. In the 
end he submitted a minority opinion to demonstrate that other options 
existed. The overwhelming majority, however, favoured a constitutional 
treaty, which would put all questions and issues into a coherent context. 
Occasionally the question of the mandate popped up, as in whether 
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economic governance really was a subject to be included. More important 
was the relationship between part I (principles, competences, institutions 
and instruments) and part III (policies). Mr Giscard took the view that the 
Convention should not change existing policies, but most members wanted 
to know how the changes agreed on competences and so forth would work 
out in the formulation and implementation of policies. 
Time was insufficient to fully discuss the policies. Therefore, the 
European Council of Thessaloniki in 2003 was asked to allow more time to 
finalise those provisions. That was agreed for ‘technical points’ only, but 
the additional plenary in July was far too involved with the final package 
and unable to properly complete part III. Moreover, the sequential 
approach followed by the Convention proved to have a major drawback by 
making it difficult to change procedures in part III, if such changes had not 
been envisaged in part I. This problem would arise in particular when 
considering possibilities for more QMV in the foreign policy area; the 
option of a super QMV, which was suggested by several members, had 
been precluded in part I. 
In the endgame the position of the president of the European Council, 
the chairmanship of the other councils and the composition of the 
Commission emerged as the most crucial questions, with as a common 
strand the wish for equality of members in rotational arrangements. Not 
everyone favoured full equality; notably the French and German 
government representatives were unhappy with a status that would be the 
same as that of, say, Malta. The problem was complicated by the fact that 
the new members had negotiated and acquired positions specified in the 
Nice Treaty. So they would have a member of the Commission at least until 
2009 (when the Union was expected to have 27 or more members) and 
participate in decision-making with a formula for calculating a qualified 
majority, which included a number of votes in addition to the requirement 
of a majority of the member states who represented 62% of the overall 
population. 
The new formula for majority voting – 50% of the member states 
representing at least 60% of the population – seemed a good compromise: 
the larger countries could block a decision, but would need a considerable 
number of smaller countries to take a positive decision. It was fair, 
democratic and, above all, permanently applicable, regardless of further 
enlargements in the future. Yet it would not give Poland or Spain the status 
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them. Although France, Germany, Italy and the UK obtained 29 votes at 
Nice, Poland and Spain received 27 in spite of their substantially smaller 
populations. Paradoxically, the new formula would not reduce the 
influence of the two countries in a vote in percentage terms (and in fact, 
even slightly increase it), but in relative terms their status would be farther 
removed from the largest members. The problem was compounded by an 
emerging division in the Convention between the large and small member 
states. A group of 16 smaller countries was meeting to assert equality. 
Although the proposed rotation of members of the Commission would 
apply to all states, the number of 15 voting commissioners plus non-voting 
status for the others was seen as insufficient to underpin the Commission 
as a common institution with legitimacy to define EU interests. 
Consensus gradually emerged on the position of the permanent 
president of the European Council (for two and a half years, once 
renewable) by ‘ring-fencing’ the functions of the role. As Mr Giscard noted, 
the post-holder would be a ‘chairman’ rather than a ‘president’. Most 
members realised that the largest countries were already committed to the 
new function and concentrated on conditions that could make the 
triumvirate of president of the European Council, president of the 
Commission and foreign minister a workable arrangement. This task was 
done by accepting Commissioner Vitorino’s suggestion that a presidency 
was less prone to pursue national hobbies if it took the multi-annual 
programme as its basis, proposed by the Commission and agreed by 
Council and Parliament. In addition, it was made clear that the president 
should not have legislative or executive functions and in representing the 
Union should do so ‘at his/her level’ (i.e. in meetings with the heads of 
state with countries such as the US and Russia) and leave the remainder to 
the foreign minister. Mr Vitorino opposed a Benelux proposal to have the 
General Affairs Council chaired by the president of the Commission, with 
the argument that this official should defend the proposals of the 
Commission, which was difficult if at the same time a compromise had to 
be sought. Minister Fischer played with t he i dea of h av ing this  Cou ncil 
chaired by a vice-president of the Commission, but was pulled back by the 
federal chancery in Bonn. Whether these objections would also apply to the 
European Council was left open and the criteria for its president did not 
exclude that in future a president of the Commission could be appointed to 
double-up with this task. One objection to the European president, which 
gained some strength later, was the inclusion of the European Council 
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building another bureaucracy. Opinion varied, because one could also 
argue that the European Council should make use of the Council 
Secretariat. On occasion it had been the most decisive element in the Union. 
On 30 May the national parliamentarians accepted a proposal from 
Dutch Senator René van der Linden to form a working group for preparing 
a meeting with Mr Giscard and his vice-presidents. There were too many 
proposals for amendments to be successful in the short time available, so 
priorities had to be set. In the liberal caucus Lamberto Dini thought of a 
straw poll, even though the government participants rejected this on the 
ground that the Convention was not representative. He did not agree with 
that argument, for, if anything, the national parliamentarians were 
weighted in favour of sitting governments. Nevertheless, he yielded to the 
chairman of the caucus, Andrew Duff, who preferred trying to find a new 
consensus by a combination of diplomatic and parliamentarian approaches. 
At first glance he felt that about 20% of the text should be amended in the 
second round. 
On 11 June the plenary received a revised part I and immediately 
broke it up into its constituent parts. The most difficult points were defence 
cooperation and enhanced cooperation, but it was also worrying that the 
revision procedures for parts I and III were still identical. Many felt that it 
should be easier to change the policies than the constitutional principles. 
This point appeared sensitive to the Irish, as former Prime Minister and 
Member of the Presidium John Bruton argued that amendment without 
unanimity was unlikely to be acceptable to the Irish public. Mr Duff tried 
an intermediary option of an easier amendment procedure when there 
would not be a change in the competences as outlined in the Constitution. 
That evening came the revolt of the small states. The representatives 
of 16 of them drafted amendments over dinner on a host of issues affecting 
their status. They wanted to delete the European Council from the list of 
institutions; omit the legislative council and give the General Affairs 
Council the task of coordinating the work of the other council formats; have 
a minimum of five members of the European Parliament per member state 
(as in Nice and not four as proposed in the Convention) and equal rotation 
in both the Council presidency and in the Commission. 
The next day Mr Giscard and Secretary-General Sir John Kerr met the 
national parliamentarians without their assistants. MP Marietta Giannacou 
and René van der Linden explained the demands drawn up together with 
the Europarliamentarians: 148 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
•  The president of the Commission should have the right to refuse 
candidates that have been proposed by the member states. 
•  The right of approval by the European Parliament should also cover 
the non-voting commissioners. 
•  The president of the Commission should be appointed after 
appropriate consultations. 
•  The president of the Commission should be involved in the 
preparation of the European Council. 
•  There should be no legislative or executive powers for the European 
Council. 
•  The General Affairs Council should determine the Council formats, 
with equal rotation of their presidency. 
•  The CFSP could not function with unanimity and if normal QMV was 
not possible a super QMV should be considered. 
Other members calibrated some of the points. Jürgen Meyer from 
Germany defended his amendment for a people’s initiative and Prionsias 
de Rossa. from Ireland did the same for social policy. Ben Fayot from 
Luxembourg was worried about the institutional triangle and demanded 
clarification of the role of the Commission vis-à-vis the president of the 
European Council. Pierre Lequiller from France and Josep Borrell from 
Spain wanted as much QMV as possible, if necessary with a higher 
threshold. Adrian Severin from Romania pressed for the list of points as the 
last chance for a compromise. Only Kimmo Kiljunen from Finland upset 
the agreement among the parliamentarians and distanced himself from the 
paper, which he found to be overly influenced by the 
Europarliamentarians. His colleagues were angry because a disunited 
presentation would diminish the chances of success. 
Mr Giscard made clear that he was not negotiating and that the 
Presidium should consider the amendments. Personally, he doubted the 
imaginative character of the final product; there was too much 
conservatism in the institutions and apparently the new members needed 
time to discover Europe. He did not understand the resistance to the 
concept of a European president: in the present mode the role could not be 
seen as a threat to the institutional equilibrium. In his view, both the 
Parliament and Commission should be smaller; otherwise, they would 
n e v e r  b e  a b l e  t o  g o v e r n  a n d  t o  i d e n t i f y  E u r o p e a n  i n t e r e s t s .  T o  J ü r g e n  
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Presidium had rejected it. It would be a pity if the legislative council were 
to disappear, for it could be a counterweight to the lobbies of sectoral 
ministers, promote coherence in policy-making and facilitate the co-
decision process with the European Parliament. On a revision clause with a 
(large) majority decision, he did not expect agreement among the 
governments. Similarly, QMV in foreign policy would be difficult, for it 
concerned action instead of legislation; on big issues he did not see the 
willingness of a minority to accept the views of the majority. On rotation of 
positions as presidency and in the Commission, he thought full equality 
difficult to attain, but it might be possible to reach a balance in the system 
by including other functions. 
After this session the Presidium met throughout the afternoon to 
consider the amendments and the plenary was convened again in the 
evening. Mr Giscard presented the list of changes,126 which met several of 
the conditions put forward by the national parliamentarians: 
•  The preamble would contain the words “inspired by the cultural, 
religious and humanistic traditions of Europe”. 
•  Art. 20 would stipulate that the European Council did not perform 
legislative tasks. 
•  Art. 21.2 would provide for cooperation between the president of 
the European Council and the president of the European 
Commission, on the basis of discussions in the General Affairs 
Council, for the preparation of the European Council and the 
continuity of its deliberations. 
•  Art. 23.4, concerning the formats of the Council, would provide for 
rotation of their presidency (except in the Foreign Affairs Council) 
with a minimum duration of one year. The European Council 
would establish the system taking into account the European 
political and geographical equilibrium and the diversity of member 
states. Mr Giscard added his personal opinion that this would be a 
difficult undertaking. 
•  The new system for determining a qualified majority contained in 
Art. 24 would take effect only on 1 November 2009 after the 
elections for the European Parliament in that year. 
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•  External representation of the Union would be a prerogative of the 
European Commission, except for the CFSP and other cases 
mentioned in the Constitution (Art. 25.3). 
•  Non-voting members of the Commission would also be subject to 
the collective approval by the European Parliament (Art. 26.2). 
•  In the principle of democratic participation formulated in Art. 46, a 
fourth paragraph would be added to include a ‘people’s initiative’. 
At least 1 million citizens could request the Commission to present 
a proposal for a legal act of the Union. 
That was as far as the Convention could go before Mr Giscard went 
off to Thessaloniki to report to the European Council in June. Upon his 
return the Convention was allowed to continue briefly for some technical 
details, but in fact made some major improvements. The Convention ended 
on 10 July, but in a tough meeting on the final eve the Presidium managed 
to make some further progress. The minister of foreign affairs would be 
assisted by a joint European external action service, with the details to be 
agreed by the Council and the Commission, without prejudice to the rights 
of the European Parliament. The European symbols would figure in the 
Constitution, such as the flag, anthem, motto, euro and the celebration of 9 
May, Schuman day. The European Parliament would be informed about a 
range of subjects and obtain the right of approval of treaty changes if the 
convention method had not been used. Unfortunately, the passerelle clause 
on the possibility of moving to QMV in the CFSP would remain 
unchanged. This caused widespread disappointment, especially among 
Convention members Elmar Brok, Andrew Duff, Lamberto Dini and Hanja 
Maij-Weggen. Nevertheless, when the texts became available, the mood 
was euphoric – consensus was near on an acceptable compromise. To many 
the final draft left something to be desired, particularly the hurried 
treatment of part III on the policies and the unsatisfactory provisions of 
part IV on revision, but in spite of ‘some imperfections’ the outcome was 
better than that from any IGC in the past. Only Mrs Ana Palacio-
Vallelersundi of Spain put a reservation on the institutional part, and the 
Danish Europarliamentarian Jens-Peter Bonde submitted a minority report 
calling for power to the citizen, the election of each Commissioner by 
popular vote in his country and the submission of the Constitution to 
referenda. To the others the next battle was to defend the text and to 
prevent it from being unravelled in the coming intergovernmental 
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ascertain their feasibility. Nevertheless, the fact that consensus had been 
reached so broadly on a single text and options had been avoided was short 
of a miracle. Mr Giscard deserved tribute for the way in which he had 
steered the proceedings, and for being prepared to give up some of his own 
pet ideas. 
2003 – Crisis and progress 
The year 2003 was one of crisis and contrasts. As Nicole Gnesotto wrote in 
her preface to Chaillot Paper No. 67,   which reproduced the important 
documents of that year, it showed acute political divisions over the war in 
Iraq and therefore affected the relations with the US. It also failed to reform 
the institutions of the European Union, but in spite of all this managed to 
make considerable progress on security and defence.  The EU embarked 
upon three military and police operations in the Balkans and Africa, 
finalised the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO, created the 
European Defence Agency, agreed on the European Military Staff, 
multilateralised the security strategy proposed by Javier Solana and agreed 
in principle on a solidarity clause in c a s e  o f  t e r r o r i s t  a t t a c k  o r  o t h e r  
calamity. 
These achievements, however, had to be set against the background 
of a general political crisis among the 15 member states, which made the 
paradoxes even more apparent. Ms Gnesotto listed several. In February, the 
UK and France fell out in the UN over the legitimacy of military action 
against Saddam Hussein, while at the same time President Chirac and 
Prime Minister Blair held a bilateral summit at Le Touquet, agreeing on 
broad measures to revitalise their military cooperation and the ESDP. 
Within NATO, the Iraq crisis potentially had repercussions on Turkey and 
led to a major disagreement with France, Belgium and Germany over the 
invocation of Art. V in case Turkey was attacked, yet a few weeks later the 
Berlin Plus agreement was finalised and an EU-NATO relationship 
established to universal satisfaction. Again, throughout the spring of 2003 
the possibility of autonomous EU military operation was seen as an 
anathema to NATO primacy by the US and several European countries, yet 
in June the Union decided unanimously to launch its first independent 
military operation and acted rapidly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
In December the European Council failed to reach agreement on the 
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Nicole Gnesotto drew several lessons from this paradoxical situation 
of political clashes combined with advances on defence issues. Her first one 
was optimistic: when it came to security, European crises usually had 
positive outcomes. That was true, but it could also be said of most other 
crises within the EU, where ultimately compromises were struck. The 
second related to the curious phenomenon that defence policy could 
develop independently from foreign policy, impervious to political 
differences, but also contradicting the declared objectives of the ESDP and 
its prospects of a common defence as an extension of the CFSP. On this 
point, she might have been too Cartesian, given that since 1989 the debate 
on European defence had centred on the issue of capabilities. Some 
countries used the lack of capabilities as a pretext for doing nothing, but as 
capabilities improved, the possibilities for European action also increased. 
After Kosovo, the UK changed its mind over the ESDP, but continued to 
stress capabilities. British pragmatism was averse to declaratory policies, 
which could not be backed up by concrete action. This difference of 
approach has often been the cause of friction with the Latin mind, which 
sketches distant prospects and takes time to fill them in.  
The third lesson concerned the relationship with the US, which after 
11 September had become largely unpredictable, just as likely to mobilise 
the Europeans as to become a divisive factor among them. The Iraq crisis 
had provoked an unprecedented split among the larger members, going 
much deeper than the special position of France. Hence the central issue for 
the EU would be how American policy could be taken into account and, if 
necessary, influenced. In other words, how could the CFSP be different 
from Washington’s policies, yet at the same time demonstrate solidarity 
with the US. Most of the European initiatives and the security strategy in 
particular could be seen as attempts to solve that dilemma. 
The Franco-British summit at Le Touquet might be taken as another 
lesson in integration: it discussed everything the two countries could agree 
on and left their differences aside. If a certain issue becomes too difficult, it 
might be better left alone for some time so the parties remain on speaking 
terms with each other by focusing on other issues. Policy towards the 
Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian problem in particular has never 
been a success – not in the CFSP nor in the preceding European political 
cooperation. That is often seen as a weakness of European policy, but the 
argument should not be carried too far, because no one else can claim credit 
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policies that are susceptible to consensus and to tread warily on others. So, 
it is a matter of less of a comprehensive single policy and more common 
policies. This does not mean that contentious issues should be avoided 
altogether, but they should not be allowed to spill over to the overall state 
of relations. In this respect the EU did well in moving its new security 
strategy close to US priorities – terrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
– but also in making the point that responses to these threats could not be 
exclusively military. In this way the EU managed to isolate disagreements 
over the intervention in Iraq and to find common ground on wider issues. 
Iraq and the failure of coercive diplomacy 
This is not the place for a full description of what happened in New York 
during the Iraq crisis. The issues were hardly discussed in NATO and the 
EU and, as always happened with events in the Middle East, had 
surprisingly little impact on the way Europeans dealt with each other. 
Some would see that as a sign of parochialism, others as acquiescence in the 
powerlessness to influence developments. In essence it was a sign of the 
fact that European interests, either explicit or unspoken, had insufficiently 
converged to make a common foreign policy feasible. That situation 
continues up to the present day where the triumvirate of France, Germany 
and the UK have negotiated with Iran over its nuclear energy programme, 
which might be a useful complement to US aims but is kept outside the 
formal structures of the EU. 
The crisis was a failure of collective coercive diplomacy. 
Developments in the UN Security Council confirmed my conviction that 
this body is a forum for political compromise and not the fount of 
international law. On the whole it remains weak on implementation and 
many of its resolutions are not followed up with concrete measures. That 
had been the case with Iraq ever since the Kuwait war. Differences of 
opinion in the Council debates strengthened the hope of Saddam Hussein 
that once again he would be able to get away with minimum concessions. 
Looking back on the proceedings, a major mistake was the absence of clear 
criteria for measuring compliance and judging the result of the inspections 
by UNSCOM, as well as the lack of a firm deadline for their completion. 
But both were not acceptable for the opponents of military action, because 
they would in all probability start an irreversible path towards 
intervention. At the beginning everyone was convinced that Saddam 
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not be able to do so, or admit that he no longer possessed weapons of mass 
destruction, without ruining his position as a regional power. 
UN Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 seemed a masterful 
compromise, but with inherent ambiguity: it stated that “Iraq had been and 
remains in material breach of its obligation under relevant resolutions…in 
particular through its failure to cooperate with UN inspectors” and it 
afforded Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament 
obligations” by giving within 30 days  
a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its 
chemical, biological and nuclear programmes…False statements or 
omissions and failure at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully 
in the implementation of this resolution, shall constitute a further 
material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the 
Council for assessment.127 
Finally, it was recalled that the Council “has repeatedly warned Iraq that it 
will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its 
obligations”. Hans Blix reported on 19 December that after Iraq’s 
declaration the issues identified by UNSCOM “remain unresolved”. On 9 
January he added that he had not found a ‘smoking gun’ but that Iraq had 
failed to answer “a great many questions”, and on 27 January that “Iraq 
appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the 
disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to 
win the confidence of the world and to live in peace”. His remark that 
cooperation on process (access to sites) had been good, but that the Iraqis 
had fallen short of substance and, in his words, “it is not enough to open 
doors. Inspection is not a game of catch as catch can”. With the cumulative 
effect of these reports, the die seemed to have been cast against Iraq. 128 
It was not, however, because the Security Council was breaking up. A 
week earlier it had met at ministerial level for an open debate on counter-
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terrorism, which was used by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to make 
clear the German political point of view on Iraq: he was strictly against 
military action because it would have negative consequences for the region 
and a negative impact on international relations. He warned his colleagues 
that a military action could end the unity of the UNSC in its fight against 
terrorism. Later, when the Council met on 5 February to hear US Secretary 
of State Colin Powell’s case against Iraq, Mr Fischer did not repeat his view 
that the only way towards total disarmament was a peaceful one, but the 
harm was done. At the Wehrkunde meeting he said that he simply did not 
believe the facts of the Powell presentation and on 5 March he joined a 
hastily convened meeting with his French and Russian colleagues, vowing 
“not to allow” a resolution authorising war to be passed by the Security 
Council. 
During these weeks the debate in the Security Council centred on the 
drafting of a second resolution that would make the use of force possible. 
The US, the UK and Spain tabled a resolution on 24 February, with as its 
principal operative paragraph that the Security Council “decides that Iraq 
has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it by Resolution 1441”.129 
To make it more palatable for the swing votes, it did not contain the words 
‘all necessary means’, which had been coined during the first Gulf war and 
applied several times since then. France, Germany and Russia tabled a 
‘non-paper’ giving the inspections another 120 days. In mid-March the UK 
made a final effort to give Saddam Hussein 10 more days to respond to six 
key tests for Iraqi disarmament, including a statement by Saddam Hussein 
on Iraqi television that he would give up weapons of mass destruction and 
the surrender or explanation of the 10,000 litres of anthrax that were still 
missing. France and Germany rejected any ultimatum involving the use of 
force. In the early hours of 17 March, France tried to move the meeting to 
the afternoon to come up with a proposal of setting a deadline in one or 
two months, but was not even supported by Germany, which had never 
been in favour of deadlines. Soon after, a disappointed British Permanent 
Representative, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, told the press that a vote on the 
resolution would not be pursued, because one country (France) had 
underlined its intention to veto any ultimatum, no matter what the 
circumstances. That night President George W. Bush made a televised 
speech telling Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours 
                                                 
129 See United Nations Security Council, Draft Resolution, S/2003/215, New York, 
23 February 2003 (http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/res-iraq-24feb03-en.pdf). 156 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
or face military action. He added that the UN had not lived up to its 
responsibilities in disarming Iraq, “so we will live up to ours”. 
What lessons can we draw from this failure of coercive diplomacy? In 
his theoretical framework, Alexander L. George identifies three key 
elements that should be present if it is to be successful: a perception that an 
asymmetry of interest and motivation exists that favours the coercers; a 
sense of urgency of the demand and the inclusion of a deadline/timeline to 
convince the coerced parties that prolonging the conflict would work 
against their own interest; and a threat of punishment that is credible.130 
Eduard Vernède adds as a fourth element: clear and timely 
communications by the coercers about their resolve.131 In pursuing coercive 
diplomacy several strategies present themselves, with declining degrees of 
intensity: 
•  an ultimatum, 
•  a tacit ultimatum, 
•  a gradual turning of the screw, 
•  a try-and-see approach, and 
•  a carrot-and-stick approach. 
Coercion is related to the concepts of deterrence and compulsion, 
which played such a big role in strategic thinking during the cold war. The 
difference lies in the potential of coercive diplomacy to be an alternative to 
primary reliance on military action. It seeks to persuade the opponent into 
compliance with a mixture of carrots and sticks. As such it is an appealing 
concept for the European Union, which possesses the range of instruments 
necessary for its effective application. Of course, success is not assured, as 
we have seen in Kosovo and now in Iraq, because the opponent is not 
convinced that yielding is the only alternative. Could this outcome have 
been different concerning Saddam Hussein? In this case probably not, 
because his status was linked to virtual possession of chemical and 
bacteriological weapons and the possibility of eventually acquiring nuclear 
weapons. On the other hand, President Bush thought that if he did not act 
now, the situation in the Middle East might turn awry during the next five 
years or so. He obviously underestimated the difficulties of post-war 
reconstruction in a multi-ethnic Iraq along with the possible repercussions 
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of a country with a Shia majority upon its Arab neighbours, including 
Saudi Arabia, but gave priority to the removal of an autocratic and 
unscrupulous dictator. 
Should the US have followed a different course in the Security 
Council? Eduard Vernède argued that their multilateral strategy failed 
owing to inconsistency in its motivation. President Bush should have 
limited his argument to the regime’s non-compliance, which was admitted 
by everyone, and not have introduced other justifications such as unproven 
links with terrorism or the controversial need for regime change to remove 
a tyrannical dictator. The rebuttal to this argument was that the only 
chance of obtaining compliance was to remove Saddam Hussein. Initially, 
the firm determination of the US to pursue hard coercion against the 
regime, if necessary unilaterally, helped to bring the Security Council on 
board by the creation of a common interest, asymmetric to that of the Iraqi 
president. Without it, Resolution 1441 would never have been adopted. The 
second requirement of President Bush’s, a sense of urgency, was met by the 
deployment of US troops to the region, but the third, a deadline, never 
materialised. 
Although Iraq was not discussed officially in NATO or in the EU, the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly devoted considerable time to its 
implications for the Alliance at its Prague session in May 2003. Pierre 
Lellouche, one of the few Frenchmen supporting intervention, was the 
Rapporteur in the Defence and Security Committee. He agreed that the 
inspections could not have been prolonged indefinitely. In 1998 the 
presence of WMDs had been established and no explanation had been 
received about what had happened to them since. His conclusions were 
that inspections could only be effective if the country concerned 
collaborated with the inspectors; further, he stressed that a credible threat 
was necessary to legitimise military intervention and agreement among the 
larger countries was a prerequisite. Unfortunately, these countries were 
currently divided over their views of a ‘multipolar’ world. 
Militarily the campaign was radically different from the past, 
featuring: no heavy initial bombardment; a deep tank penetration with 
relatively few troops – less than half of the Kuwait campaign and lighter 
and more flexible; improved guidance to the individual soldier; and very 
few casualties among coalition forces, some 160, and not all of them caused 
by enemy action. Accidents and friendly fire took a relatively heavy toll. 
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forces and the ensuing inability to consolidate control and prevent looting. 
Mr Lellouche’s question marks went in the same direction: How could a 
civilian administration be restored and how should we deal with the wider 
problem of relations with one and a half billion Muslims in the world?  
As the first war under the ‘revolution of military affairs’, the Iraq 
campaign was bound to have a strategic effect, particularly on the conduct 
of asymmetric warfare. Lord Timothy Garden pointed at the psychological 
effort (Psyops) at a tremendous scale with pamphlets being dropped 
everywhere.132 Special forces had been important in the Western Desert, but 
on the whole he was not certain what difference network-centric warfare 
had made. And how accurate the intelligence had been became a crucial 
question for the new form of warfare to work. Furthermore, in a rapid race 
forward, logistics predictably had proven difficult and sometimes 
vulnerable, impacting on the progress made. Nevertheless, the overall 
swiftness of the campaign had been impressive. The campaign started on 
20 March and on 4 April Baghdad airport had been captured. 
Many questions remained that would not be fully answered in the 
years to come. Did the campaign in Iraq really represent a fundamental 
change in warfare? Airpower had been effective in cutting the links 
between the command and control nodes and the defending forces, but 
then Iraq had been under constant surveillance for over a decade and was 
constrained by sanctions in the modernisation of its capabilities. In any 
case, there had not been sufficient feet on the ground for rapidly pacifying 
the country after the initial military success. Was the platform/weapons 
balance of investment right and what would this mean for the cost-
effectiveness of new generation of air-delivered, precision-guided 
weapons? And most important for future interventions in failed states and 
otherwise, what are the combat implications if a nation has to be rebuilt 
afterwards? Targeting policy will be affected by the need to rebuild 
essential services as soon as possible. In the Political Committee of the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Bert Koenders raised the question of 
legitimate war out-of-area in the context of the invocation of Art. V against 
                                                 
132 See Professor Sir Timothy (now Lord) Garden, Iraq: The Military Campaign, 
Lessons Learned – A First Look, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels, 25 May 
2003.  FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 159 
 
terrorist attacks.133 If self-defence was stretched too far, what would this 
mean for the role of the United Nations in peace and security? 
Only a few members of the EU were involved in the reconstruction 
effort in Iraq with a military presence and their number was dwindling. 
NATO could not move beyond a small mission to train the new Iraqi army, 
partly outside the country. In November 2004 the European Council issued 
a statement that EU involvement in Iraq could not take place “until all 
security concerns were appropriately addressed”.134 In the meantime some 
of the lessons learned have become apparent. The recent book by Paul 
Bremer., the former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in 
Baghdad, has confirmed that after the successful military campaign there 
were insufficient forces to consolidate the victory; that there was no 
detailed post-war reconstruction plan; that the US lacked decent 
intelligence to deal with an insurgency it had failed to predict, but had been 
prepared by Saddam Hussein; and that the Americans were naively 
shocked by the dismal state of Iraq’s economy and infrastructure after 
years of sanctions.135 We see later in the discussion that these shortcomings 
are already reflected in increased attention to post-conflict stabilisation and 
reconstruction. 
Further proposals 
A number of bilateral summit meetings took place during the year and 
were used to gather support for innovative ideas floated in the Convention 
or for actions in the field. Sometimes their statements fell flat and served 
only to show the conviction that Europe had to progress further. The 
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Franco-German summit for the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty on 22 
January 2003 proposed the creation of “a European Security and Defence 
Union which will give concrete shape and efficiency to its members’ 
solidarity and common security and must also contribute to strengthening 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance”.136 The word ‘Union’ was 
suggesting something similar to the monetary union based on the euro. The 
reference to a European pillar was odd, because that concept had vanished 
from current jargon. Para. 25 raised eyebrows in other European capitals, 
because it indicated a special relationship within the 15 member states: 
France and Germany will ensure they adopt common positions in the 
international bodies, including the Security Council, and define 
agreed strategies vis-à-vis third countries, especially in the framework 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.137  
It has to be remembered that at that time Germany was a member of 
the Security Council, but nevertheless the announcement of common 
positions was at variance with the insistence of both France and the UK to 
maintain the right of independent positions in the UNSC and with 
Germany’s professed alignment with the CFSP. 
Next to the joint declaration of President Chirac and Chancellor 
Schröder another declaration was produced on the same day by the Franco-
German Defence and Security Council.138 It repeated the proposal for a 
European security and defence union and was more specific concerning its 
objective: it sought to ensure the security of its territory and peoples and 
contribute to the stability of its strategic environment. To achieve this 
objective, France and Germany specifically wished to promote: 
•  a comprehensive vision of the EU’s security entailing a passage on 
“solidarity and common security” in the Constitution and appending 
a political declaration identifying every kind of risk, including in 
particular that of terrorism, and the means to confront them; 
•  greater flexibility by extending and further adapting the enhanced 
cooperation mechanism to the ESDP; 
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•  a strengthening of military capabilities and the development of new 
forms of cooperation, especially by harmonising the planning of 
needs, the pooling resources and capabilities, and, eventually, the 
sharing out of tasks; and  
•  the definition of a European armaments policy including the creation 
of a European armaments agency, based on OCCAR, which could be 
progressively enlarged. 
Among the concrete measures announced by the Council figured the 
subordination of the Franco-German Brigade to the Eurocorps as a very 
rapidly available element. Based on the future A400M aircraft, the two 
countries intended to form a joint air-transport squadron. They also 
announced an analysis of the threat constituted by the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
Something very controversial happened soon after on the way to the 
Constitution. On 29 April 2003, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt 
convened a meeting of his colleagues Gerhard Schröder, Jean-Claude 
Juncker and Jacques Chirac. This group represented the ‘coalition of the 
unwilling’ on Iraq, which gave it a special significance. The conclusions 
were not spectacular and fitted in the way the Convention was developing, 
except on one very sensitive point in transatlantic relations: the creation of 
a headquarters in Tervueren as a “nucleus of a collective capability which 
instead of national means they would make available to the EU for 
operational planning and command of EU-led operations without recourse 
to NATO assets and capabilities”. 139 In principle, something could be said 
in favour of an EU planning capability for its own autonomous operations. 
Mr Verhofstadt had already included the idea in a letter to Messrs Chirac 
and Blair in July 2002, but received a cold response to his concern about the 
stalemate in the development of the European security and defence policy. 
This time he tried again with a different group, but the timing was 
disastrous. It came six weeks after the Berlin Plus arrangements had been 
finalised at last and NATO had handed over its Operation Allied Harmony 
in Macedonia to the EU’s Operation Concordia under the deputy SACEUR 
as operation commander. Why hurry to create another headquarters and 
why in Tervueren? A joker said that apparently Belgium was looking for a 
new occupant for its obsolete Africa museum. Much ridicule was spent on 
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the proposal of what came to be known as the ‘chocolate summit’, 
suggestive of heads of government eating pralines of chocolate soldiers. 
The rationale, as explained by Philippe De Schoutheete, was twofold: 
first to get around the situation in which the smaller countries would have 
no choice but putting their forces under the command of the British or the 
French as the only eligible lead nations. In practice this amounted to 
putting an EU label on what was essentially a British or French operation. 
The second argument was to remove the temptation for other countries to 
build headquarters similar to Northwood and Creil, which would lead 
unnecessarily to a multiplication of national capacities.140 
The effect on the Convention was negative and led to further delay in 
discussing defence issues. In particular, doubt was cast on the notion of 
permanent structured cooperation. Was Tervueren the beginning of such 
cooperation? In Washington the biting comment was that Europe needed 
better capabilities, not more headquarters. Although suspicions lingered, 
the crisis did not escalate further, thanks to a compromise brokered by the 
UK. At a meeting in Berlin between Messrs Blair, Chirac and Schröder on 
20 September 2003, it was agreed to expand the EU Military Staff and invite 
NATO to establish a liaison arrangement with it, while at the same time 
create a small EU cell at SHAPE. Their communiqué stated that “the EU 
should be endowed with a joint capability to plan and conduct operations 
without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities”. Washington was 
greatly disturbed and the US ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, called 
it “the most serious threat to the future of NATO”.141 Nevertheless, the 
claim to an autonomous planning capability for the deployment of a force 
of 1,500 troops (or 3,000 if two battle groups were deployed 
simultaneously) was not illogical. Autonomous European operations were 
likely only when the US did not want to join. Moreover, the planning task 
for such limited operations did not require the involvement of the entire 
NATO machinery and could be achieved with a modest enlargement of the 
EU Military Staff. The American reaction was overdone and most people in 
the EU and NATO were happy with the compromise. The three countries 
that had drafted it introduced the proposal during the Naples meeting of 29 
November 2003 under the title “European Defence: NATO/EU 
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consultation, planning and operations”. It was taken over in its entirety by 
the Italian presidency and approved at the European Council meeting of 12 
December. In an effort to patch up transatlantic relations the Council issued 
a declaration as an annex to the Presidency Conclusions, which repeated 
the call of the strategy document for an international order based on 
effective multilateralism. If the transatlantic partnership was to yield its full 
potential, the EU-US relationship must be effective. The declaration ended 
by stating “Now more than ever, the transatlantic link is essential if we 
want to create a better world”.142 
The controversy came to an end six months later at the European 
Council of 17-18 June 2004. It was agreed to establish a civilian/military 
cell within the EU Military Staff, a small EU cell at SHAPE and that NATO 
liaison arrangements with the EUMS were to enter into force by the end of 
the year. It was held that by 1 January 2006 at the latest, an operations 
centre should be available, able to plan and conduct autonomous 
operations within the scope of the Petersberg tasks, on the scale of 
Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, i.e. some 1,500 
troops. The Council reaffirmed the parameters of December 2003 by 
stating: 
in particular that this will not be a standing HQ, that the main option 
for autonomous military operations remains national HQs and that a 
decision to draw on the collective capacity of the EUMS would be 
taken, upon the advice of the Military Committee, in particular where 
a joint civil/military response is required and where no national HQ 
is identified.143 
The question remained as to what extent the NATO Response Force 
and the battle groups would compete with each other. Since 1999, NATO 
and the EU had been presenting a picture of leap-frogging organisations. 
The Helsinki Headline Goals with 50-60,000 troops, available within 60 
days and sustainable for a year, had been modelled on the experience in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, where a corps-size operation had had to be mounted. 
The NATO Response Force, at the initiative of US Defense Secretary 
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Donald Rumsfeld, aimed at a much more rapid intervention, involving all 
three objectives in an ‘insertion force’ with fighting capabilities. The 
political motivation of this proposal, which was implemented with 
unprecedented speed, was the argument that it was the last chance for the 
Europeans to keep NATO relevant to the Pentagon. The NRF would consist 
of European contributions and the US part would be limited to supporting 
force multipliers such as strategic transport and satellite intelligence. That 
changed in 2005 when the US became ready to assign forces to the NRF. 
Another interesting development was the willingness of France to join, 
although this caused a problem in taking a decision on deploying to 
Darfur. 
As a result of the humanitarian crisis in Bunia in the Ituri province of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU moved to the battle group 
concept, which also focused on quick reaction. There, a force of some 1,500 
troops had been able to stem escalation and to fill the gap before a UN 
peacekeeping force was assembled and deployed. The first battle group 
was to be operational in 2005 and by 2007 two groups should continually 
be on stand-by. Will they ever be used? This question is a good one and 
also applies to the NRF. Will the time needed for political decision-making 
allow for deployments within 5-10 days?144 And what crises are susceptible 
of being contained by 1,500 persons? A great deal of pre-planning will have 
to be done, preferably in the form of (illustrative) scenarios. Although it is 
true that political agreement to a scenario in advance of a real crisis will be 
difficult to obtain, it will be necessary to know under what circumstances 
the promised contributions will be made available, for which kind of 
operation and where in the world. 
In the debate about competition between NATO and the EU it seems 
paradoxical that both the NRF and the battle groups are made up of 
European soldiers. The old criterion, that NATO would be the organisation 
of choice if the US participated in the operation, consequently makes less 
immediate sense. Equally, it would not be wise to insist on a general ‘right 
of first refusal’ for NATO. Under the Berlin Plus arrangement the EU could 
make use of NATO assets and even conduct an EU-led operation under the 
command of the deputy SACEUR. Therefore, it is not very clear how the 
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choice would be made. Of course, the size of the NRF is larger and its 
sustainability is a maximum of six months. The deployment of EU battle 
groups is envisaged for 30-120 days, but both units operate under the 
assumption of ‘first in, first out’, which means that under most scenarios 
t h e y  n e e d  t o  b e  r e p l a c e d  b y  o t h e r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  m i s s i o n .  
Equally, their readiness status is similar: the battle groups work with 5-10 
days, the NRF with 5-30 days. Both are formed through force generation 
conferences, but in NATO these are based on the requirements formulated 
by the SACEUR, for two rotations at the same time, while for the EU it is 
twice yearly, ‘bottom-up’ and less formally coordinated by the EU Military 
Staff and Military Committee. The EU extends this process to the niche 
capabilities of the smaller countries, which cannot be major contributors to 
a battle group. 
The military side of the problem of possible competition could be 
solved by an agreed rotation schedule, which would avoid simultaneous 
calls by both on the same national units. In any case, the same units should 
not be dedicated to both the NRF and the EU battle groups. The extremely 
short readiness time makes that most undesirable. NATO at 26 members 
and the EU at 25 have sufficient forces to deliver 20,000 to 25,000 personnel 
for the NRF and 3,000 for the battle groups at any given time. In practice, a 
particular unit could be assigned to one force this year and to the other 
force two or more years later. In other years the force would have a role in 
general NATO defence planning or in the EU’s Headline Goals. It would be 
a mistake to think of European capabilities only in terms of the NRF and 
battle groups. That would not be a sufficient rationale for maintaining 
combined defence forces of close to two million soldiers. 
On the political side, the problem of who does what has to be solved 
in early consultations between NATO and the EU. The size and intensity of 
the operation and the need and willingness for the US to join in will be 
crucial elements. In any case, it will be important for all units to fulfil the 
same criteria for training, operating procedures, standards and 
certification. Both sides will also have to know what the other organisation 
will be able to do in terms of missions, deployability and sustainability, 
force generation and rotation schemes.  
Another outstanding question concerns the progress of the 
permanent structured cooperation. To what extent will it be applied and 
who would be likely to join? The new member states as well as the neutral 
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either because of a lack of sufficient military capabilities or willingness to 
enter into more binding commitments. When signing up for the battle 
groups or niche capabilities, almost all EU member countries have taken 
the position that they had sufficiently demonstrated their willingness to 
contribute larger forces to the EU. But would this be sufficient to qualify for 
the structured cooperation? Further, the additional requirement of more 
binding commitments towards each other has not been defined.  
Permanent structured cooperation is a special form of enhanced 
cooperation, which would come to be legitimised in advance by the 
Constitution without a need of further approval. In theory, its 
qualifications make it less open-ended than the enhanced cooperation 
envisaged in other areas. There it is mainly functional, to make progress 
with a smaller group of, say, 8 in an EU of 25 member states, when a 
qualified majority is not allowed or not attainable; it would have limited 
scope and not represent a core group across the board of Union activities. 
Its main value would lie in its availability as a means to go ahead if others 
are stalling. It is not easy to find good examples for enhanced cooperation 
outside the current cases of the euro, the WEU, the Schengen agreement 
and armaments cooperation. Perhaps some specific forms of taxation or 
environmental measures may be eligible, particularly if decision-making in 
the enlarged Union proves difficult, but on the whole the unity of the 
internal market would be an argument against proliferation of limited 
regimes.    
The Constitution in the balance 
The task of transforming the outcome of the Convention into a 
constitutional treaty fell on Italy. Expectations were not high in view of the 
controversial position of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Italy had 
been given the assurance that the ceremony of signing the Constitution 
could take place in Rome, thus turning back full circle to the Treaty of 
Rome of 1957. But many issues remained to be resolved. At the final session 
of the Convention, Spain, Poland and Austria had voiced reservations and 
in Warsaw a kind of frenzy developed to maintain the Nice arrangements 
for qualified majority voting. ‘Nice or die’ became the slogan of some 
member states, reinforced by the sentiment that a reference to God would 
be necessary to embark on the voyage towards European finality. 
The European Council of Thessaloniki in June 2003 had concluded 
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Intergovernmental Conference and from the start the Italian presidency 
wanted the outcome to stay as close to this draft as possible. Any change 
could be made only on the basis of an alternative consensus, which had a 
sobering effect on the inclination to introduce amendments: the actor 
proposing a change had to muster support for his/her ideas. Equally, the 
presidency avoided the creation of an institutionalised negotiating forum of 
high officials and raised the process to the level of heads of government, 
assisted by the ministers of foreign affairs. This approach was endorsed by 
the informal meeting of the GAERC at Riva del Garda on 5-6 September 
2003. The European Council started the IGC on 4 October and met again on 
16-17 October and 12-13 December. The foreign ministers met five times, 
including an important ‘conclave’ in Naples on 28-29 November. Senior 
civil servants met twice as ‘focal points’ – not to negotiate, but to draw up 
an inventory of outstanding issues. Legal experts met to screen the texts.  
Based on the Naples meeting, the Italian presidency drew up a list of 
more than 50 changes and additions, which seemed susceptible to 
consensus. The outstanding issues, however, were such that the December 
session of the European Council broke up fairly quickly without an 
agreement, relating mainly to the composition of the Commission and the 
European Parliament, the definition of a qualified majority and the scope of 
its application. The incoming Irish presidency proceeded carefully with a 
series of bilateral meetings prior to the European Council of 25-26 March 
2004 and was able to accelerate its mediation efforts after the terrorist 
attacks in Madrid on 11 March had reinforced the sense of necessity for 
strengthening the effectiveness of the Union. The changes of government in 
Spain and Poland allowed new incumbents to modify positions on the 
voting method, which led Dublin to the conclusion that on all remaining 
issues compromises should be possible. In three sessions of the GAERC 
ministers and one meeting of the focal points, items from the list of 
outstanding issues were transferred to the document of finished subjects. 
On 18 June the European Council reached an overall agreement,145 which 
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did not change the security provisions. The subsequent screening by the 
legal experts had the unfortunate effect of changing the numbering of the 
final text to be signed in Rome on 29 October 2003, in comparison with the 
draft of the Convention. 
Solidarity clauses 
In the Convention draft the notion of solidarity appeared in several places. 
The preamble mentions it in its second paragraph in the context of “to 
strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world”.146 The 
Union’s values in Art. I-2 refers to the values “common to all Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. Art. I-3 sub 3 
adds “solidarity among generations”, and sub 4, dealing with relations 
with the wider world, “solidarity and mutual respect among peoples”. Art. 
I-5 includes the principle of “loyal cooperation” for the relations between 
the Union and the member states, which “shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the 
Constitution”. 
A specific solidarity clause was proposed in case a member state is 
the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. It was 
included in the draft as Art. I-42, which states that: 
The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including 
the military resources made available by the Member States, to: 
(a) -  prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; 
  -  protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any 
terrorist attack; 
  -  assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political 
authorities in the event of a terrorist attack; 
(b)  -  assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political 
authorities in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.147 
                                                                                                                            
Council in the Commission’s Note on IGC 2003: Meeting of Heads of State or 
Government, CIG 82/04, PRESID 24, Brussels, 16 June 2004(c). 
146 See the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, adopted by 
consensus of the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July, CONV 850/03, 
Brussels, 18 July 2003. 
147 The detailed arrangements for implementation were stated in Art. III-231: 
member states shall coordinate between themselves in the Council, assisted by the FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 169 
 
Among so much solidarity it was odd that no reference was made to 
assistance in the case of an armed attack. Jacques Chirac and Gerhard 
Schröder had included it in their proposal for a European Security and 
Defence Union contained in the declaration celebrating the anniversary of 
the Elysée Treaty, but the Convention had not been able to do more than 
devise a series of modalities to introduce some flexibility in an area that 
basically would continue to be governed by unanimous decision-making. 
In the IGC the Italian presidency reached solutions on the old problem of a 
collective defence commitment and the new proposal for structured 
cooperation but it had not been easy. The two problems were interrelated 
because, if everyone was prepared to render military assistance to a partner 
in case of aggression, the need for some to enter into more binding 
commitments would not arise to the same extent.  
The dilemma for the neutral or non-aligned was that they wanted to 
maintain their policy, but at the same time prevent the others from 
establishing core groups, from which they would be excluded. In the 
autumn of 2003 they went public with their opposition. In an article by the 
Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja in the Financial Times of 28 
October, under the headline “Europe needs to work as a whole on 
defence”, he warned of the risk of splitting the Union and thus weakening 
the CFSP.148 He insinuated that a group of countries had the ambition of 
retaining a role as guardian of the true European faith, which the 10 new 
members were perceived to threaten. Mr Tuomioja rejected the premise of 
the Convention’s proposal, as he saw it, that a “smaller group has to act as 
a vanguard without trying or even wanting to involve the Union as a 
whole”. He had a point in opposing a core group that itself would decide 
on the ability of new applicants to join, without any agreed criteria, but this 
had already been redressed in the IGC and the new European Defence 
Agency could assist here.  
More fundamental was his position that a group of countries could 
not be allowed to use the EU ‘trademark’ without a mandate from the 
Union. What followed was the bizarre argument for a leader of a non-
aligned country that Europe should not duplicate NATO resources as only 
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NATO could give a credible security guarantee. And if Finland were to 
give up its military non-alignment – for which there was neither need nor 
support – it would be NATO to which it would send the application. This 
rightly raised eyebrows among those who said that the non-aligned had 
entered the Union under false pretences by not accepting any prospect of a 
common defence. Fortunately, Mr Tuomioja left the door open to 
developing the solidarity clause in a way acceptable to all. 
The public debate was continued with a joint letter in the Dagens 
Nyheter of 11 November 2003 by Mr Tuomioja and his colleague, the 
Foreign Minister for Sweden Laila Freivalds under the headline “We want 
a stronger EU security policy”.149 Their main objections – to structured 
cooperation and a mutual defence clause within the European Union 
framework – remained and the principle was repeated that all EU crisis-
management actions must be backed by common decisions, but the setting 
was more constructive. In their letter the two ministers stated that the 
European Union “must have the capacity to tackle all types of action that 
member states want to be able to carry out, including some that are very 
complex and demanding”. The article concluded with “support for the idea 
of a new solidarity clause that builds on the voluntary principle while 
expressing the political solidarity that already exists between EU 
members”. 
This idea was taken up in a letter to the IGC of 5 December by the 
four foreign ministers of the neutral and non-aligned, with Brian Cowen for 
Ireland and Benita Ferrero-Waldner for Austria joining their colleagues 
from Finland and Sweden. They were prepared to underline the principle 
of EU solidarity more widely in the field of security, including in situations 
referred to in Art. 51 of the UN Charter, but “provisions containing formal 
binding security guarantees would be inconsistent with our security policy 
or with our constitutional requirements”. As a result, the following text 
was proposed: 
If a Member State is [a] victim of armed aggression, it may request 
that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the 
means in their power, military and other, in accordance with article 51 
of the UN Charter.150 
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The Italian presidency tried several formulas in the run-up to the 
December European Council. The articles enabling enhanced cooperation 
for common defence were deleted.151 In their place came a general 
solidarity clause without any procedural follow-up on how it could be 
implemented. The outcome was positive inasmuch as it contained an 
obligation of aid and assistance. It was ambiguous, however, in the 
statement that this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security 
and defence policy of certain member states. The full new para. 7 of Art. I-
41 reads as follows: 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, 
the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. 
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with 
commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are 
members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and 
the forum for its implementation.152 
What does this mean? The reference to Art. 51 is no problem, for both 
the WEU and NATO did the same thing. This placed them clearly in the 
realm of collective defence (with the obligation to report any action taken to 
the Security Council) and prevented them from being regarded as agencies 
under the UN, which would have made them dependent on authorisation 
by the Security Council. The first sentence of the new text resembles Art. V 
of the WEU, which included a commitment of automatic military 
assistance, but for all practical purposes, left its implementation to NATO. 
Yet the word ‘military’ no longer appeared. The second sentence was 
problematical if the neutral and non-aligned were to take it as an escape 
from the obligation in the first sentence. A proper interpretation would be 
that all member states have the duty to assist militarily, but that some will 
only do so bilaterally and not automatically participate in an organisational 
framework. It certainly does not amount to an alliance clause. One might 
question the value of such an arrangement, but at least a taboo has been 
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broken and the notion of solidarity has been extended to its root elements 
of defending territorial integrity and national independence. It is to be 
expected that the growing cooperation among the 25 member states, now 
even including Martian subjects such as battle groups, will influence 
political realities and get people used to military cooperation. Fortunately, 
in the absence of concrete military threats from neighbouring countries, 
there is time to develop a new consensus on the future of the ESDP and to 
concentrate for the short term on the new threats outlined in Javier Solana’s 
2003 EU security strategy paper, A Secure Europe in a Better World.153 
Although the possibility of enhanced cooperation for collective 
defence was deleted, the Constitution maintained a remnant of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in Protocol 24, which, with reference to Art. 41(2) had as 
its sole article: “The Union shall draw up, together with the Western 
European Union, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them”. 
The reference related to the prospect of a common defence, which since 
Maastricht had been made less conditional and stated that the CSDP “shall 
include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This 
will lead to a common defence when the European Council, acting 
unanimously, so decides.” Clearly, that prospect should be maintained, but 
in 2004 the link with the WEU was odd. Its functions had been transferred 
to the EU and the only remaining activities were armaments cooperation 
(but the WEAG would be transferred to the European Defence Agency) 
and the WEU Assembly. If the solidarity clause were to be enshrined in a 
ratified Constitution, maintaining the modified Brussels Treaty (1954) 
would make little sense. The Dutch presidency made an attempt to finish 
the WEU off at a ministerial meeting in New York, but met Belgian 
opposition, which rightly argued that the automatic military assistance 
clause should be maintained as long as the Constitution had not entered 
into force.  
The WEU Assembly made a proposal to the Intergovernmental 
Conference, to make the mutual defence obligation in the Constitution 
identical to Art. V of the modified Brussels Treaty, in order to ensure:  
that all the member states would be entering into a clear commitment, 
that provisions on cooperation with NATO would be included in the 
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Constitutional Treaty, and that the way in which the mutual defence 
obligation would be guaranteed for those countries which are member 
states of the EU but not of NATO would be specified.154  
The report recommended that the Brussels Treaty should be maintained 
“for as long as the European Union does not have either the appropriate 
legal means or the necessary instruments to render the Treaty and all the 
WEU bodies obsolete” and that the new members of the EU should be 
invited to become members of the WEU.  
The position of the WEU Assembly had become tenuous in the 
absence of an interlocutor. The WEU Council meetings had ceased, making 
a sensible dialogue impossible. The Assembly continued to produce useful 
reports and remained the only forum where national parliamentarians 
could discuss security and defence issues, but its debates continued in 
limbo. It had suggested the formation of an interim assembly for 
intergovernmental cooperation, consisting of national and 
Europarliamentarians, but this option did not make headway in the 
Convention or in the IGC. Then the Assembly gave itself the new name of 
Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly. The 
European Parliament on the whole was not keen to have another assembly 
working on issues in what it regarded to be its own domain, if not now, 
then sometime in the future. Governments limited themselves to the option 
of the COSAC, the half-yearly meeting of members of the European Affairs 
committees of national parliaments, where the European Parliament was 
represented. Nevertheless, national parliamentarians had no high opinion 
of the COSAC, which was doing little more than providing information 
and but did not engage in the consensus-building role of joint work on 
reports and resolutions.155 
Other changes 
Another change was made in the scope of structured cooperation. The 
word ‘permanent’ was added and it was made clear that this cooperation 
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would not affect the provisions for the Petersberg tasks contained in Art. 
III-309. Protocol 23 stipulated that it would be open to any member state 
that undertakes to: 
a)  proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through 
the development of its national contributions and participation, 
where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European 
equipment programmes and in the activity of the European agency; 
b)  develop the capacity to supply by 2007 at the latest, either at national 
level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted 
combat units for the missions planned, structured at tactical level as 
combat formations, with support elements including transport and 
logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Art. III-309, 
within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in response to requests 
from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained 
for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 
days; 
c)  take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, 
flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by 
identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, 
including possibly reviewing their national decision-making 
procedures; 
d)  work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to 
make good, including through multilateral approaches, and without 
prejudice to undertakings in this regard within NATO, the shortfalls 
perceived in the framework of the ‘capability development 
mechanism’; and 
e)  take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or 
European equipment programmes in the framework of the agency.  
The effect of these changes, paradoxically, was to enable virtually all 
of the member states to join in the permanent structured cooperation. At 
the same time the changes were a strong incentive for the two major, 
concrete ongoing activities: the battle groups and the agency. On the other 
hand, the hopes, albeit unrealistic, of some member states that this 
cooperation would result in a core group acting on behalf of the EU were 
thwarted. The decision to start an operation clearly would have to be taken 
unanimously, only softened by the possibility of constructive abstention for 
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prevent the others from conducting the operation. If a third of the 
membership abstained in this manner, a decision could not be taken. 
Another change in the field of external affairs was the provision that 
the EU’s minister of foreign affairs shall preside over the Council for 
Foreign Affairs. As vice-president of the Commission the post-holder shall 
be responsible for the tasks of the Commission in the field of external 
relations and for other aspects of the Union’s external action; for these 
matters (i.e. those relating to the specific tasks of the Commission) the 
individual shall be bound by the Commission’s collegiate procedures. If the 
Commission has to resign on account of a censure motion passed by the 
European Parliament, the foreign minister must resign from the 
Commission (but presumably could be re-appointed). The president of the 
Commission was conferred the right to request a commissioner to resign, 
but with regard to the foreign minister this right was subject to the 
European Council’s agreement. 
The fear that the minister of foreign affairs might become a cuckoo’s 
young of the Council in the nest of the Commission was real, but ultimately 
most participants were prepared to try the new arrangement because it 
would improve the effectiveness of the Union’s policies. It could put an end 
to the absurd situation in which High Representative for CFSP Javier 
Solana had the competence, but no money and External Relations 
Commissioner Chris Patten had access to the EU budget, but no 
competence except in civilian aspects of crisis management. Moreover, Mr 
Solana had no problems in his relationship with the Commission thanks to 
the excellent cooperation with Mr Patten and was hampered much more in 
his freedom of action by the six-monthly presidency, which wanted to put 
its mark on the CFSP. 
The title ‘foreign minister’ also provoked a degree of opposition. To 
some it created the impression of the EU moving towards a (super)state. In 
particular, British members preferred to follow their national terminology 
and thought of the title ‘secretary for foreign affairs’. In the Dehaene report 
to the Convention the name ‘external relations commissioner’ had been 
proposed. There the ministerial title had been associated with the rejected 
option of a strong president of the European Council.  
At first, Mr Solana himself was not keen on the double-hatting 
formula and gave priority to allowing enhanced cooperation in the security 
field. He did not lobby the Convention either way. In his annual State of 
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in June 2003 he welcomed the effort of the Convention to be more precise 
as to who represents what and added ironically that for a declaratory 
policy it was not necessary to have it conveyed by a single person. Then the 
troika of past, present and future president would be sufficient. But if the 
EU wanted to become an active player, the old arrangements would no 
longer suffice.  
Another issue to be decided was how the new minister would relate 
to the European Parliament. In the past, countries such as France and the 
UK showed little enthusiasm for a greater role of the European Parliament 
in the CFSP, largely because their own parliaments had little say in these 
matters. In their view, a parliament should be limited to its legislative 
function. Mr Solana took care to inform it regularly, beyond the minimum 
required by the treaties. In its part I the Constitution did not move much 
beyond the Nice Treaty in stipulating in Art. I-41 sub 6: “The European 
Parliament shall be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic 
choices of the common foreign and security policy. It shall be kept 
informed of how it evolves.” Real progress was made in Art. III-304, which 
included in the tasks of the foreign minister the duty to see to it that the 
views of the European Parliament “are taken into consideration as 
appropriate”. Cynics might say that opinion would vary on what was 
considered appropriate, but the Parliament undeniably got a foot in the 
door for putting questions about the follow-up. In addition, the European 
Parliament attained the right to address questions and recommendations to 
the foreign minister. Twice yearly a debate would be held on the progress 
made in the CFSP, including the common security and defence policy. 
Obviously, implementation of the new subsidiarity procedure would 
require changes in national parliamentary procedures. National 
parliaments should get organised to reach an opinion on new legislative 
proposals from the Commission within the timeframe of six weeks. That 
has posed a special problem for countries with a bicameral system, which 
probably would have to resort to a form of joint committee for dealing with 
the subsidiarity issue. Divided opinions are theoretically possible, but 
would cancel each other out in the ‘yellow card’ procedure in the Union 
framework. 
Aftermath 
After the conclusion of the IGC and the signing of the Constitutional Treaty 
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12 January 2005 with a resolution giving a closely argued rationale for its 
positive appreciation.156 It welcomed in particular greater clarity 
concerning the nature and objectives of the Union, its greater efficiency and 
stronger role in the world, more democratic accountability and more 
fundamental rights for the citizen. The text also provided an argument 
against those who fear that the EU will become a centralised, all-powerful 
‘super state’ by pointing at: 
•  the strong emphasis on decentralisation inherent in the theme of 
unity in diversity; 
•  the obligation to respect the national identity of the member states 
“inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government” contained in Art. I-5; 
•  the principles of attribution of competences (by member states of the 
EU to “attain objectives they have in common” as stated in Art. I-1), 
subsidiarity and proportionality; and 
•  the involvement of member states in the decision-making process 
within the Union and in the approval of any changes therein. 
The resolution said little about security matters. The reference to 
solidarity was limited to the clause relating to terrorist attacks and 
calamities, and on security and defence policy the text was limited to the 
statement that the ability of the EU to create common structures would be 
strengthened with the necessary flexibility to allow for the diverging 
approaches of the member states in these matters. The Parliament endorsed 
the creation of the post of foreign minister and said of the integrated 
European foreign service that it should be positioned as close to the 
Commission as possible and contribute to the communitarian dimension of 
Europe. 
Afterwards member states had to decide on ratification of the 
Constitution, which would be subject to a referendum in a growing number 
of countries, including France, the Netherlands and the UK (the latter 
probably not before 2006). There was competition among the UK, the Czech 
Republic and Denmark for being last, but the UK won. A referendum on a 
complicated subject such as the Constitution was asking for trouble, 
particularly in periods of economic gloom and unpopular governments. 
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Although the text was more readable than previous treaties on European 
Union, few people would be able to grasp its essential points of 
transparency, democracy and effectiveness in a Union of 25 member states. 
The paradox was that rejection would leave us with the Treaty of Nice, 
which on all accounts is less capable of managing the enlarged Union. But 
that argument would carry little weight with voters who were dissatisfied 
with Europe in general and their own government in particular. The 
problem is compounded by the fact that it will be very difficult to interpret 
the reasons for rejection in a way that will enable a repair job on the 
difficult aspects. 
Lithuania and Hungary took the lead with a convincingly positive 
vote in their parliaments. Eleven others followed, including Germany and 
Italy, and in referenda Spain and Luxembourg. Together these countries 
represented a majority of the EU membership. France and the Netherlands 
had a resoundingly negative outcome. According to the text of the Treaty, 
the European Council would take stock of the situation if by November 
2006 four-fifths of the EU member states had approved the Constitutional 
Treaty. 
The long period needed to complete the ratification of the 
Constitution risked having a paralysing effect on the normal business of the 
Union, particularly if delicate issues were raised simultaneously, such as 
the adoption of the financial perspectives for the period 2007-13. At a time 
when the population had to be convinced that Europe is good for them, it 
was counterproductive to simultaneously wage battles over disparities in 
financial contributions. This put a heavy premium on the sensible conduct 
of the rotating presidencies during the ratification period. The 2005 
Luxembourg presidency took the risk and tried to solve the financial 
questions rapidly but failed. After their defeats in the referenda, the 
governments of France and the Netherlands were hardly in a position to 
make concessions. The abortive Brussels European Council of June 2005 
under the Luxembourg presidency spoiled the atmosphere even more. At 
the time it seemed that a reduction of the British ‘rebate’ could be expected 
only if the amount spent by the EU on the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) was to be reduced within a fairly short time span. But that would be 
difficult in view of the agreement in 2003 to limit only the growth of the 
CAP to 1% annually. At the end of his presidency, Prime Minister Blair 
agreed at the Brussels European Council in December to a deal by giving 
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member states, but only received a soft commitment in return to review 
budgetary reform in 2008. The other issue, whether richer countries should 
claim money from the structural funds for the poorer regions in their own 
country, was not touched upon in December. A deal was struck at a 
volume for seven years of €862.3 billion (1.045% of overall GDP) compared 
with the original Commission proposal of February 2004 of €994.3 billion 
(1.21% of GDP), which had raised expectations of the new member states 
too high. For the CFSP, Mr Solana obtained €100 million annually, more 
than before, but only half of what he had asked for. Military expenditure 
remains excluded from the EU budget. 
In the public mind the feeling of ‘we are paying too much’ has 
assumed exaggerated proportions, particularly because everyone is paying 
according to the same principles, but some are getting more receipts than 
others. This will probably require some arrangements for capping the size 
of the so-called ‘net contributions’, but if some are allowed to pay less, 
others will have to pay more. More than anything else in the Union, the 
budget is a zero-sum game. 
In the field of CFSP the loss of the position of minister of foreign 
affairs will be most severe. Not that the function was without problems, 
straddling the Council and the Commission, but the role was worth trying 
in order to allow synergies to develop, including use of the Union budget. 
Now as before much will depend on the relationship between the high 
representative and the commissioner for external relations, but several 
other commissioners have responsibilities in areas that have a direct impact 
on external relations. That too would have been a problem under the 
minister of foreign affairs, and his/her colleagues would have had to adjust 
to the semi-autonomous status of the role. Particularly interesting in this 
connection was the creation of a joint external service, incorporating 
officials from the Commission, the Council and those on secondment from 
member countries. Javier Solana, who had already been designated as the 
first minister of foreign affairs and knows Brussels well, would be up to 
that difficult task. Unfortunately, the future of the post has been thrown 
into limbo, which means that the fall-back position of joint proposals by the 
high representative and the external affairs commissioner will have to be 
utilised to the maximum. 
Uncertainty about the fate of the Constitution weighs heavily on the 
solidarity clause. Not much can be expected before November 2006. For the 
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abrogated and the WEU will continue its truncated existence. In theory it 
would be possible for the member countries to endorse the solidarity 
provisions separately, like other articles that could be lifted out of the 
Constitution. Cooperation on security and defence would in any case 
remain intergovernmental, but in view of the many innovations contained 
in the Treaty text it could not easily be implemented without a 
comprehensive framework. It could also be taken up in the form of a core 
group but as the largest advocate of this modality (France) has rejected the 
Constitution, a push in this direction would lack credibility. This does not, 
however, absolve the countries with a ‘no’ vote from making proposals for 
the way forward. First steps in this direction were made by the European 
Commission with its Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, and by the 
European Parliament with its resolution on the Duff–Voggenhuber report. 
These are discussed in the concluding chapter.157 
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6.  Progress on a Security Strategy 
While the IGC was going on and Iraq kept the member states divided, it 
nevertheless was possible to make progress on a security strategy, which 
defined the new threats facing Europe in a way that ran parallel to thinking 
in the US. High Representative Javier Solana presented his draft of A Secure 
Europe in a Better World at the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 
2003 and managed to obtain endorsement through the process of 
multilateralisation without much damage to the original concept. His main 
concerns were terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failed states in 
connection with organised crime. The new threats were often more distant, 
more dynamic and more dangerous, and the first line of defence would 
often be abroad. This implied that we should be ready to act before a crisis 
occurred. None of the threats could be tackled by purely military means 
and in his view Europe should think particularly of operations involving 
both military and civilian capabilities. Mr Solana’s main objectives were 
extending the zone of security around Europe and strengthening the 
international order. The strategy held that Europe should become more 
active, more coherent and more capable. A key sentence was “we need to 
develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary 
robust intervention”.158 It survived in the final text adopted by the 
European Council of 12 December 2003. That could not be said of another 
expression, “pre-emptive engagement”, coined in the context of 
strengthening the international order by contributing to better governance 
in the world and offering justice and opportunity to everyone. The first 
draft stated that “Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious 
problems in the future”. Although this wording was put in a paragraph 
related to trade and development policies, it did not survive in the drafting 
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group. It came too close to the doctrine of pre-emption by military means, 
which had appeared in the new American strategy documents. The words 
were changed to “preventive engagement” and moved to a different place 
in the document, under the heading “Policy implications for Europe” 
instead of “Countering the threats”. Finally, the notion of “effective 
multilateralism”, which was already present in the first draft, was 
highlighted as the caption of the objective of “an international order based 
on effective multilateralism”, which clearly was a political message against 
American unilateralism. 
The Solana document was remarkable, both in content and timing. 
Perhaps it was not a proper strategy, but more a pre-strategic concept or 
even an “inspirational sketch”,159 but it certainly was the most coherent 
response to the new environment the EU had to live in and, as a political 
document, could be compared with the US National Security Strategy. The 
difference was that the EU could list all the means and all the threats, but 
had to remain vague as to what specific end its capabilities could be used to 
exert influence. Critics pointed at the absence of any mention of the 
purposes of the European Rapid Reaction Forces, which was seen as an 
indication that they would focus on pre- and post-crisis management.160 
This shortcoming prevented the document from becoming a fully fledged 
strategy. Nevertheless, its timing at the height of the transatlantic rift over 
the Iraq crisis was propitious as a successful attempt to show that political 
priorities did not differ much in substance.161 Both the US and the EU put 
terrorism at the head of the list as well as weapons of mass destruction. 
Obviously, there were differences in meeting these threats. Washington 
focused more on hard power, using the military in a war-winning mode. 
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The Europeans accepted the need for military capabilities in support of 
their political goals, but tried to maximise the spectrum of instruments at 
their disposal in the EU. Crisis management would be successful only if the 
entire range of diplomatic means – conciliation, governance, financial and 
technical support, the repair of infrastructure, inter-ethnic rapprochement 
and if necessary sanctions (using both carrots and sticks) – were utilised in 
combination with each other. In this approach the role of the military 
abroad was comparable to that of the police at home: after quelling a 
disturbance they should deter by their presence, but have the will and 
capability to act decisively when the preservation of law and order 
demanded. The Swiss military scholar Gustav Däniker defined this role as 
the ‘guardian soldier’. 
In the extreme, the difference between the US and the EU could be 
described as hard power versus soft power, but that comparison needs 
qualification. In the US, authors such as Joseph Nye have written 
extensively on the need to combine the two. On the European side, which 
possesses little hard power, there is an obvious inclination to upgrade the 
importance of soft power, but the lesson of recent crisis-management 
operations shows that, without some military capabilities, soft power is 
unlikely to be effective. In this context the emphasis of the Solana paper on 
early, robust action is significant, all under the caveat that solutions cannot 
be reached by military means alone. 
The US National Security Strategy, signed by President George W. 
Bush on 17 September 2002, itself was not a unilateralist document.162 It 
focused on championing aspirations for human dignity, strengthening 
alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the 
US and its friends. It emphasised working with others to defuse regional 
conflicts and preventing its enemies from threatening the US, its allies and 
its friends with weapons of mass destruction. It further sought to ignite a 
new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade, 
expand the circle of development by opening societies, build the 
infrastructure of democracy and develop agendas for cooperative action 
with the other main centre of global power. 
Politically more important than the somewhat semantic debate on 
pre-emption versus prevention was the changing US attitude towards 
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alliances, already signalled before. In the words of Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, the coalition no longer 
determined the mission, but it was the mission that determined the 
coalition. In other words, for the Americans NATO would be a toolbox 
without much influence on how crises should be managed, and the US 
would be the hegemon showing leadership for those who wanted to 
follow, either within or outside the Alliance. That was bound to erode the 
partnership. During the cold war the Europeans had accepted American 
leadership, because only the US could neutralise Soviet power. Today, 
however, that leadership can continue only if Washington is prepared to 
consult its European allies and not pursue unilateral policies from the 
outset. 
Effective multilateralism 
The notion of effective multilateralism resembles the proverbial giraffe: 
easy to recognise, but difficult to define. The fact that it should be effective 
already indicates that many forms of multilateralism do not attain their 
objective. The qualifier was added to make clear that multilateralism in 
itself is not inherently good. Most organisations remain purely 
intergovernmental without binding commitments and reappraisal of 
performance. Only very few have decision-making procedures with a form 
of majority voting that is binding on the participants. The EU decides a 
growing number of issues with QMV but virtually never extends this to the 
realm of foreign affairs and defence.  
NATO had a force-planning cycle, with ministerial guidance, force 
proposals by the Major NATO Commanders, a defence-planning 
questionnaire and replies by member states, followed by country 
examinations, ultimately leading to a commitment for one year and an 
indication of effort for the next four years. Although the overall plan clearly 
created a multilateral framework, contributions were determined by what 
the members were prepared to do in terms of expenditure and composition 
of their forces. Laggards were faced with moral pressure, but could persist 
in their insufficient contribution. On political issues consensus remained 
the rule, although in practice often the convention was observed that in a 
minority of one, no one would persist in opposing a decision. Only Greece 
and Turkey have on occasion not followed this approach, and in the 1980s 
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The UN Security Council adopts resolutions with nine affirmative 
votes, assuming that there is no veto from a permanent member, and the 
outcome is binding on the parties to which they are addressed. If these 
parties do not comply, sanctions might follow, but enforcement remains a 
weak spot of the functioning of the Council. The General Assembly of the 
UN adopts resolutions with a two-thirds majority, but their character is 
only politically binding. 
The plea by the Solana strategy for effective multilateralism is 
responsive to the current mood of interdependence in which no single 
state, not even the US as the only remaining superpower, is able to 
successfully achieve complex objectives on its own. On the other hand, the 
US cannot be compelled to do things that it considers to be against its 
national interests, nor does it have to ask permission from anyone for the 
conduct of its policies. Therefore, international order should not be built 
against the strongest power, but in cooperation with it. Throughout history 
the emphasis on international law and agreements has come from the 
weaker powers wanting to restrain the stronger. Hugo Grotius’s advocacy 
of the law of the seas was a prime example. To reach some acceptable 
degree of effectiveness in today’s world it is necessary to recognise the fact 
of American pre-eminence. The UN will not be able to preserve 
international peace and security in opposition to the US. The only way to 
exert some influence on an America that is increasingly inclined to free 
itself from the obligations of international institutions is to demonstrate 
that these organisations can be effective in delivering what they promised 
and will have value for everyone as a source of legitimacy and joint action. 
It is easy to criticise the US for going it alone on Iraq. We shall never 
know how politics in the Middle East would have developed if Saddam 
Hussein had been allowed to stay in power. In military terms the US 
proved its superb capability to defeat conventional forces, but was not able 
to deal with counter-insurgency and peacekeeping assignments. Far too 
little attention was paid to planning for reconstruction and humanitarian 
assistance. Washington has recognised this and is currently is taking 
remedial measures.163 
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 It also is interesting to note that US declaratory policy does not reject 
multilateralism as such. On the contrary, President Bush consistently talks 
about ‘coalition forces’, thus creating the impression of broad support for 
his political and military objectives. Equally, in the WTO the US works 
constructively with panels settling disputes and accepts their outcome. 
Clearly the US attaches great interest to the proper functioning of the 
international trading system. Unfortunately, this feeling does not translate 
into the realm of security and military power. The maxim that stated ‘the 
mission will determine the coalition’, instead of vice versa, could easily 
destroy NATO. No wonder European allies are stressing the need for 
revitalisation of the consultative processes in the organisation. Everyone 
accepts that the actual despatch of forces abroad will always remain a 
sovereign national decision, but if NATO has no role in determining the 
mission, its members will have no choice except to follow the American 
proposal or stay out. Then NATO’s politico-military framework would no 
longer perform a multilateral function and would be limited to being a tool 
of US policy. That cannot be the purpose of a multilateral organisation.  
Historians argue that through the ages no hegemonies in power ever 
accepted becoming subjected to a multilateral rule-based system. So why 
should we expect this from the US? Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay called 
their book America Unbound to describe the present trend to refuse 
commitments restraining US freedom of action.164 To them the deeper 
problem is not so much the imperious style of President Bush (whom they 
see as a revolutionary at heart, audacious rather than cautious), but the 
premise that America’s security rests on an America unbound. Earlier in 
US history, part of the Monroe doctrine refused both entanglement in 
European wars and European involvement in the Western hemisphere, but 
at the same time championed international law. Now, the US is in a 
different position after playing a decisive role in two world wars and a cold 
one. Today, the hope for a multilateral approach to law and justice rests on 
a moderate version of the moralistic tradition of American foreign policy 
and the recognition of the necessity of international interdependence. 
Alfred van Staden went too far in saying that the present problem of world 
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order is basically how to manage American power,165 for in reality there is 
very little scope for managing anything; in that respect the term ‘crisis 
management’ has always been a misnomer. But he is right in his conclusion 
that the effectiveness of the UN system very much depends on the 
possibility of linking American power with international legitimacy. 
Priority should be given to strengthening the legal regimes that have been 
established to combat international terrorism and to counter the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In concrete terms this means 
pressurising the states that remain outside the anti-terrorist conventions, if 
necessary by sanctions, and putting cases of non-compliance with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty on the agenda of the UN Security Council. If the other 
permanent members of the Council do not cooperate in dealing with these 
problems, they will bear the responsibility for the ineffectiveness of the UN. 
If multilateral organisations do not function properly, states will resort to 
coalitions of the willing seeking their own legitimacy. 
2004 – Reconciliation and consolidation 
After the crisis over US policy on Iraq, which split the EU down the middle, 
2004 was a much better year for the EU’s role in the world. Enlarging the 
EU with 10 new member states was the biggest success of a common 
foreign policy aimed at stabilising a continent by definitively terminating 
the dividing lines of the cold war. It took longer than the enlargement of 
NATO, but the impact was wider and deeper than the security dimension. 
The EU also showed that in some foreign policy and security issues it 
might be better placed to achieve results than NATO or the US. The best 
example was the regime change in Ukraine, where overt NATO 
involvement would have been counterproductive in leaving Russia no way 
to back down. The same might happen in Iran, although both the EU and 
the US will face some hard decisions if nuclear proliferation continues. On 
Turkey the EU managed to use a shrinking window of opportunity to 
decide to start negotiations in October 2005, which are aimed at 
membership but do not give a guarantee of successful completion. Finally, 
the ESDP underwent further diversification by the development of civilian 
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aspects of crisis management, thereby capitalising on its unique potential to 
merge a spectrum of instruments into a holistic approach to security.166 
On the military side, much effort was put into the battle group 
concept, building upon the success of Operation Artemis in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo as the first EU autonomous operation. It seemed as if 
NATO and the EU were leap-frogging over each other in boosting rapid 
reaction capabilities. The EU started with the Helsinki Headline Goals of 
50-60,000 personnel available within 60 days and sustainable for at least a 
year. NATO followed with the NATO Response Force (originally some 
20,000, but growing to 25,000), ready at much shorter notice (within weeks) 
and able to fight as an insertion force. The battle groups would be much 
smaller, some 1,500 personnel, available within 5-10 days. How would 
these forces relate to each other? Could units simultaneously be assigned to 
both? And how could the time required for decision-making be geared to 
rapid deployment? These are among many questions that so far have not 
yet been fully answered. 
The proposal for a NATO Response Force was launched by US 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld at an informal meeting of NATO defence 
ministers in Warsaw in 2002. NATO acted with unusual speed, spurred 
into action by the feeling that this might be the last chance to convince the 
Pentagon that the Europeans were serious in their determination to 
improve their defence capabilities. In 2003 the NRF already possessed an 
initial operating capacity with the goal of reaching full deployment in 2006. 
Every six months another set of units, which had been working up to full 
readiness for about a year, would be on standby for immediate activation. 
At the beginning of each period an exercise would be held under overall 
command of a framework nation and subordinate component commands 
for army, navy and air force. The composition of the NRF would be based 
on a combined joint statement of requirements and the various 
contributions would be certified to ensure that they would be up to the 
expected standard in terms of composition and training. 
The purpose of the NRF is threefold: a collaborative and focused 
effort that builds joint and combined capabilities and promotes 
interoperability, and above all cohesively transforms NATO capabilities. 
Transformation was the new game in town, first in the US, later also in 
Europe. It aimed at a new vision of future operating environments and at 
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building the capabilities necessary to deal with them. NATO responded by 
changing its command structure and turned Allied Command Atlantic 
(ACLANT) in Norfolk into Allied Command Transformation, contiguous 
to the national US command with the same mandate. It was judged 
important to maintain a major NATO command on American territory. In 
Europe a Joint Warfare Center was created in Stavanger, Norway and a 
Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Warsaw. The NRF should be 
able to perform different missions, but primarily in the area of crisis 
response, either as a stand-alone force or as a demonstrative force package, 
or as a force enabler acting as an initial entry force for others to follow. 
Exercise Allied Action, held in the spring of 2005 was largely a 
Spanish-Portuguese affair as far as the land component was concerned. 
This meant that its impact on transformation was limited. Comments on 
the work of the Joint Warfare Center and the modern Spanish headquarters 
at Zaragoza were highly favourable. Shortcomings were a lack of attack 
helicopters, medical evacuation, logistics and insufficient manoeuvre units. 
On the naval side the absence of land attack capabilities became apparent, 
which would be remedied only when a NATO strike fleet joined the 
operation. As a result of these lessons learned, NATO planners raised the 
preferred size of the NRF to some 25,000 personnel.   
Work on the EU battle group concept started with a ‘food for 
thought’ paper by the UK, France and Germany.167 It sought a catalogue of 
high-utility force packages that could be rapidly tailored to specific 
missions, usable either individually or together in small multiples. Key 
elements of the joint proposal concerned joint force packages that were: 
•  coherent, credible and battle-group size including appropriate 
supporting elements (combat support in the form of fire support and 
operational assistance and combat service support in the fields of 
administration and logistics) together with necessary strategic lift, 
sustainability and debarkation capability. For a Central African 
theatre the baseline battle group would require 200 C130 aircraft 
sorties (or 30 C17 or similar aircraft) for initial deployment. 
Sustainability should be for 30 days of initial operations, extendable 
to at least 120 days; 
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•  designed specifically (but not exclusively) to be used in response to a 
request from the UN and capable of participating in an autonomous 
operation under a Chapter VII mandate (i.e. to restore international 
peace and security); 
•  appropriate for, but not limited to, use in failed or failing states (of 
which most are in Africa); and 
•  capable of deploying within 15 days to respond to a crisis, which 
would mean formations fully manned, equipped and trained, and 
held at high readiness, defined as typically 10 days notice or less. 
The paper assumed that the EU’s framework nation concept could be 
applied to the command function, with the possibility of rapid 
augmentation and multinationalisation of the headquarters. Currently, 
three operation headquarters with a 10-day readiness or less figured in the 
Force Catalogue. In some cases a fully-fledged force HQ (FHQ) might not 
be necessary, for example if the battle group was to assist another force its 
staff officers could join their HQ; for a small, benign and primarily land 
operation an augmented brigade HQ might be sufficient. Similarly, for 
operations with a maritime bias an FHQ at sea based on existing national 
capabilities might be appropriate. 
At that time it was not envisaged to assign the battle groups to a 
standing rotation or roster, but to regard them as a high readiness 
inventory (initially seven to nine) providing the ‘first stop’ for EU rapid 
response, replacing the High Readiness Capabilities database. If this line of 
thinking were maintained, problems would arise in connection with 
assignments to other rapid reaction forces, especially the NATO Response 
Force. The food for thought paper stated that battle group formations will 
have potential utility as a contribution to the NRF (which is based on 
rotation) or vice versa, but such switching would undermine the credibility 
of both concepts. Commanders hate being assigned to two tasks at once, 
which means that if they have to engage in one, they cannot 
simultaneously perform the other. Excluding dual-tasking might imply that 
flexibility in crisis situations would be limited unduly, but then it does not 
seem necessary to maintain such flexibility. Not everyone has to be ready to 
participate in everything at the same time and the number of members of 
the EU and NATO is large enough to develop rotation schemes that 
provide sufficient capabilities for both. This does not exclude the possibility 
of both the NRF and the battle groups engaging in a single operation if this 
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should remain clear. The debate should not be stretched too far, however, 
because as yet both consist entirely of European forces, and national 
governments will argue that they possess only one set of forces. The 
problem might come up again when US forces join the NRF, as foreseen in 
2005 but not yet implemented. In any case, the battle groups are intended 
for autonomous EU operations, which means that they should be able to 
function without recourse to NATO assets. 
The trilateral paper on battle groups was endorsed by the EU with 
2007 as the target date for full operational capability.168 It made some 
additional points on links with the United Nations. It held that the battle 
group concept should be developed in a manner complementary to the 
SHIRBRIG initiative, which was larger (up to a brigade), but was held at 
slightly lower readiness (15-30 days) and was constituted principally for 
operations under a UN Chapter VI mandate. It would be possible to use 
SHIRBRIG to relieve a rapidly deployed battle group, subject to 
consultations with the UN. In all cases attention would have to be given to 
the links to follow-on forces, whether regionally generated or otherwise 
made available. This may require the battle group to take under command 
the lead elements of the successor formation or leave small elements behind 
for an effective overlap. 
Progress on capabilities 
The presidency report on the ESDP of 15 June 2004 called the ability of the 
EU to deploy force packages at high readiness in response to a crisis a key 
element of the 2010 Headline Goal. This could be either as a stand-alone 
force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases. The report 
continued: 
These minimum force packages must be militarily effective, credible 
and coherent and should be broadly based on the battlegroups 
concept. This constitutes a specific form of rapid response and 
includes a combined arms battalion-sized force package with Combat 
Support and Combat Service Support. Rapid reaction calls for rapid 
decision making and planning as well as rapid deployment of forces.  
  On decision making the ambition of the EU is to be able to take 
the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of 
the Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of 
forces the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission 
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on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch 
the operation. Relevant air and naval capabilities would be included. 
The need for reserve forces should be taken into account. These high 
readiness joint packages (battlegroups) may require tailoring for a 
specific operation by the Operation Commander. They will have to be 
b a c k e d  u p  b y  r e s p o n s i v e  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  a s  w e l l  a s  
adequate command and control structures available to the Union. 
Procedures to assess and certify these high readiness joint packages 
will require to be developed. The development of EU Rapid Response 
elements including battlegroups will strengthen the EU’s ability to 
respond to possible UN requests.169  
The European Council of December 2003 had taken the decision to set 
up a civil-military planning cell, composed of some 35 civilians and 
military within the EU Military Staff. It took about a year to establish its 
mission as follows: 
The Civ/Mil cell will enhance the EU’s capacity for crisis management 
planning. It will reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an 
EU autonomous operation, assist in coordinating civilian operations 
and have the responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and 
run an autonomous EU military operation, once a decision on such an 
operation has been taken. Crisis management activities are complex 
and, in most cases, call for the use of civilian and military means. The 
creation of the Civ/Mil Cell is a step in the EU’s efforts to harness the 
wealth of civilian and military instruments at its disposal in 
responding to crises. The operation of the Cell should lead to greater 
coherence of the civilian and military structures under the Secretary-
General/High Representative.170 
Finally, the European Council of December 2004 decided that the 
capacity to rapidly set up an operations centre should be available by 1 
January 2006 at the latest. Readiness would be assured by a permanent key 
nucleus, which would be reinforced upon a Council decision to activate an 
operations centre. This decision, normally in the form of a joint action, 
would include the appointment of the operation commander. 
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2005 – Renewed multilateralism, but institutional failure 
The year started out with a new US administration, which seemed to 
recognise that even the most powerful country in the world could not 
manage everything on its own. The visit of President Bush to Europe was 
seen as a charm offensive to make a new start. Donald Rumsfeld, the 
controversial Secretary of Defense, who a year earlier had antagonised the 
allies that did not support his Iraq policy by calling them ‘old Europe’ got a 
laugh at the Munich Conference on Security Policy on 11-13 February by 
saying “that was the old Rumsfeld”. This time it was Chancellor Schröder 
who put the cat among the pigeons with his remark that NATO no longer 
was the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate 
strategies.171 His speech, read by Defence Minister Peter Struck, continued 
by saying that the same applied to the dialogue between the EU and the US 
“which in its current form does justice neither to the Union’s growing 
importance nor to the new demands on transatlantic cooperation”. 
Therefore, he proposed a panel of independent personalities to make 
recommendations for the adaptation of the structures of our cooperation to 
the changed circumstances and to report early in 2006. The speech 
provoked uproar only a few days before President Bush arrived in Europe, 
but stated a fact of life: NATO had not served as the principal forum of 
consultation. Allied political consultations had declined in substance, but 
then NATO ministerial sessions never produced thorough discussions as 
ministers kept to their prepared statements. Only restricted sessions (and 
the early days of the Nuclear Planning Group with US Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara) produced discussions in which ministers personally 
became more deeply involved. It was also quite legitimate to ask whether 
direct EU–US relations could be improved in order to fill the gap. NATO 
Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer hurriedly called the German 
chancellor to ascertain the scope of his remarks, but also admitted that 
NATO should become more political. 
The words of the chancellor did not contribute to the necessary fence-
mending, which might have been possible. Nor were they very original; 
both Kofi Annan and the OSCE had resorted to high-level panels to make 
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recommendations. Chancellor Schröder’s proposal was only procedural 
without any substantial indications of what should be changed. The next 
day Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer did his best to fill this gap, but did 
not get further than mentioning issues such as the death penalty and the 
Kyoto protocol on CO2, hardly items for a strategic discussion with a US 
focused on the Middle East and weapons of mass destruction. 
Perhaps the biggest tactical error was the absence of the chancellor 
himself (because of illness) and the reading of his speech by Defence 
Minister Struck, who according to some in the audience did not pronounce 
every passage with equal conviction. Now the upshot was that Germany, 
formerly America’s best ally, had allowed a certain distance to creep into 
the relationship. Not that anything extremely wrong was said. A strong 
Europe was seen as a guarantee for a loyal division of labour in the 
transatlantic partnership, but the assertion of a new position for Germany 
was hardly necessary. The remark that Germany’s foreign and security 
policy emanated from its position in the centre of Europe also made the 
Europeans present wonder whether the notion of Mitteleuropa was being 
espoused again. And his assertion that the presence of American forces, 
which in the past had functioned as proof of close solidarity, no longer had 
the same priority, but was still politically meaningful, was less than 
generous. Equally, the audience was not impressed by the claim that active 
engagement in crisis management with some 7,000 German soldiers abroad 
legitimated the claim for a permanent seat on the Security Council.172 
After the conference the question remained of whether the Alliance 
would be capable of encompassing transatlantic relations without at the 
same time creating new machinery for closer EU–US consultations. The old 
solutions of a two-pillar NATO or a European ‘identity’ within the Alliance 
never got off the ground and the increased self-assurance of the EU made 
them obsolete. Yet, the tide seemed to be flowing out.  
After its setbacks in Iraq, the US administration has changed its tone 
and recognised the need for multilateral coalitions, but its fundamental 
attitude towards NATO remains in doubt. The charm offensive of the Bush 
trip to Europe of 2005 did not work. It does not make sense to say that the 
Alliance is valuable only if American positions prevail, even if in practice 
this has often been the case. For the US, NATO has been and remains the 
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primary forum for dealing with Europe, but if they want to pressure the 
Europeans into building better capabilities and accepting larger 
responsibility, they will have to accept more influence on designing a 
common course. The EU has an advantage over NATO in possessing 
economic clout and increasing cooperation in the field of justice and home 
affairs. In fighting terrorism most of the means will have to be non-military 
and the same applies to post-conflict stabilisation efforts. NATO will be 
able to perform some of these functions, but certainly not all. As a 
consequence, both the US and the EU will have an interest in establishing 
closer direct links than are possible within the more limited context of the 
Alliance. 
When the European Council endorsed the European Security Strategy 
at its December 2003 meeting, it asked that the follow-up focus initially on 
four topics: effective multilateralism with the UN at its core, terrorism, the 
Middle East and Bosnia. In this way it met criticism that the Security 
Strategy was tackling too many issues at once and linked it to the method 
agreed at Amsterdam to adopt strategies (with unanimity) to be translated 
into concrete action (with majority voting, if possible). On the UN, 
terrorism and Bosnia the EU had a good record of common policies, but in 
the Middle East this had never been possible since the European political 
cooperation began in 1971. Participation in the ‘Quartet’ with the UN, US 
and Russia was more of a following than an initiating character, but might 
become more ‘autonomous’ in the light of the diminished status of the US 
in the Arab world (see Box 1).  
Although agreement grew on the main threat, popular perceptions 
still diverged. The traumatic experience of 9/11 and the sudden realisation 
of vulnerability continued to have a lasting impact on domestic policy. The 
creation of a Department of Homeland Security was not emulated in 
Europe, which had learned to live with vulnerability and many forms of 
terrorism. Many people wondered whether al Qaeda would continue to 
focus on the US and thereby separate the allies or also strike in Europe and 
create solidarity among the victims. The attacks in the train stations of 
Madrid and London gave a new impulse to anti-terrorist measures in the 
European Union, although EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries 
continued to complain of the slow pace of implementation. A major 
difference across the Atlantic continued to be the military approach of the 
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approach of the Europeans. In this connection the agreement on rapid 
action abroad, before the danger strikes at home, was somewhat surprising. 
Box 1. EU and US approaches to world affairs 
The differences between the EU and the US in their approach to world affairs can 
be summed up in a simplified manner, taking its cue from Robert Kagan in the 
following table: 
 EU  -  US 
Come from 
 Venus  -  Mars 
Seek international order through 
 International  law  -  Powerful  hegemony 
    Coalition deals with crises  -  Crisis forms the coalition 
  European Security Strategy (Solana) - National  Security  Strategy 
 Prevention  -  Pre-emption 
  Soft power  -  Hard power 
 Equality  -  Leadership 
Source: Adapted from Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New 
   World Order, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. 
Conceptually, the Iraq war cast doubt on the argument that attack is 
the best form of defence,173 which had been expressed in two key 
documents of the war on terror, both issued in 2002. The UK’s Strategic 
Defence Review: A New Chapter states: “Experience shows that it is better 
where possible to engage an enemy at longer range, before they get the 
opportunity to mount an assault on the UK”.174  The National Security 
Strategy of the United States commits the US to attack terrorist organisations 
by “convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign 
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responsibilities”.175 The implication here is that if states do not get rid of 
terrorists on their soil, the US will do it for them. The argument is 
buttressed by the more fundamental idea that lack of democracy is a 
principal cause of terrorism, and that a forcible intervention could lead to 
the growth of a more stable democratic system. Prof. Adam Roberts argued 
that the history of counter-terrorist operations suggests no such simple 
conclusion and that the choice was a false one, there being no substitute for 
defensive anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities. His third point was 
that the thesis was a recipe for a revival of imperialism and that military 
intervention must inevitably mean, in many cases, exercising external 
domination for a period of decades.176 So the argument will continue. 
Concerning the other major new threat, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, Resolution 1540 of the Security Council of 28 April 
2004 broke new ground. Not only did it affirm that proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons (as well as their means of delivery) 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, it was also gravely 
concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-state actors may 
acquire, develop, traffic in or use these weapons. Illegal trafficking added a 
new dimension to the issue of proliferation and also posed a threat to 
international peace and security. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the Council decided that all states should refrain from providing 
any form of support to non-state actors, take and enforce effective measures 
to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation, and to report 
within six months to a committee of the Council consisting of all members. 
This resolution could be of great importance in monitoring the nuclear 
aspirations of Iran and North Korea and lay the basis for further action by 
the Security Council. It also explains why the International Atomic Energy 
Agency was reluctant to refer the issue of Iran’s non-compliance to the 
Council. 
Nuclear issues took an unexpected turn with the speech of President 
Chirac to a military audience on 19 January 2006, in which he said that 
French nuclear weapons could be directed at states that supported 
terrorism, not to annihilate them but to destroy their capability to assist 
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terrorists.177 Apart from the questions this raised about possible targeting in 
response to which precise threat, his declaration was widely judged as 
inopportune at a time of delicate negotiations with Iran. Nothing would do 
more to whet Iran’s appetite for nuclear weapons than such vague threats. 
Moreover, his unsolicited offer to Europeanise the French nuclear arsenal, 
made without any prior consultations with his partners, was hardly 
conducive to the formation of a common European strategy. 
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7.  Towards an EU Armaments Agency 
The European Council of Thessaloniki in 2003 decided to lift the proposal 
for a European armaments agency out of the draft for a European 
Constitution and to implement it quickly in the course of 2004, 
independently from the IGC and the ratification process of the 
Constitution. It would not be the first time that such an intention was 
expressed. In fact, similar proposals had been made since 1982. The defence 
industry across the EU had consistently argued in favour of the creation of 
a European defence equipment market and, in its merger and cooperation 
arrangements, was miles ahead of what their governments were prepared 
to do. Ever since the creation of the Eurogroup in 1968 at the initiative of 
British Defence Secretary Denis Healey, a series of organisational structures 
came into being, each overtaking the previous one before it could prove its 
worth. The independent European Programme Group was followed by the 
WEAG and the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO); in 
the context of the EU the POLARM group (the Ad Hoc Working Party on a 
European Armaments Policy) was created; and at a more restricted 
intergovernmental level the Letter of Intent (LoI) group and OCCAR were 
established.178 All had some value, but their output remained below 
expectations.  
To some, this leap-frogging was intentional, as the political will 
seemed to be lacking to establish an effective agency, which of necessity 
would need to have clear decision-making procedures and sufficiently 
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binding elements to implement them and to stay the course. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam was a disappointment by not making any progress except an 
anodyne provision that “the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy will be supported, as member states consider appropriate, by 
cooperation among them in the field of armaments”.179 This time 
expectations were high, but coloured by some scepticism. 
The working group on defence of the Convention had proposed a 
European armaments and strategic research agency to make clear that its 
task would be more than arms procurement. During its deliberations a 
p a p e r  b y  G i s e l a  S t u a r t  f r o m  t h e  U K  criticised the idea of Europe-wide 
procurement as a step towards a ‘fortress Europe’ approach.180 Her 
preference was for an intergovernmental defence capability development 
agency, designed to promote the strengthening of the defence industry and 
its competitiveness by coordinating national efforts in equipment, 
personnel and contracted-service work, while not cutting it off from the US. 
Others regarded a healthy EU defence industry as a necessary precondition 
for European defence. The Franco-British communiqué at Le Touquet on 4 
February 2003 compromised on an “intergovernmental capabilities 
development and acquisition agency”.181 This was not the end of the story, 
for the European Convention changed it to a “European bureau for 
armaments, research and military capabilities”. In the Constitution the 
word “bureau” was changed to “agency” and in the final phase the 
preparatory committee agreed on the name “European Defence Agency” 
(EDA).182 In Art. III-311 of the Constitution its tasks were defined as 
follows: 
a)  to contribute to identifying the member states’ capability objectives 
and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by 
the member states; 
b)  to promote harmonisation of operational needs and the adoption of 
effective, compatible procurement methods; 
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c)  to propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of 
military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes 
implemented by the member states and management of specific 
cooperation programmes; 
d)  to support defence technology research and coordinate and plan joint 
research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future 
operational needs; and 
e)  to contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any 
useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological 
base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of 
military expenditure.  
The Agency’s statute, seat and operational rules would be defined by 
the Council, adopting a European decision by qualified majority. Further 
provisions were:  
Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together 
Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out 
its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.183 
The meeting of the GAERC of 16 June 2003 in Luxembourg, 
preparing for the Thessaloniki summit, had adopted two resolutions – one 
on “Restructuring challenges” and one on “Security of supply”.184 The 
former recognised the importance of maintaining a “leading edge 
competency in critical defence-related technologies and capabilities”, but 
did not yet mention an agency and was limited to welcoming the 
Commission’s intention to launch a monitoring activity with a view to 
analysing existing deficiencies and structural problems, and to assessing 
the implications of EU enlargement on the European defence technological 
and industrial base. The decision of the European Council was cautious: 
“proposals and initiatives, including also in the context of the Convention, 
concerning an intergovernmental agency” were welcomed, but the 
incoming Italian presidency only was mandated “to promote the possible 
creation”185 of such an agency, taking into account the work of the 
Convention. The Italian presidency did not waste any time and on 4 
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September managed to obtain a decision of COREPER establishing an Ad 
Hoc Preparation Group, with participation of the Commission, and 
working in close coordination with the Political and Security Committee. 
The group could be reinforced by representatives of the EU Military 
Committee and the POLARM working party, meeting also at the level of 
national armament directors. The decision summarised the aims as set out 
by the European Council succinctly as follows: 
developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, 
promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, 
strengthening the European defence industrial and technological 
based and creating a competitive European defence equipment 
market, as well as promoting, in liaison with the Community’s 
research activities where appropriate, research aimed at leadership in 
strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities, 
thereby strengthening Europe’s industrial potential in this domain.186 
According to Brussels standards, progress was quick. On 17 
November the GAERC agreed on the principles establishing the Agency 
(and at the same time decided to establish a ‘road map’ to monitor progress 
in the European Capabilities Action Plan) and on 28 January 2004 Javier 
Solana appointed Nick Witney, formerly Deputy Undersecretary in the UK 
Ministry of Defence, as head of the Agency Establishment Team with the 
task of drafting a comprehensive plan, including elements for a Council 
Joint Action. 
On 14 June 2004 the Council agreed a Joint Action establishing the 
European Defence Agency with Mr Witney as its first Chief Executive. His 
deputy and five directors, representing the LoI countries and Belgium, 
were appointed soon afterwards. The budget for 2004 was €2 million, 
expanded to €24 million in 2005 to cover installation costs, salaries and the 
first studies on capability shortfalls. Long-term decisions would be taken 
unanimously by the Council of Ministers, but the yearly programme would 
be determined by qualified majority by the executive board, on which all 
participating countries are represented. Denmark did not join and the 
position of Norway and Turkey, which participated in the Western 
European Armaments Group as equal partners, still had to be defined. In 
November 2004 the WEAG ministers decided to terminate their activities in 
this forum by the middle of 2005. 
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In the light of past performance it was not surprising that the creation 
of the EDA was met by the usual scepticism. Much would depend on the 
willingness to enter into binding commitments and to stay the course 
during the inevitably long gestation period of armaments projects. During 
the negotiations, marked differences appeared on the status of the EDA. 
The UK had switched its position and now was in favour of a fully 
independent agency, but France and Germany wanted political control by 
the Council and the Political and Security Committee. 
The EDA will not be a European version of the US Defense Advanced 
Research Project Agency (DARPA), which, although coming under the 
Department of Defense, has a broad mandate of coordination and aims 
specifically at integrating the military and commercial industrial bases. In 
the EU the two are still separated, largely because of a continuing quarrel 
over the competence of the European Commission and Parliament in these 
matters. The outgoing Prodi Commission published a Green Paper and, 
acting on the advice of a ‘Group of Personalities’ announced the creation of 
a European Security Research Advisory Board.187 It saw a truly European 
market as crucial for strengthening the competitiveness of European 
industry by overcoming the current state of fragmentation of markets along 
purely national lines. 
Ever since 1957, Art. 223 (currently Art. 296 of the TEU) had allowed 
each country to take “such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with 
the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material”. In 1958 
the Council adopted a list of military goods to which this article would 
apply, a list that today is clearly obsolete. The Commission argued that the 
article should not be seen as constituting a general derogation for 
everything that is military, but should be justified on a case-by-case basis. 
The problem was complicated by the fact that many could accept more 
competition within the EU, but resist opening up the internal market to 
firms from countries that keep their own defence markets closed. In this 
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Defence Procurement, COM(2004) 608 final, Brussels, 23 September 2004(b) and 
European Commission, “Commission consults on more open and efficient defence 
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line of argument, Art. 296 should be maintained, at least as a bargaining 
chip for gaining access to defence contracts abroad. Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso still has to make up his mind in light of the answers to 
the questions put in the Green Paper. In the current climate, in which the 
Lisbon agenda for innovation and competitiveness takes central stage, the 
time may be ripe for substantial progress. Among the many important 
issues to be discussed will be the relationship between the EU framework 
programmes for research and the work of the new European Defence 
Agency, as well as the possibility of common funding for defence-related 
projects. 
By now it has been generally accepted that progress towards a 
European defence equipment market (EDEM) is necessary if Europe is to 
remain competent and competitive in its defence industrial and 
technological base. No agreement exists, however, on the degree of 
involvement of the European Commission in defence and equipment 
matters. From its side, the Commission envisaged either an interpretative 
communication, to clarify existing provisions in order to put an end to the 
misuse of the exemption under Art. 296 of the TEU, or a defence directive 
to coordinate national procedures for the procurement of equipment for 
military use. As a third option, member states have tasked the European 
Defence Agency with exploring the possibility of a code of conduct to 
foster cooperation within the scope of Art. 296. By the end of 2005 the latter 
course was deemed the most promising. 
A task force formed by the EU Institute for Security Studies 
concluded that none of these three instruments by itself would be sufficient 
for creating the level playing field necessary for an effective European 
market place. Accompanying measures would be required, particularly for 
establishing common regimes for security of supply and transfers. 
Therefore, it was recommended to develop the three instruments 
concurrently as part of a comprehensive strategy for establishing the 
EDEM. 
In conclusion, the creation of the EDA is a welcome step in the 
direction of a comprehensive approach and, in spite of the haggling about 
its name, a true capability agency. It will be headed by the high 
representative, but ministers of defence will assume responsibility, thereby 
giving substance to their central role in building European capabilities. This 
restores part of the role they had in the WEU, at par with the foreign 
ministers, which was almost lost in the early days of the ESDP. The EDA’s FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 205 
 
role in drafting and possibly monitoring a code of conduct will not be an 
easy one. To some extent it might even be contradictory to another part of 
its mandate: the development of cooperative projects. The latter are likely 
to involve high-value systems with an advanced technological content, 
designed to strengthen specific industrial capabilities. Its participants will 
not cherish the idea of opening themselves to competition from companies 
from non-participating nations. The task force thought that, at best, this 
would be possible at the subcontracting level and for maintenance and in-
service support contracts. 
In the past, the WEAG and WEAO have had some success in bringing 
research, development and acquisition closer together, but the link with 
operational requirements has been weak. That is not surprising in view of 
the long lead times involved in arms procurement. Also, at the national 
level difficulties arise in the relationship between those responsible for 
planning and procurement, but procedures exist for solving problems. At 
the European level, there is no institutionalised defence-planning cycle, as 
in NATO, and no armaments planning system. Part of the problem has 
been the position of France, which since 1967 has not participated in the 
integrated military structure and defence planning and has emphasised the 
voluntary nature of the European method. As a result, there is a gap 
between the bottom-up method of making contributions and the top-down 
process of institution-building. The EU lacks the interface that tries to 
persuade countries to do more in remedying the shortfalls that have been 
identified together. 
Perhaps NATO was, like Wagner’s music in the ears of Mark Twain, 
better than it sounded, but it certainly was not perfect either. For decades 
force proposals were adjusted to what the Major NATO Commanders 
expected the member states to accept or even welcome. But it was a process 
of mutual arm-twisting, through which everyone stood up better. It 
worked when the threat of major aggression was real and all nations were 
under pressure to do more for the common defence, which would only be 
as strong as the weakest link. That sort of peer pressure is lacking at a time 
when collective defence has been replaced by expeditionary capabilities 
and force projection. Today, it is very difficult to quantify military needs 
objectively, which is a major reason for the increasing re-nationalisation of 
defence planning. In the European context it should be possible to take an 
aggregate look at what we could make available together on the basis of 
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what to remedy remaining shortfalls in the short and in the long term. If 
the EDA manages to do that, it would be a great success, also for 
transatlantic relations. For EU shortfalls by and large are the same as the 
shortcomings in the capabilities the European allies offer to NATO. New 
capabilities will benefit both organisations. It is important that the 
European Capabilities Action Plan has been made more concrete by 
supplementing it with an ECAP roadmap, indicating when the shortfalls 
will be met. Another positive element is the central role given by the EU 
capability development mechanism to the EU–NATO Capability Group to 
coordinate programmes. But progress towards the creation of a European 
equipment market will not be measured by the creation of ever more new 
groups but by a coherent approach, dealing with the wide range of 
competition, export controls, common funding of research and 
development and determining its place within the internal market in close 
cooperation with the European Commission. 
In the summer of 2005 both the EDA and the European Commission 
made themselves known.188 The EDA announced technology 
demonstration studies for long-endurance UAVs, funded from its 2005 
budget. National experts had identified another 10 critical technology areas 
that could be addressed by ad hoc cooperative projects among its members. 
Commissioner Günter Verheugen, responsible for enterprise and industry 
policy, launched four specific measures at a defence workshop: 
•  the mapping of the European defence technological and industrial 
base to support the elaboration of policy options; 
•  standardisation and the preparation of a handbook together with the 
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) for use in defence 
procurement contracts; 
•  intra-EU transfers, i.e. simplified licensing schemes for defence 
products, components and intermediate goods, which today are 
treated like exports to non-member countries; and 
•  harmonised procurement rules as a central issue for the creation of a 
European defence equipment market. 
 
                                                 
188 This occurred through the EDA meeting of 6 July 2005 organised by its Research 
& Technology Directorate and the press release of the European Commission of 11 
July 2005.  
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8.  Justified Intervention 
Prior to 1990 several interventions took place with at least partial 
humanitarian justification, conducted by one or two countries. The concept 
of ‘humanitarian intervention.’ implemented by a coalition of forces was 
developed only after the end of the cold war. Before that time Belgium had 
intervened in the Congo in 1960, together with the US in Stanleyville in 
1964 and with France in the Shaba province in 1978. The US had intervened 
in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 
1989. India had intervened in East Pakistan in 1971, resulting in the creation 
of Bangladesh. Vietnam had intervened in Cambodia in 1978, Tanzania in 
Uganda in 1979 and France in Central Africa in 1979. At the time, most of 
these cases were criticised as indefensible intrusions on state sovereignty, 
but ironically might have been regarded as permissible humanitarian 
actions today. They were not justified as such, however, and India and 
Vietnam implausibly claimed their interventions as cases of national self-
defence. France changed its justification from providing assistance at the 
request of the new government to intervention on humanitarian grounds 
before the coup d’état took place. 
During the 1990s intervention had a stronger normative component 
than during the cold war, but remained selective. Differing political 
interests continued to play a role, which probably was inevitable but gave 
rise to accusations of double standards. Yet it was clear that the 
international community was not ready to deal with everything that went 
wrong in an imperfect world. On the positive side was the marked 
reduction of unilateral interventions by the great powers, who attached 
more importance to justifying their actions in terms of widely-shared 
normative principles.189 
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In my book, Debating European Security, an attempt was made to 
define the application of justified coercion in order to preserve or restore 
peace.190 In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis and the plight of Kurdish 
refugees on the snowy mountains of northern Iraq, new concepts were 
framed to allow for safe havens and humanitarian intervention. In Bosnia 
safe areas were created with a lesser degree of security and proved to be 
anything but safe. In Kosovo humanitarian intervention became a 
euphemism for tough offensive action. In Rwanda, no one acted in time to 
prevent horrendous killing. In the case of northern Iraq in 1991, the legal 
base rested on UNSC Resolution 688, which, however, did not provide 
explicitly for military enforcement action. The intervention was justified by 
the fact that Iraq had been branded a threat to peace and security, which 
could override the prohibition of interference in domestic affairs. When 
intervention was authorised in Somalia, the state had ceased to function, 
making the need for humanitarian relief overwhelming. In Bosnia the 
UNPROFOR mandate also started out as a humanitarian relief operation, 
but gradually acquired a wider scope. It could be argued that humanitarian 
aid without substantial protective action only results in further misery and 
violence, feeding those who may be the next victims. In any case, no 
intervention in itself is ‘humanitarian’, although its purpose is to end grave 
violations of human rights. The name should be changed. 
Humanitarian intervention has never been a precise concept and 
certainly no established doctrine; every time it has had to be weighed 
against its potential consequences. It has also fallen victim to considerable 
derision. Stanley Hoffmann described it as “well-meaning, but 
fundamentally insufficient, often naïve and self-defeating” and Noel 
Chomsky ironically wrote of the “new military humanism” in Kosovo.191 
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Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996; see also Noam Chomsky, The 
New Military Humanism, Lessons from Kosovo, London: Pluto Press, 1999. I am 
indebted to Désirée Geerts for her thesis “Naar een recht op humanitaire 
interventie?”, Leyden University, November 2000, and her closing sentence, “if 
power is used to do justice, law will follow”. FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 209 
 
The Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) has provided a useful 
definition of humanitarian intervention, as set out below:  
Coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another 
state without the consent of its government, with or without 
authorisation from the UN Security Council, for the purpose of 
preventing or putting to a halt gross and massive violations of human 
rights or international humanitarian law.192 
The merit of this definition is the recognition that humanitarian 
action could take place with or without a UNSC mandate. DUPI developed 
four alternative strategies for dealing with humanitarian intervention. The 
status quo strategy relied exclusively on authorisation by the UNSC as the 
sole centre of decision-making. The ad hoc strategy allowed intervention 
without such authorisation in extreme cases of violation of international 
law. The third strategy, of exception, envisaged a subsidiary right of 
intervention, which would require new rules and criteria. Finally, the 
general right strategy would not only require an amendment of the UN 
Charter, but also risk opening an unrestrained ‘free for all’. DUPI opted for 
a combination of the status quo and ad hoc strategies, with the argument 
that this would not affect existing international law. Intervention without 
UNSC authorisation would be seen as an ‘emergency exit’, subject to clear 
political and moral justification.  
Among international lawyers the debate about the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter continues. A recent 
study193 came to the conclusion that the arguments in favour of an absolute 
prohibition of the use of force were more convincing than the arguments 
against it, and that humanitarian intervention was contrary to that 
provision. Equally, an explicit right of humanitarian intervention did not 
exist under customary international law, nor was it evolving. Nevertheless, 
the principle of necessity could not be dismissed out of hand as a possible 
justification and could be extended to a humanitarian necessity. The 
advantage of this course would be that it did not affect the ius ad bellum. A 
state invoking this principle would be temporarily relieved of the 
obligation to comply with the prohibition of the use of force, but would be 
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well advised to ensure that the additional conditions formulated by leading 
experts are satisfied, even though their formal acceptance seemed unlikely 
in the foreseeable future. The Netherlands formulated these conditions in a 
note to parliament of 30 October 2001,194 after having organised three 
international seminars on the subject, which are: 
•  serious and massive violation of human rights; 
•  reliable and objective proof from different sources of these violations 
or the threat thereof; 
•  that the government of the state in question cannot or will not take 
adequate measures , or is itself responsible for the violations; 
•  an urgent necessity to intervene; 
•  that use of force is the ultimate means to redress the situation; 
•  that the primary purpose of the intervention is to stop the violations; 
•  evidence that the intervention is supported by those it intends to 
protect; 
•  that the position of neighbouring countries has been taken into 
consideration; 
•  that there is a reasonable chance of success at an acceptable cost; and 
•  that the intervention is unlikely to lead to greater problems. 
In implementing the intervention,  
•  its purpose should be made public at the outset; 
•  the use of force should be limited to what is necessary and 
proportional to the objective; 
•  the rules of the ius in bello should be observed; 
•  the consequences to the political system of the country should be 
limited to the objective; and 
•  full reporting should be effected towards the Security Council. 
A new approach was followed by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty of December 2001. Co-chaired by 
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, the commission developed the 
concept of “the responsibility to protect” in an effort to bridge the gap 
between the advocates of intervention and the defenders of state 
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sovereignty. Seeing sovereignty as responsibility, the debate was turned on 
its head by changing the terminology from “intervention” to “protection”, 
away from the language of humanitarian intervention.195 Their basic 
principle was that, if a state is unwilling or unable to halt or avert serious 
harm to its population, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect. With a sophisticated argumentation, 
the responsibility to protect was built up out of three specific 
responsibilities: to prevent, to react and to rebuild. Preventive options 
should always be exhausted before intervention was contemplated, and 
military action should be governed by a set of clear criteria: 
1)  the just cause threshold, i.e. serious and irreparable harm to human 
beings occurring or imminently likely to occur in terms of a large loss 
of life or large-scale ‘ethnic cleansing’;  
2)  the precautionary principles of right intention (best assured with 
multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the 
victims concerned), last resort (reasonable grounds for believing that 
lesser measures would not succeed), proportional means in scale, 
duration and intensity, and reasonable prospects of success, with the 
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences 
of inaction; 
3)  the right authority – although there is no more appropriate body than 
the Security Council, it should work better. In all cases its 
authorisation should be sought, either by members or by the 
secretary-general under Art. 99 of the Charter. The Council should 
deal promptly with the request and the Permanent Five should agree 
not to apply their veto where their vital state interests are not 
involved. If the Council rejects the proposal or fails to deal with it in a 
reasonable time, alternative options would be consideration by the 
General Assembly under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure, or action 
by regional or sub-regional organisations, subject to seeking 
subsequent authorisation from the Security Council. In all its 
deliberations the Council should take into account that if it failed to 
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discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking 
situations crying out for action, “concerned states may not rule out 
other means to meet the gravity and the urgency of that situation”; 
and  
4)  operational principles, which include 
a)  clear objectives, a clear and unambiguous mandate and the 
resources to match; 
b)  a common military approach among the involved partners, a 
unity of command and unequivocal communications; 
c)  gradualism in the application of force, the objective being 
protection of the population, not defeat of the state; 
d)  rules of engagement reflecting proportionality and 
humanitarian law; 
e)  recognition that force protection cannot become the principal 
objective; and 
f)        the  maximum  possible  coordination with humanitarian 
organisations. 
In an article in Foreign Affairs,196 the co-chairmen explained that their 
‘just cause’ criteria did not cover human rights violations falling short of 
outright killing or ethnic cleansing (such as systematic racial discrimination 
or political oppression), the overthrow of democratically elected 
governments or the rescue by a state of its own nationals on foreign 
territory. Although deserving external action – including in appropriate 
cases political, economic or even military sanctions – these instances would 
not seem to justify military action for human protection purposes. On the 
whole, these clarifications made sense in an effort to make the main 
principles acceptable to a broad audience. But the rescue of own citizens in 
a chaotic situation should not be deleted from the scope of their proposals, 
because it also directly concerns the responsibility to protect. For the 
Europeans, rescue action constitutes one of the Petersberg tasks agreed in 
1992 and, as demonstrated on several occasions, might only be executed at 
very short notice without the opportunity to conduct elaborate 
consultations or even to put it on the agenda of the UN Security Council. 
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Prevention and pre-emption 
Everyone agrees that prevention is better than cure, but it is tantalisingly 
difficult to apply effective conflict prevention. Only in Macedonia was the 
UN Preventive Deployment Force effective in stabilising the local situation 
through its mere presence, although its official mission was to prevent 
border incursions. Some definitions of conflict prevention are so expansive 
that they include virtually all development work and post-conflict peace-
building. Too heavy an emphasis on the structural causes of conflict is 
empirically inaccurate, because social inequities and resource scarcity do 
not always lead to deadly conflict and sometimes lead to positive social 
change. The research studies for The Responsibility to Protect distinguished 
between precipitating causes versus underlying causes.197 They stressed 
that ignoring the underlying factors amounted to addressing symptoms 
rather than the basic problem. Yet, years of development assistance has not 
reduced the propensity to lethal violence. So the authors reached the 
conclusion that the links between development and prevention were still 
only partially understood. 
In 1992, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali set the 
tone for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-making and peace-
building in his Agenda for Peace.198 He identified preventive diplomacy as 
“the most desirable and efficient” option for managing conflicts and listed 
several essential capacities: confidence-building measures, early warning 
and fact-finding capabilities and a rapid, preventive deployment capacity. 
Conflict prevention was in fashion, but the results remained extremely 
modest. Why? Some believe that the analytic capacity to predict and 
understand conflicts should be strengthened as well as systematic early 
warning. Yet, in most cases adequate notice has been available. Similarly, 
member countries have sufficient operational capabilities and an 
increasingly sophisticated toolbox at their disposal. The problem lies in the 
absence of an agreed strategic framework in which many actors can be 
brought together in decentralised actions. Norway established a Fund for 
Preventive Action in 1996 to allow the secretary-general to use special 
envoys and special representatives in emerging conflicts. Clearly, the UN 
will not be capable of mounting complicated military operations on its own 
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and will have to seek the help of regional organisations or ad hoc 
coalitions. Conversely, these organisations could do more in offering 
coherent force packages for UN-mandated operations. There is still too 
much competition among international organisations. 
In the public mind, pre-emption is often regarded as implying the use 
of military force, but that is not necessarily so. The word literally means 
seizure to the exclusion of others, or more generally to forestall or to 
preclude. In trade and finance, and also in bridge, the practice was much 
more generally used than in defence and was much less controversial. The 
military connotation arose in cold war nuclear strategy in relation to the 
threat of a disarming first-strike eliminating retaliatory capabilities. The 
concept acquired a new relevance in the light of new terrorist methods to 
seek catastrophic effects in pursuit of objectives that are ill-defined and 
therefore hard to deter. In customary international law there are few 
examples of pre-emption, but traditional wisdom makes it conditional 
upon the imminence of the use of force by the adversary. 
An early precedent exists in the Caroline case of 1837, when a 
schooner under a US flag supplied Canadian rebels with reinforcements to 
fight the British. While the ship was still on US territory, British forces 
captured and destroyed the Caroline. Two American crewmembers died. 
The British claim of self-defence was contested by the US Secretary of State, 
Daniel Webster, who wrote that Great Britain had to prove that 
the necessity of self-defence was instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation...[and that its forces] 
even supposing the necessity of the moment authorised them to enter 
the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or 
excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must 
be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.199  
The Netherlands Advisory Committee on public international law 
has discussed the question of whether the Webster formula could still be 
regarded as valid after the adoption of the UN Charter. It traced the few 
cases of “anticipatory self-defence” that have occurred in recent times: the 
Six-Day War started by Israel in 1967 against the impending attack by its 
neighbours; the Israeli destruction of the Osiraq nuclear reactor under 
construction in Iraq; strikes by the US and UK in 1998 “to degrade Iraq’s 
WMD capabilities”; and the destruction of the pharmaceutical factory al 
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Shifa in Khartoum in 1998, 13 days after the terrorist attacks on the US 
embassies in Nairobi. The Advisory Committee found that these examples 
did not warrant an unequivocal conclusion about the existence of a right of 
pre-emptive action, nor about preventive action. Only in the case of the 
Osiraq reactor did the Security Council condemn the Israeli attack as a 
violation of the Charter. Israel contested this by claiming an existing state 
of war, but this was countered by others with the argument that 14 years 
had elapsed since the last combat action. 
A larger number of cases could be cited where the use of force was 
threatened in case the adversary proceeded with certain actions deemed to 
be aggressive. Bush administration officials have quoted the Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962 as an example of pre-emptive action as opposed to a pre-
emptive strike, as the quarantine of Cuba was to prevent a further build-up 
of offensive arms. Another example was the threat issued against Libya in 
1989-90 to shut down a chemical facility at Rabta suspected of producing 
chemical weapons. In 1994 the US considered a pre-emptive strike with 
conventional weapons at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor of North Korea. 
The new focus of the Bush administration sprang from its assessment 
that with the growing nexus between transnational terrorism and 
proliferation of WMDs, deterrence – while still applicable – might not 
always work and if it failed, defences would never be perfect. The first 
explicit mention of pre-emption came in the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 September 2001, 
only a few weeks after the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the 
Pentagon. The report stated that the US “must deter, pre-empt, and defend 
against aggression” targeted against the US.200 
President Bush first explicitly mentioned pre-emption in his speech at 
West Point on 1 June 2002, in which he said “if we wait for threats to fully 
materialize, we will have waited too long”. Therefore, “Americans had to 
be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and 
to defend our lives”. On 17 September the concept was elaborated in the 
National Security Strategy: 
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, 
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
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attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.201 
As discussed in chapter 5, this strategy was not a unilateralist 
document. It focused on championing aspirations for human dignity, 
strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, igniting a new area of 
global economic growth through free markets and free trade. Alongside 
these themes were those of expanding the circle of development by 
opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy and 
developing agendas for cooperative action with the other main centres of 
global power. 
A basic premise was that traditional concepts of deterrence would not 
work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton 
destruction and the targeting of innocents. The word ‘pre-emption’ 
appeared several times in the National Security Strategy text, as in “While 
the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international 
community, we will act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them 
from doing harm against our people” (p. 6). Further on the text states: 
The US has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to 
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the 
threat, the greater the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action, even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy’s attack.202 
In December 2002 the Bush administration released its National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
because deterrence may not succeed and because of the potentially 
devastating consequences of WMD use, US military forces and 
appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend 
against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases 
through pre-emptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect 
and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are 
used.203 
On behalf of the administration some effort was made to reduce the 
impact of what started out as only a small part of a much wider security 
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strategy. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice clarified in a speech on 1 
October 2002 that the number of cases in which it might be justified will 
always be small. “Pre-emptive action does not come at the beginning of a 
long chain of effort.”204 
Contrary to some misperceptions, the need for quick action against a 
clear and immediate danger is not disputed internationally, nor is it a 
specific policy of the Republican administration. The National Security 
Strategy adopted in 1999 under President Clinton already contained the 
sentence “We will do what we must to defend these interests, including 
when necessary and appropriate, using our military unilaterally and 
decisively”.205 Australian Prime Minister John Howard observed drily that 
if you believed that somebody was going to launch an attack against you 
and you had the capacity to stop it, then of course you would have to use it, 
if there was no alternative. Perhaps more interesting was the French law for 
the military programme 2003-08, which stated that “the possibility of pre-
emptive action might be considered from the time that an explicit and 
confirmed threatening situation is identified”.206 In Japan, the Director-
General of the Defence Agency Shigeru Ishiba said that “Once North Korea 
declares it will demolish Tokyo and begins preparing for a missile launch, 
we will consider it the start of a military attack against Japan”.207 
Pre-emption is a special case of the use of force and in most instances 
likely to be a unilateral action. As such it is intricately linked with the 
question of the legitimacy of the use of force without authorisation by the 
UN Security Council, which has the monopoly except in case of self-
defence. If pre-emption can be linked to self-defence, there should not be a 
legal problem, at least not when the action is taken because the use of force 
by the adversary is seen to be imminent. Here lies the distinction with 
preventive action designed to deprive an adversary of a capability that he 
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might someday have or to forestall a potential action in the future. In effect, 
the problem boils down to the question of whether the right of self-defence 
includes the right to move against weapons of mass destruction while it is 
still possible to do so. Elaine Bunn pointed out that the threshold for 
preventive action will be much higher than for pre-emption based on the 
presentable intelligence of an imminent threat. In this connection the 
change in the EU strategy from pre-emptive engagement to preventive 
engagement is odd, but can be explained by the European culture of 
endorsing crisis prevention easily, without associating it with military 
force. 
Walter Slocombe argued that it was too simple to say that “force as a 
last resort” is an absolute principle.208 After their experience in the Balkans, 
many Europeans would agree with him, because early action would have 
prevented a terrible process of escalation. Ms Bunn noted the irony that the 
more imminent the threat is, the easier it will be to justify pre-emption 
politically, but the harder it will be to make it operationally decisive, 
because the enemy would have prepared his defences.209 Once a rogue state 
has achieved a serious WMD capability, it will be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to eliminate it. Conversely, when the threat is less imminent, 
world opinion would be against military action, even though at that stage it 
would be more effective in eliminating or postponing the threat.  
International terrorism is a special case and action against it does not 
fall in the category of pre-emption. The US is ‘at war’ with al Qaeda, which 
struck the first blow. The US has declared that it will regard countries 
giving sanctuary to terrorists as subjects to military attack, just as much as 
the terrorists themselves. That raises sovereignty issues, but these relate to 
the conduct of this non-traditional war and not to pre-emption. The 
invasion of Iraq was different, because the US had a short-term and a long-
term objective. They wanted to remove the weapons of mass destruction 
(which subsequently appeared to be no longer there) and to prevent 
Saddam Hussein from acquiring them in the future. Their basic approach 
was the fear that with Saddam Hussein remaining in power the situation in 
the Middle East would deteriorate even more and that the only confident 
way of eliminating his WMD programmes was to replace his regime. This 
meant that regime change not only became a political objective, but also the 
                                                 
208 See Slocombe (2003), op. cit. 
209 See Bunn (2003), op. cit. FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 219 
 
preferred military option. That peace-building was more complicated than 
war-winning dawned painfully when it was too late to do much about it. 
In Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s formulation it was the necessity 
of self-defence that must be instant and overwhelming and, in Mr Slocombe’s 
argument such a necessity could exist without an immediate prospect of 
attack. Thus, the right of anticipatory self-defence presupposed a right to 
act while action is still possible. All this would have been more convincing if 
i n  f a c t  W M D s  h a d  b e e n  f o u n d .  T h e debate on pre-emption remained 
inconclusive and shifted back to the (il)legitimacy of the use of force 
without authorisation by the UN Security Council. 
In 1990-91 the UNSC had adopted Resolution 661 allowing the use of 
“all necessary means” to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It could be 
described as a fig leaf resolution, barely enough to cover the subject and 
leaving entirely open the way in which the member states would respond. 
In this case it provided legitimacy to the ad hoc coalition that assembled 
massive force under US leadership. General Normal Schwarzkopf was 
successful in giving every participant a useful role, the Saudis a partial 
command function and the French a dashing run on the flank. 
In the Kosovo crisis of 1999, NATO provided its own legitimacy in 
the light of flagrant Serbian violations of human rights. Recourse to the 
UNSC in all probability would have met a Russian veto and perhaps also a 
Chinese one. Relations with Russia deteriorated and up to the present day 
Kosovo remains a sore point in Moscow’s foreign policy. The question of 
whether under all circumstances a mandate from the UNSC is necessary 
remains on the table. In the West, Germany is the most insistent, while the 
US is leading the argument that such a policy would leave the decision on 
intervention in the hands of Russia or China (or both). The Charter does not 
provide for the situation in which the UNSC is unable to perform its 
function of primary responsibility for peace and security. During the 
Korean war, the possibility of a Uniting for Peace resolution by the General 
Assembly was opened in 1950 and again in the Suez crisis in 1956 and the 
Congo in 1960, but has never been used in recent times. The great increase 
in membership would make it difficult to muster a two-thirds majority for 
such delicate issues as the use of force in a climate of a paralysed Security 
Council. Yet it might have been successful in the Kosovo case.  
International law differs from national law in many respects. It is less 
binding, because it is only gradually able to impinge on national 
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international conferences where some of the participants have an interest in 
preserving ambiguities. And it lacks enforcement mechanisms. In some 
cases international agreements are concluded under the express condition 
that they are politically binding as a guideline for action, but not legally 
binding. Within the UN the Security Council has primary responsibility for 
peace and security and the monopoly in legitimising the use of force, 
except for the ‘inherent right’ of self-defence. If the UNSC agrees, military 
action becomes legal, if not it is illegal. From a legal and a democratic point 
of view, this causes several problems. In the first place, what is right 
becomes dependent on the outcome of a negotiating process (particularly 
among the permanent members) that is sometimes described as judicious, 
diplomatic war-fighting. A second issue is that the UN depends entirely on 
the will of its members for the implementation of its resolutions. The third 
problem rests on the composition of the Council, where members are 
proposed by regional groupings without any regard for the capacity of the 
chosen countries to contribute to the implementation of the resolutions they 
vote for. Finally, there is the lack of democracy. The UN is the least 
democratic organisation European countries belong to. The majority of the 
members are not democratic, there is no parliamentary dimension and the 
principle of ‘one country, one vote’ distorts the link between vote and 
responsibility. That is one of the reasons why the General Assembly is no 
longer regarded as a body that might be able to act under the Uniting for 
Peace procedure in cases where the Security Council becomes deadlocked. 
In theory the UNSC could take preventive and even pre-emptive 
action in a situation that it has declared a threat to peace and security, but 
is most unlikely to agree to do so. In practice, it only deals with a crisis once 
violence has erupted, which in many cases will be too late, especially when 
weapons of mass destruction are involved. So the problem boils down to 
the question of how we can avoid extension of the right of self-defence to 
such a degree that it would legitimise preventive strikes in any number of 
volatile regions and lead to a world where the unilateral use of force would 
become the rule rather than the exception. 
When is it right to fight?  
After the publication of The Responsibility to Protect, which he co-authored, 
Gareth Evans continued his laudable quest for criteria of legitimacy. He 
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Sweden-sponsored Kosovo Commission in 1999.210 In that case the NATO 
intervention may not have been legal in the absence of UNSC 
authorisation, but in the view of the Kosovo Commission it was legitimate 
after balancing out some 14 ‘threshold’ and ‘contextual’ principles. Mr 
Evans took the argument a step further and in fact turned it upside down, 
by saying that UNSC actions should not only be legal, they should also be 
legitimate. And to enhance legitimacy he repeated the criteria for action 
published in The Responsibility to Protect, relating to the seriousness of the 
threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of 
consequences. He had a point in saying that legitimacy helps breed legality 
and that a technically illegal action that is widely perceived as legitimate 
(as in Kosovo) does far less damage than action that is considered neither 
legal nor legitimate. So legitimacy certainly is an important element and the 
five criteria should spur the Security Council into assuming responsibility, 
but the criteria will not provide a full answer concerning how to act when 
in spite of their fulfilment the UNSC still remains unable to agree on a 
resolution. In addition, as already mentioned, a problem remains with the 
‘last resort’ criterion, for in several recent cases escalation of the crisis could 
have been prevented if military action had been taken earlier. If better 
analysis and early warning are to be meaningful, they should also include 
the possibility of rapid military action to stem the crisis. The example of the 
EU-led Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
demonstrated the need for quick intervention before the UN was able to 
put together a peacekeeping force. It also showed how the UN can 
cooperate with a regional organisation. 
This line of thinking by Gareth Evans impacted on the report of the 
16-member High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change under the 
chairmanship of the former Prime Minister of Thailand, Anand 
Panyarachun, in which he also participated.211 It was transmitted to 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 1 December 2004 and contained an 
impressive analysis and 101 recommendations to make the UN effective, 
efficient and equitable in providing collective security for all in the 21st 
century. Its main aim was to put forward a new consensual vision of 
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collective security resting on three basic pillars: today’s threats recognise no 
national boundaries, are connected and must be addressed at the global, 
regional as well as the national levels. The panel adopted a very broad 
definition of threats to international peace and security as “any event or 
process that leads to large-scale mortalities or lessening of life chances and 
undermines states as the basic unit of the international system”. In 
clustering them, economic and social threats were put first, followed by 
inter-state conflict, internal conflict (including genocide), nuclear, 
radiological, chemical and biological weapons (in that order), terrorism and 
transnational organised crime. Of all the threats in these categories, those 
that were distant should not become imminent and those that were 
imminent should not become destructive.  
In approaching the issue of UN reform, the panel found it as 
important today as it was in 1945 to combine power with principle and 
stated: “Recommendations that ignore underlying power realities will be 
doomed to failure or irrelevance, but recommendations that simply reflect 
raw distributions of power and make no effort to bolster international 
principles are unlikely to gain the widespread adherence required to shift 
international behaviour”. A note of regret was struck in the observation 
that the glimpse of renewed collective security immediately after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 lasted only months and that both 
states and international security organisations had failed to keep pace with 
fundamental changes in the security climate in which smaller and smaller 
numbers of people are able to inflict greater and greater amounts of 
damage, without the support of any state. 
The panel reached the stern conclusion that the biggest source of 
inefficiency in our collective security institutions has simply been an 
unwillingness to get serious about preventing deadly violence. The biggest 
failures of the UN in dealing with civil violence have been in halting ethnic 
cleansing and genocide, with Rwanda and Kosovo as examples, to which 
recently Darfur could be added. Collective instruments have often been 
hampered by a lack of compliance, erratic monitoring and verification, and 
weak enforcement. Early warning can only be effective when it leads to 
early action for prevention, and monitoring and verification work best 
when they are treated as compliments, not substitutes, for enforcement.212 
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Part three of the report dealt with collective security and the use of 
force and started with the question, “What happens if peaceful prevention 
fails?” Then effective collective security may require the backing of military 
force, starting with the rules of international law, if anarchy is not to 
prevail. It should distinguish among situations in which a) a state claims to 
act in self-defence; b) it is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and 
c) the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to 
protect a state’s own people. Under the first condition (a), the most difficult 
question would arise when the preventive strike is in response to a threat 
that is not imminent, and under the second condition (b) when a state 
appears to pose a threat, but there is disagreement in the Security Council 
as to what to do about it. In answering these questions, several important 
points were made. There should be credible evidence of the reality of the 
threat, taking into account both capability and specific intent, and the 
military response should be the only reasonable one in the circumstances. 
The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs could not be used to 
protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, which could properly be 
considered a threat to international peace and security and as such provoke 
action by the Security Council. When governments are unable or unwilling 
to protect their own citizens, that responsibility should be taken up by the 
wider international community, but force, if it needs to be used, should be 
deployed as a last resort. The panel endorsed the emerging norm that there 
is a collective international responsibility to protect. It also repeated the 
argument made by Gareth Evans that the effectiveness of the global 
collective security system depended ultimately not only on the legality of 
decisions, but also on the common perception of their legitimacy; they 
should be made on solid evidentiary grounds and for the right reasons, 
morally as well as legally. The Security Council should always address “at 
least” the five basic criteria of legitimacy proposed by Gareth Evans and 
Mohamed Sahnoun in The Responsibility to Protect. The panel advised that 
the Council should embody them in declaratory resolutions and member 
states should subscribe to them. 
Among the many constructive recommendations – perhaps too many 
to expect successful implementation – an important point was made on 
post-conflict peace-building: 
When peacekeeping operations are deployed to implement peace 
agreements, they must be equipped to repel attacks from spoilers. 
Contingency plans responding to opposition should be an integral 
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strength to resist aggression will invite it. In some contexts, opposition 
to a peace agreement is not tactical but fundamental.213 
Therefore, the secretary-general should recommend and the UNSC should 
authorise troop strengths sufficient to deter and repel hostile factions.214 
The panel also presented criteria for membership of the Security 
Council, but could not agree on a model for its enlargement and listed two 
options, both extending membership to 24 and giving 6 members to each of 
the 4 regions of the world. In their view, reforms of the Security Council 
should meet the following principles: 
a)  They should, in honouring Art. 23 of the Charter of the United 
Nations,215 increase the involvement in decision-making of those who 
contribute most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically – 
specifically in terms of contributions to the UN’s assessed budget, 
participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to 
voluntary activities of the UN in the areas of security and 
development, and diplomatic activities in support of UN objectives 
and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making 
substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7% 
of GNP for official development assistance (ODA) should be 
considered an important criterion of contribution.  
b)  They should bring into the decision-making process countries more 
representative of the broader membership, especially of the 
developing world. 
c)  They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council. 
d)  They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the 
body. 
On membership, model A envisaged the creation of six new 
permanent seats plus three new two-year seats. Model B did not provide 
for new permanent seats, but created a new category of eight four-year 
renewable-term seats and one additional two-year non-renewable seat. In 
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both models preference should be given to the top three contributors in 
their region, either in terms of their contributions to the regular budget or 
to the voluntary budget, or as troop contributors to UN peacekeeping 
operations. Under each criterion three countries could qualify, so each 
region would have a maximum of nine candidates for permanent or longer-
term seats. In 2020 a review should take place, which should include the 
contribution of permanent or longer-term members “from the point of view 
of the Council’s effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and 
remove new and old threats to international peace and security”.216 
Many countries expressed support for the view that the Council 
should be more representative and take account of the changing 
geopolitical situation during the 60-year history of the UN, but the choice 
of new members proved very divisive and even threatened to derail the 
entire reform package. Brazil, Germany, India and Japan formed a ‘gang of 
four’ drafting a joint resolution, but Japan met Chinese hostility, Germany 
opposition from Italy and Spain, Brazil from Argentina and the African 
countries could not agree on South Africa and Nigeria and claimed a 
seventh seat, for which Senegal declared itself a candidate. The Middle East 
was left out of any deal. For a while the debate was compounded by the 
claim of granting the veto to the new permanent members as well, which 
would be a recipe for ineffectiveness of a Council already encumbered by 
its increased size.   
The panel’s effort to establish criteria for a seat on the Security 
Council was laudable, but its chances for success were not bright. How 
would the three criteria interact in making a choice, and would another 
enlargement of the Council really be conducive to the increased legitimacy 
of its resolutions? A Security Council of 24 members would certainly lead 
to the caucusing of smaller groups and not only of the permanent five who 
currently do much of the preparatory work. In addition, both options 
would substantially reduce the chances of the smaller countries, such as the 
Scandinavian ones or the Netherlands, to ever serve on the Council in spite 
of their substantial contributions to the budget and the activities of the UN. 
The main question, however, related to the primary function of the Security 
Council. Should it be regarded as a general executive board, in which case 
financial contributions could play a role in the selection process, or should 
it be limited to proper security issues? In this respect the report blurred the 
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issue, by regarding hunger, poverty, disease and pollution as great threats 
to mankind. That cannot be contested, but the question remains to what 
extent the Security Council should deal with all of them and project itself 
above all other activities and agencies of the UN. 
The panel did not deal explicitly with that distinction, but implicitly 
took away some of the glamour of the Security Council by proposing a 
peace-building commission and a peace-building support office to identify 
countries that are under stress and risk sliding towards state collapse and 
to assist in the planning for transitions from conflict to post-conflict peace-
building. The panel recommended that the commission should meet in 
different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and 
country-by-country strategies, and be chaired for at least one year by a 
member approved by the Security Council. In addition, a new post should 
be created for a deputy secretary-general responsible for peace and 
security. Neither recommendation seems self-evident. The peace-building 
commission would not be able to do much without the involvement of the 
Security Council, and the same applies to the new deputy secretary-
general, who should not take away a core function from the secretary-
general. Moreover, how should one classify a state as ‘sliding towards 
collapse’ and persuade it to attend a meeting of the commission? On the 
early warning function the commission would compete with the Security 
Council, but post-conflict stabilisation would be a different matter. 
In general, however, the report made excellent reading and contained 
some gems of blunt speaking. In connection with the Commission on 
Human Rights the panel was concerned that in recent years “States have 
sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights, but 
to protect themselves against criticism, or to criticise others. The 
Commission cannot be credible if it is seen to be maintaining double 
standards in addressing human rights concerns.” The notion of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ is an imaginative way out of the dilemma of the 
state sovereignty of misbehaving states, even if it is not made fully clear 
who is responsible (the members of the international community or the UN 
Security Council?). Presumably both, but then it should be remembered 
that the Security Council can authorise states or groups of states to 
intervene, but cannot oblige them to do so. In fact, the entire report was 
predicated on the normative character of the UN Security Council and did 
not refer to the use of force undertaken directly by the UN Security Council 
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the United Nations Security Council was seen solely as an organising body 
that authorised operations undertaken by member states.217 
A major criticism of the report came from Mats Berdal in the 
periodical  Survival.218 He felt that those favouring reforms should first 
diagnose what was wrong with the Security Council today and then 
explain how their proposals would remedy those failings. The report did 
not make clear how peace and security would be better served by an 
enlarged Council, which risked becoming unwieldy and less likely to reach 
consensus. 
Appearing virtually simultaneously with the High-Level Panel’s 
report was the UN’s Human Development Report 2004, which devoted 
chapter 4 to “Democratising security to prevent conflict and build 
peace”.219 It underlined not only the important point that building a 
functioning state requires a basic level of security, but also made the 
human development case for democratic civil control of the security sector. 
In democratic systems there should also be an obligation for policy-makers 
and security forces to be accountable to the public for their decisions and 
for their use of public resources. Such wording was a refreshing change 
from past practice where the subject of security-sector reform was usually 
treated as a separate topic unconnected with the overall issue of 
development.  
Kofi Annan responds 
The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan responded comprehensively to the 
High-Level Panel and the major UN conferences in the economic, social 
and related fields following up the Millennium Summit and preparing for 
the new summit of September 2005. His report, In larger freedom: Towards 
development, security and human rights for all, was not as blunt as that by the 
High-Level Panel, but endorsed most of its recommendations and infused 
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them with a greater sense of urgency.220 He even talked of a “fork in the 
road”, which was not fully warranted by the largely evolutionary character 
of the recommendations. Repeating the aim of his inaugural speech eight 
years earlier “to perfect the triangle of development, freedom and peace”, 
he now added the need for new mechanisms of accountability – of states to 
their citizens, of states to each other, of international institutions to their 
members and of the present generation to future generations. “The 
business of the September summit must be that promises made are 
promises kept.” 
Mr Annan showed his political sensitivity by harking back to the 
Four Freedoms enunciated by President Franklin Roosevelt in his State of 
the Union message of 6 January 1941. The secretary-general’s report came 
six weeks before the world commemorated that 60 years ago the most 
devastating world war had ended; it also sought to connect with the moral 
and material contribution of the US towards that outcome. Freedom would 
be the key in those celebrations and the secretary-general gave it new 
significance by joining freedom from fear and freedom from want with the 
freedom to live in dignity, thus underlining the intricate relationship 
between security, development and human rights.  
Under the heading “Freedom from fear” Mr Annan complained that 
on the security side, despite a heightened sense of threat among many, we 
lack even a basic consensus, while implementation, where it occurs, is all 
too often contested. He made a long, perhaps even overly long, list of 
proposals: “We must act to ensure that catastrophic terrorism never 
becomes a reality. This will require a new global strategy, which begins 
with member states agreeing on a definition of terrorism and including it in 
a comprehensive convention.” The strategy should be based on five pillars: 
it must aim at dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting 
it; it must deny terrorists access to funds and materials; it must deter states 
from sponsoring terrorism; it must develop state capacity to defeat 
terrorism; and it must defend human rights. In his view, it was time to set 
aside debates on so-called ‘state terrorism’. The use of force by states was 
already thoroughly regulated under international law and the right to resist 
occupation must be understood in its true meaning: “It cannot include the 
right to deliberately kill or maim civilians”. Following the High-Level 
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Panel’s call for a definition of terrorism the secretary-general wrote that it 
should include “any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm 
to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a 
population or compelling a government or an international organisation to 
do or abstain from doing any act”.221 On a different aspect he proposed to 
create a special rapporteur to report to the Commission on Human Rights 
on the compatibility of counter-terrorism measures with international 
human rights. 
The section on “Reducing the risk and prevalence of war” followed 
the High-Level Panel’s suggestion to create an intergovernmental peace-
building commission and office with the following functions: 
[to] improve UN planning for sustained recovery, focusing on early 
efforts to establish the necessary institutions; help to ensure 
predictable financing for early recovery activities, in part by providing 
an overview of assessed, voluntary and standing funding 
mechanisms; improve the coordination of the many post-conflict 
activities of the UN funds, programmes and agencies; provide a 
forum in which the UN, major bilateral donors, troop contributors, 
relevant regional actors and organisations, the international financial 
institutions and the national or transitional government of the country 
concerned can share information about their respective post-conflict 
recovery strategies, in the interest of greater coherence; periodically 
review progress towards medium-term recovery goals; and extend the 
period of political attention to post-conflict recovery.222 
As to the composition of this new body, it was proposed to have a 
core set of members of the Security Council and a similar number from the 
UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), along with leading troop 
contributors and the major donors to a standing fund for peace-building. In 
its country-specific operations national or transitional authorities should be 
involved as well as relevant regional actors and organisations, again with 
troop contributors (where applicable) and the major donors to the specific 
country.223 
These proposals deviated from the High-Level Panel in giving an 
important role to the ECOSOC and in eliminating any early warning 
functions from the mandate of the peace-building commission. Mr Annan 
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focused on the ‘gaping hole’ in the UN machinery arising from the fact that 
no part of the system effectively addressed the challenge of helping 
countries with the transition from war to lasting peace. He sought to rebut 
early criticism of the proposal with an explanatory note stressing that the 
formal prerogatives of the principal organs of the UN should not be 
altered.224 Nevertheless, the thinking behind the proposal would have an 
impact. The report’s proposed sequential reporting to first the Security 
Council and then, depending on the state of recovery, to ECOSOC, was 
aimed at “predictable, effective mechanisms for continued support so that 
early transition from the Security Council is possible”. 
 Such transition would have the advantage of removing the subject 
from the agenda of the UNSC and thereby from the possible use of a veto 
by the permanent members. By scratching early warning from the 
mandate, there should be less concern for duplication with the Security 
Council, but the issue of prevention would come back in connection with 
the risk of war-torn countries relapsing into violence. Therefore, post-
conflict peace-building was called a critical form of prevention, by reducing 
the risk of conflict through efforts to build state capacity, especially in the 
area of the rule of law. Furthermore, the report advised that the new 
commission should have a link with the international financial institutions 
in order to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to 
review progress towards medium-term recovery goals, thus ensuring 
extended political attention to post-conflict recovery. 
Another institutional change was the proposal to replace the existing 
Commission on Human Rights by a smaller human rights council, directly 
elected by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority and functional 
either as a principal organ of the UN or as subsidiary body of the General 
Assembly. The first option received wide support in the West, for it would 
place the Council at the same level as the Security Council and ECOSOC, 
but obviously would require careful delimitation of the competences of 
each of the three principal organs. A clear advantage would be that a 
council could sit permanently, while the current commission sits only six 
weeks in the year.   
The section on “Use of force” was short and covered only five 
paragraphs. Nevertheless, it made some important points on the 
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disagreement concerning pre-emptive action to defend against imminent 
threats, preventive use against latent or non-imminent threats and the right 
or obligation to rescue the citizens of other states from genocide or 
comparable crimes. The report stated that imminent threats are fully 
covered by Art. 51 dealing with self-defence and added that “Lawyers have 
long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has 
already happened”. Where threats were not imminent but latent, the 
Charter gave full authority to the Security Council to use military force 
(including preventively) and to preserve international peace and security. 
Mr Annan was not seeking alternatives to the Security Council as a source 
of authority, but wanted to make it work better. He argued that when 
considering whether to authorise or endorse the use of military force the 
Council should come to a common view on: 
•  how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; 
•  the proper purpose of the proposed military action; 
•  whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in 
stopping the threat; 
•  if the military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and 
•  whether there is a reasonable chance of success. 
By endeavouring to make the case for military action in this way, the 
UNSC would, in the words of the secretary-general, add transparency to its 
deliberations and make its decisions more likely to be respected, by both 
governments and world public opinion. He therefore recommended that 
the UNSC adopt a resolution setting out these principles and expressing its 
intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorise or 
mandate the use of force. Such a procedure might indeed add transparency 
to the debates in the UNSC and provide a logical agenda covering the 
crucial issues, but obviously the questions posed would not necessarily 
lead to identical answers. The Council should take on such responsibility, 
but no procedural provisions could replace the lack of consensus.  
From the start of the exercise it was clear that consensus would be 
difficult to achieve, especially when the issue of the composition of the 
UNSC hijacked the agenda. The document adopted on 14 September 2005 
did not satisfy anyone. The Financial Times described the outcome on major 
issues as “abandoned, delayed, avoided or fuzzed”.225 The North–South 
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division had become even more acute with the Third World reacting 
against what it saw as ‘new humanitarianism’, aimed at interference in its 
internal affairs. The definition of terrorism remained a stumbling block and 
nothing could be achieved on non-proliferation of WMDs. The resolution 
was long on development and contained a pledge to make concrete efforts 
towards the target of 0.7% of GNP devoted to official development 
assistance. In para. 22a, members resolved to adopt by 2006 and implement 
comprehensive national development strategies to achieve the 
internationally agreed development goals and objectives. Part III on peace 
and collective security reiterated the “call upon States to refrain from 
organising, financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise 
supporting terrorist activities and to take appropriate measures to ensure 
that their territories are not used for such activities” in para. 86. The 
Peacebuilding Commission would begin its work before the end of the 
year, but was reduced to an intergovernmental advisory body acting on the 
basis of consensus. Its standing Organisational Committee would consist of 
members of the UNSC, members of the ECOSOC elected from regional 
groups and, giving due consideration to countries having experienced post-
conflict recovery, top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions, 
and top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions. 
A Peacebuilding Fund would be established on the basis of voluntary 
contributions and a small peace-building support office would assist the 
commission (paras. 97-103). 
Part IV dealt with human rights and the rule of law and contained a 
section on “responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” in paras. 138-140.226 
Member states accepted this responsibility and recognised that the 
international community, through the UN, also had the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help 
protect populations. The resolution added: 
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with the relevant regional organisations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
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In spite of all the caveats this statement constituted an important step 
in dismantling absolute notions of sovereignty. It should help in dealing 
with intra-state conflict and make the mounting of peace-support 
operations easier. The resolution also made a specific reference under the 
heading of “Peacekeeping” to the efforts of the EU and other regional 
entities to develop capacities such as those for rapid deployment, standby 
and bridging arrangements and gave support to the development of a 10-
year plan for capacity-building with the African Union.    
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9.  The Question of ‘What For?’ under   
Different Scenarios 
During the 1990s, the work of the EU was capability-driven. To some the 
assumed lack of capabilities was an excuse for not focusing on European 
contingencies. What use would autonomous action be if the capabilities 
were clearly inadequate? This argument was carried too far, because with 
armed forces totalling some 2 million men and women for the enlarged EU, 
a number of operations would be feasible. This would not include a 1990 
Kuwait operation or that of 1995 in the Bosnian crisis or of 1999 in Kosovo, 
but then these were American scenarios implemented with US forces. 
Alternative actions were not considered. 
The ‘what for?’ question became increasingly relevant for military 
and political reasons. Without a reasoned answer, no country would be 
able to quantify its defence needs. Prior to 1989, defence planning had 
yardsticks of opposing forces and commitments to defend precise 
geographical sectors. After the fall of the Berlin wall, no one could provide 
uncontested arguments for the optimum size of their army, navy and air 
force. Only the acceptance of obligations to participate in multinational 
forces could introduce a new element of sustainable commitment. In order 
to be convincing, however, multinational force packages need some basis in 
probable scenarios, preferably fairly specific, but at least generic if too 
much precision raises questions of political sensitivity in parliamentary 
debates at home or in diplomatic relations abroad. In any case, it will be 
necessary to know in advance, at least for planning purposes, which 
country might be prepared to participate in what type of operation. 
Otherwise the time would be lacking for adequate preparation of the 
command function and the arrangements for transportation, 
communications and logistics. 
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On the political side, governments and parliaments will have to be 
aware of the circumstances and conditions under which they might be 
prepared to send their forces abroad. This decision will always be a 
sovereign national decision with a considerable degree of selectivity. It is 
most unlikely to ever become the subject of a majority vote, even in the 
most integrated form of a European Union. As a consequence, there has to 
be a measure of redundancy in planning multinational operations, for 
national commitments cannot always be relied upon. But the more national 
interests converge and military cooperation grows closer, the more the 
likelihood of consensus about necessary action and the stronger the moral 
pressure to show solidarity. 
The measure of parliamentary involvement in national decisions on 
the despatch of forces for peace-support operations varies considerably. 
The Netherlands have developed a “review framework”,227 which contains 
a non-exhaustive checklist of aspects that may be included in the analysis, 
such as: 
•  an assessment of the political context of the conflict; 
•  the political attitudes of the parties in the conflict; 
•  the issues at stake in the conflict and the motives of the parties; 
•  the character of the conflict (intra- or inter-state) and the risks of spill-
over; 
•  (previous) negotiations, international efforts and mediation; 
•  whether or not an agreement is in force, and if so, the extent to which 
it is respected; 
•  a political risk analysis of the existing situation considering future 
developments; 
•  the role of the military operation in the political process; and 
•  the humanitarian, political and economic situation, along with 
refugees, reconstruction, rule of law, disarmament and elections. 
A simpler, but basically similar approach was given by the British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1999, 
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F i r s t ,  a r e  w e  s u r e  o f  o u r  c a s e ? … S e c o n d ,  h a v e  w e  e x h a u s t e d  a l l  
diplomatic options?…Third, are there military operations we can 
sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the 
long term?…And finally, do we have national interests involved?228 
After studying successful and unsuccessful efforts at crisis 
management, Michael O’Hanlon, with remarkable foresight of the 
consequences of the crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, drew some additional 
conclusions: 
intervention for humanitarian purpose[s] should not be attempted in 
countries or regions where it could make wider war involving major 
powers likely…humanitarian interventions should not seek to defeat 
very strong armies supported by mass movements…interventions 
should usually not be undertaken in highly populous countries unless 
an indigenous security force can be quickly salvaged and enlisted in 
policing work.229 
Major Marc Houben has analysed crisis-management procedures in 
nine European countries, ranging from the “dominant government” in the 
UK and France, the “dominant parliament” in Germany and Italy, and the 
“imperative of consensus” in Denmark and Italy.230 Belgium and the 
Netherlands are discussed under the heading “Changing the rules” to 
indicate the de facto change of political rules and practice as the result of the 
traumatic experiences of both countries in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 
mid-1990s. His research focused on the question of how national behaviour 
influences the effectiveness of the coalition of states involved in a crisis-
management operation, and studied how and why states precondition their 
participation and whether the quality of national decision-making 
improves when a government has formalised these preconditions in 
advance. He concludes that parliamentary involvement in the deployment 
of armed forces has increased in most countries. The national decision-
making process has changed because of the growing number of actors 
involved, which requires national governments to spend more time and 
energy on building and sustaining sufficient levels of support at home.  
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Parliaments have two instruments at their disposal for influencing 
policy decisions ex ante: a constitutional requirement or convention of 
parliamentary consent before a decision can enter into force, and the power 
of the purse. Major Houben concludes, however, that a well-developed ex 
post accountability mechanism results in a larger parliamentary impact on 
policy, primarily because of its deterrent effect.231 This impact may be 
diluted when parliament is co-opted fully into the substance of its policies. 
In Germany, the two work together so closely that the dividing line 
between the executive and legislature becomes blurred and no ex post 
evaluation takes place. In the cases of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Norway, the emphasis is on the ex ante part. In the UK 
this is minimal, hence the emphasis on ex post evaluation. In France, Italy 
and Spain, parliamentary involvement is even more minimal, both before 
the decision is formalised and in the evaluation process. In France the 
power of the purse is exercised only in the approval of the loi du programme 
for a five-year period. 
On the research questions posed, Major Houben concludes that with 
a review framework in place, parliamentarians know where and what to 
look for and are generally able to obtain better information and to enhance 
their expertise. On the question of whether parliamentary involvement 
leads to risk-averse decisions, his conclusion was that only France, Spain 
and the UK are outspoken in their willingness to take risky decisions and 
apparently have a larger ‘risk-absorption’ capacity. These countries are also 
the only three among those examined where the executive can take 
decisions single-handedly and enforce them on the political system. This 
does not mean that those countries are less interested in conducting crisis-
management operations multinationally. All countries of Western Europe 
have recognised the advantages of multinational operations. For the 
smaller countries they provide the necessary economies of scale and the 
reduction of risk as the result of the risk-sharing. Multinationality makes it 
easier to obtain broad support and facilitates decision-making and, 
although large coalitions may lose on decisiveness and tenacity, the 
European view is decidedly in their favour. Only in the formation of the 
NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups have some limits been put 
on the multinationality of war-fighting elements, which by and large 
should be provided by one or two countries in order to maintain their 
effectiveness as insertion forces in a hostile environment. 
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Modalities for action 
In the European Constitution, the Petersberg tasks have been further 
defined to include the use of both civilian and military means and to extend 
to joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military 
advice and assistance tasks. They entail conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping tasks and conflict-prevention, including peace-making and 
post-conflict stabilisation. 
Several modalities for action are envisaged. The best contingency 
obviously would be a unanimous decision to start an operation in which all 
members would participate in the implementation, if necessary with a 
system of rotation. The decision has to be unanimous, but countries may 
apply constructive abstention, which distances them from the decision, but 
does not form an obstacle to it being taken. The Council may also entrust 
the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of member 
states “in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests”.232 
These states “which are willing and have the necessary capability of such a 
task” in association with the minister of foreign affairs shall agree among 
themselves on the management of the task. They shall keep the Council 
regularly informed of its progress, and do so immediately, should the 
completion of the task produce major consequences or require amendment 
of the objective, scope and conditions. 
The third modality is permanent structured cooperation among those 
member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which 
have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a 
view to the most demanding missions. Basically it is a form of closer 
cooperation, which generally is excluded from the ESDP, but with the 
limitation that an operation in the Union framework cannot be started by 
this smaller group and continues to require the unanimity of all members. 
A special protocol contains the provisions governing permanent structured 
cooperation. 
In her preface to the report of an independent task force published by 
the EU Institute for Security Studies under the title European defence, a 
proposal for a White Paper, its director, Nicole Gnesotto, wrote that there 
were two reasons to believe that the ESDP will continue to grow 
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substantially in the years to come.233 The first was the deterioration of the 
international context with crises remaining in the Balkans, Africa, the 
Caucasus and Moldova, but especially in the Middle East. Whether they 
liked it or not, Europeans would not be able to avoid this international 
disorder, especially at a time when security had become a major concern of 
its citizens. Her second reason concerned American insistence that their 
allies do more, either bilaterally or in the context of international 
frameworks. 
The idea of a white paper along the lines issued by many national 
governments was not new, but it was not possible to agree on charging an 
intergovernmental group with this task, or even on a formal request to the 
Institute. The European Council in Laeken on 15 December 2001 did not get 
further than a “Declaration on the operational capability of the common 
European security and defence policy”234 and a report by the Belgian 
presidency, which included a statement that the Institute “will work in 
particular on a publication on European Defence in the framework of the 
Petersberg tasks” in order to improve the way public opinion was 
informed. The Institute did so by means of an independent task force.  
The members of the task force shared the basic assumption that “even 
though the use of force is neither the first nor the only way to deal with 
regional or international crises, the EU must have at its disposal a certain 
level of forces at a certain state of readiness and operational efficiency, if 
only to widen its range of options when faced with a crisis and to facilitate 
decision-making at the highest political level”.235 In itself this assumption 
said little of the level of the forces and equipment needed. Moreover, the 
group was confronted with a growing tension between two types of 
military requirements: on the one hand, the ability to provide very mobile, 
flexible and rapid forces for expeditionary intervention; on the other, the 
necessity to deploy and sustain for a very long period substantial 
peacekeeping forces for crisis management. Even if the risk of escalation 
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was taken into consideration, the second category was less of a fighting 
force than the first and required other skills, training and equipment.  
The task force developed five scenarios to serve as broad descriptions 
of potential missions, from which guidelines for planning and procurement 
could be deducted: 
1)  a large-scale peace-support operation; 
2)  a high-intensity humanitarian intervention; 
3)  regional warfare in the defence of strategic European interests; 
4)  prevention of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction; and 
5)  homeland defence. 
Scenario 1 ranges from modest and uncontroversial monitoring and 
truce supervision to large-scale multi-dimensional deployments like the 
Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR) and KFOR, which have been a 
constant of the post-World War II security landscape. For this kind of 
operation the report did not reveal serious shortfalls. In line with the 
recommendations of the UN Brahimi report, the EU is able to deploy an 
operation within 60 days, setting up a mission headquarters within 15 days. 
The most pressing challenge was seen to be that of deployable and secure 
command, control and communications. Nevertheless, it was noted that an 
emphasis on peace-support operations can have high opportunity costs, in 
the sense that they might substantially reduce the ability to perform 
satisfactorily in scenarios involving high-intensity force projection. 
Scenario 2 aims at fielding and, if appropriate, leading a force capable 
of stopping an emerging genocide, without an overly severe limitation on 
geographical location, given the global range of precedents like Bosnia, 
Rwanda and East Timor. Emphasis is on speed and momentum with 
follow-on forces exercising a de facto international protectorate. 
Prolongation of the international presence would make it a peace-support 
operation under scenario 1. The report made the valuable observation that 
in political terms there is a built-in obstacle against timely action: as long as 
nothing serious has happened, intervention can hardly be justified, and if 
crimes are already being committed it may be politically possible to 
intervene, but by then it may be too late to save lives.  
Operational assumptions are that the intervention requires special 
operations forces, supported by tactical air forces for close air support and 
offensive air support, and air- and sealift. The force should be able to carry 
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and destroy), to establish and control safe areas, to deny and guarantee 
movement as appropriate, to wage a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, to offer 
military assistance to international governmental organisations and NGOs, 
and to bring humanitarian relief. Given the urgency of action a lead-nation 
approach recommends itself, as was the case for Operation Artemis in the 
Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The task force signalled a number of shortfalls in this scenario. The 
most serious again was secure and deployable command, control and 
communications, but now also theatre surveillance and reconnaissance, 
target acquisition and human intelligence. For a relatively limited 
deployment the available sea- and air-lift would be sufficient. The EU 
countries would lack highly mobile forces and special operations forces for 
unconventional warfare, however, as well as support and attack 
helicopters. The overall conclusion of the task force was that “the shortfalls, 
while significant, could be corrected through the reallocation of funding 
and changes in organisational priorities, with limited impact on the overall 
level of defence spending”.236 
Scenario 3, regional warfare in the defence of strategic European 
interests, could be termed a ‘peace-enforcement operation’, although of a 
particularly muscular variety. The task force felt that future regional wars 
could affect European Union interests in two very important but rather 
different ways. First, they would be affected by directly threatening 
European prosperity and security, for instance by interrupting oil supplies 
or other flows of goods and services, or by massive increases in the cost of 
energy, or through the forced emigration of war-threatened populations. In 
this scenario a regional power attacked a neighbouring country, which then 
asked the European Union and the United States for help under Art. 51 of 
the UN Charter. Second, the impact could be felt by its effect on Europe’s 
ties with the US. Not participating in a crisis that clearly affected European 
Union interests would seriously impact on that relationship. In the 
aftermath of the Iraq war, the latter argument may not be shared as 
universally as it was before. Even earlier, the reasoning went along 
separate paths. Some talked about ‘not less America, but more Europe’, 
which is consistent with close transatlantic ties. Yet others wanted to build 
up Europe as a counterweight to the US, which is less consensual and, in 
the short term, not a realistic objective. Therefore, it seems more 
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constructive to insist on Europe becoming able and willing to shoulder 
larger responsibilities, which will extend beyond its own continent. 
Today, only the US would be able to provide the framework for 
regional warfare. The report concludes that EU countries would not only 
suffer from all the shortfalls mentioned under the previous scenarios, but 
also early warning and distant detection, carrier-based air power, 
precision-guided munitions and stand-off weapons. They would have 
insufficient combat search and rescue, air-to-air refuelling, theatre ballistic-
missile defences, battle damage assessment, psychological warfare units, 
transport helicopters and even medical units. Logistical capabilities were 
unlikely to sustain the operation for the required period. Building a 
European-led variant of this scenario would require defence spending 
increases far in excess of what might be expected in a ‘baseline scenario’. 
Scenario 4 deals with the prevention of an attack involving weapons 
of mass destruction, particularly in the hands of non-state groups or 
irregular groups whose affiliation with any given state is not admitted. A 
case in point was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Operation 
Enduring Freedom. Contrary to the war in Iraq, this operation was of 
limited size. In fact, it was a combination of large-scale unconventional 
warfare and medium-scale, broad-spectrum naval and air operations. In 
the autumn of 2001, the US deployed some 6,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, 
which was, the task force noted, fewer than the UK sent to the Falklands in 
1982. These were supported by a US CentCom force array in the broader 
theatre of operations of some 60,000, which is not more than the EU’s 
Helsinki Headline Goal. 
In theory such an operation would be possible for the EU, but the 
task force concluded that it would best be conducted in coordination with 
the US. European countries would have enough special forces, but at 
present seemed unable to sustain them over a longer period. Moreover, it 
was unlikely that most of them would perform well in difficult terrain and 
under the threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons. In addition, the EU lacked strategic intelligence assets and 
medium- and long-endurance UAVs.  
Homeland defence as a concept was unfamiliar to Europeans, who 
used to conceive of defence as closely connected with their own 
independence and territorial integrity. Ever since President Ronald 
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and the subsequent plans for defences 
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European security concerns. Nevertheless, terrorism also presents new 
military tasks to them, mostly in support of civil authorities. In scenario 5, 
the aim is to protect facilities that intelligence sources consider to be targets 
of an impending terrorist attack, and to limit the consequences of such an 
attack once it occurs. Neither contingency is a Petersberg task, but the 
European Constitution, which still has to be ratified, includes a solidarity 
clause among member countries for terrorist attacks or natural calamities.  
Planning assumptions included protection of the four largest airports, 
the two biggest harbours, the 10 most critical power plants, the 10 most 
critical chemical plants and all the capitals of EU member states, including 
the seat of the EU in Brussels. The EU must provide light infantry as a back-
up to national police forces to help protect essential infrastructure and to 
assist in securing the external borders of the EU. For consequence limitation 
national forces should assist in the maintenance of law and order. The 
French emergency plan Vigipirate Renforcé was mentioned as an example. 
Under this heading also comes effective quarantining of areas in which 
‘ring vaccination’ is necessary in order to treat all of the affected population 
without having to divert scarce resources if the epidemic could not be 
contained.  
Civil protection is a national responsibility, but most EU nations lack 
the means to deal with the consequences of attacks by weapons of mass 
destruction. To deal with catastrophic terrorism there is a need for more 
special operations forces or counter-terror units.  
The task force concluded with a series of findings and proposed ways 
of correcting deficiencies, such as: 
1)  The EU cannot deploy land forces quickly and cannot sustain them, 
owing to the shortage of committed, deployable, combat-ready 
forces.  
2)  The Union has no agreed system of force packaging, which severely 
restricts deployability and sustainability.  
3)  The Union is capable of conducting a wide range of operations, 
including high-intensity warfare. Yet, it runs a relatively high risk of 
casualties among engaged forces and collateral damage.  
4)  Out-of-area warfare and new roles and missions, such as counter-
insurgency and counter-terrorism, require a new doctrinal approach 
and new training methods. But the Union has no conceptual 
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traditional platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare, as 
demonstrated in the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. A 
European doctrine centre was thought necessary, possibly within a 
European Defence College.  
5)  The EU cannot provide the operational framework for large-scale 
operations. There are sufficient operational headquarters, but 
technical shortfalls for operations in distant places.  
6)  The growing military-technical gap between the US and most of the 
European allies raises questions about interoperability.  
7)  The Union has limited capabilities for strategic decision-making and 
crisis management, partly as a result of the weakness of Europe’s 
military space programme.  
Remedies could consist of ‘bottom-up’ specialisation through 
unilateral concentration on a specific type of force; niche capabilities; co-
financing of national capabilities; and developing collective capabilities in 
the fields of command, control and communications (C3), intelligence, 
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), logistics, 
combat search and rescue, air-to-air refuelling, suppression of enemy air 
defences, air defence systems, all-weather precision-guided munitions 
(PGM) and stand-off weaponry. More radical remedies would be ‘top-
down’ specialisation, which implies combining capabilities for collective 
use and entails a collective decision-making process or a supranational 
authority, or setting up a standing nucleus force and permanent operation 
headquarters. The latter could be organised at the level of the battle groups, 
which are the new focus of the European Rapid Reaction Forces, to consist 
of 1,500 troops complemented by air and naval components. Finally, 
research and development activities should be better funded and 
coordinated. Comparing the scenarios, the report gave priority to 
homeland defence: civil protection, medical supplies, logistics and 
emergencies must be coordinated at the European level and the post of a 
European coordinator was deemed a necessity. 
The mission record 
The first time European countries together took responsibility for stability 
outside their own continent was during the Iran–Iraq war, when in 1987 
mines appeared in the Gulf, threatening international passage and the 
supply of oil. The WEU coordinated the mine-clearing operation. The same 
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naval action, this time in enforcing a UN embargo against Iraq. France and 
the UK provided land and air forces to the US-led coalition, and Italy sent 
air forces, but these were not coordinated in a European framework.  
During the Yugoslav crisis in 1992, the WEU began to implement the 
UN embargo on Serbia with a naval flotilla (parallel to a NATO flotilla and 
later integrated with it) but extended this with police and customs officers 
on the Danube when oil supplies appeared to get through on the river. In 
1994 the WEU supplied the police contingent to the EU administrator of the 
Mostar district of Bosnia. In 1997 the WEU sent a Military Assistance Police 
Element (MAPE) to Albania after the country was ravaged by the upheaval 
following the financial collapse of the pyramid system. 
Between 1999 and 2001, at the request of the EU, the WEU Demining 
Assistance Mission in Croatia (WEUDAM) provided support in clearing 
anti-personnel mines to the Croatian Mine Action Centre. 
On 24 March 1999 NATO initiated air operations against military 
targets in the remainder of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after its 
representatives had failed to sign the interim peace agreements on Kosovo. 
On 10 June Mr Milosevic agreed to withdraw his troops and the next day 
K F O R  t r o o p s  e n t e r e d  K o s o v o .  N A T O  w o u l d  r e m a i n  i n  c h a r g e  o f  t h e  
Kosovo operation up to the present, but in Bosnia and Macedonia the EU 
gradually took over. On 13 November in Marseilles the WEU Ministerial 
Council transferred its crisis-management functions to the EU, but for a 
while NATO remained in the lead. The Operation Essential Harvest for 
collecting arms from Albanian fighters in Macedonia in August 2001 still 
consisted of 400 troops deployed by NATO, as well as the subsequent 
Amber Fox, which protected the election monitors, but the following March 
the European Council in Barcelona announced its willingness to take over 
NATO’s operations in the republic. At the same time the EU took over from 
the UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia, the first ever EU 
operation. On 31 March 2003 the EU launched the Operation Concordia in 
Macedonia, consisting of 350 lightly armed personnel. It was expected to 
last for six months, but was later extended until 15 December 2003, when it 
was succeeded by a 200-strong police mission under the name Proxima to 
help develop domestic police forces. 
On 12 June 2003 the EU started Operation Artemis in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in order to stabilise the situation in Bunia, the capital 
of the Ituri province before the UN was able to assemble a peacekeeping 
force. It involved 1,800 military personnel with France as the lead nation 246 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
and lasted until 1 September when full responsibility was handed back to 
the Mission of the UN in Congo (MONUC). The EU decided in December 
to continue its activities in the form of the police mission EUPOL Kinshasa 
to support the setting up of an international police unit. 
The EU took a further step in the Balkans when NATO decided at the 
Istanbul summit of June 2004 to terminate its SFOR operation in Bosnia and 
transfer it to the EU. SFOR became EUFOR under Operation Althea with a 
force strength of some 7,000 personnel. Commemorating the 10th 
anniversary of the Dayton agreements, the European defence ministers 
decided in November 2005 to keep the force at that level during 2006.  
In addition to the military and police missions on 16 July 2004 the EU 
launched the EUJUST Themis for Georgia, consisting of 10 civilian legal 
experts and designed to support the authorities in addressing urgent 
challenges in the criminal justice system and in developing a coordinated 
approach to the reform process. Somewhat similar was the EUJUST LEX 
Rule-of-Law Mission to Iraq, agreed on 21 February 2005 and made 
operational by 1 July, to train some 770 judges, investigating magistrates, 
senior police and penitentiary officers at a cost of €10 million over a period 
of one year. 
In the wake of the tsunami that wrought havoc in the Aceh province 
of Indonesia it became possible to end the longstanding battle between the 
government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) with a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed on 15 August 2005. After a Joint Action decision by 
the Council on 9 September, the EU – together with Norway, Switzerland 
and the countries from Asean – rapidly deployed the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission, which became operational on 15 September, the date on which the 
decommissioning of GAM armaments began as well as the relocation of the 
‘non-organic’ Indonesian military and police forces. The first phase of these 
two programmes was completed on 27 September, so that the agreed 
‘allocations’ to former GAM combatants could start on 12 October. 
In 2005 the EU slowly became active in Palestine. Since 4 January 
police experts headed by a British chief superintendent were deployed to 
the region, but not as an EU force. An exchange of letters on 20 April 
between Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian Prime Minister and Marc Otte, the 
EU Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Process, led to the 
creation of the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support, 
housing the four officers in the interior ministry in Ramallah and a satellite 
office in Gaza City. They produced a three-year development programme FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 247 
 
consisting of transformational and operational plans and serving as a 
“blueprint for building a modern, democratic and accountable police 
service and as a framework for donor assistance”.237 More spectacular was 
the involvement of the EU in the opening of the border between Gaza and 
Egypt at Rafah after the Israeli withdrawal from the strip. Israel wanted to 
keep control of the external border, but yielded after intervention by US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The agreement, which took effect on 
25 November 2005, allowed Israeli access to television monitors, but the 
actual monitoring of the security forces of the Palestinian Authority would 
be done by a 60-strong EU police force.  
The EU also enhanced its role in the Moldova area. At the request of 
the presidents of Ukraine and Moldova, the EU agreed to provide 50 
border guards plus 19 staff from 1 December 2005 for a period of two years 
to monitor the entire border between them, including the border between 
Ukraine and Transnistria. These guards will have the right to make 
unannounced visits, open containers and visit offices where border-
formalities are conducted. Their purpose is to counter the smuggling that 
allegedly keeps the Transnistrian authorities in the saddle, but which they 
deny. Consequently, Tiraspol did not object to the EU mission. The 
agreement was concluded outside the OSCE and the negotiation 
mechanism that includes Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, with the EU and 
the US as observers. Equally, it did not affect the presence of 1,200 
peacekeepers in a zone of 10 kilometres on both sides of the Moldovan–
Transnistrian border, one-third of whom are Russians. Politically the 
conflict remains frozen, but the regime in Tiraspol might find it harder to 
continue past practices. 
As High Representative, Mr Solana made increasing use of EU special 
representatives. Those on the spot obviously had a better grasp of the 
situation and also avoided micro-management by the Brussels institutions. 
At the time of writing such personalities were functioning for Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Central Asia, Sudan, Moldova, the Middle East Peace Process, 
the South Caucasus, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the African 
Great Lakes region. In addition, personal representatives of the secretary-
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general/high representative were appointed for the issues of non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for human rights.238 
Energy security 
The scenarios discussed in the previous section will be a useful tool for 
force planning. Yet they still say little about the possible causes of conflict 
the EU might have to deal with or about the regions in which they will 
become apparent. We have seen the priorities in the EU security strategy 
document: terrorism, WMDs, failed states and their connection with 
organised crime. But it did not answer the question of to what extent the 
protection of our more specific interests will warrant the use of force. Two 
cases spring to mind: the security of energy supply and the threat to safe 
passage through international waters, as the result of either state action or 
piracy. Outside the EU, the availability of drinking water might also be a 
source of tension. Energy is a necessary component of economic growth 
and as such takes a special place among other commodities. An Adelphi 
Paper of the International Institute of Strategic Studies was devoted to 
initiatives to “improve resource governance in the interest of peace”.239  It 
included diamonds, minerals and timber in its analysis next to oil. Starting 
with an analysis of the ‘resource curse’, which tends to result in economic 
underperformance and governance failure in both underdeveloped and 
developed countries, the paper discussed recent attempts to curtail the link 
between resources and armed conflicts. It concluded that while in the past 
UN sanctions have generally been used as an economic leverage to 
promote negotiations or policy changes, they are increasingly aimed at 
putting targeted belligerents ‘out of business’ by prohibiting the 
commodity exports upon which they rely economically. The logic of 
sanctions has thus evolved from containment and influence to policing, but 
the enthusiasm of member states to engage in implementation measures 
has been limited and mainly related to naval embargoes. The author of the 
Adelphi Paper even suggested “earlier and stronger imposition of targeted 
sanctions, and peacekeeping mandates allowing for the military capture 
and supervision of resource production sites”. Given the current emphasis 
on sovereignty among the developing countries, such measures seem 
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unlikely to be acceptable to them, even if they are torn by rebellion, war-
lordism or outright conflict with envious neighbours. 
The UK has already made the security of energy supply an 
autonomous objective of its foreign policy, spurred on by a shortage of 
natural gas after the country became a net importer. During a decade of 
very cheap gas the issue of energy security was neglected.240 The 
Netherlands is also in the process of upgrading the importance of energy 
security as a foreign policy objective. Its realisation could take different 
forms: cooperation with oil- and gas-producing countries; the promotion of 
stable development; the encouragement of an investment climate that 
overcomes the shortfalls of the past and guarantees sufficient levels of 
exploitation in the future; the prevention of interruptions in the transport of 
oil and gas, especially in pipelines and sea-lanes; and finding a response to 
the fast-growing global energy demand in a way that is sustainable and at 
the same time takes climate issues into account. All these possibilities 
impact on relations with the countries in the regions concerned, but also on 
transatlantic relations. 
The first oil crisis of 1973 highlighted European dependence on the 
import of energy. The Netherlands and Portugal suffered an Arab oil 
boycott, together with the US, South Africa and Rhodesia. At that time oil 
accounted for 62% of primary energy use and 97% of that oil had to be 
imported, largely from the Middle East and North Africa. The Copenhagen 
summit of December 1973 called for a diversification strategy in terms of 
energy carriers and the countries of origin. At American initiative an 
energy conference was called in Washington in February 1974, which led to 
the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the 1974 
Agreement on an International Energy Program (IEP), which was to 
promote “secure oil supplies on reasonable and equitable terms” and to 
take “common effective measures to meet oil supply emergencies by 
developing an emergency self-sufficiency in oil supplies”.241 
The IEA was an initiative of Henry Kissinger and had both an 
economic and a political purpose. By establishing it within the OECD the 
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US was assured of an important role and hoped to prevent the Europeans 
from pursuing a separate producer–consumer dialogue. Nevertheless, the 
IEA was unable to start a fertile dialogue of its own and several countries 
began to pursue bilateral deals. France did not sign the IEP until 1992, 
along with Finland. The agreement requires solidarity at a time of a supply 
disruption: countries that are less affected must come to the assistance of 
those who suffer more severely. The test of this solidarity in the event of a 
serious disruption is yet to come, but the obligation is less pertinent to 
modern times, because new types of threats such as instabilities in a 
producer country or terrorist acts and major accidents are outside its 
application. Moreover, there is no crisis mechanism for natural gas. 
The European Community had already agreed on stockholding 
provisions for oil before the IEP was concluded. Currently, the European 
Commission wants to go a step beyond the IEP rule of 90 days of oil 
consumption and increase stocks to 120 days. The problem lies deeper, 
however. The IEA system basically depends on a free market with plenty of 
oil, which only requires arrangements for crisis situations. Today’s reality is 
different. International companies have access to only some 30% of the 
available oil. The rest is tied up in bilateral arrangements. This poses the 
question of to what extent the IEA arrangements should be complemented 
by a more active EU energy policy. In the European Constitution energy 
was made a shared competence of the EU and the member states. Art. III-
256 put the subject in the context of the internal market and the need to 
improve the environment. More specifically, the objectives of the Union 
were to: 
•  guarantee the functioning of the energy market; 
•  guarantee the continuity of energy supply; and 
•  stimulate energy-efficiency, savings and the development of new and 
sustainable energy. 
Art. III-256 stipulated in sub 2 that European legislation would not affect 
the right of a member state to determine the conditions for the exploitation 
of energy resources, its choice among different sources of energy or the 
general structure of its energy sector. Art. III-234 in the section on 
environment made this prohibition less absolute with a passerelle  clause 
allowing a unanimous decision to move to majority voting on measures 
that could have significant influence on these choices. But prior to that a 
large part of energy policy would remain within the domain of the member 
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Among the producing countries Russia and the Central Asian 
republics are increasing their exports and benefit greatly from the high 
energy prices. This region possesses one-third of the proven world reserves 
of gas. One of the challenges for the EU will be to enter into a constructive 
structural relationship with them without having to forego the 
fundamental values and objectives of its policies. This challenge acquires a 
new dimension with the factual re-nationalisation of the Russian energy 
sector. The EU will show modest growth in its oil imports, compared with 
other parts of the world (from 13.6 million barrels per day to 14.4 million in 
2010, 15.3 million in 2020 and 15.6 million in 2030). Demand for natural gas, 
on the other hand, is expected to increase greatly, also for environmental 
reasons, which means looking for new suppliers. The gas reserves of the 
Middle East have hardly been developed, but the large finds in Qatar 
already make it an interesting partner for the supply of liquid natural gas. 
In comparison to oil, gas is less easily diverted to other destinations, which 
makes a reliable long-term contractual relationship important for both the 
consumer and supplier. 
Security of supply also is closely connected with the choke-points in 
transit: the Bosporus, the Suez, Bab el Mandab, Hormuz, the Strait of 
Malacca and the Panama Canal. Thought will have to be given to responses 
to their possible blockage or closure. Supplier countries will have little 
interest in a prolonged interruption of their deliveries. For temporary 
stoppages, the IEA and EU stocks might be sufficient to cope with the 
situation and to act as a deterrent against political blackmail. The general 
conclusion, however, should be th a t  t h e  w o r l d  w i l l  b e  m u c h  m o r e  
vulnerable to terrorist action anywhere in the chain of production, 
transport and refinery. 
Core groups 
Ever since Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble raised the issue in 
1994 the debate on European security has included the possible formation 
of a core group of countries willing to proceed further with defence 
cooperation. Several core groups already existed, which had emerged 
outside the treaties: the WEU, the European Monetary System and the 
Schengen agreement for the free circulation of persons. The latter two were 
brought within the orbit of the Treaty on European Union, so why not do 
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The debate on flexible integration produced an impressive but 
confusing range of concepts. Some talked of a two- or multi-speed Europe, 
others of variable geometry, an á la carte Europe, differentiated integration, 
abgestufte integration, concentric circles, a hub-and-spoke Europe, exclusion 
of the uncooperative and the afore-mentioned terminology of flexible 
integration and core groups. Three variables could be applied to all of the 
concepts: time (permanent or temporary), space (which group of states) or 
matter (general or specific policies). All of the concepts were marked by an 
inherent tension between the notions of inclusiveness and effectiveness. 
Throughout the debate, some thought them essential for making progress, 
while others feared that they would lead to a break-up of the European 
Union. 
The European Council summit held in Turin in March 1996 took a 
first step by asking the following Intergovernmental Conference to 
examine whether and how to introduce rules either of a general 
nature or in specific areas in order to enable a certain number of 
Member States to develop strengthened cooperation, open to all, 
compatible with the Union’s objectives, while preserving the acquis 
communautaire, avoiding discriminations and distortions of 
competition and respecting the single institutional framework.242  
This examination led to a proposal to choose between three models of 
flexibility: multi-speed (a core group able to pursue policies further, but 
with the others following later), variable geometry (a permanent separation 
between a core and the less developed states) and á la carte (pick and 
choose while maintaining a minimum number of common objectives).243 
Variable geometry could be agreed without treaty change, while the others 
would require an IGC and a new treaty. Obviously, the European 
Commission was dead-set against the á la carte model, which threatened to 
unravel the acquis and the internal market in particular. The idea of a hard 
core or a directorate going faster on matters across the board was soon 
swept off the table, which left the models applying to specific policies. The 
defensive approach of most of the participants resulted in a debate about 
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disallowing what should not be done, rather than allowing what should be 
done. All participants wanted strict rules regulating flexibility.244 
  As a result, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty opened the possibility of 
enhanced cooperation, but under stringent conditions and only in the area 
of the first pillar. In the CFSP the option of constructive abstention was 
introduced, by which a country could abstain and would then not be 
bound by the decision. Amendments at Nice in 2001 relaxed the criteria for 
enhanced cooperation and removed the veto of members opposed to the 
measure. A minimum of eight members would be required to institute it. 
Enhanced cooperation would also become possible in the field of CFSP, but 
only for the implementation of a joint action or a common position, which 
meant that on the policy as such the veto would be maintained. It would 
not be applied to military matters. 
Under the assumption that a Union of 25 members or more would 
need a measure of flexibility in order to remain effective, the European 
Convention discussed several new modalities and included them in the 
draft Constitution.245 The most innovative was the permanent structured 
cooperation (the word ‘permanent’ was added during the IGC) for those 
member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which 
have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a 
view to the most demanding missions. The detailed arrangements were set 
out in Art. III 312 and Protocol 23. The underlying logic was both political 
and military: political to give the Union a tool to make coercive diplomacy 
more credible; military in order to make more effective use of available 
defence budgets by restructuring, pooling and harmonising European 
defence policies and resources. The difficulty was that national sovereignty 
and collective effectiveness are uneasy bedfellows. 
The criteria for joining the permanent structured cooperation were 
not made fully clear. Starting this form of cooperation would be done by 
qualified majority vote, but how would the capabilities and willingness of 
the prospective members be judged? My own view was to ask the 
European Defence Agency for its advice on application, as part of its 
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function as a ‘capability agency’. The new modality was intended as a 
special form of enhanced cooperation recognised in advance by the 
Constitution, thus circumventing the prohibition of regular enhanced 
defence cooperation enshrined in the Nice Treaty. It met with considerable 
resistance, particularly from the new member states and the non-aligned 
who feared being excluded from a closed club.  
To a certain extent their preoccupations were alleviated by the 
creation of battle groups in the context of the ESDP. As it worked out, all 
members wishing to join were enabled to participate in a group, but that 
did not yet amount to structured cooperation as such. The battle groups 
were the vanguard of European Rapid Reaction Forces, in most cases 
consisting of one or two countries, able to be deployed quickly and to 
establish a presence before the main forces – either the Helsinki Headline 
Goal units of 50-60,000 or a UN force – had arrived. They did not replace 
the Headline Goals, which were reformulated for the period up to 2010 and 
focused on qualitative aspects, but were important in moving away from 
the voluntary bottom-up process of force generation. The method of the 
Headline Goals was to define needs, which then had to be advertised for 
contributions from the member states. Such a system was bound to create 
shortfalls in the more difficult or expensive tasks. It was envisaged that the 
battle groups would be based on comprehensive criteria and the pledged 
units would have to undergo a process of certification of their capabilities, 
similar to that of the NATO Response Force, in order to ensure a credible 
force. How that would be done was another matter, because so far 
certification has been left to the lead nation. The application of some 
common criteria will be necessary to prevent the battle groups from 
becoming a motley bunch of dispersed units. In any case, the fact that the 
battle groups are pre-planned multinational units (and in some cases 
provided by a single country) cannot be sufficient reason to regard them as 
permanent structured cooperation. Their rapid reaction capability is an 
important qualitative improvement, but in itself says little about the 
willingness of states to enter into more binding commitments towards each 
other. That is another argument for committed scenario-planning. 
If the Constitution does not enter into force, nothing would prevent 
the battle group programme from going ahead, but under the current Nice 
Treaty permanent structured cooperation would not be allowed. It would 
be possible for the Council to decide a joint action in which only a limited 
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members apply constructive abstention. This could only be done on a case-
by-case basis and therefore could not qualify as permanent cooperation. 
Consequently, under the Nice regime permanent structured cooperation 
could only be formalised outside the EU Treaty framework, and under 
present circumstances this does not seem probable. It has to be 
remembered that even under the Constitution as amended by the 
Intergovernmental Conference the decision to take military action would 
be subject to unanimity. So a core group could not act on behalf of the 
Union as a whole without an express and unanimous mandate.  
As far as other core groups are concerned, it is not easy to envisage 
areas in which they could function without affecting the internal market. 
Perhaps some elements of environmental or taxation policies might be 
eligible. Cooperation on defence procurement has already been lifted out of 
the draft Constitution and implemented through the European Defence 
Agency. The possibility of core groups, therefore, will serve mainly as an 
incentive for difficult partners to participate in the search for a 
compromise. If they do not, they risk being excluded from the mainstream. 
Of course, nothing prevents informal core groups from emerging, as has 
happened already. The Franco-German axis has functioned as such for 
many years, as have other preparatory meetings among like-minded 
members. We have seen meetings of the founding six, the Visegrad four, 
the Nordic countries, the ‘net contributors’ and ‘Schengen Plus’. The last 
variant of enhanced cooperation outside the EU Treaty was the ‘Schengen 
III’ agreement signed at Prüm on 25 May 2005 among the old six EU 
member states minus Italy but plus Austria and Spain. The agreement has 
the objective of strengthening cooperation in combating terrorism, 
transborder crime and illegal immigration. The signatories expressed the 
hope that others would join and the agreement could be inserted into the 
legal framework of the Union. It represents an interesting formula to watch. 
American scenarios 
While Europeans were planning scenarios with enhanced military 
capabilities, Americans were confronted with the need to consider 
scenarios that focused less on traditional ‘war winning’ objectives and 
allowed for stabilisation and reconstruction. Experience in the Balkans had 
shown that military operations in themselves tended to be rather short, but 
had to be followed by a prolonged phase of stabilisation and nation-
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‘deterrence by presence’ and, if necessary, of forceful action, but nation-
building would be effective only through close civil-military cooperation. 
Almost at the same time as the report of the task force of the EU 
Institute of Security Studies, the Center for Technology and National 
Security Policy (CTNSP) of the US National Defence University published a 
report on stabilisation operations with scenarios for force-sizing.246 One of 
its major points was that the very rapid defeat of the enemy military meant 
that the US must be ready to field the resources promptly – ideally 
concurrently – with the end of major combat. This could only be done if 
planning for the stabilisation and reconstruction operations was integrated 
into planning for the conflict from the beginning and if the right skills were 
in the theatre to begin operations concurrently with the surrender or 
collapse of the enemy military. In the past the relatively long duration of 
major combat was supposed to allow time to plan for reconstruction 
operations and to begin them as the conflict wound down. The new 
challenge was to fill the gap between the major combat mission and nation-
building by a stabilisation and reconstruction mission.  
It is still too early to judge reactions to this thesis. It would be a 
drastic departure from the Powell doctrine developed at the time of the 
1990 Iraq war, which aimed at massive intervention, doing the job 
militarily and leaving as quickly as possible. Yet, the report underlined that 
successive post-cold war US interventions have become increasingly more 
ambitious and include regime change. Rapid and decisive military victory 
did not guarantee a peaceful post-conflict stabilisation environment and, 
historically speaking, five to seven years were needed for successful nation-
building. 
The CTNSP report advances the key judgement that there is no 
standard model of a stabilisation and reconstruction (S&R) scenario upon 
which to base US force planning. Much would depend on the magnitude of 
the operation, which is largely determined by the size of the country and 
the difficulties encountered. Therefore, the ambitiousness of US goals 
would be a key consideration. Nevertheless, the report formulated far-
reaching recommendations. It proposed to create two joint military 
headquarters to organise units critical to the S&R mission and to field two 
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division-equivalents with joint assets, organised to be flexible, modular, 
scalable and rapidly deployable, with four brigade-size groups that include 
military police, civil affairs staff, engineers, and medical and Psyops 
personnel, supported by a tactical combat capability. A multi-agency, 
civilian rapid-response capability should be established to deploy with the 
S&R forces and prepare for the transition from S&R (under military 
control) to the nation–building mission (under civilian control). 
On the equipment side, high-priority items were wireless and land-
based communications for civilian/military interoperability, unmanned 
systems, non-lethal weapons, detection devices for urban operations and 
course-of-action analysis and planning tools. Special attention was paid to 
unmanned vehicles for surveillance and threat neutralisation. In Iraq, two 
levels of UAVs were used, the high-altitude Global Hawk and the medium-
altitude Predator. For detailed local surveillance further deployment of 
low-level UAVs would be required, including small systems such as 
Dragon Eye and unmanned ground vehicles for going into buildings and 
caves. Wide area coverage could reduce manpower requirements.  
In the US a similar concern was expressed by the Heritage 
Foundation in its recommendations for “winning the peace”.247 Essential 
principles for post-conflict operations should be to eliminate the regime but 
preserve the governmental structure, and to formulate a vision of the end-
state and a plan that will accomplish it. Such operations should be 
multilateral, if possible, but “without compromising US national 
objectives”. Within the US many different agencies should be involved. 
In the meantime, NATO had been working on its Defence 
Capabilities Initiative aimed at filling by and large the same deficiencies, 
but was at least initially handicapped by listing too many improvement 
areas and as a consequence suffering from a lack of priorities. More 
significant was US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s proposal for a 
NATO Response Force, which would have real fighting capabilities in a 
network-centric environment and be able to act as an ‘insertion force’ in the 
early stages of a conflict. The NRF would have some 24,000 personnel, all 
European, with the US performing some enabling functions such as 
transport, satellite intelligence and communications. To the Pentagon this 
force was the last opportunity for the Europeans to show that they were 
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serious about NATO. Yet to many Europeans, the proposal raised 
questions about its compatibility with the Headline Goals. These questions 
became more acute when the EU was moving towards battle groups, 
consisting of some 1,500 personnel, also available within less than two 
weeks. The battle group concept was supported by the experience in the 
Bunia crisis in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
where the only autonomous EU operation thus far took place in the 
summer of 2003. Under French leadership the EU secured the situation for 
two and a half months until the UN was able to take over.  
NATO was quick in implementing the NRF concept. On 14 January 
2005, the NRF-4 led by the German/Netherlands Corps HQ and consisting 
of some 18,000 personnel went on standby, the largest rotation so far. Other 
high-readiness headquarters available to NATO are the Turkish, Italian, 
Spanish, the British-led Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the five-
nation Eurocorps, rotating every six months. They operate under the Allied 
Joint Force Command (JFC) in Naples (for NRF-4), Brunssum and Lisbon, 
which take annual turns. The land component of NRF-4 is grouped around 
the Dutch-led multinational 43 Mechanised Brigade of more than 4,000 
troops, including soldiers from Denmark, France, Germany and Norway. 
According to the NATO Military Committee document MC 477 of 10 April 
2003, the NRF is to be a stand-alone force for crisis response, able to sustain 
itself for a month (or longer if re-supplied) in five main scenarios: 
•  conducting a non-combat evacuation; 
•  supporting consequence-management operations such as deploying 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear protection capabilities 
following a chemical or nuclear incident or deploying engineers, 
medical, logistical and force-protection capabilities during a 
humanitarian crisis situation; 
•  deploying crisis-response operations including peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement (the latter requiring the full NRF package); 
•  aiding counter-terrorism operations; and 
•  carrying out embargo operations. 
The Mechanised Brigade could be deployed either as an initial entry 
force to facilitate the arrival of a larger follow-on force, or as a 
demonstrative force package to show resolve. In a further development, the 
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The command arrangements looked fairly complicated; the air 
component would be led by the AIRSOUTH HQ in Izmir and the maritime 
by the UK Maritime Forces Battle Staff. Moreover, there appeared to be 
disagreement over when and where to deploy the NRF. France was 
reported to insist on deployment primarily to deal with new crises, while 
others would allow it to also be used to reinforce existing operations.248 
Another problem was the financing, because – as in the EU – the principle 
of costs lie where they fall was followed, meaning that all parties had to 
pay for their own expenditures, which could result in an uneven burden for 
some and a free ride for others. At least NATO had the advantage that its 
headquarters and infrastructure were commonly funded, but it was 
overtaken by the EU in defining the common costs of an operation. 
On account of the terrorist attacks in the US, many of the questions 
posed by the QDR of 2001 remained unanswered. In the meantime, the 
preparation of the QDR for 2006 has begun with the publication of the 
National Defense Strategy of the US by Secretary Rumsfeld in March 2005. 
His foreword started with “We live in a time of unconventional challenges 
and strategic uncertainty” and the body of the text commenced ominously 
with “America is a nation at war”.249 Europeans had no qualms about the 
first phrase, but difficulty in comprehending the second. They feared a 
siege mentality in dealing with a long-term phenomenon, which, if it was a 
war, could not be won and certainly not by military means alone. On 
substance the strategy repeated the principles of 2002: to assure allies and 
friends, to dissuade potential adversaries, to deter aggression and counter 
coercion, and to defeat adversaries. Like its predecessor it was not a 
unilateralist document. Its aim was to preserve and extend peace, freedom 
and prosperity throughout the world. “International partnerships continue 
to be a principal source of our strength.” And “our military presence 
abroad comprises tailored and increasingly rotational forces operating in 
and from four forward regions – Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian 
Littoral, and the Middle East-Southwest Asia. Complemented by our 
capabilities for prompt global action, our forces overseas help assure 
partners.” The new global posture would use main operating bases, 
forward operating sites and a diverse array of more austere cooperative 
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security locations. A new approach would be followed to preposition 
equipment and stocks in critical regions and along key transportation 
routes in order to enable worldwide deployment. This should be 
increasingly “joint” in character. New legal arrangements would be sought, 
“consistent with our partners’ sovereign considerations”, to maximise US 
freedom to deploy its forces as needed, conduct essential training with 
partners in the host country and support deployed forces around the 
world. 
The National Defense Strategy of 2005 recognised that the US 
militarily predominates in the world in traditional forms of warfare and 
that potential adversaries accordingly shift away from a traditional military 
challenge towards asymmetric capabilities and methods, such as: 
•  irregular challenges coming from those employing unconventional 
methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents; 
•  catastrophic challenges involving the acquisition, possession and use 
of WMDs or methods producing WMD-like effects; and 
•  disruptive challenges coming from adversaries who develop and use 
break-through technologies to negate current US advantages in key 
operational domains. 
These categories overlap. Iraq and Afghanistan presented both 
traditional and irregular challenges, while al Qaeda posed an irregular 
threat, but actively sought catastrophic capabilities; North Korea 
constituted at once traditional, irregular and catastrophic challenges. 
The word “pre-empt” appeared only once in the document, under the 
heading “Defeat adversaries”. The strategy was intended to provide the US 
president with a broad range of options: 
These include preventive actions to deny an opponent the strategic 
initiative or pre-empt a devastating attack; combat operations against a 
capable and organised military, paramilitary or insurgent adversary; 
and stability operations that could range from peacekeeping to 
substantial combat action.250  
Under “Implementation guidelines” it was said that “allowing 
opponents to strike first – particularly in an era of proliferation – is 
unacceptable”, which was followed by the words from the 2002 National 
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Strategy that the United States must defeat the most dangerous challenges 
early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to mature. 
The document was specific in listing eight major terrorist 
vulnerabilities: 
•  ideological support – the key to recruitment and indoctrination; 
•  leadership; 
•  foot soldiers – maintaining a regular flow of recruits; 
•  safe havens – the ability to train, plan and operate without 
disruption; 
•  weapons – including WMDs; 
•  communications and movement – including access to information 
and intelligence; 
•  the ability to travel and attend meetings, as well as command and 
control; and 
•  access to targets – the ability to plan and reach targets in the US and 
abroad. 
In the run-up to the new Quadrennial Defense Review for 2006 the 
Pentagon has announced its intention to consult a number of allies 
bilaterally (including the UK and the Netherlands) and multilaterally with 
NATO. In contrast with earlier documents, it will start with determining an 
optimum mix of capacities, organised around core challenges and core 
capabilities, before decisions are taken on the overall strength of the armed 
forces. 
After the visit of President Bush to Europe in February 2005, our 
preliminary conclusion is that the US is again attaching importance to 
multilateral organisations, but remains uncertain about the ability and 
willingness of the Europeans to play more than a regional role, limited to 
the European continent and its immediate periphery. Signals from 
Washington remain ambiguous. The conservative Heritage Foundation 
wrote that the nations of Europe are good partners in the war on terrorism, 
in the war in Afghanistan and in the Balkans and that US policies must 
build on this.251 Europe would remain the foundation of all major defence 
                                                 
251 See the Heritage Foundation, Mandate for leadership: Principles to limit government, 
expand freedom, and strengthen America, Washington, D.C., 2005(a). This quote and 
the following three are from the contribution by John C. Hulsman, pp. 104-09. 
Another contribution, by Jack Spencer and Baker Spring, advocated maintenance 262 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
alliances, with the UK remaining as the cornerstone of American strategic 
thinking. Yet, the same paragraph continued by stating that “a Europe in 
which national sovereignty remains paramount is in the best interest of the 
US” and in view of the many problems within the EU its members 
must be regarded, and encouraged to act, independently in order to 
support US priorities and national interests. To achieve this goal, the 
United States must ensure that NATO remains the pre-eminent 
transatlantic security organization while impressing upon its 
European allies that the current disparity in capability is not 
politically sustainable. 
And a few pages later: “A Europe exercising supranational imperatives 
regarding foreign and security policy could hamstring American efforts to 
form politico-military coalitions”.  
The Heritage Foundation advocated pressing for increased NATO 
flexibility, centred on the use of the Combined Joint Task Force mechanism. 
Politically, it was interesting to note this reversion to an idea launched in 
1994 by President Clinton at the NATO summit. Then it was intended to 
cut across the NATO command structure and to make European-led 
operations possible. Its revival had a different purpose, similar to the 
constructive abstention in EU decision-making: “member states would not 
have to participate in a specific mission if they did not feel their vital 
interests are involved, but their opting out of a mission would not stop 
other NATO members from intervening if they so desire”. That is still a 
bridge too far for the Alliance, for it would mean that a group of members 
would act on behalf of the Alliance even if full political support is not 
forthcoming. A coalition of the willing within the Alliance has not been 
possible in the past and at the meeting of the Ministerial Council in Vilnius 
in 2005 this idea, proposed by the Netherlands foreign minister, did not get 
anywhere. It ran counter to the perception of indivisible security, which 
was particularly important to the new members. If all agree on the political 
decision, there is no problem to entrust the mission to a smaller group, but 
if not, a coalition of the willing outside the Alliance would seem the only 
possibility. NATO does not have the ambition of conducting an 
overarching foreign policy.  
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Apparently, the US was still regarding the EU as what Klaus 
Naumann described as an “unbalanced power”.252 This raises the question 
of whether in the eyes of the US the EU will ever be able to overcome its 
present deficiencies and become capable of effective decision-making and 
of maintaining forces technically able to fight alongside their American 
allies. Or will the CFSP remain a declaratory policy-producer without any 
military significance? This question is being asked on both sides of the 
Atlantic.253 
In a study for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy 
of the National Defense University, three authors proposed a new and 
comprehensive military framework to help guide NATO improvements in 
the years ahead.254 They envisioned a pyramid-like structure of future 
forces and capabilities in five critical areas: a new NATO special operations 
force, the existing NATO Response Force, high-readiness combat forces, 
stabilisation and reconstruction forces, and assets for defence sector 
development. In their view, the US would provide one-third of the 
necessary forces with the Europeans being responsible for two-thirds. This 
would be a viable proposition for the Europeans because it would require 
only 10% of their active military manpower, plus investments in such 
affordable assets as information networks, smart munitions, commercial 
lift, logistical support and other force enablers. If NATO succeeded in 
creating these forces for power projection and expeditionary missions, it 
would possess a broad portfolio of assets for a full spectrum of operations 
against such threats as terrorism, WMD proliferation and cross-border 
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aggression. In addition, it was proposed to create two additional pyramids, 
one in the US and one in Europe. The US pyramid should be anchored in a 
new, smaller American presence in Europe that could help the Europeans 
and NATO towards transformation, while also providing a viable US strike 
force similar to the NATO Response Force. The EU should field the battle 
groups, a European Rapid Reaction Force and stabilisation and 
reconstruction assets that could contribute to common transatlantic 
missions. 
An interesting feature of the pyramid concept is the possibility of 
sequential use. A crisis intervention could begin with special operations 
forces targeting enemy positions, as occurred in the early stages of the 
Afghanistan operation. Next, NATO could deploy the brigade-size NRF to 
establish a foothold, defeat access-denial threats and conduct initial strikes. 
Then, NATO could deploy the larger High Readiness Force to conduct 
major combat operations aimed at winning the contest in this key stage of 
war-fighting. Afterwards, NATO could deploy the S&R Force to stabilise 
the situation and begin reconstruction until peace is restored and civilian 
assets can be deployed to complete the reconstruction phase. At this 
juncture, NATO assets for defence and security sector development could 
begin helping the new government to preserve safety and security while 
building democracy. Such a sequential process is not the only or even the 
most likely way to use the full spectrum of forces, but is useful in 
understanding the different roles involved. 
The study also asked the very relevant question of how many forces 
NATO would really need to be well prepared for expeditionary missions 
outside Europe. Today a total of 57 European divisions are available to 
NATO, of which 25 are High Readiness Forces and 12 are ‘deployable’ 
High Readiness Force divisions (made up of 36 brigades). Rapid 
deployment, however, would only be possible for the equivalent of one or 
two divisions. In the view of the authors, NATO would be adequately 
prepared if, in addition to the NRF, it had a rapidly deployable European 
force of 5-6 divisions (15-18 brigades), 275-325 combat aircraft and 50-60 
naval combatants. Joining up with one or two US divisions plus air and 
naval assets, these forces would create a powerful NATO capacity for 
expeditionary warfare.    
The implementation of these proposals would make eminent sense 
for the US, but is much more problematical for the Europeans – for several 
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flexible and the stronger their resistance to exclusive tasking will be. EU 
countries are already providing the bulk of forces for the operations in the 
Balkans and in Africa and have gained considerable experience in peace-
support operations. What they lack, on t h e  w h o l e ,  i s  r e a l  w a r - f i g h t i n g  
experience, but their forces are built on the assumption that if they are 
trained for the high spectrum of violence, they will also be able to deal with 
the lower levels. In the American case, this has been less true and training 
for stabilisation duties has been insufficient. Moreover, the Netherlands’ 
experience in Srebrenica has shown that the borderline between 
peacekeeping on the one hand and peace enforcement and protection on 
the other is volatile and subject to rapid escalation. 
Most countries possessing modern armed forces still have the 
ambition to be able to fight alongside US forces, yet see the capability gap 
widen. They would resist seeing part of their forces being relegated to 
peacekeeping duties alone, for fear that sooner or later they might no 
longer be able to do anything else. On the other hand, the earlier reliance 
on precision-guided weapons to defeat the enemy at arms length without 
substantial casualties has suffered a rude shock in Iraq. Feet on the ground 
remain as relevant as ever, certainly in asymmetric warfare. The ‘revolution 
of military affairs’ lost much of its steam in a world that gives priority to 
combating terrorism, because that fight cannot be carried out by military 
means alone.  
Not all countries would object to specialisation in the lower end of 
peace-support duties. Several Scandinavian countries, which have long-
standing experience in peacekeeping during the cold war, are moving in 
that direction. Equally, both in the battle groups and the NATO Response 
Force, some smaller countries are looking for ‘niche’ capabilities to 
contribute. Obviously this would involve a fairly detailed division of 
labour and guarantees that the planned contributions would actually be 
forthcoming. One field where consensus seems to exist on the need to do 
more concerns special forces. This is a growth area for operations both in 
asymmetric warfare and in anti-terrorist actions at home and abroad. 
An international study group formed by the Washington-based 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) followed a broader 
approach and made a total of 50 recommendations.255 Among the most 
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relevant was the need to set active defence-planning targets, not less than 
25% for research and development, not more than 40% for personnel, along 
with a common fund of some 0.17% of defence budgets for operations 
(amounting to a total of $1 billion). The European Capability Action Plan 
should be moved to the new European Defence Agency, which should be 
given a budget of some $200 million and a link should be established with 
Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk. It was felt that NATO needed 
a new strategic concept, since the current one dated from 1999. (That was 
debatable; given the persisting differences of view the time may not be ripe 
for such an undertaking.) Another important point highlighted was the 
need to ‘de-conflict’ NATO and EU operations when both want to be active 
in the same place. Indeed, the situation has become paradoxical: the EU is 
supposed to act autonomously only when NATO as a whole is not 
engaged. Yet, Darfur became the scene of an unsightly argument as to 
whether the NRF or a battle group should be deployed, while both were 
made up of European units. 
The major problem with the proposals of both the National Defense 
University and the CSIS reverts to the earlier question put in this book: 
What for? Obviously, without capabilities geared to probable scenarios, the 
EU and NATO would have little relevance. But Europeans see the primary 
function of their military forces as rendering their political objectives more 
credible, while the US primarily trains them for war-winning. 
Nevertheless, this should not detract from the fact that no other region of 
the world has more to offer the US in terms of political and economic 
cooperation and even the legitimacy of its operations than the EU. Yet, the 
gap is growing and anti-Americanism has increased a great deal during the 
Bush presidency. With so many divergent opinions on a host of issues 
impacting on modern society, doubts are rising about the often-professed 
community of values and every constructive effort to restore that 
community is worthwhile. 
Enlargement 
Both NATO and the EU followed the same type of conditions in their 
enlargement strategies, but did not consult about them. The EU adopted 
the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, to foster: 
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•  stable institutions that guarantee democracy, as well as the rule of 
law, human rights and the protection of minorities; 
•  a functioning market economy, able to withstand competition and 
market forces; and 
•  the ability to assume the responsibilities of membership and the 
acceptance of political, economic and monetary union. 
  NATO initially outlined its eligibility criteria in the 1995 Study on 
NATO Enlargement:256 
•  a functioning democratic system and a market economy; 
•  treatment of minority populations in accordance with OSCE 
guidelines; 
•  resolution of all outstanding disputes with neighbours and a 
commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes generally; 
•  a military contribution to the Alliance and willingness to achieve 
interoperability with other  members’ forces; and 
•  democratic-style civil-military relations. 
The language of these checklists was deliberately imprecise and calls 
for exact statements on what was expected and required under these 
headings were studiously ignored. The EU had the acquis of some 80,000 
pages to point at, but in both cases these criteria were only pre-conditions 
for membership and the final decision on membership would be a political 
one. NATO even explicitly stated that there was no fixed list of criteria; it 
would invite new members according to the “judgement of whether doing 
so will contribute to security and stability of the North Atlantic area at the 
time such a decision is made”.257 
The conclusions of the study by the Centre for European Security 
Studies were quite sobering: neither the Czech Republic, nor Hungary or 
Poland was particularly well prepared for NATO membership on the eve 
of the 1997 Madrid summit, although Poland was better prepared than the 
other two.258 Even at the time of formal accession their progress left much 
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to be desired, especially in the area of military organisation. By contrast, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia had reached the same level of the three 
incumbents by September 2001. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – the so-
called ‘start-from-scratch’ countries – were better prepared than most and 
offered well-educated and well-trained forces that had a lot of experience 
in working with NATO member states. The study showed a disappointing 
score for the military preparedness of Slovenia. In the end, the Prague 
summit of November 2002 invited all seven countries to join the Alliance. 
For other aspiring members, mainly other countries of former Yugoslavia 
and Albania and perhaps also the former Soviet republics, Partnership for 
Peace offered a prospect for closer links, with a Membership Action Plan as 
the next step. 
For the EU, accession negotiations were conducted by the European 
Commission, which issued detailed yearly reports on progress made in 
some 30 chapters. These reports judiciously combined praise for progress 
with sometimes severe criticism, but never arrived at a negative conclusion. 
Among the most worrying conclusions was the prevalence of corruption in 
Hungary and Latvia, it even being ‘endemic’ in Poland. This raised 
eyebrows in the member states, but did not prevent a positive conclusion 
on the admission of all 10 candidates by 1 May 2004. Subsequently, the 
European Union has limited the status of candidate membership to 
Bulgaria and Romania, who signed accession treaties for entry in 2007 with 
the possibility of a delay of one year, and Turkey and Croatia, with whom 
accession negotiations started in 2005. In the case of Turkey, the 
negotiations are expected to last at least 10 years and no guarantee has been 
given as to their ultimate outcome. For other countries on the periphery, 
both to the east and south, a policy document was developed that 
envisaged closer links but did not offer a prospect of membership. 
By May 2004 NATO counted 26 members and the EU had 25. The 
non-EU members of NATO were the US, Canada, Norway, Turkey and 
Iceland and for the next two or three years Bulgaria and Romania. The EU 
members that did not simultaneously belong to NATO were: Austria, 
Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Cyprus and Malta. Denmark, Cyprus and Malta 
took a special position by not joining in the European security and defence 
policy. The fact that membership of the two organisations differs makes 
joint EU-NATO meetings at ambassadorial level interesting for some, but 
tedious for others, who have to sit there with two representatives. In that 
respect the joint ministerial meetings are more useful. FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 269 
 
Relations with Russia 
Twenty years ago a book of this kind would have said much about Russia 
or the Soviet Union as it then was. With President Mikhail Gorbachev 
coming to power, the security prospects were changing, but his call for a 
‘common European home’ did not appeal to everyone. Some of its 
occupants seemed noisy brutes, which one would prefer to keep at a 
distance. Nevertheless, it was difficult to imagine European security 
without an answer to the question of what role Moscow would play. That 
question is still with us today. For quite a while our concern has been more 
with Russia’s weakness than its strength, and the jury still is out on a 
verdict of whether President Vladimir Putin is a weak or a strong leader, 
able to move his country around. He has turned the country towards a 
system of managed democracy with a strong role for the president along 
with a weakening of all other institutions. A state-driven society and 
economy is dominated by an energy-political complex reminiscent of 
former military-industrial complexes. Mr Putin has strengthened state 
control of the media and converted elections into a means of legitimising 
the decisions made by the elites.259 Equally worrying are his recent moves 
to strengthen control of the commercial sector generally, beyond the 
‘strategic’ sectors such as energy, along with the bill before the State Duma 
to give officials new powers to control non-governmental organisations, 
including foreign ones. 
Mr Putin has gradually managed to increase his grip on the former 
Soviet republics of Central Asia at the expense of American influence. He 
seems to have realised that good relations with the US are possible, but has 
failed to use the NATO–Russia Founding Act and subsequently the 
NATO–Russia Council to the full of their potential. Equally, he must 
consider his western border with the EU the best he can have, but 
apparently cannot resist the traditional reflex of throwing his weight 
around in what used to be called the ‘near abroad’. Recent examples of 
‘pipeline politics’260 have not only put question marks around his motives 
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with regard to his neighbours, but also concerning his reliability as an 
energy supplier. His dealings with Ukraine and Moldova cannot but 
increase Western efforts to diversify energy dependence. In dealing with 
the frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Russia has not moved away from the old Soviet concept of ‘correlation of 
forces’, which considered power relations as a zero-sum game: if NATO 
increased its membership, Russia must be losing. Russian policies in 
Moldova and Georgia seemed focused more on destabilisation than a new 
constructive relationship. These matters may come to a head when NATO 
starts considering a new step in the enlargement process. But the most 
enigmatic question for some time to come will be the future of the Russian 
president himself. Will he play musical chairs with Aleksandr Medvedev 
and become chairman of Gazprom or will he move to a constitutional 
system with a strong prime minister? 
On 10 May 2005 the EU and Russia signed four ‘roadmap’ documents 
at their summit in Moscow defining ‘spaces’ for their long-term 
relationship. These spaces relate to the common economic space; freedom, 
security and justice; external security; and research, education and culture. 
Altogether some 400 action points were listed. In the economic field the 
terms ‘harmonisation’ and ‘convergence’ were used frequently, but it was 
left unclear as to who should harmonise on what. The Centre for European 
Policy Studies was not impressed and regarded the four spaces as the 
“proliferation of the fuzzy”.261 Their point was that the EU, having a well-
defined corpus of laws, norms and values, did not have a clear model for 
exporting these beyond suggesting weak and fuzzy derivatives of the 
enlargement process. No mention was made of free trade, not even as a 
long-term objective, which gave the impression that Russia would be bent 
on continuing protectionist practices.  
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On external security there was an interesting reference to “dialogue 
and cooperation in the settlement of regional conflicts, inter alia in regions 
adjacent to EU and Russian borders”. Apparently, the EU had originally 
advanced the wording of a ‘common neighbourhood’, which was rejected 
by Moscow because it impinged on its notion of ‘near abroad’. The EU 
presidency’s press release talked explicitly of the continuing frozen 
conflicts, but that detail was not reciprocated by the Russian side.262 More 
positive was the Russian position in efforts to persuade Iran to refrain from 
nuclear proliferation. Russia supported efforts by the foreign ministers of 
France, Germany and the UK (in Brussels referred to as the ‘Three Tenors’) 
and offered to provide uranium enrichment on Russian territory. 
The enlargements of NATO and the EU have brought both 
organisations closer to the borders of Russia. They have enhanced stability 
in an area that otherwise would have been a grey zone on the edge of 
Western prosperity. Ultimately, this should also be in the interest of Russia, 
provided it accepts the independence of the new republics and former 
satellites. The fact that NATO’s first and only invocation of Art. V was not 
directed against Russia will help in accepting the new NATO. The OSCE 
and its Office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities has 
assisted in restraining nationalist impulses against Russian minorities, 
which was a precondition for creating an environment of mutually 
beneficial economic relations. The current boom in oil prices eases Russia’s 
financial problems, but could also weaken the motivation for real reforms 
in an economy that has traditionally been dependent upon the export of 
raw materials. A visitor to rural Russia is still appalled by the prevailing 
poverty and the backward state of its infrastructure. 
The coalescence of external and internal security 
In peace-support missions the role of the military abroad resembles the 
functions that the police exercise at home. They are there to preserve law 
and order; they deter by their presence; and they are prepared and willing 
to act forcefully if necessary for the implementation of their mandate. This 
does not mean that their mission could be left to the police, because the 
situation might escalate and require fighting forces. At the same time, some 
police or paramilitary forces will be useful to deal with riot control and the 
arrest of war criminals or, in the reconstruction phase, to train indigenous 
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forces. After an intervention a military presence will be required for a long 
time to provide an umbrella of security under which a new process of state-
building has a chance of success. Generally, the maxim still applies that 
peacekeeping is not necessarily a soldier’s job, but only soldiers can do it. 
Do the military still have a job to do at home when collective defence 
has a low priority? They have a latent task as a back-up for the police in 
emergency situations and calamities, but are reluctant to enter a slippery 
slope of ‘mission creep’ that would keep them from proper soldiering. The 
civilian side looks askance at a domestic role of the military personnel, who 
are not trained in the checks and balances pertaining to the preservation of 
law and order at home. Conversely, in many countries the public has more 
confidence in the army than in the police and other security services, which 
might be more prone to corruption and undue pressures. Yet, if the 
peacekeeping task abroad increasingly resembles what the police are doing 
at home – aimed at deterring by presence with the capability and the will to 
act when necessary – there is little reason to keep them away from domestic 
involvement, particularly when terrorism strikes.  
Fighting terrorism at home implies both the availability of 
intelligence about international networks and the ability to use force 
rapidly and decisively. Governments have to issue new guidelines for ‘who 
does what, when and how’ and efficient communication among all 
concerned. The number of authorities involved is high and the introduction 
of a new layer of coordination is problematical in terms of the time needed 
to take action. The US has created the Department of Homeland Security, 
but its performance in the calamity of hurricane Katrina has not been 
impressive. In Europe most countries want to maintain a balance between 
ministries of justice and home affairs and to apply the lines of command 
used under normal conditions to exceptional circumstances as well. 
Security in the age of terrorism acquires a specific human 
dimension.263 Protection of the individual citizen is a fundamental duty of 
the democratic state. It is made more complex and difficult when the threat 
of terrorism looms large and creates an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. 
It also reinforces the concept of ‘human security’, which was advanced 
                                                 
263 See State and human security in the age of terrorism: The role of security sector reform, 
a compilation of presentations made at the second joint seminar of the UN Office at 
Geneva and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, held 
on 26 January 2004 in Geneva, UN, September 2004(b). FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 273 
 
prior to the attacks of 2001 in response to human suffering in post-World 
War II conflicts. The Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was a 
major proponent, convinced that it was more important to address threats 
to individuals than to nation states. On his initiative the UN Commission 
on Human Security drew a number of wide-ranging conclusions in the 
spring of 2003, which went far beyond the traditional notions of security 
and also dealt with fair trade, minimum living standards, access to health 
care and basic education and even an equitable system of global patent 
rights. To some, this range was too wide, because the recommendations, if 
followed up, would alleviate much that currently is wrong or unfair in the 
world. Nevertheless, it was symptomatic of a new approach to security, 
which had seen its first success in the banning of anti-personnel landmines. 
On military security, the report started with the protection of people in 
violent conflict, recalling the fundamental norms of international 
humanitarian law.264 This was followed by the protection of people from 
the proliferation of arms, including the spreading of small weapons and 
light arms, and supporting people on the move. The fourth point proposed 
the creation of human-security transition funds for post-conflict situations, 
judging the availability of financial means an indispensable tool for 
political and physical reconstruction. A concrete result of the report was the 
inclusion of small arms and light weapons and their transfers as a major 
item on the agenda of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. 
The tendency away from collective defence and towards peace-
support operations had another, quite different effect on the position of 
servicemen and women in society. Their role as ‘guardian soldiers’ has 
already been mentioned. In addition, they have come to be regarded as 
‘citizens in uniform’, in principle entitled to the same fundamental rights as 
their civilian colleagues. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe adopted a recommendation on the right of association for members 
of the professional staff of the armed forces on 3 September 2002. It argued 
that with the abolition of conscription, military personnel were becoming 
increasingly ‘regular employees’ with the ministry of defence as their 
employer. Consequently, they should be fully eligible for the rights of 
employees established in the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the European Social Charter. The recommendation accepted an interdiction 
of the right to strike, but specifically mentioned the right to negotiate on 
salaries and conditions of employment and the right to be members of legal 
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political parties. Civil rights in the armed forces may only be restricted to 
the extent irrefutably necessitated by their military assignment.265 
The European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL) has 
been active in this field by defending the social rights of service personnel, 
particularly vis-à-vis the EU and NATO.266 It provides a list of core elements 
that may become part of a common European military law and prepares a 
handbook on multinationality. The growing number of multinational units 
is an obvious impulse to harmonise labour regulations for the military.  
EUROMIL also commented on the draft Constitution proposed by the 
European Convention, based on the verdict of the European Court of 
Justice that EU social legislation also applies to members of the armed 
services. That raised the question of whether the articles in the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights relating to freedom of expression and association 
would also apply to military personnel (specifically, Arts. 11 and 12 in the 
Charter adopted as a political document at the Nice European Council in 
2000, which became Arts. II-71 and 72 in the Constitution). The answer was 
negative as long as the restrictions had been made by law. Therefore, an 
amendment was proposed stipulating that any limitation could only apply 
if it is considered to be indispensable to maintain member-state functions. 
The European Code of Police Ethics made the same point in a slightly 
different manner: restrictions “may only be made when they are necessary 
for the exercise of the functions of the police in a democratic society”.267 
It should be recalled that the EU Charter, which will not become 
legally binding as foreseen in the Constitution but retains its political 
character as adopted by the Nice European Council, concerns the relations 
between the EU citizen and EU institutions. As at present it seems unlikely 
that the EU will produce legislation affecting the position of service 
personnel, their protection will mostly remain a national matter. 
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Conclusions 
The door to the future is barred 
by a thousand guardians of the past. 
Jacques Klein 
The words of Jacques Klein were spoken in the context of his efforts as the 
UN’s special envoy in Bosnia. Many will sympathise with him, for progress 
in the Balkans has been painfully slow. At least people are not killing each 
other on a massive scale, but a retreat of the international community 
would risk a relapse into violence. In the wider world the perception of 
most Europeans will not be optimistic either. They remember the brutalities 
in Rwanda, Chechnya and the Democratic Republic of Congo and keep 
their fingers crossed about stabilisation in Iraq. Yet, even in Sub-Saharan 
Africa the number of casualties has declined. Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
welcomed the 2005 report on War and Peace in the 21st Century prepared by 
Andrew Mack and the Human Security Centre of the University of British 
Columbia in Vancouver268 as a “rare message of hope”: since the end of the 
cold war the number of cases of genocide in the world had fallen by 80% 
and the number of mortalities owing to armed conflict even more 
dramatically. What are the causes of this positive trend? First was the end 
of the cold war that had kept authoritarian regimes in power and paralysed 
peace-making. Most important was the conscious effort of the international 
community to establish the conditions under which peace had a chance. 
After a decline in the mid-1990s the number of soldiers abroad on peace-
support missions is at record height. Many of the forces contributed have 
come from European countries. After bickering over strategic priorities, a 
new consensus has emerged on the threats posed by terrorism and the 
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the most dangerous.269 In 
development policies a more coherent approach has been followed by 
emphasising good governance and the link between security and 
development. 
At the political level the outlook for democracy in what has come to 
be known as ‘Wider Europe’ has been transformed within the space of one 
year. The Rose, Orange and Cedar revolutions have repelled the pervasive 
pessimism about the conditions of phoney democracy and the absence of 
genuine reform on the periphery of the EU.270 Yet, nothing in these 
encouraging developments is irreversible. Even in the new democracies 
that have entered NATO and the EU we have seen a disturbing failure of 
reforming governments to be re-elected, but at least the people have 
become aware of the possibility to change their destiny. By contrast, in ‘old 
Europe’ a mood of discontent is giving scope to renewed nationalism and 
scepticism about the premises of European integration. Paradoxically, 
positive appreciation of the European project now emanates from others 
outside our continent. 
Jeremy Rifkin’s interesting book on The European Dream noted several 
differences between the EU and the US.271 Rather than commemorating a 
noble past, the EU sought to ensure that the past would not be repeated. 
With its concept of multi-layer governance, later clarified by the principle 
of subsidiarity, the EU became the first post-modern institutional process. 
Indeed, it was more of a process than a final destination, and much 
progress was possible precisely because the ultimate goal remained 
undefined. In spite of romantic notions of the past, Europe never existed, 
certainly not within the scope of the present EU, so it had to be created. In 
that respect the argument that a European demos does not exist is not very 
relevant. The same could be said of the origins of many present states. A 
community feeling is not an absolute, but rather a dynamic factor, which 
can grow or diminish over time. Moreover, a strong community feeling is 
not a precondition for the development of a political system, but on the 
contrary, its result. This view does not ignore the constraining effect that 
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the still-embryonic community feeling has at the European level, but this 
effect should not lead to the fatalistic conclusion that democratic reform 
only makes sense when a real European identity has developed. We are 
doing our best to foster nation-building elsewhere, so it would be strange if 
we deny such developments within our Union, which already possesses 
some of the symbols and joint activities that are the make-up of a new 
identity.272 As to the notion of ‘post-modern’, it is best explained by Robert 
Cooper as not resting on a balance of power among the participants, but on 
the rejection of force and the respect for self-enforced rules of behaviour.273 
Without qualification that might sound naïve, but Cooper carries the 
argument further by describing the challenge to the post-modern world as 
getting used to double standards. Among themselves, Europeans may 
operate on the basis of laws and cooperative security, but when dealing 
with the jungle outside, they might need to revert to the rougher methods 
of an earlier era. 
The paradox, however, of European integration is that its architects 
are the nation states, whose very existence is based on the exclusive control 
of their territory and people. Would there be more to be gained than lost in 
sacrificing a degree of national sovereignty in return for a greater measure 
of security and opportunity? As Jeremy Rifkin observed, at each turning 
point in the 50-year development of the Union, the nations and peoples of 
Europe have narrowly voted ‘yes’ to a rewriting of the political contract, 
conferring more authority on the Union, while giving up an increasing 
share of their national sovereignty in the process.274 That process might 
now be stalling. According to opinion polls the majority of our peoples 
remain in favour of European integration, although many replace it with 
the word ‘cooperation’, but few would admit to having European dreams. 
The need of the moment seems to be a bottom-up effort of showing people 
that an effective EU makes a difference to their life and future. The new 
member states have no difficulty in understanding that, but people in the 
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old member states have become immune to explanations of the blessings of 
Europe. In fact, detailed explanations tend to increase their opposition and 
unease. Here lies a task for responsible political parties. As long as every 
member state sees the balance of plusses and minuses responding to its 
vital interests, there is a future. 
With or without a Constitution?  
The debate on the future of Europe has suffered a great setback by the 
rejection of the Constitution in at least two countries. The immediate effect 
of the stalemate will be a reluctance to embark on any courageous project. 
Many countries seem to be thrown back on nationalist reflexes and the 
awareness of the necessity of the European approach, whether through 
integration or cooperation, will have to be rebuilt from scratch. 
Paradoxically, globalisation is accompanied by fragmentation and people 
seem to be growing more parochial at a time when it should be clear that 
no one can manage alone anymore. The debate has been too inward-
looking, centred on immediate cost benefits, and should be turned towards 
the new external challenges.  
It will not be easy to make the institutional progress necessary to 
cope with the growing demands of a larger Union in a world of increasing 
complexity and interdependence. The argument has always been between 
two schools: those who believe that it would be futile to attempt to reach 
agreement on the finalité politique, but that incremental progress would 
continue to be made as the necessity of new transborder cooperation 
became evident, and those who saw the need for clarity in the ‘who does 
what and how’ framework, particularly in an enlarging Union. Both 
schools had their merits, but the policy of small steps in practice had the 
effect of eroding public support for the underlying vision, especially in the 
founder member states. 
Only Germany has by and large kept its sense of history and 
adjusted to it, which prompted German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to 
start the debate on Europe’s destiny. His speech at the Berlin Humboldt 
University of 12 May 2000 has been criticised for coming either too soon or 
too late, but was inspired by concern that the citizen might turn against 
Europe and resume the nationalist reflexes of the past. The only trouble 
was that his thoughts were overly inspired by German solutions for 
governing a complex country, and could not stand up to the combined 
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his advocacy of a core group when it caused complications in the 
negotiations with Poland, and wavered over majority voting in the area of 
CFSP. His trial balloon to make a vice-president of the European 
Commission chairman of the General Affairs Council did not rise because 
his chancellor did not support it.  Under Chancellor Schröder Germany 
distanced itself from the US to an extent that made many wonder whether 
NATO would survive. He wanted to be auf gleicher Augenhöhe – at the same 
eye level – and followed a line of national pride and moral superiority that 
served him well during the previous elections but on the whole avoided 
hard commitments. His major mistake came during the Iraq crisis, when as 
a member of the Security Council Germany categorically said it would 
never join the use of force, even if the Council were to sanction it. 
The Constitution would have finally given the EU the instruments 
and capabilities to back up its foreign policy objectives. Some of them may 
survive because they do not require treaty changes. The question remains, 
however, as to whether the Union would have the will and the guts to use 
them. Progress has been careful but tangible. The record of past and 
present missions is discussed in the previous chapter. Most are of limited 
size, but Operation Althea in Bosnia includes 7,000 personnel, succeeding 
NATO’s SFOR under the Berlin Plus arrangements.275  
The European Convention was remarkable in turning itself into a 
kind of joint constituent assembly, combining national and European 
parliamentarians as well as representatives of national governments, who 
ultimately would have a final round among themselves in an 
Intergovernmental Conference. In this respect it was different from a 
national  constituante,  like its illustrious example in Philadelphia in the 
creation of the United States of America, where the entire negotiating 
process took place within the convention. This time the government 
representatives had an early warning role in declaring certain propositions 
unacceptable, but were also negotiating among themselves and keeping the 
forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference in mind. In the plenary 
sessions some of them indicated what would be rejected, as in the ‘red 
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lines’ of the British. It created an element of distortion among the positions 
of the participants, but it also kept a sense of realism in the debates. 
As a precedent for managing treaty changes the Convention proved 
its utility. It was a unique experience for all participants, but also for the 
outside world, through its open and public debate on the why, where and 
how of European integration. The three avenues of approach dealt with 
institutional clarity and simplification, the definition of the role of the EU in 
the world, and, prompted by the emergence of catastrophic terrorism, 
internal security. Owing to delays caused by the Iraq crisis, insufficient 
time could be spent on the current policies of part III of the Constitution, 
which were largely left untouched. With the privilege of hindsight, it 
would have been better if these had been presented in an annex, which 
might also have increased the chances of a simplified amendment 
procedure. Now everything remains subject to ratification procedures, 
unless passerelle clauses enable modification through a unanimous decision 
of the Council.  
Changes were limited to a substantial increase of the number of 
issues to be decided by qualified majority voting, which became the general 
rule and subject to co-decision by the European Parliament. New was the 
acceptance of a legal personality for the EU as a whole, which had not been 
possible in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. On defence more elaborate 
articles had been added, including one comparable to a collective defence 
obligation. The question of leadership of the EU had been resolved in a 
complicated and ambiguous manner, like most progress in the Union. 
Three captains on the ship was not the best recipe for a steady course, and 
questions remained concerning the relationship between the president of 
the European Council and the presidencies of the sectoral councils acting 
under a team arrangement. A problem for the new foreign minister 
concerned the role of the other commissioners dealing with subjects 
touching on external relations. Nevertheless, it was worth trying. Europe 
can only function with collective leadership and does not resemble a single 
state. In fact, it is much more of a super-partnership than a super-state. The 
prerogatives of the semi-permanent president of the European Council had 
been curtailed to pushing the multi-annual agenda proposed by the 
Commission and agreed by the Council and the European Parliament, and 
to representing the Union ‘at his/her level’, i.e. in meetings with the 
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For the rest, the unexpected agreement on a foreign minister should 
be given substance by making him/her responsible, with the right of 
initiative, for the conduct of foreign policy through an integrated 
diplomatic service of the EU. This would do away with the dual 
representations currently existing in international organisations. The new 
double-hatted responsibilities might be helpful in relations with 
Washington, which has always clamoured for a single EU telephone 
number. Much of it could be implemented without ratification of the 
Constitution, except the double-hatting. In theory, Spain could make Javier 
Solana its member of the Commission, but this could be opposed by the 
legalistic argument that a commissioner is prevented from having other 
jobs. Unfortunately, new doubts have been cast about this major 
innovation, which would substantially enhance the coherence of the EU’s 
role in the world. In analysing the prospects for the 2005 UK presidency it 
was said that the period of reflection on the Constitution was a relief to the 
Blair government “in light of initial British opposition to some central 
elements of the Constitutional Treaty, notably the establishment of an EU 
Minister of Foreign Affairs”.276 The six-monthly presidency might have 
some merit in the legislative field, but is an impediment to an active foreign 
policy. As High Representative for CFSP, Mr Solana has had far fewer 
difficulties with the Commission than with the successive presidencies, but 
he shall have to endure more as he is unlikely to become the ‘Even Higher 
Representative’ as foreign minister. 
All this cannot be done in a purely intergovernmental framework of 
cooperation. Political will needs some form of majority voting. At the 
Amsterdam European Council in 1997 a separation was made between 
those strategies that would require unanimity and those for which 
implementation could be accomplished through majority decisions. This 
concept has never been implemented. Some regard majority voting on 
foreign affairs unthinkable and refuse to go beyond ’constructive 
abstention’, which does not hold up a positive decision, but does not bind 
the abstainer to its implementation. This modality has never been used 
either. In the middle of the Convention a paper by the French and German 
foreign ministers accepted QMV for the CFSP; however, the proposal was 
abandoned after the Iraq crisis. The UK has remained adamantly opposed. 
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The purpose of voting should not be to put countries into a minority 
position, but to make progress on a course, which, although not deemed 
the preferred way by all, is nevertheless one that everyone could live with. 
In the WTO’s Uruguay round it took six difficult sessions before a vote was 
taken on the EU’s negotiating position. In most cases consensus will be 
possible if there is a will to compromise. Ministers in the Council are not 
pushing for a quick vote, because next time they themselves might be in the 
minority. But the possibility of a vote at the end of the road changes the 
game. The knowledge that one cannot block progress can trigger a change 
in tactics, to join in the debate and work towards a compromise. That is 
easier said than done. So a first step in this direction might be the definition 
of certain levels or subjects where QMV could be practiced.  
Some have argued that the president of the European Commission 
should chair the European Council or the GAERC. The Constitution leaves 
that possibility open, but its value is doubtful. It would follow the example 
of NATO where the secretary-general chairs all sessions of the Council, at 
ambassadorial, ministerial and heads of government levels. But in the EU 
the Commission is the initiator of policy and has to be able to defend its 
proposals in front of the Council. That position does not fit easily with the 
role of a chairman, who has to work for a compromise. During the 
Convention the two incumbent commissioners were not in favour of such a 
change. The proposal to elect the president of the Commission by the 
European Parliament and have the choice confirmed by the European 
Council – the reverse of the procedure endorsed in the Constitution – was 
not supported by many Europarliamentarians, the reason being that it 
would politicise the function unnecessarily. An intermediate solution 
might be a shortlist drawn up by the Parliament from which the European 
Council chooses the president of the Commission. 
The European Parliament emerged as the big winner from the 
Convention, in spite of the fact that some large countries have little love for 
this democratic institution. With the virtual application of the rule of co-
decision for all issues where QMV has been applied in the Council, the 
parliamentarians could no longer complain about a democratic deficit, at 
least not in the field of legislation. In general, the European Parliament has 
always made clever use of the competences attributed to it, but this has not 
resulted in a higher standing of its members in the political debate in their 
home countries, which remains dominated by national issues. Perhaps this 
is because on many European policy matters the differences between the FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 283 
 
parties are not that great and are not reflected in domestic politics until 
much later when European Union directives have to be translated into 
national legislation. That could be an argument for politicising Europe 
more, but ultimately the EU can only progress if people take a long-term 
view of their national interests and remain willing to compromise. Political 
debate should not end in polarisation, either nationally or internationally. 
We shall have to analyse more seriously the conditions under which our 
democratic ideals can actually be reconciled with the increasing 
transnational interdependence in every field of international relations.277  
On substance the Constitution introduced a number of important 
changes in the area of CFSP. The Petersberg tasks of humanitarian and 
rescue missions, peacekeeping and the role of combat forces in crisis 
management (including peace enforcement), were extended to include 
conflict prevention and disarmament operations. Two solidarity clauses 
appeared, one in case of a terrorist attack or natural disaster and one in case 
of aggression against a member state. Countries whose military capabilities 
fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to 
one another with a view to the most demanding missions could establish 
permanent structured cooperation within the EU framework. And finally, 
an armaments agency was created to define common requirements, pursue 
research and technology, promote joint procurement and, at the end of the 
cycle, evaluate progress and existing shortfalls. On the face of it, all 
together this represented gigantic progress. 
How would it work in practice? The solidarity clause in case of 
armed attack was a compromise. The Convention had not been able to go 
beyond making this the subject of closer cooperation, which in effect would 
have meant the continuation of Art. 5 of the WEU Treaty with its automatic 
military assistance clause. During the Intergovernmental Conference the 
Italian presidency proposed extending it to all members, but only during 
the subsequent Irish presidency was it possible to find a compromise 
acceptable to the neutral or non-aligned member states. The Italians had a 
point in saying that solidarity was incompatible with neutrality. In earlier 
discussions, Austria, Finland and Sweden had been accused of bad faith in 
entering the Union, which by then had agreed upon the prospect of a 
common defence policy. Ireland had accepted it at Maastricht, but later, 
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after its negative referendum on the Treaty of Nice, managed to obtain an 
assurance from the European Council of Seville of remaining able to 
continue its traditional security policy. All four countries wanted to 
maintain their status of being free from military alliances. They could not 
be persuaded by the argument that the EU was no military alliance as such, 
but a community of destiny that had to include some military capabilities 
in a much wider spectrum of assets and instruments. Nevertheless, the 
compromise in the Constitution was real progress, even if it remained 
ambiguous on its possible implementation. All had assumed an obligation 
to render assistance to the aggressed partner, but some would do it 
collectively and some individually. The solidarity clause removed an 
anomaly (and also possible guilt feelings). 
As the Constitution is unlikely to be salvaged, the period of 
reflection will have to produce some alternatives and go beyond vague talk 
of bringing the Union closer to the citizen. The European Parliament in 
collaboration with national parliaments could formulate a common 
template for debate, focusing on issues that are of manifest interest to the 
citizens and the obvious necessity of doing things together on an increasing 
spectrum of problems that exceed national boundaries. What are the 
purposes of European integration during a time of globalisation? And what 
decisions should be taken at the European level? Apparently President 
Chirac envisages a rendez-vous institutionnel during the Austrian presidency 
of the first semester of 2006 and Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel 
has also talked of organising a broad debate. Others doubt its utility before 
the French presidential elections of 2007, which have led Germany’s new 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to suggest an extension of the reflection period 
until 2007, when her country will assume the presidency. 
Without a Constitution, most progress could be made in the 
intergovernmental areas, especially in the CFSP and ESDP, provided the 
political will is there. According to Eurobarometer polls, 82% of Europeans 
are in favour of an independent EU foreign policy and even 67% for an EU 
foreign minister. The question is whether they would also be prepared to 
pay for it. In a 2003 survey, Eurobarometer equally found much support for 
European defence, but this enthusiasm was not matched by eagerness to 
provide the necessary funds.  
In any case, the reflection pause should not stall the CFSP. Several 
improvements could be implemented, for they are largely in the 
intergovernmental area of cooperation and would not require treaty FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 285 
 
changes. The European Defence Agency for defining capabilities and 
promoting cooperation on research and defence procurement can go ahead, 
for it has already been lifted out of the proposals by the Convention. The 
institutional innovations probably could not materialise, as with the foreign 
minister providing a personal union between communitarian and 
intergovernmental competences. Such a failure certainly would hamper the 
attempt of the Union to play a larger role on the world scene, because it 
would not be able to effectively combine the available communitarian and 
intergovernmental instruments. The ensuing stalemates might lead to 
renewed efforts to form core groups, moving ahead outside the framework 
of the Treaty on European Union. A mitigating factor on this tendency, 
however, would be the negative vote by the French, previously the 
champions of an avant garde. With what kind of France would a core group 
have to work? Moreover, most of the new member countries attach such 
importance to transatlantic relations and are so concerned about equality 
among all members, that they would be reluctant to follow French 
‘multipolar’ frameworks, even if Paris no longer uses that word. 
The outgoing head of Javier Solana’s Policy Unit, Christoph 
Heusgen, has listed a number of practical but modest steps to make the 
best of a bad situation.278 Formally, while the high representative cannot yet 
chair the foreign ministers’ council, large parts of the agenda could be 
entrusted to his leadership. A step in this direction has been set by Mr 
Solana’s chairmanship of the Political and Security Committee when it 
meets with the NATO Council. The same could be done in the political 
dialogue with non-EU countries. Very important is close cooperation with 
the European Commission. Mr Heusgen mentioned the joint visits to Africa 
by Mr Solana and the Commissioner for Development, Louis Michel, along 
with his own practice of inviting representatives of the Commission to 
sessions of his Policy Unit. 
Even more important is the wider question of how to maintain the 
momentum in a larger Union. If Europe is in a pause, it should not be 
equated with immobility. The European bicycle is not very good at a sur 
place. More analysis will be needed of the reasons why people have become 
disenchanted and what they might be willing to accept. Doing the same 
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things as the Constitution, but under a different guise, might alienate 
people even more. But their reasons for voting ‘no’ are so varied that a 
common denominator will be difficult to find. That is the problem with a 
referendum that leaves only a simple yes or no choice. Apparently, a 
majority of the ‘no’ voters is not opposed to the European Union, but found 
the Constitution a bridge too far, according to a Eurobarometer survey.279 
In the Netherlands they complained of insufficient information of what it 
was all about. Almost a fifth of them were worried about a loss of 
sovereignty and 13% complained about the cost of Europe for taxpayers. 
While the French widely supported the general notion of a constitution, the 
Dutch were far less convinced. Peculiarly enough, 65% of all respondents 
thought that the rejection of the European Constitution would allow for 
renegotiation in order to put greater emphasis on social aspects and to 
better defend Dutch interests. Both responses fit uneasily with the 
complaint of insufficient information, but might indicate that renegotiation 
could be a credible option. Whether this would also be acceptable to the 
growing number of countries that have already approved the Constitution 
is another matter, just like the question of what other compromise might 
survive a second round of ratifications and possible referenda.    
The Bertelsmann Stiftung has put its hand to drafting amendments 
to the Treaty of Nice in such a way that the innovations of the Constitution 
could be saved. They focus on the institutional improvements: the minister 
of foreign affairs, team presidencies, the semi-permanent president of the 
European Council, the double majority for QMV and co-decision for the 
European Parliament, mechanisms of differentiated integration and 
structural improvements such as the legal character of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the passerelles and the solidarity clauses. It is a useful 
initiative that merits implementation if governments have the courage to 
try again. A drawback of this course of action would be the loss of a 
consolidated treaty that is readable for those who make the effort and 
simplifies the multitude of current procedures. We may have to live with 
that, but we should be aware of the risk of de-constructing the remarkable 
consensus reached during the Convention by creating new divisions 
between large and small states, rich and poor, new and old, and disrupting 
the balance between the institutions. 
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Several points of a future consensus have already emerged. First, 
the text should be much shorter, possibly limited to part I of the 
Constitution dealing with institutions and competences. The long and 
awkward part III, which did not do much more than describe existing 
policies, did not add much; it also suffered from the lack of an easier 
revision procedure than the earlier parts. Second, the word ‘constitution’ 
should be avoided, as it created the impression of the EU being a super-
state (nevertheless, the European Parliament stuck to this terminology). 
Third, throughout the member states there is support for applying the 
subsidiarity rules without a formal treaty provision. National parliaments 
could do that immediately when new Commission proposals appear and 
thereby increase their involvement in EU affairs at an early stage of 
deliberations. Subsidiarity is primarily a political question, as a strict 
distinction between national and EU competences would be difficult to 
draw. The sooner parliaments realise this, the better it will be for 
familiarising them and citizens with the EU agenda. Equally, it could be 
decided to have public meetings of the Council when it debates legislation, 
to adopt improvements in the comitology, to use the passerelle clause for 
applying QMV in the field of justice and home affairs, and to elaborate 
upon the people’s initiative (requiring a million signatures, which would 
not be an insurmountable barrier if use of the Internet is allowed).  
In the absence of governmental initiatives, the only activities have 
come from the European Commission and the European Parliament. The 
Commission published its Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate.280 In 
the European Parliament a proposal for a resolution by Andrew Duff and 
Johannes Voggenhuber envisaged a new attempt by 2007 to be ready before 
the European elections of 2009, using the Constitution as a starting place. 
Their resolution was adopted in amended form by the European 
Parliament on 19 January 2006.281 It made the point that without the 
Constitution the success of enlargement would be endangered, because the 
Treaty of Nice could not provide a viable basis. Moreover, the institutional 
provisions of Nice would have to be revised after the EU membership had 
reached the number of 27, which meant that without further changes 
enlargement would have to come to an end after the accession of Bulgaria 
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and Romania.282 The main proposal of the resolution was to convene an 
Interparliamentary Forum of national and European parliamentarians in 
the spring of 2006, prior to the European Council of June and to draw 
conclusions from the process not later than the second half of 2007 so that 
new provisions could enter into force before the European elections of 2009. 
The Forum should focus on questions concerning the aims of integration; 
the role of the EU in the world; the future European social and economic 
model in the light of globalisation; the definition of the borders of the 
Union and the strengthening of freedom, security and justice; and the 
financing of the EU. 
The reactions from the member states were diffused, to say the least. 
There was much talk of regaining the confidence of the citizens and a broad 
debate, but no action was taken. The incoming Austrian presidency seemed 
to wish to revive the Constitution and to bring it in from the cold by 
developing a ‘road map’ for the reflection period (if that was the right   
metaphor, albeit frequently used for any conceivable process) and the 
remainder of the ratification process, but also made clear that it could not 
be a ‘miracle healer’. Chancellor Schüssel wanted to ask the people to 
formulate the questions.283 In Germany, Chancellor Merkel wanted to draw 
conclusions during her presidency in the first semester of 2007. In France 
presidential hopeful Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a slimmer version of the 
Treaty, based on parts I and II of the rejected Constitution, which would 
not have to be put to another referendum. The Netherlands government 
did not make any proposals and only stated that it would not re-submit the 
Constitution, even if somewhat embellished, to another popular vote; its 
first priority was to raise the effectiveness of the Union in order to show 
that it served the interests of the citizen. Taking all these reactions together, 
the procedure adopted by the European Parliament seems to be the most 
realistic, for it asks relevant questions and incorporates the options 
suggested by Germans and French. To have a better chance of success it 
would be advisable to drop the word ‘constitution’. 
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As long as the Constitution remains in doubt, the WEU Treaty with 
its automatic military assistance clause will remain in force, even though 
the functions of the organisation have all been transferred to the EU. The 
last activity to be moved was cooperation on military procurement, which 
has been assumed by the new European Defence Agency. The research cell 
is expected to follow in the spring of 2006. The only remaining field is the 
parliamentary dimension of the WEU Assembly, now baptised the Inter-
parliamentary European Security Assembly, which continues to play a 
useful role as long as the European Parliament is denied a competence in 
intergovernmental subjects such as the CFSP. The Assembly is the only 
place where national parliamentarians can discuss security and defence 
issues in a European context. If this problem is not resolved, 
parliamentarians of member states paradoxically would be better off in the 
NATO and OSCE assemblies than in an EU framework. A possible way out 
would be to create a mixed body of national and EU parliamentarians to 
deal with the intergovernmental aspects of European integration, but 
neither the member states nor the European Parliament seem inclined to 
push for this solution. The meetings of the COSAC (consisting of 
representatives of national committees for European affairs) once per 
presidency cover the entire range of EU activities and do not perform the 
consensus-building function of joint work on reports and resolutions. They 
do not close the gap between national responsibility for the ESDP and the 
need for European-level expertise.284  
Judging from past practice, the consensus-based development of the 
CFSP on the whole has worked fairly well, sometimes even better than the 
outcome of communitarian dossiers. In spite of all the difficulties, every 
year has seen some progress, especially in the security and defence field. 
The EU has accepted wider responsibilities and is running an increasing 
number of operations. In this respect the old metaphor of ‘watching the 
grass grow’ is applicable: at any given moment little seems to move, but at 
the end of the week the lawn has to be mowed. On some issues, 
particularly those relating to the Middle East, no agreement has been 
possible, but in these complicated areas a solution has eluded everyone 
else, too. The reduced leverage of the US on the countries of the region 
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might enhance the possibilities for a European role as shown by the sudden 
involvement of EU monitors on the border between Palestine and Egypt. 
The weak points of the CFSP remain money and effective crisis 
management. For 2006 the European Parliament agreed to raise the budget 
from €60 to €100 million, a small sum in comparison with the other 
programmes, but that is the consequence of denying the Parliament any say 
on the substance. From its side the Commission asked for €500 million for 
research alone, underlining the importance of good cooperation with the 
European Defence Agency (which itself is not financed from the EU budget 
but from national contributions). Nevertheless, the capabilities for relevant 
operations are there and all members want to contribute. As a result, the 
envisaged permanent structured cooperation will probably not be pushed. 
For the time being we have to be content with exploring the limits of 
intergovernmentalism. One of the most important steps would be a 
continuous effort of the high representative and the commissioner for 
external relations to make joint proposals to the Council and to forge their 
representations abroad into a single external service. 
Strategic thinking 
Few people think of a linear battlefield any more. In most cases, the 
military will have to operate in small units in the midst of an uncertain 
population. ‘Crisis response’ is the NATO term that encapsulates 
peacekeeping and, when the opponent does not yield, it becomes ‘peace 
enforcement’. An even wider term is ‘peace-support operations’, which also 
includes reconstruction and peace-building. In an ideal model, civil war is 
followed by outside military intervention, emergency aid and finally 
reconstruction. Unfortunately, crises have a tendency to last and 
intervention is no guarantee against a relapse into violence. Consolidation 
and reconstruction require a long-term commitment, as we have seen in 
Bosnia and Kosovo.  
None of the international organisations is very good at crisis 
management. In fact, few manage anything except trying to limit escalation 
as much as possible. As we have seen, in most cases the UN is unable to 
conduct military peace-support operations. Only in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo do we see robust peacekeeping. The UN does not do 
forced entries and has never fielded more than 20,000 troops in any single 
operation. Where these thresholds must be surpassed, NATO, the EU or an FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 291 
 
ad hoc coalition is needed.285 The OSCE became increasingly paralysed by 
Russian complaints of double standards and an exclusive focus on the area 
of the former Soviet Union. NATO is withdrawing from European 
operations and conducts its participation in Afghanistan solely with 
European units. Meanwhile, competition with the EU grows and gives rise 
to talk about de-conflicting operations and an ‘inverted’ Berlin Plus 
agreement, i.e. that the Alliance could make use of European assets. No 
wonder that the academic community is contemplating the lack of 
‘functional security’ as a result of the inadequate functioning of the 
international organisations. 
Lawrence Freedman has made the point that the EU has exercised 
soft power without really trying. It has derived power from its very 
existence rather than from an active foreign policy. Candidates for 
membership were prepared to be judged against its standards of liberalised 
markets and democratic government. Foreign policy has remained largely 
reactive and many initiatives appeared designed to discourage the 
Americans from taking bolder steps. Freedman draws the unpleasant 
conclusion that given the limited stock of hard and soft power available on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and uncertainty about whether the spread of 
democracy is really a strategic vision rather than a noble aspiration, there 
seems to be little choice but to deal directly with regimes of doubtful 
character and legitimacy.286 
The ESDP aims at conferring upon the EU the ability to take 
collective decisions relating to regional (and on occasion wider) security 
and to deploy a range of instruments to conduct peacekeeping and, if 
necessary, peace enforcement – preferably with a legal mandate – as a 
distinctive European action. Progress has been real, but Europe has found it 
difficult to develop strategic thinking as a basis for its policies. The focus on 
capabilities cannot escape the question of ‘what for?’ The European security 
strategy has made a laudable effort, but falls short of a guideline for day-to-
day policy decisions and defence planning. At a given moment it will have 
to be further refined in a kind of white paper setting out common objectives 
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and the practical measures to implement them. The task force convened by 
the EU Institute of Security Studies has produced an interesting sample that 
is discussed in chapter 8 under European scenarios. In 2005 work started on 
a more specific strategy for Africa, where the EU is assisting the African 
Union and already has liaison offices in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and the 
Darfur region. The Belgian Minister for Development Cooperation, 
Armand de Decker, a former President of the WEU Assembly, has 
proposed the creation of an EU-African Union peacekeeping training centre 
as part of this strategy. 
Hand in hand with these multilateral processes, national 
governments should do a number of things: 
•  update their security concepts and policies and specify their defence 
needs on the basis of a reasoned threat assessment;   
•  define their level of ambition for participation in international peace-
support operations and specify them in terms of units, skills and 
readiness for rapid deployment; 
•  gear personnel and equipment levels to these ambitions, including 
training, logistical support and cooperative arrangements. Preferably 
multinational force packages should be formed, trained and ready to 
deploy as soon as the political decision to join an operation has been 
taken. The battle groups are a step in this direction, but lack the size 
and the combined weapons to be effective, except in a few African 
contingencies; 
•  coordinate through both NATO and the EU to ensure more attention 
is given to the acquisition plans of allies and partners in order to 
avoid duplication and to remedy shortfalls more systematically; and 
•  obtain public support for the defence effort by applying the 
democratic principles of ‘reveal, explain and justify’. There are far too 
many variations in national practices for democratic control of the 
security sector. 
These questions are becoming particularly relevant as military strategy is 
entering what is called “fourth generation warfare”,287 using all available 
networks – political, economic, social and military – to convince the 
enemy’s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either 
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unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. This strategy does not 
attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces, but combines hard 
and soft power. It is the antithesis of the high-tech short-war approach the 
Pentagon still appears to be following and seems more appropriate to the 
Europeans.  
Apart from these general considerations a number of political and 
military questions have to be answered conjointly before a government 
decides to participate in a peace-support operation. As early as 1995, a few 
weeks before Srebrenica was overrun by the troops of General Ratko 
Mladic, the Netherlands formulated a list of 14 points that had to be taken 
into consideration during the process of decision-making. It was a checklist 
that boiled down to three criteria: the Netherlands’ interest in joining the 
operation, its military feasibility in a multinational context and widespread 
support by public opinion.288  
In a recent book, General Sir Rupert Smith listed two sets of questions 
to be asked in developing an operational plan. The first set was sought to 
define the desired outcome and the efforts needed to achieve it. The 
questions included those such as: Who are we opposed to and what are 
their desired outcomes? Are we seeking order or justice, and if it is justice, 
who is it for? Are we going to deal with their present leaders or should we 
change them partly or entirely? Are we using their laws or ours? To whom 
will the task of administering the state fall to, them or us? And what are we 
prepared to threaten or promise to achieve our objectives? 
When the crisis moves from confrontation to war, the second set of 
questions has to be considered: How do we show that our threat is credible 
and that we are prepared to escalate the level of violence if necessary? How 
do we demonstrate that our desired outcome is more in the opponent’s 
interest (and that of their people) than us carrying out our threat? And how 
do we ensure that our promises appear credible in the eyes of our 
opponent? And so on. From his own experience, Sir Rupert Smith 
concluded that the true institutional difficulty was to bring all the agencies 
concerned to answer all these questions coherently.289  
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Another set of lessons can be formulated after the unfortunate 
experience in post-conflict stabilisation in Iraq, where following a very 
successful military campaign the country lost its ‘immune system’: 
•  long-term success should be built up by means of quick impact 
projects that have immediate effect in the battle for hearts and minds; 
•  if living conditions do not improve the local population will lose its 
positive opinion about the military presence; 
•  basic utilities should function within a period of, say, 100 days if 
political credibility is to be maintained; 
•  at the beginning of a reconstruction phase, money and markets have 
to be available with a minimum of administrative red tape and with 
the assistance of civilian experts; and 
•  ‘local ownership’ is essential for the sustainability of reconstruction 
projects. Therefore, the transfer of financial means and authority by 
the intervening party to local authorities is the only way to maintain 
legitimacy of the intervention.290  
In combating terrorism, the US and Europe are moving closer together. 
After the attacks in Madrid and London, Europeans have realised the 
seriousness of the threat, but still have difficulty with the war image 
fostered in Washington, because it suggests that the problem could be 
solved by military means and disrupts the fabric of democratic society. It 
distorts the balance between freedom and security and risks leading to 
discrimination of minority groups originating in Muslim countries. While 
Europeans have lived with terrorism of varying intensity, the shock of 9/11 
has had a greater impact on the American perception of terrorism abroad 
and coloured their approach to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. As 
American politics was recast around security issues and the war on terror, 
the European electorate continued to focus on economic issues, mainly 
unemployment.291  
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If terrorism is the main threat, the value added by NATO is not self-
evident, except when it would be able to define the military tools needed in 
the fight against it. The EU will be a valuable partner of the US and new 
lines of information and consultation will have to be opened up. For 
everyone the new close relationship between internal and external security 
will have an impact on the organisation of their military, police and other 
instruments of law, order and crisis management. The US has created the 
Department of Homeland Security and the EU is giving new impetus to 
their cooperation in the areas of justice and home affairs, which will be less 
comprehensive, but nevertheless a powerful incentive for joint action.  
In dealing with the present, one should keep in mind how past 
terrorist campaigns have ended. On that point, Adam Roberts has given us 
important indications:292 
•  an awareness on the part of the terrorist movements that they are 
being defeated politically or at least are not making gains; 
•  the recognition by governments that organise or assist terrorism that 
they must renounce this method of pursuing a cause, as Libya did in 
2003; 
•  the holding of genuine multi-party elections; 
•  the amelioration of conditions in order to weaken the strength and 
legitimacy of their support;  
•  a shared awareness of stalemate, giving both sides a possible 
incentive to reach a negotiated or tacit settlement involving mutual 
concessions; 
•  sometimes terrorist campaigns wind down rather than end; and 
•  in some cases the combatants, or at least a proportion of them, may be 
retrained, as in Guatemala in the mid-1990s. 
Prof. Roberts concluded that it does not make sense to give terrorists more 
credit than they deserve, for example by stressing their potential for 
strategic effect. In his view, an important aim must not be the capture of 
every last terrorist leader, but their relegation to a status of near-irrelevance 
as life moves on, long-standing grievances are addressed and people can 
see that a grim terrorist war of attrition is achieving little and damaging 
their own societies. 
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On 1 December 2005 the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 
adopted the European Counter-Terrorism Strategy, “the European Union’s 
strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while respecting human 
rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of 
freedom, security and justice”.293 The strategy covered four strands of 
work: to prevent, protect, pursue and respond. It contained several 
innovations and was remarkable in its stress on cross-pillar connections. 
According to the strategy, once per presidency a high-level political 
dialogue should be held between the Council, European Parliament and 
Commission to ensure inter-institutional governance. COREPER is to 
monitor progress with regular follow-up and updates by the Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator (currently Gijs de Vries from the Netherlands) and 
the Commission. In addition to the European Arrest Warrant, a new 
instrument has been created – the European Evidence Warrant – enabling 
member states to obtain evidence from elsewhere in the EU to help convict 
terrorists. Joint investigation teams should be established where necessary 
for cross-border investigations. Under the heading “pursue” the point was 
made that the threat assessments of the Joint Situation Centre should be 
integrated into policy-making on counter-terrorism. Under the heading of 
“respond”, key priorities are to agree EU crisis-coordination agreements 
and the supporting operational procedures, and to revise the legislation on 
the Community mechanism for civil protection. All in all, this represents 
tangible progress in a most sensitive area. 
Transatlantic troubles 
Over the past 15 years, NATO and the EU have had their ups and downs, 
usually in opposite proportions. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
future of NATO was in doubt and the EU was in ascendancy, until the 
sobering experience of Bosnia, which could only be resolved by American 
intervention. The same experience repeated itself in Kosovo. Afghanistan 
started as a unilateral action of the US, but the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) came under the UN and was led by NATO. In 2005 
the US changed course and wanted to merge the ISAF with its own 
Taliban-chasing Operation Enduring Freedom. Several allies found that 
difficult because of the different nature of the two operations and hesitated 
about putting them both under an American commander while US forces 
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were being reduced and replaced by others. American leadership, if 
Washington still wants to exert it, does not come naturally to the 
Europeans any more, certainly not when there is no corresponding force 
contribution. In Iraq, the EU has not been involved, but NATO has 
managed to play a minor role in training the new security forces. At the 
same time, the EU has demonstrated step by step that it has been able to 
take over NATO activities in the Balkans, starting with the intention of the 
Seville European Council of July 2002 to assume responsibilities in 
Macedonia.294  
In fact, on our own continent there has been ‘more Europe’ without 
harming the Alliance. The 2004 NATO ministerial session in Istanbul 
settled the transfer of SFOR in Bosnia to EUFOR, the first sizeable 
European operation with some 7,000 personnel, working under a UN 
mandate and the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO. The problem lies 
more in a global role of NATO and the architectural ambitions of the EU. 
As previously noted, the US ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, 
exploded after the UK had agreed on a (small) EU headquarters, calling 
this “the most serious threat to the future of NATO” instead of showing 
appreciation for British efforts at damage limitation.295 Since then, 
Washington has appeared to be more relaxed. Transparency has improved 
and in the relations between NATO and the EU an institutional 
accommodation has been found, which seems to have prevailed over 
political unease and ill will. One might question the efficiency of the 
regular joint meetings of the NATO Council and the Political and Security 
Committee, because most countries sit there with two ambassadors and 
one of them may regard it as a waste of time. In that respect, the recently 
instituted joint meetings at ministerial level are more useful, as well as 
close contacts between the two bureaucracies. The test will come in a crisis 
when decisions will have to be taken on which organisation is going to act. 
The example of Darfur has not been edifying, where the US wanted to 
coordinate air transport through SHAPE and some Europeans favoured the 
coordination centre at the Eindhoven airbase.  
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Is Europe doing enough? At first glance the obvious answer is no. 
With more personnel under arms than the US, the output in fighting power 
is too small. Ever since the end of World War II, Washington has been 
pushing the European allies to do more. In the Soviet era, the burden-
sharing debate was painful, because European defences clearly would not 
have been able to withstand a massive Soviet attack. Even that debate was 
difficult to quantify, because the percentage of GDP spent on defence was 
only a rough indicator of tangible capabilities and did not take the quality 
of training and equipment sufficiently into account. Today, such arithmetic 
is even more difficult as the numbers of forces despatched by European 
countries are only a small proportion of total capabilities. Deployability is 
what is lacking. 
The EU Institute of Security Studies has taken the initiative to give 
new substance to the concept of burden-sharing, taking a broad view and 
including not only force contributions, but also official development 
assistance and other international efforts.296 Then European performance 
acquires a better light with the EU providing 55% of total ODA, although 
very few countries meet the agreed objective of 0.7% of GDP. The US did 
better by providing almost twice the humanitarian assistance as the EU. In 
SFOR in Bosnia the European contribution has always been larger than that 
of the US (with France having the largest contingent in 2002, but Germany 
in 2005 when the operation was taken over by the EU as with Althea). 
Those figures are useful in showing that the EU is doing more than in the 
past, but say little about their comparative effectiveness. More work will 
have to be done on measuring input and output. A Clingendael study has 
done so for six of the smaller EU countries and measured them according 
to their operational capabilities for carrying out stabilisation operations, 
education and training, their organisation, research and development, and 
finance.297 Who will determine the overall burden and establish criteria, 
and how will contributions in one area match gaps in another? On defence 
planning and the monitoring of member countries’ fulfilment of their 
targets for the Defence Capabilities Initiative, NATO is still ahead. In the 
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end, only solid achievements will have an impact on how others will 
perceive the policies of the EU. In US-EU relations the military factor is 
bound to retain much of its weight and consequently will continue to be an 
important measure of mutual appreciation and solidarity.  
Are Europeans and Americans still capable of effective solidarity in 
a major crisis? Is it conceivable that the US would not join in if European 
security really is threatened? Probably not. But then, serious old-fashioned 
crises within Europe are unlikely to occur. Instead attention is focusing on 
the impact of crises outside our continent. Samuel Huntington thought of 
the clash of civilisations in a geopolitical context, but today it occurs more 
visibly within our own cities. So the question is what the Europeans could 
handle themselves, or in other words, what the limits of European force 
projection will be and whether they are sufficiently organised to deal with 
calamities at home. 
The NATO Response Force was pushed by Washington as a 
challenge to the Europeans that they continued to believe in NATO as a 
military organisation at the time they were developing their security and 
defence policy. As Philip Gordon remarked, the plan seemed to be 
working. Even France has committed 1,700 troops and senior French 
officers have obtained command positions.298 Conversely, France has 
remained difficult in consultations concerning NRF deployment and has 
limited EU-NATO meetings to Berlin Plus contingencies, thus excluding 
consultations on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The NRF will 
be fully operational in 2006 and include: a land component with forced-
entry capability; a naval task force of one carrier battle group, an 
amphibious task group and a surface action group; an air component 
capable of 200 combat sorties per day; and finally, special forces on call. 
The Americans will ask to what extent NATO will go global or what 
coalitions of the willing are likely in the pursuit of common interests. As 
Neil MacFarlane has shown, recent interventions have had a stronger 
normative component more similar to the 1990s than to those of the cold 
war era. He noted a reduction in the frequency of unilateral intervention by 
the great powers and their growing reluctance to intervene without 
justification in terms of widely shared normative principles. That 
                                                 
298 This point was noted in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy – 
The First Five Years (1999–2004), EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, August 
2004(b), pp. 215-19. 300 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
assessment might be less strong after the Iraq war, but he also pointed out 
that historically speaking the ‘absolutisation’ of sovereignty and the 
interpretation of the principle of non-intervention that developed during 
the cold war had been atypical.299 
 Having peace in Europe, we have to decide what to do with it. Is 
our society so averse to taking risks that it will be reluctant to send forces to 
dangerous places? And if not, are we going to follow where the Americans 
want to be going? The response to that question would change the nature 
of an Alliance built up during 50 years of collective defence. Today, in each 
crisis the member states have to make up their mind whether to join the 
action or not. Joining peace-support operations never is an automatic 
process, but is inherently selective. In this respect the call for a new 
transatlantic bargain, always heard when relations are in trouble, has 
become more difficult to respond to. The historic bargains of the past – 
never formalised and never perfect – brought a US commitment to provide 
its European and Asian partners with security and access to American 
markets in return for a reliable partnership and the acceptance of US 
leadership within an agreed politico-economic system.300 More specifically, 
in Europe the American nuclear guarantee was set against a credible 
conventional effort by the Europeans. What would a new bargain consist of 
in terms of mutual obligations in a joint effort to solve common problems? 
Lord David Hannay made common sense in proposing the initiation of a 
quiet dialogue to identify the gaps and weaknesses in existing US–EU 
relations and how best to plug them.301 When policy options are 
considered, as much analytical common ground as possible should be 
established as well as ways to reconcile them. 
Currently, we see competition between NATO and the EU in 
conducting non-Art. V (i.e. peace-support) missions. Kosovo remains the 
only NATO operation inside Europe. US forces are being reduced and 
moved to the new member states. In Asia the ISAF headquarters are run by 
NATO, but only with European soldiers. US efforts to merge the ISAF and 
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Operation Enduring Freedom have failed so far. All this raises the question 
of under what conditions our nations are prepared to envisage military 
action in this ‘unbrave’ new world, regardless of the geographical 
dimension. And how could we arrive at a division of labour when both 
NATO and the EU are willing to engage in non-Art. V missions? We have 
come a long way from the maxim that the EU would act only when NATO 
as a whole is not engaged. Today there is even talk of ‘de-conflicting’ the 
two. Would a new strategic concept help in clarifying the situation? On 
previous occasions this has been a tedious job, but the fact of working 
together ultimately created a bond among the participants in the exercise. If 
we can expect sufficient political will to reach a common understanding, it 
might be given a try. If not, a declaration of common values and objectives 
could be more constructive. Paradoxically, if consultations function 
satisfactorily there is less need for a strategic concept, but if they do not, a 
new one will be very difficult to achieve.   
In transatlantic relations, a Union willing to assume larger 
responsibilities, outside Europe as well, would become a more credible 
partner to the US, although it remains to be seen whether “our past saviour 
and increasingly confusing partner and friend”302 would recognise this 
sufficiently. In any case, the US cannot maintain the contradictory position 
of supporting European integration and at the same time opposing a more 
independent position. Clearly, the EU will not become a ‘peer competitor’ 
of the US in any politico-military sense. The purpose of the European 
security and defence policy is not to oppose the US, but to enhance 
Europe’s influence through an asset that might increase European 
autonomy. At best it will be a correction mechanism in international power 
relationships, and even that might be too far-fetched. 
All of us will have to draw lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq and 
reassess the difficult task of post-conflict stabilisation. The new focus of the 
EU on battle groups will provide the means for early action, but work 
remains to be done on how groups will operate together if an operation  
requires more than one, how joint operations with combined weapons will 
be organised and how many peace-support operations could be sustained 
at the same time. The battle groups do not fully answer demands for the 
creation of an EU force, but – in the words of the IISS Strategic Survey 
2004/05 – have “the virtue of furnishing relatively discrete units that can be 
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assembled individually”.303 That does not do justice to the willingness of 
almost all EU member states to bring at least part of their forces up to 
standard and submit them to certification. It is true that their size is limited 
and that the EU has not worked out how different battle groups should 
operate if more than one is needed for an operation. This is related to the 
question of who should provide the reserves necessary in case of escalation 
or a more prolonged operation. Then the Helsinki Headline Goals could be 
called upon or the NATO Response Force. The same question of reserves is 
topical for the support of UN operations, where ideally the Europeans (and 
NATO) should make joint contributions.304 
For the time being, the issue of an EU headquarters seems to be on 
the back burner as the Berlin Plus arrangement (applied to the operations 
Concordia and Althea) and the compromise of September-December 2003 
(on an EU cell in SHAPE and liaison arrangements) seem to work 
adequately. The same probably applies to permanent structured 
cooperation. The current emphasis is on practical cooperation, such as the 
French initiative to pool together sea and air transport. Pooling will also be 
important to avoid an unnecessary duplication of investment. In a way, this 
is the opposite of task-specialisation, which may make it more attractive for 
countries afraid of becoming overly dependent upon the capabilities of 
others. The units put into a pool of, say, aircraft or helicopters, would have 
common bases, but could be used for national purposes as well.   
Simultaneously, transport needs should be assessed realistically and not be 
solely concentrated on air transport. During the Iraq war, 95% of US 
transport was carried out by sea. In the next few years European 
requirements should be linked to the transport needs of the battle groups, 
which are only useful if they can intervene quickly. The same will be true 
for the NATO Response Force, although its transport is supposed to be 
assisted by American assets. 
On the US side, the Iraq experience may lead towards a better 
appreciation of the values of multilateralism. The persistent use of the term 
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‘coalition forces’ already indicates that Washington wants to create the 
impression of a multilateral operation. The best scenario would be a UNSC 
resolution after the Iraqi elections and the formation of a government, 
mandating a stabilisation force to which European countries could more 
easily contribute. The continuing high level of violence and suicide 
bombers has made such a force very unattractive. Nevertheless, failure to 
restore stability and establish democracy in Iraq would have far-reaching 
consequences, not only in the region, but also for transatlantic relations. In 
any case, success will require much more consultation, in both the EU and 
in NATO, and in closer EU–US contacts on our policy objectives. 
Unfortunately, the EU stumbled just at the moment that the Bush 
administration was beginning to acknowledge its existence and even its 
virtues. 
Whither Europe?  
Without a consolidated basic treaty the EU will continue to grope for its 
future and its place in the world, and will always repeat the same 
fundamental debate on every new policy issue. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
had hoped for a Constitution that would last for 50 years, but that was 
unlikely from the beginning. It might have worked if the Constitution had 
been limited to the first 60 articles, but certainly part III with its detailed 
policy areas would have had to be reviewed much sooner. The fact that 
revision of that part remained as difficult as the more fundamental parts I 
and II was a negative aspect of the final product. 
The catalyst in the debate was obviously the impending 
enlargement with 10 new members and more to come. Any purist would 
have preferred the ‘deepening’ – in the sense of institutional clarity – to 
have preceded the actual ‘widening’ of the membership. That proved to be 
politically impossible. The imperative of enlargement to foster stability 
throughout a part of Europe that had twice been the cause of a world-wide 
conflagration prevailed over other considerations. These countries, which 
had suffered communist oppression, could not be refused any longer by 
their free brethren who had consistently urged them to become democratic 
first and then fulfil the entire gamut of the Copenhagen criteria of 1993. 
Enlargement was probably most difficult for France, which saw the new 
members as strengthening either German influence in Central Europe or 
the Atlanticist camp, and under President François Mitterrand France had 
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the stability argument won, reinforced by the consideration that a Germany 
firmly embedded within the European Union geographically would be 
more at ease with itself – and less dependent on American backing – than a 
country on the dividing line between a prosperous West and a poor and 
disorganised East. In the process both countries tried, for different reasons, 
to establish a good relationship with Russia. Their problem, however, was 
that Russia still had little to offer except opposition to the US intervention 
in Iraq and remained pre-occupied with its domestic situation. 
Others suspected the UK of ulterior motives in propagating 
enlargement in order to avoid deepening. The point has merit, certainly in 
the domestic debate within the country, but should not be exaggerated. 
Every enlargement has been accompanied by some deepening, but after the 
2001 summit in Nice the prevailing question was whether it was sufficient 
to keep the larger Union governable. At St Malo in 1998 the British came 
closer to Europe, leaning on their diplomatic expertise and military assets, 
but wanted to keep the second pillar of the CFSP intergovernmental, 
without the possibility of majority voting. Apparently they had doubts 
about the possibility of swaying European decisions their way. Under the 
Treaty of Nice, the possibility of enhanced cooperation was opened in the 
field of CFSP and the Constitution added modalities for security and 
defence. Their implementation hangs in the balance. The careful 
assumption of larger responsibilities in the Balkans seems a good omen 
that, in spite of many differences, the EU remains capable of common 
actions.  
Most observers seem to agree that a Europe of 25 member states will 
need more flexibility. Yet, the experience of the Convention and the IGC 
shows that the new members are extremely suspicious of any schemes that 
might leave them out of the loop or infringe on their equal status. 
Moreover, they are not the cause of fundamental divergences of view; there 
the culprits are the old member states with their perennial debate on the 
future of the European Union. Flexibility could take different forms, 
applied to either the tempo of integration or its scope. Variable geometry, 
integration by sector or a Europe à la carte could be on the menu, but so far 
flexibility or enhanced cooperation seems to be more a deterrent for those 
lagging in the mainstream than a method that will be regularly used. Of 
course, we see several examples in daily life: the euro, the Schengen 
agreement (which moved to a third agreement among the old six member 
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of 27 May 2005 at Prüm), the automatic military assistance clause of the 
WEU and Denmark opting out of the security and defence policy. And 
indeed, it is a tribute to the EU that it could become a network of different 
procedures and heterogeneous constructions that has furnished flexible 
responses to different requirements.  
That might happen again in the future, but the question is whether 
new cases could arise easily and where – certainly not where the internal 
market is concerned. Defence industrial cooperation might be a suitable 
area; however, the new European Defence Agency could provide the 
umbrella under which everyone might find a place. Permanent structured 
cooperation could be another, but not as the closed shop originally 
envisaged. The criteria for participation are not as hard as they might seem 
and it is not clear where the functional military requirements end and the 
political commitments start. Some effort will have to be made to arrive at 
objective criteria and the new European Defence Agency could play a role 
in their definition and application. At the moment, all the member states 
except Denmark and Malta are interested in showing willingness to 
contribute to peace-support missions through the battle groups. The first 
test to be applied to their offers is the degree of immediate usability and 
deployability. To go further it will be necessary to clarify what the 
additional commitments towards each other might entail and how binding 
they would be. The Iraq crisis has consigned the more ambitious projects to 
the dustbin and, as Philip Gordon remarked, will keep us divided until we 
have found a collective interest in stability.305  
Neither NATO nor the EU has conducted ground warfare 
operations and it is an open question as to whether they would be capable 
of doing so in an out-of-area contingency. Both organisations depend on 
the willingness of member states to make forces available for a specific 
operation they could not train for. It is very hard to prepare for unfocused 
power projection and the US standard for unspecified missions would be 
several notches too high for its allies. Moreover, NATO has lost the link 
between multinational headquarters and assigned forces. It has the great 
advantage of generally accepted, standing operating procedures and rules 
of engagement and did a good job in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan in 
the consolidation phase. But that does not mean that it will be capable of 
expeditionary warfare. The NATO Response Force is a step in that 
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direction, but there is no certainty that it will ever be used. The same thing 
could be said of the EU battle groups, but at least one of them has 
functioned, albeit avant la lettre. For the US, NATO is a toolbox from which 
to pick and choose if deemed useful and does not seem to be the 
instrument of choice for scenarios outside Europe. Yet, Washington tries to 
convince its allies to go global. The Europeans do not see NATO primarily 
as a war machine any longer and prefer it to be a security organisation with 
military capabilities linked to the only remaining super power. Under those 
circumstances, NATO is becoming a looser Alliance, which adapts to the 
enemy of the moment. If that is true, the EU–US relationship needs to be 
reflected within the Alliance and notions of a two-pillar system may 
acquire new meaning. Not as a European identity, because that notion 
could only work if all members of the EU are also members of NATO, but 
as a close and permanent consultation mechanism. 
If we focus too much on coalitions of the willing, we are in danger 
of moving away from the effective multilateralism our strategy is 
espousing and undermining the notion of the indivisibility of security. That 
applies to both NATO and the EU. Rather than abstract architectures it 
seems necessary to deal with some very practical questions: To what levels 
of commitment are we prepared to see the ESDP develop, and how much 
are we prepared to spend on it? What size of force packages are needed for 
a credible EU force-projection capability? Or more facetiously, where are all 
the enemies we need these tasks for? What are the limits to the deployment 
of the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups? In other words, let 
us focus on the things we are capable of doing, rather than harping 
continuously on the things we would not be able to do. Institutionally, the 
Political and Security Committee has brought continuity to the CFSP and 
avoided the theoretical debates that have sometimes marred the meetings 
of political directors in the Political Committee of the European political 
cooperation. It has managed to gradually incorporate security issues in its 
work, which in the times of the EPC had been left to the WEU. 
If there is any lesson from our experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
and recently in Darfur, it is that one cannot stop ethnic cleansing with soft 
power alone. The war in former Yugoslavia was the failure of non-military 
conflict resolution. This legacy might return to haunt us. That is why the 
step-by-step assumption of responsibilities in the Balkans is wise and in 
accordance with what public opinion is capable of accepting. There is a 
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war they supported the defence budget on the assumption that if force 
levels were adequate they would not have to be used. Today, defence 
outlays are supported only if the military are seen to be useful and do a 
good job in peace-support operations.  
During the early 1990s, blue beret s  o r  b l u e  h e l m e t s  w e r e  t h e  
emblems under which peacekeeping operations were carried out, but they 
hardly ever fired a shot and it did not take long to realise that the UN were 
not capable of sizeable enforcement measures. The pendulum swung back 
to the green helmets of national forces. An interesting suggestion was made 
by Jean-Marie Guéhenno in his foreword to Chaillot Paper No. 78 to link 
battle groups and the UN Strategic Reserve.306 This could break the 
deadlock in inter-institutional relations, where all the parties want to do 
everything on their own. But a drawback would be that tying forces down 
to a specific role would affect their autonomous character. 
The role of defence as a vital function of the state has changed 
dramatically over the past 15 years – at least for the countries of Western 
Europe, which are no longer concerned about the threats of aggression to 
their independence and territorial integrity. The old members worry about 
new threats, but the new members situated closer to Russia still have the 
old ones in mind. Together they wonder what the enormous increase in the 
American defence budget will be used for. The events of 11 September, 
when commercial aircraft were turned into weapons of mass destruction 
have increased scepticism about national missile defence. Equally, the 
revolution of military affairs and the ensuing transformation efforts have 
proved of little use in post-war consolidation and reconstruction in Iraq. 
Asymmetric warfare could not have come as a surprise. Ever since military 
historian Liddell Hart advanced the ‘indirect approach’ it has been the 
preferred way for an opponent, certainly if that opponent is faced with a 
redoubtable arsenal like that of the US. The challenge today is how to use 
the military in situations where the problem is only partly military. There 
lies an opportunity for the EU with its spectrum of instruments. 
Nevertheless, some military capabilities will remain necessary. 
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A changing defence organisation  
The process of reorientation and reorganisation that started after 1989 has 
gone a long way, but is still far from complete. While the fight against 
terrorism is making new demands on the military, it is also provoking 
resistance to giving up the more traditional skills and capabilities. At the 
same time, the coalescence between internal and external security and the 
call for increased transparency and accountability make it necessary to 
review some fundamental questions if the defence organisation is to 
function harmoniously: 
1)  How will integral defence-planning be affected? 
2)  Who is responsible for operational guidance? 
3)  What is the position of the chief of the defence staff (or general staff 
according to the name given to the top military officer)? 
4)  Who exercises the control function? 
5)  How can we ensure that the general interest of the defence 
organisation prevails over the interests of the individual services? 
6)  What is the relationship between the central organisation of the 
defence ministry and the services? 
7)  How does consultation with other government departments take 
place and what subjects are covered? 
Further, much centres on the position of the chief of the defence staff 
(CDS). The CDS combines many functions by being the senior adviser to 
the minister of defence, the ‘corporate planner’ of the department and the 
highest military commander. An almost impossible combination, the role 
requires careful definition of these responsibilities and the appointment of 
deputies for the functions of planning and operations. The planning 
function entails the setting of priorities among the wishes of the different 
services and incorporating them in a plan covering all activities of the 
department, not only those directly linked with the individual services. On 
the basis of this plan budgets will be allocated. Yet, by then it may be too 
late to exert real influence on running projects, which consideration 
militates for drawing up a medium-term framework programme that 
allows for periodic review. If the CDS primarily functions as a chairman of 
the service chiefs without some hierarchical authority, the corporate plan is 
unlikely to be more than a compilation of service plans. If, on the other 
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ultimate approval by the political authorities – his/her working relations 
with colleagues is at knifepoint. 
This renders the relationship particularly delicate, because the CDS 
depends on information from below to judge the quality, deployability and 
sustainability of the units that the post-holder might wish to use in an 
operational capacity. ‘Jointness’ could help in overcoming this problem, but 
unfortunately in most services promotion is made within their own 
organisation and not in the more distant place of a defence staff where 
service loyalties have to be subordinated to the general interest. 
Another question to be posed is: Who functions as the main player 
opposite the CDS? Is it the secretary-general of the department or the 
official responsible for finance and budgeting? And in which forum will 
final arbitration take place? Different answers are given, relating to the 
specificity of the matrix that is inherent in a system where functional and 
operational lines cross. Within each service the functions of operations, 
personnel, equipment and financial control have their own domain and a 
decision has to be made as to how the authority of the chief of staff of a 
service relates to directives that are coming through functional lines from 
the central organisation. For several decades, the Netherlands suffered 
from a matrix organisation that provided for interminable discussion 
among all concerned, but failed to define how a decision should be arrived 
at. That has been remedied by giving the chief of staff both planning and 
command functions, and reducing the role of the services to supplying the 
forces needed for the operations engaged in. 
Waves of reform  
In almost all European countries waves of reform have followed each other 
in close array since 1991. Each wave has brought the conscription model 
closer to its end. Three different waves can be distinguished:307 
1)  The downsizing wave of 1990-95 was predominantly cost-motivated 
and capitalised on the ‘peace dividend’. The duration of military 
service was shortened, heavy ground-war equipment sold or 
disposed of and barracks closed. 
2)  The NATO-oriented phase of internationalism and 
professionalisation of 1996 to 2000-01 was provoked by the wars in 
former Yugoslavia and the Kuwait crisis. It was characterised by a 
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conceptual and strategic transformation of the military in order to 
face an expanded spectrum of tasks, along with a changing 
competence and recruiting profile. National defence strategies lost 
further significance in favour of a much wider security strategy – 
wider in both a geographical and a functional sense. Partnership for 
Peace extended the notion of ‘security through participation’ to the 
entire continent. Since the number of eligible conscripts started to 
exceed the needs of the services, arguments of fairness and burden-
sharing militated in favour of a complete suspension of the draft.  
3)  The third wave of reform, currently taking place since 2000-01 aims at 
structural modularisation and flexibilisation, combined with a 
comprehensive professionalisation. The US started with the 
revolution of military affairs and translated it into the doctrine of 
transformation directed at network-centred warfare. The Major 
NATO Command at Norfolk was turned into the Allied Command 
Transformation to push this concept throughout the Alliance. Its 
implementation was slowed down by the Iraq crisis and its renewed 
emphasis on ‘feet on the ground’, but no one doubts the value of 
applying modern technology to military operations. 
In a survey of some 30 European nations, Karl Haltiner and Paul Klein 
identified a surprisingly high number of common trends and tendencies. 
They all seem to converge on a common process of demilitarisation of 
European societies through a lowering of the ratio of persons and resources 
raised for military purposes. The political position of the armed forces 
changes accordingly and their social position comes under pressure unless 
the consensus behind their new duties of peace-support provides a new 
underpinning. Looking at the impact of the successive reform waves, the 
two authors highlighted a number of distinct observable trends that are of 
paramount importance for the future position of the armed forces, towards 
•  the constabularisation and internationalisation of the armed forces; 
•  the demilitarisation of societies; 
•  a feminisation of the armed forces, especially for military operations 
other than war; 
•  the civilisation and re-militarisation of the military; 
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•  a renaissance of the control issue as a result of the downsizing, the 
decline of conscription and professionalisation, which might lead to 
increased tensions between political and military elites. 
Most of these trends are self-explanatory, but the fourth one, concerning 
civilisation and re-militarisation, deserves further elucidation. What was 
meant concerned the development, on the one hand, of armies as multi-
functional organisations, which increasingly follow economic and financial 
criteria of efficiency and introduce civilian expertise, especially in logistical 
functions. Guard duties are being transferred to private security companies 
and catering services provide meals for entire brigades. Conversely, the 
actual military combat capabilities are concentrated in downsized 
organisational cores, which are likely to develop their own role models and 
military virtues. This could lead to isolation of the military in society, 
which in turn would give more importance to democratic control of the 
armed forces, not only in Eastern but also in Western Europe. A much 
broader question concerns the willingness of modern societies to run risks 
on missions that do not immediately concern the defence of their own 
territorial integrity and independence. And if they do not, the utility of 
their armed forces will be called into question. 
The need for direction 
No one could deny that an EU of 25 member states is a historic 
achievement within the short time-span of 15 years. Europe is no longer a 
fault line of history. The EU has become a different place and has achieved 
what the founding fathers had uppermost in their minds: never again war. 
During the 1950s, that meant never again war between France and 
Germany; today it signifies democracy, stability and in the words of the 
Constitution, “unity in diversity” throughout our continent. In this respect 
enlargement has been the best result of the CFSP, in close cooperation with 
the entire spectrum of instruments at the disposal of the Union. In the 
words of Chris Patten, the EU has been an outstanding agent and sustainer 
of regime change, rather more effective than America for all its flamboyant 
attachment to the notion.308 
The carrots of membership or special arrangements were also proof 
of the value of soft power, especially when exercised close to home. That 
should not be an issue. More important is the question of where the power, 
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hard or soft, really lies and how it will be exercised. What do we want to 
accomplish through the enlarged Union in a new neighbourhood? Will it 
be possible to continue the process of transcending ethnic and religious 
identification within our own societies and in our external relations? Could 
the EU act as a conduit in reconciling the West and the Islamic world and 
assume a larger role at a time when American influence is low? That would 
be an even greater challenge than dealing with the security threats of the 
new century. Unfortunately, with the Constitution in limbo, the idea of a 
European Union as a semi-coherent unit with a balanced mix of 
communitarian and intergovernmental activities is at risk. 
The time does not seem ripe for core groups. The new member states 
are keen to avoid arrangements they would be unable to join. The neutral 
or non-aligned states are prepared for some solidarity clause relating to 
common defence against aggression. Yet, most expect some flexibility to 
become necessary in an expanding Union. Several modalities present 
themselves. An institutionalised coalition outside the TEU with its own 
institutions is becoming increasingly difficult and would have little room 
for manoeuvre. It might be revived inside the European Parliament where 
Karl von Wogau, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 
advocates a European defence union on the pattern of the monetary union. 
He took up the notion launched by President Chirac and Chancellor 
Schröder in January 2003. To a former secretary-general of the WEU this 
idea raises a smile, for the EU in 1998 just assumed the functions of the 
Western European Union. Do we want to resuscitate the WEU? Probably 
not.  
The second option would be enhanced or reinforced cooperation in 
defence, which has been eased somewhat by the Nice Treaty and extended 
to the area of CFSP. The question here will be whether inside the group 
some measure of qualified majority voting would be allowed. So far the UK 
has resisted this. In the Constitution the mode of permanent structured 
cooperation emerged, but remained limited to general participation in the 
battle groups, which might help in providing rapid reaction units but says 
little about strengthening commitments concerning their use. The main 
limitation of structured cooperation rests in the fact that the decision to 
engage in an operation on behalf of the Union remains the prerogative of a 
unanimous decision by all the members. It should be noted that the 
proposals for this new form of enhanced cooperation seem to have 
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The third possibility is a leading coalition, either informal or with a 
measure of commitment, within the treaty framework of the EU, which 
prepares joint positions before decisions have to be taken. In the past the 
Franco-German axis has functioned as such and developed bilateral 
institutions to work out these agreements in a give-and-take mode. On 
occasion this procedure has caused severe irritations among the other 
members and proven counter-productive. Its acceptability to the other 
(particularly smaller) member states might be greater if the UK were to join 
in. On foreign and defence issues that might be easier than on subjects 
relating to the other pillars. This concept would come perilously close to a 
directorate and it is interesting to note that President Chirac has taken 
pains to reject the idea of a directoire.309 In foreign affairs it has to be 
recognised that some countries are able to play a larger role than others, 
but EU policies only have merit if they are indeed ‘common’. That will take 
time as the development of policy initiatives within the EU is a slow and 
complicated process. In reality, bodies such as contact groups or the EU-3 
on the Iranian problem emerge outside the TEU structure, sometimes even 
without involving the high representative. The test of the CFSP will be the 
degree to which it can transcend the level of diluted compromises of 
generalities and act with determination and stamina.310  
A friend compared the present situation to a crisis in a tennis club, 
which is not about tennis but about the statutes, the structure of the 
clubhouse and the contribution of the members. The comparison is even 
more complicated by the fact that some of the members prefer to play 
different games: communitarian on what used to be the central court with 
initiative for the Commission to propose new rules, co-decision by the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and the application of 
the law by the Court of Justice, and an intergovernmental game on separate 
courts without any clear rules for foreign policy or justice and home affairs. 
The foreign minister was a device to keep the two courts within one club. 
Moreover, we need an initiator of policy – preferably the Commission, as it 
is the best guarantee for all, large and small alike, that European interests 
are defined that overarch national ones. Unfortunately, the tide is not with 
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the Commission, but the high representative could assume a similar 
initiating role in his field of competence. The resistance of governments is 
at odds with public opinion, which overwhelmingly supports a greater role 
for the Union in the world, at least in the abstract sense. Whether they will 
also accept the consequences of their conviction by giving up some national 
influence remains more doubtful. 
Dominique Moïsi has sketched three negative scenarios and one 
positive one.311 Europe should resist the Venetian temptation of acquiescing 
i n  i t s  d e c a y ,  a s p i r e  t o  m o r e  t h a n  a Magna Helvetia and counter “the 
revenge of nationalism”. Instead, we should aim at finding a compromise 
between the different visions of Europe, based on an enlightened view of 
our self-interests mixed with a reasonable dose of idealism and pursued by 
new leadership in the founding member states. Indeed, the drive for 
European integration seems to be fading among the old members – with 
the exception of the Belgian premier Guy Verhofstadt with his plea for a 
United States of Europe – but could be revived by the expectations of the 
new. The year 2005 did not end badly, with a compromise on the financial 
perspectives, which is always the most difficult point on the agenda. On no 
other item is the zero-sum character of the negotiations so blatant, i.e. ‘if 
you pay less, I’ll have to pay more’. Prime Minister Blair will be 
remembered for his leadership in saving the Union from utter stalemate. 
He also managed to disprove the conventional wisdom that the EU only 
takes decisions at the very last moment. After all, in 50 years of integration 
and cooperation, Europe has become a better place. 
                                                 
311 See  Dominique Moïsi, “Europe must not go the way of decadent Venice”, 
Financial Times, 13 July 2005.   
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GLOSSARY 
ABM Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Treaty 
ACA Armaments  Control  Agency 
ACLANT  Allied Command Atlantic (NATO) 
ACTORDS Activation  Orders 
AIRSOUTH  Headquarters, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (NATO) 
ARRC    Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO) 
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations 
ATHENA  Financing mechanism through the contributions of member states, 
based on a percentage of GDP 
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System 
Benelux  Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
C4SI  Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Surveillance   
and Intelligence 
CAP  Common agricultural policy (EU) 
CBRN  Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
CentCom  Central Command (US) 
CFSP    Common foreign and security policy (EU) 
CIC Capabilities  Improvement  Conference 
CivPol Unit  UN Civilian Police Unit 
CJTF    Combined joint task force 
CME 02  Crisis-management exercise in 2002 (EU) 
COARM  Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (EU) 
CODUN  Council Working Group on Global Disarmament and Arms 
Control (EU) 
CONOP  Council Working Group on Non-proliferation (EU) 
COPO  Comité politique [Political Committee of Political Directors from 
capitals that coordinated the European political cooperation] 
COREPER  Comité des representants permanents [Committee of the EU 
Permanent Representatives]  
COSAC  Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of 
  Parliaments of EU member states 
CSBM  Confidence and security-building measures 
CSDP  Common security and defence policy 
CSIS     Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
CTNSP  Center for Technology and National Security Policy  
DCI  Defence Capabilities Initiative (NATO) 
DCMs  Deployable communication and information modules 316 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
DUPI  Danish Institute of International Affairs 
ECAP  European Capabilities Action Plan 
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council 
EDC    European Defence Community 
EDEM  European defence equipment market 
EEC    European Economic Community 
EPC    European political cooperation 
ESDI    European Security and Defence Identity 
ESDP  European security and defence policy 
EU European  Union 
EUFOR  EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
EUJUST Themis  EU’s first Rule of Law Mission (carried out in Georgia) 
EUMC  EU Military Committee 
EUMS EU  Military  Staff 
EUPM/EUPOL EU  Police  Mission 
EUROFOR  European multinational force of Southern Members of the WEU 
EUROMARFOR  European Maritime Forces of Southern Members of the WEU 
FAWEU   Forces Answerable to the WEU 
FHQ   Force  headquarters 
FRY  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
GAERC  General Affairs and External Relations Council (EU) 
GAM  Free Aceh Movement 
ICBM  Intercontinental ballistic missiles 
IFOR    Implementation Force in Bosnia 
IGC   Intergovernmental  Conference  (EU) 
IISS    International Institute for Strategic Studies 
IPTF  International Police Task Force in Bosnia (UN) 
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (UN-NATO)  
JFC  Joint Force Command (Allied) (NATO) 
KFOR  Kosovo Force (NATO) 
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army 
MAPE    Multinational Advisory Police Element, Albania (WEU) 
MilRep(s)  Military Representative(s) (NATO) 
MONUC  Mission of the UN in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
NAC    North Atlantic Council (NATO) 
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NBC(R)  Nuclear, chemical and biological (radiological) 
NPA NATO  Parliamentary  Assembly 
NRF  NATO Response Force 
OCCAR  Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement 
[Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation] FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 317 
 
ODA Official  development  assistance 
OSCE    Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PfP    Partnership for Peace 
PGM Precision-guided  munitions 
POL/MIL  Police and military 
PSC  Political and Security Committee (EU) 
PU  Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (EU) 
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review (US) 
QMV    Qualified majority voting 
S&R  Stabilisation and reconstruction 
SAC  Standing Armaments Committee (WEU) 
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO) 
SACLANT  Supreme Allied Command(er) Atlantic (NATO) 
SFOR    Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (NATO) 
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO) 
SHIRBRIG  Multinational brigade for UN operations 
SIPRI    Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SMART  concept  Supporting human rights, monitoring, advising, reporting and 
training 
SPD    Social Democratic Party (Germany) 
TEU    Treaty on European Union 
UAV    Unmanned aerial vehicle 
UN   United  Nations 
UNHCR  UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNMIK    UN Mission in Kosovo 
UNPROFOR  UN Protection Force (in Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
UNSC   UN  Security  Council 
UNSCOM  UN Special Commission, for inspections in Iraq 
UNTAG  UN Transition Assistance Group 
WEAG/WEAO  Western European Armaments Group/Organisation (WEU) 
WEU    Western European Union 
WEUDAM  WEU Demining Assistance Mission in Croatia 
WMD    Weapons of mass destruction 
WTO    World Trade Organisation 
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Annex 1. The European Union Military 
 Staff Organisation
∗  
1.  Introduction 
At Helsinki, the EU member states decided to establish within the Council, 
new permanent political and military bodies enabling the EU to assume its 
responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis 
management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks. As 
provided in the Helsinki report, the EUMS, “within the Council structures, 
provides military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the 
conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations”. For this 
purpose, the Terms of Reference of the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS) are defined as below.  
2.  Mission 
The Military Staff is to perform “early warning, situation assessment and 
strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European 
national and multinational forces”’ and to implement policies and decisions 
as directed by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC).  
3.  Role and Tasks 
•  It is the source of the EU’s military expertise.  
•  It assures the link between the EUMC on the one hand and the 
military resources available to the EU on the other, and it 
provides military expertise to EU bodies as directed by the 
EUMC.  
                                                 
∗ The following text is an except is from the annex to European Council (2001), 
Decision 2001/80/CFSP of 22 January 2001 on the establishment of the military 
staff of the European Union, OJ L 27, 30 January 2001. 334 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
•  It provides an early warning capability. It plans, assesses and 
makes recommendations regarding the concept of crisis 
management and the general military strategy and implements 
the decisions and guidance of the EUMC.  
•  It supports the EUMC regarding situation assessment and 
military aspects of strategic planning,† over the full range of 
Petersberg tasks, for all cases of EU-led operations, whether or 
not the EU draws on NATO assets and capabilities. 
•  It contributes to the process of elaboration, assessment and 
review of the capability goals taking into account the need, for 
those Member States concerned, to ensure coherence with 
NATO’s Defence Planning Process (DPP) and the Planning and 
Review Process (PARP) of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 
accordance with agreed procedures. 
•  It has the responsibility to monitor, assess and make 
recommendations regarding the forces and capabilities made 
available to the EU by the Member States, on training, exercises 
and interoperability. 
4.  Functions 
It performs three main operational functions: early warning, situation 
assessment and strategic planning, in addition to the functions below.  
•  Under the direction of the EUMC it provides military expertise 
to EU bodies and, in particular, to the Secretary-General/High 
Representative [SG/HR].  
                                                 
† Preliminary definitions:  
Strategic planning – planning activities that start as soon as a crisis emerges and 
end when the EU political authorities approve a military strategic option or a 
set of military strategic options. The strategic process encompasses military 
situation assessment, definitions of a POL/MIL framework and development of 
military strategic options.  
Military strategic option – a possible military action designed to achieve the 
POL/MIL objectives outlined in the POL/MIL framework. A military strategic 
option will describe the outline military solution, the required resources and 
constraints and recommendations on the choice of the operations commander 
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•  It monitors potential crises by relying on appropriate national 
and multinational intelligence capabilities.  
•  It supplies the Situation Centre with military information and 
receives its output. 
•  It carries out the military aspects of strategic advance planning 
for Petersberg missions.  
•  It identifies and lists European national and multinational forces 
for EU-led operations coordinating with NATO.  
•  It contributes to the development and preparation (including 
training and exercises) of national and multinational forces 
made available by the member states to the EU. 
[The modalities of the relation with NATO are defined in the relevant 
documents:] 
•  It organises and coordinates the procedures with national and 
multinational HQs including those NATO HQs available to the 
EU, ensuring, as far as possible, compatibility with NATO 
procedures.  
•  It programmes, plans, conducts and evaluates the military 
aspect of the EU’s crisis management procedures, including the 
exercising of EU/NATO procedures.  
•  It participates in the financial estimation of operations and 
exercises.  
•  It liaises with the national HQs and the multinational HQs of the 
multinational forces.  
•  It establishes permanent relations with NATO according to 
“EU/NATO Permanent arrangements” and appropriate 
relations with identified correspondents within the UN and 
OSCE, subject to an agreement from these organisations. 
a)  Additional functions in crisis management situations are: 
-  It requests and processes specific information from the 
intelligence organisations and other relevant information from 
all available sources.  
-  It supports the EUMC in its contributions to initial Planning 
Guidance and Planning Directives of the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC).  336 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
-  It develops and prioritises military strategic options as the basis 
for the military advice of the EUMC to the PSC by – 
  defining initial broad options;  
  drawing as appropriate on planning support from external 
sources that will analyse and further develop these options 
in more detail;  
  evaluating the results of this more detailed work and 
commissioning any further work that might be necessary; 
and 
  presenting an overall assessment, with an indication of 
priorities and recommendations as appropriate, to the 
EUMC.  
-  It can also contribute to the non-military aspects of the military 
options.  
-  It identifies in coordination with national planning staffs and, 
as appropriate, NATO, the forces that might participate in 
possible EU-led operations. 
-  It assists the operation commander in technical exchanges with 
third countries offering military contributions to an EU-led 
operation and in the preparation of the force generation 
conference.  
-  It continues to monitor crisis situations.  
b)  Additional functions during operations are: 
-  The EUMS, acting under the direction of the EUMC, 
continuously monitors all the military aspects of operations. It 
conducts strategic analysis in liaison with the designated 
operation commander to support the EUMC in its advisory role 
to the PSC in charge of the strategic direction. 
-  In the light of political and operational developments, it 
provides new options to the EUMC as a basis for EUMC’s 
military advice to the PSC.  
5.  Organisation 
•  It works under the military direction of the EUMC to which it 
reports.  FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 337 
 
•  The EUMS is a Council Secretariat department directly attached 
to the SG/HR; it is composed of personnel seconded from the 
member states acting in an international capacity under the 
statute to be established by the Council. 
•  EUMS is headed by the DGEUMS, a three-star flag officer, and 
works under the direction of the EUMC.  
•  In order to cope with the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks, 
whether or not the EU has recourse to NATO resources, the 
EUMS is organised as in Annex ‘A’. 
•  In crisis management situations or exercises, the EUMS could 
set up Crisis Action Teams (CAT), drawing upon its own 
expertise, manpower and infrastructure. In addition, it could, if 
necessary, draw upon outside manpower for temporary 
augmentation to be requested from the EU Member States by 
the EUMC.  
6.  Relations with third countries 
•  The relations between the EUMS and the non-EU European 
NATO members and other countries, which are candidates for 
accession to the EU will be defined in the document on the 
relations of the EU with third countries. 
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Annex 2. The EU’s External Action 
Principles
∗ 
1.  The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by, and 
designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired 
its own creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of 
law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships 
with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations, 
which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations. 
2.  The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and 
shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international 
relations, in order to: 
a)  safeguard its common values, fundamental interests, security, 
independence and integrity; 
b)  consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and international law; 
c)  preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international 
security, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act 
and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to 
external borders; 
                                                 
∗ This text is extracted from Art. III-283 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, CIG 87/04, 6 August 2004 (Art. III-193 of the Convention draft). FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 339 
 
d)  foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development of developing countries, with the primary aim of 
eradicating poverty; 
e)  encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, 
including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade; 
f)  help develop international measures to preserve and improve the 
quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global 
natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; 
g)  assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-
made disasters; 
h)  promote an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance. 
3.  The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives listed 
in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the 
different areas of the Union’s external action covered by this Title and the 
external aspects of its other policies. 
The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its 
external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and 
the Commission, assisted by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, shall 
ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.  
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Annex 3.   Working Document No. 2 
Working Group VIII on 
Defence, European Convention 
 
Wim van Eekelen 
19 September 2002
∗ 
1.  In the Maastricht Treaty the notion of ‘defence implications’ (which 
were left to WEU to elaborate) remained ambiguous. In fact, neither the EU 
nor WEU dealt with defence in the sense of defence of national 
independence and territorial integrity. Apart from naval embargoes in the 
Gulf and in the Adriatic all operations were of a modest scale and involved 
police and customs officers. It would have been better to refer to 
‘operational’ or ‘military’ implications of the CFSP. The Amsterdam Treaty 
did not correct this ambiguity. In Nice collective defence was expressly left 
to NATO. Of course, the WEU Treaty in its Art. V contained an automatic 
military assistance clause, but WEU never became an organization to 
implement this commitment. 
2.  In discussing defence the working group should discuss three 
aspects. 
A)  Should the growing solidarity among members of the EU also find 
expression in a collective defence commitment, possibly in a protocol 
to be signed by those members willing to subscribe to it? 
B)  What military capabilities are deemed necessary for supporting the 
CFSP/ESDP and how should these be organized and deployed? 
                                                 
∗ This Working Document was submitted to the European Convention, Working 
Group VIII on Defence, by Wim van Eekelen, 19 September 2002. FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 341 
 
C)  Is it now possible to create an armaments agency, starting with 
standardization of the equipment of the Headline Goal capability of 
50-60,000 men and linking it with the technological and industrial 
policies of the EU? 
3.  Military cooperation in the EU has suffered from a lack of strategic 
vision of European interests and from the difference between the 
traditional legislative process with directives, etc. and the much more time-
sensitive requirements of crisis management. Both disadvantages will take 
time to overcome. So far the ‘strategies’ of the EU have been insufficiently 
precise to serve as guidelines for military cooperation. 
4.  The statement that the Headline Goals (HLG) should be able to carry 
out even the most demanding of the Petersberg tasks has led to criticism of 
the existing gaps in the European capabilities. It seems important to redress 
this feeling of European inadequacies by progressively defining what the 
EU would be able to do, rather than focusing on what it is and will be 
unable to do. Clearly, a comparison between the HLG of 50-60,000 men 
(even if multiplied to be sustainable for a year) and the much greater 
potential of the combined military forces of all members of NATO will 
always put the EU at a disadvantage. 
5.  A practical step-by-step approach would be to develop possible 
scenarios, starting at the periphery of Europe, and request member 
countries which contribution they would in principle – for planning 
purposes – be prepared to make. Then it would be possible to plan force 
packages, their command arrangements as well as transport, logistics and 
communications, and exercise them. That would also be the best way to 
discover deficiencies in the force packages. Until now, however, the 
scenario approach has met political problems (notably in Germany) 
because of reluctance to consider hypothetical situations. Nevertheless, a 
rapid reaction capability will only be effective if some degree of advance 
planning is allowed. 
6.  A very important part of the Headline Goal decision is the addition of 
a police component of 5,000 men. This fits in with the experience in former 
Yugoslavia that after the initial intervention to restore peace, the role of the 
military is an umbrella function under which political reconstruction can 
take place. Civil-military is of the essence and the restoration of civil society 
depends more on the functioning of police, judges and jails than on 
military activities. At the same time peace support is changing the role of 
the military. Increasingly it functions abroad in the way the police do at 342 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
home: it deters through its presence and is ready to act if the peace is 
disturbed. The role of the military changes to that of a ‘guardian soldier’ 
(the expression comes from the Swiss Gustav Däniker) and ministries of 
defence become ministries of international security. The EU will be well-
placed to respond to this new security environment, because it favours the 
combined use of all the instruments at its disposal. 
7.  This does not mean that the traditional military skills are becoming 
less important. On the contrary, events have proven the possibility of rapid 
escalation from peacekeeping to self-defence and the need for offensive 
action. European forces need to be prepared for those contingencies. The 
real questions remain the ‘what for’ and ‘how much is enough‘. 
Expenditure in terms of a percentage of GDP is too rough a yardstick if the 
resulting forces remain focused on territorial defence and are not able to 
participate in intervention- and force-projection type operations. Moreover, 
the Headline Goals of 50-60,000 men will absorb only a part of national 
defence budgets. Although some countries will have to spend more to 
make a credible contribution, it will be more important to spend differently 
and to introduce a system of common examination and evaluation in order 
to assess the quality, readiness and relevance of the national commitments. 
8.  With the creation of an EU military staff and a military committee the 
EU has mirrored the NATO structure. One might question the wisdom of 
parallel structures at a time when political and military elements have 
become more intertwined than ever before. The architecture might work, 
however, if the Council, after deciding to start an operation, allows the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) to act on its behalf in the day-to-day 
work of crisis management and if the PSC develops a dear link with and 
sufficiently flexible mandate for the field commander. 
9.  European armaments cooperation is not a success story. Some 
progress bas been made in the consolidation of the armaments industry, 
first in promoting national champions, now focusing more on trans-border 
mergers and cooperation. In EUCLID pre-competitive research was 
promoted, including the competence to conclude contracts. The overall 
picture remains dispersed, however, with WEAG/WEAO, OCCAR and LoI 
working on separate tracks. The latter two are basically work-sharing 
arrangements covering a number of concrete projects subscribed to by a 
limited number of countries (instead of previous arrangements on a 
project-by-project basis). Crucial steps will be: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS | 343 
 
a)  the combination of national research and development budgets for 
common projects, preferably with a common budget. 
b)  the recognition in the Treaty of the European Union that the 
preservation of a defence industrial and technological base is an 
interest of the Union as a whole. 
c)  focusing cooperative projects on potential synergies. The large 
transport aircraft is an example (even though the quantitative needs 
for possible European operations have not been defined). 
Standardization of equipment for the HLG is another, where 
commonality would be both militarily effective and industrially 
economically efficient. 
d)  enhancing competition among EU members, which does not 
necessarily mean opening up the armaments market to non-EU 
countries which keep their own markets closed. 
10.  Decision-making: The dispatch of forces into an actual operation is 
likely to remain subject to the agreement of national governments (and in 
many cases also of national parliaments). This does not mean, however, 
that the entire process of decision-making has to remain intergovernmental 
and unanimous. In the first place a distinction has to be made between the 
start of the operation and its conduct in the field: while for the decision to 
start an operation consensus is desirable, insistence on unanimity for the 
follow-up would be a recipe for inaction. Therefore, the possibility of 
‘constructive abstention’ should be envisaged, which does not bind the 
abstaining country to implement the decision. In any case, participation in 
the initial political decision does not mean that forces will be contributed to 
its implementation. This will depend on the nature of the operation, its 
planning and national capabilities. The conduct of the operation probably 
will not involve all members of the EU and therefore will have to provide a 
special role for the contributors. The notion of a “coalition of the willing” 
can also apply within the EU (or NATO) and is not limited to an ad hoc 
crisis management operation outside institutional structures. This means 
also that there is no clear rationale for excluding the possibility of 
‘reinforced cooperation’ from the field of security and defence, provided 
the requirements of transparency and open-endedness are preserved. 
11.  As a new and potentially autonomous actor in the field of security the 
EU has a chance to develop a broad concept of security. The European 
Council of Göteborg (June 2001) adopted a programme for the prevention 
of violent conflict which made conflict prevention and early warning a 344 | WILLEM VAN EEKELEN 
 
priority to be integrated in the entire spectrum of the CFSP and using all its 
instruments. At the beginning of each presidency the regions requiring 
priority attention would be indicated. A weak point in the programme is 
the lack of a reference to crisis management, which is to be explained by the 
reluctance of the formerly ‘neutral’ members of the EU. Their reluctance 
could be overcome by the formulation of a Strategic Concept which defines 
the ‘what for?’ of the ESDP and the Headline Goals and the conditions 
governing the possible use of force. Such a concept would develop the 
notions of comprehensive security, including conflict prevention, 
democracy building and economic development and also cooperative 
security with neighbouring regions, but – in order to be credible – should 
also contain a military capability underpinning the policies of the Union.  
12.  The pillar structure of the EU is not conducive to a comprehensive 
approach. Apart from other weaknesses, the military cooperation is not yet 
fully integrated and the ambiguities of Maastricht have not been resolved. 
The time-urgency of crisis management requires new procedures such as 
the High Representative chairing the Council when it needs to discuss 
CFSP/ESDP matters and the PSC in an actual crisis. This is no role for a six-
monthly presidency. Double-hatting the High Representative with the 
Commissioner for External Relations has the attraction of bringing the 
military and civilian aspects closer together. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
Commissioner is a member of a collegiate body and therefore bound by its 
decisions remains an obstacle. A first step cou ld be to allow each to  be 
present in the fora of the other, i.e. the High Representative to attend the 
meetings of the Commission when external relations are discussed.  
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